JUDGMENT - A.D. TATED, J.:---This revision application is directed against the order dated 13th November, 1986 passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, Greater Bombay, in short Cause Suit No. 3172 of 1984 filed by the respondent under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for recovery of possession of the suit premises i.e. Shop No. 20 in Municipal Market at Borivli on the averments that he was carrying on the grocery business in those premises since the year 1971 and while he was in settled possession of the premises and was running his grocery business he was without due process of law forcibly dispossessed by the present petitioner on 12th April, 1984. The respondent took out a Notice of Motion for appointment of a Court receiver with a direction to appoint him as his agent and allow him to run the business of Bharat Stores which he was running till he was dispossessed on 12th April, 1984. In support of the Notice of motion, the Respondent (plaintiff) filed his affidavit and produced various documents. 2. The petitioner (defendant) by his affidavit-in-reply opposed the Notice of Motion. According to the petitioner (defendant), he held the premises on licence from the Municipal Corporation and he was running the business at suit premises. According to him, the Respondent (plaintiff) was working at his shop as his servant. He denied that the business under the name and style of Bharat Stores was being carried on by the respondent (plaintiff) in his rights at the suit premises. 3. The learned trial Judge after considering the affidavits filed in support and in reply and also the various documents produced by the parties on record, passed an order on 13th November, 1986 and thereby made the Notice of Motion absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a), (b) and (c). In the final order he has set out various terms on which the respondent (plaintiff) should be allowed to run his business at the suit premises as agent of the Court Receiver. 4. Feeling aggrieved by said order, the original defendant first filed an appeal and later on converted it into revision. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant) contends that in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act the trial Court held no jurisdiction to pass orders of appointment of a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant) contends that in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act the trial Court held no jurisdiction to pass orders of appointment of a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. He also contends that the respondents (plaintiff) is the servant of the petitioner (defendant) and as such, being his licencee on the suit premises, was not entitled is maintain an action under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. His third submission is that the Metropolitan Magistrate in the proceedings under section 145, Cri.P.C. had already attached and sealed the suit premises and, therefore, it was not proper on the part of the learned trial Judge to appoint a Court Receiver and direct him to allow the respondent (plaintiff) to conduct business at the suit premises as his agent. 5-A The learned Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) on the other hand submits that there is voluminous evidence on record on the basis of which the learned trial Judge has found the respondent (plaintiff) in his own right was conducting grocery business in the name style of Bharat Stores for the last many years and there was not an iota of evidence except the bare word of the petitioner (defendant) that the respondent (plaintiff) was doing business at the suit premises as his servant. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) there is no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant) that the respondent (plaintiff) carried on the business as licensee of the petitioner and as such he was not entitled to maintain an action under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The learned Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) submits that there is nothing either in the Specific Relief Act or in the Civil Procedure Code debarring the Civil Court from exercising powers under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. He submits that even in a suit under section 6 of the specific Relief Act a Civil Court can exercise all the powers it has under the Civil Procedure Code. He submits that even in a suit under section 6 of the specific Relief Act a Civil Court can exercise all the powers it has under the Civil Procedure Code. Regarding the third submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant), the learned Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) submits that on the voluminous evidence on record the learned trial Judge found that the respondent (plaintiff) was running the business at the suit premises and he was forcibly removed from the premises by the Petitioner on 12th April, 1984. On the complaint of the respondent there were proceedings under section 145, Criminal P.C, and the suit premises were sealed by the Metropolitan Magistrate. He submits that the respondent (plaintiff) is with out business for the last more than two years and in the circumstance of the present case it is not proper that the suit premises should be kept sealed and the respondent (plaintiff) should be kept without business for a number of years till the suit is finally decided by the City Civil Court. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff), the learned trial Judge was perfectly right in appointing the Receiver and directing him to allow the respondent (plaintiff) to do business at the suit premises as his agent and the learned trial Judge also provided sufficient safeguards for protecting the interest of the Petitioner (defendant). Therefore, according to him the learned trial Judge was not at all wrong in passing the impugned order and it could not be interfered with in this revision. