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1987 DIGILAW 21 (HP)

HINDUSTAN SALTS LTD. v. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, H. P.

1987-04-21

P.D.DESAI, R.S.THAKUR

body1987
JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J—The petitioner (Hindustan Salts Limited) is a Government Company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The following industrial dispute between the petitioner and its workmen represented by the second respondent-Union (Salt Mines Labourers Union) was referred for adjudication to the first respondent (Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Himachal Pradesh) under sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by an order dated August 23, 1973, Annexure-PC issued by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India ; "Having regard to the capacity of the industry to pay, whether the demand of Salt Mines Labour Union, Drang, Mandi, for bringing daily rated workers employed in the sale mines of Messrs Hindustan Salts Limited, Mandi, on monthly pay rolls is legal and justified? If not, to what reliefs are the daily rated workmen entitled ?" The reference is pending adjudication since then before the first respondent. 2. It is not in dispute that the second respondent was being represented in the adjudication proceedings through Shri Mohan Lal (respondent No. 3) in his capacity as the President of the Union and that one Shri Dhani Ram, Secretary of the Union, actually concucted the adjudication proceedings for and on behalf of the said Union as its authorised representative. 3. On October 25, 1986, an application was received by the first respondent purporting to have been made by Shri A. N. Kapoor (respondent No. 2-A) in his capacity as the General Secretary of the second respondent- Uoion stating that a vote of no confidence had been passed against respondent No. 3 and other office bearers and members of the Executive Committee of the Union in a special general meeting which was held on October 10, 1986 and that new office bearers and members of the Executive Committee had also been elected in the said meeting. The communication proceeded to state that the second respondent-Union would be henceforth represented in the pending reference by the new office bearers and requested that the case be adjourned in order to enable those office bearers to prepare and argue the case. 4. The communication proceeded to state that the second respondent-Union would be henceforth represented in the pending reference by the new office bearers and requested that the case be adjourned in order to enable those office bearers to prepare and argue the case. 4. On December 27, 1986, yet another application was moved by respondent No- 2-A describing himself as the General Secretary of the second respondent-Union, inter alia, stating that on October 14,1986 a settlement was duly arrived at between the petitioner and its workmen represented by the second respondent-Union and that the said settlement was the outo one of the negotiations held between the petitioner and the new office bearers of the second respondent-Union as a result of the authorisation given in that behalf by 50 out of 75 workmen employed by the petitioner. The application proceeded to state that the settlement arrived at accordingly, was "just and fair", and that in light thereof "the pending dispute with regard to the fixation of wages already stands settled with the management and now there is no dispute pending before the Honourable Tribunal to adjudicate upon and, therefore, no award may kindly be passed in the matter." In addition to the averments as aforesaid, the applicant stated in the application as follows : "Sh. Mohan Lal the then President of the Union has already been removed by the majority of the workmen and Sh. Dhani Ram who was authorised by the then President of the Union has no authority to represent the workmen in the above matter. And as a Secretary of the Union the undersigned is only competent to represent in the matter on behalf of the workmen. In this connection the Honourable Tribunal has already been informed alongwith the minutes of the meeting held on 10-10-1986. Copy of the said letter is enclosed." The first respondent was requested not to pronounce any award or alternatively, to make an award in terms of the settlement. 5. In this connection the Honourable Tribunal has already been informed alongwith the minutes of the meeting held on 10-10-1986. Copy of the said letter is enclosed." The first respondent was requested not to pronounce any award or alternatively, to make an award in terms of the settlement. 5. An application in almost similar terms was filed on December 28, 1986 by and on behalf of the petitioner through its authorised representative and a request was therein made that in view of the settlement dated October 14, 1986 arrived at between the workmen and the management which was "just and fair under the prevailing circumstances", the depute when was pending adjudication stood resolved and that an award be passed in terms of the settlement. 6. The case was fixed for hearing before the first respondent on the same day, that is, December 28, 1986. The first respondent passed an order on that day directing that a copy of the application as well as of the settlement be supplied to the authorised representative of the second respondent- Under (Shri Dhani Ram) since he not only contested the said settlement but also the authority of respondent No. 2-A to arrive at the settlement as well as his claim to be an office bearer or member of the second respondent- Union. The first respondent directed that the case be listed on January 10, 1987 for hearing arguments on the said application as well as in the main case in the event of the settlement being not recorded. 7. On behalf of the respondent-Union, a reply was filed under the signature of Shri Dhani.Ram stating, inter alia, that respondent No. 2-A was not entitled to represent the Union in the course of the adjudication proceedings since he was the office bearer of a rival Union which was sponsored by the management and that the so-called settlement was not fair and it was not acceptable to a majority of the workmen whom the second respondent-Union represented. Besides, the settlement was not registered under section 2 (p) of the Act and it did not relate to the main point in dispute which was referred for adjudication to the first respondent and, therefore, it was not capable of putting an end to such a dispute. Certain documents were annexed to the said reply in support of the averments therein made, 8. Certain documents were annexed to the said reply in support of the averments therein made, 8. On January 10, 1987, the first respondent passed the following order in the proceeding in the presence of the third respondent : "Reply filed. Heard, None is present on behalf of the rival Union. From the perusal of the reply and documents filed alongwith it, I am of the clear