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant) in support of his contention that no receiver could be appointed in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act relied on the decision in (Foujmal Manaji v. Bikhibai)1, A.I.R. 1937 Sind 161. It was a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963. In that suit besides possession mesne profits were also claimed and for collecting mesne profit receiver was appointed by the trial Court. Against the order of the trial Court miscellaneous appeal was preferred before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Sind. It was a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963. In that suit besides possession mesne profits were also claimed and for collecting mesne profit receiver was appointed by the trial Court. Against the order of the trial Court miscellaneous appeal was preferred before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Sind. The judgment was delivered by Davis, J.C. The relevant observations on page 161 of the report read as follows :--- "Under this section a suit for possession and mesne profits will not lie nor can the Court pass a decree for mesne profits prior to the suit. Nor do no think an order for mesne profits during the pendency of the suit can be made under this section, nor do we think a receiver can be appointed. It is clear that this section provides a special and comparatively summary remedy for a person dispossessed without his consent, and the section relates only to possession." The learned Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) referred to the Division Bench decision of this High Court in (Pandhari Shamrao Kolhe v. Meerabai w/o Laxman Kolhe)2, 1980 Mh.L.J. 39. It was a case under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and was held therein that in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act mesne profits or damaged could be claimed. On page 40 of the report it is observed thus :--- "........Incidentally we think that Mr. Choudhari is not well advised in raising this contention inasmuch as there is authority to the proposition that in a suit under section 6 (former section 9 of the Specific Relief Act) of Specific Relief Act, relief of mesne profits or damages could be joined. An authority for this proposition may be found in the case of (Ram Parekh Bai v. Sheodibai Joti)3, (1983) I.L.R. 15 All 384." The Division Bench decision of this Court on the point of tenability of a claim for mesne profits in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is directly contrary to the decision of the Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant). In the Sind decision there are no reasons given for the opinion that a receiver cannot be appointed in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. I am unable to subscribe to the view expressed therein. In the Sind decision there are no reasons given for the opinion that a receiver cannot be appointed in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. I am unable to subscribe to the view expressed therein. There is no prohibition either in the Specific Relief Act or in the Civil Procedure Code for the Civil Court to act under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P.C. in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The provisions of Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P.C. empower the Civil Court to appoint a receiver if the Court considers it just and convenient. It is a salutary provision empowering the Court to do justice between the parties pending final decisions of the suit and such powers are necessary even in a suit instituted under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Consequently, I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant) that the learned Counsel for the Petitioner (defendant) that the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1. Civil P.C. in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant) in support of his contention that no suit could be instituted by a licensee under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act relied on the decision in (Maganlal Radia v. State of Maharasthra)4, (1970) 72 Bom.L.R. 734. It was a suit filed by a licensee whose licence was revoked and who was evicted by summary procedure by the Revenue Officer. The suit was against the State of Maharashtra. Sub-clause (2)(b) of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act specifically bars a suit under section 6 against the Government. In the present case there is not an iota of evidence that the respondent (plaintiff) was conducting business at the suit premises as a servant of the petitioner (defendant). On the contrary, there is a voluminous evidence on record which shows that the respondent (plaintiff) was doing business on the suit premises on his own. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that it is suit by a licensee against the licensor and as such it is not tenable. 8. On the contrary, there is a voluminous evidence on record which shows that the respondent (plaintiff) was doing business on the suit premises on his own. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that it is suit by a licensee against the licensor and as such it is not tenable. 8. The last submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant) is that the suit premises having been sealed by the Metropolitan Magistrate in the proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the learned trial Judge should have allowed the same to remain sealed and should not have appointed a receiver with a direction that he should permit the respondent (plaintiff) to use the premises for his business as his agent. In the present case the respondent (plaintiff), by producing voluminous evidence before the learned trial Judge, satisfactorily prima facie proved that he was doing business at the suit premises for a number of years till he was wrongfully dispossessed on 12th April, 1984. Hence I do not think that the learned trial Judge was wrong in appointing a receiver and directing him to allow the respondent (plaintiff) to do business as his agent. He has provided sufficient safeguards in his order to protect the interest of the petitioner (defendant) too. It is a matter of common knowledge that for final decision of the suits in the City Civil Court at Bombay one has to wait for a number of years, as there is lot of congestion of work in that Court. It is not proper that the premises which were sealed on 12th April, 1984 should be continued to be sealed for a number of years and the respondent (plaintiff) should be kept without any business for those years. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, I find that the learned trial Judge was perfectly right in allowing the respondent (plaintiff) to conduct his business in the suit premises as agent of the Court Receiver. 9. Having considered all the submissions made before me by the learned Counsel for the parties, I find that there is nothing for this Court to interfere with the order passed by learned trial Judge in this revision. Consequently, the revision is dismissed in limine. 9. Having considered all the submissions made before me by the learned Counsel for the parties, I find that there is nothing for this Court to interfere with the order passed by learned trial Judge in this revision. Consequently, the revision is dismissed in limine. At the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioner (defendant), he is granted 4 weeks time to approach the Supreme Court and for that period the order passed by the trial Court is stayed. He agrees to give 3 days notice to the Advocate for the respondent (plaintiff) in case he moves the Supreme Court for orders. Revision dismissed. -----