view that the rival Union has no authority to intervene in these proceedings. The settlement between the rival Union and the Management of the respondent Salt Mines cannot affect the proceedings of this case. This case is pending for the last more than 7 years This settlement arrived at by the rival Union with the management appears to be a device to put off the workers claim for an indefinite period. The application filed by the management alongwith the document witnessing the settlement is rejected. No costs. The arguments will be heard on 7-2-1987 at Una." 9. On behalf of the management, an application was filed on the same day requesting that the order passed in the earlier part of the day be set- aside and the management be heard on the question of recording the settlement in view of the fact that the said order was passed in the absence of its authorised representative who could cot reach before the case was taken up for hearing. The first respondent passed the following order on the same day on the said application : "Shri A. K. Shukla has filed an application for setting aside the order passed above. I have considered this application. The application put in by the respondent management on the last date of hearing has been considered by me and rejected on merits. This application is rejected. This Tribunal has no power of review." These two orders are under challenge in the present petition. 10. Sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Act, which is material for the purposes of determining a part of the controversy, reads as follows : "36. This application is rejected. This Tribunal has no power of review." These two orders are under challenge in the present petition. 10. Sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Act, which is material for the purposes of determining a part of the controversy, reads as follows : "36. Representation of the parties.—(I) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by— (a) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a registered trade union of which he is a member ; (b)any member of the executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated ; (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with or by any other workman employed in, the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed." 11. In view of the aforesaid statutory provision and of rival claims made by respondent No 3 on one hand and respondent No. 2-A on the other with regard to the entitlement to continue to represent the second respondent-Union in the pending adjudication, the proper course which the first respondent ought to have adopted was to direct both of them to adduce evidence so as to ascertain who were the real office bearers of the second respondent-Union and who was competent to represent the workmen and then to arrive at a decision on the disputed claim in accordance with law after taking into consideration the material brought on the record of the case and after affording an opportunity of being heard to both the parties. Furthermore, since the alleged settlement was produced and placed on record, it was his duty to have held a proper inquiry with a view to satisfying himself whether the workmen or a majority of them, through their accredited representatives, had entered into the said settlement and whether the terms of such settlement were just and fair and to the manifest advantage . of the workmen and whether as a result of such settlement the dispute, which was pending adjudication, had been resolved in a spirit of give and take and in the interest of general industrial peace. of the workmen and whether as a result of such settlement the dispute, which was pending adjudication, had been resolved in a spirit of give and take and in the interest of general industrial peace. The first respondent ought to have held a proper inquiry in this matter after affording to the parties an opportunity of leading evidence as well as after affording to them an adequate opportunity of being heard in regard to the same. Instead of proceeding in the aforesaid manner, the first respondent straightaway rejected the claim of respondent No. 2-A to be entitled to represent the Union on the ground that "the rival union has no authority to intervene in these proceedings and in the same manner the settlement was also rejected on the ground that it appeared to be a "device to put off the workers claim for an indefinite period." The above decision was recorded ex pane and without holding any inquiry or recording any evidence. „ One of the issues in controversy was also not correctly comprehended since respondent No. 2-A was not claiming to join the proceedings as a representative of any rival union but as a newly elected office bearer of the second respondent-Union. No inquiry was held and even finding was not recorded by the first respondent that independently of the dispute as to the right of representation in the pending proceedings, in its opinion, the settlement was not arrived at between the petitioner and the workmen or a majority of them through their accredited representatives and/or that it was not fair and/or that it did not touch the dispute which was the subject-matter of the reference. The first respondent appears to have dealt with the matter in a casual manner and without properly appreciating his duty and function when confronted with such a problem. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders are quashed and set-aside. The case is remanded to the first respondent with a direction to decide the following issues : (1) Who are the real office bearers competent to represent the work-men through the second respondent-Union in the course of the pending reference proceedings under section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ? (2) Whether the workmen or a majority of them through their accredited representatives have entered into a settlement or compromise with the management which is duly recorded ? (2) Whether the workmen or a majority of them through their accredited representatives have entered into a settlement or compromise with the management which is duly recorded ? (3) Whether the terms of such settlement are just and fair and to the manifest advantage of the workmen ? (4) Whether the settlement puts an end to the dispute which was referred for adjudication ? 13. The first respondent will afford to the parties a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence on these issues and also a similar opportunity of being heard in the matter and he will arrive at a fresh decision in accordance with law and in light of the observations made in the course of this judgment. The first respondent will complete such inquiry and record his order on the matters covered by these issues within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of this order. 14. The parties will appear before the first respondent on May 3, 1987 at 11 A.M. at Shimla. 15. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.