L. M. GHOSH, J. ( 1 ) SEVERAL complaints were registered under sections 14a (l) and 14 (1a) of the Employees Provident Fund Act and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1952) against several companies. Out of 6 (six) such, complaints, these six revisional applications have sprung up. ( 2 ) THE learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, on receiving the complaints from the Provident Fund Inspector, issued processes against the accused. The accused No. 1 is the Company. The accused Nos. 2 and 3 are the Directors. These accused Nos. 2 and 3 have filed the revisional applications, challenging the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, taking cognizance of the offence against them. ( 3 ) IN all these six cases, the petitioners are the Directors. ( 4 ) MR. S. P. Talukdar, appearing for the petitioners, has made short submissions. His first submission is that the petitioners and the company have deposited the amounts under the Act of 1912, and so the complaints filed on the grounds of violation of the provisions of the Act are not factually tenable. His second submission has been that the complaints, on the face of them, did not disclose any offence against the petitioners. Mr. Biswanath Ghosal, appearing for the O. P. No. 2, has submitted that it is not the stage for assessing evidence and so the contention that the amounts said to be due have already been deposited, cannot be accepted, specially because the affidavits have been sworn by some person not in-charge of the matter. His second submission has been that the complaints clearly disclose the commission of offences, because it is clarified in the complaints that the petitioners were in- charge of the business and were responsible for the conduct of the business. Mr. Tapas Mirdha, appearing for the State, has accepted the arguments of Mr. Ghosal. None has appeared for the O. P. No. 1. ( 5 ) AS to the first submission of Mr. Talukdar, namely, that the amounts due had already been deposited, it is felt that the Court cannot take any notice of the Same. That the amounts were deposited, have been stated in paragraphs 4 and other paragraphs following there. The affidavits were sworn by one. Sri Prabin Pattanay as who simply avers that he is fully conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case. That the amounts were deposited, have been stated in paragraphs 4 and other paragraphs following there. The affidavits were sworn by one. Sri Prabin Pattanay as who simply avers that he is fully conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case. The statements in paragraph Nos. I and 2 only are said to be true to his knowledge and the statements made in paragraphs 3 to 10 are merely his submissions. Therefore, his submission that the amounts said to be due have already been deposited, are not based on knowledge. Moreover, it is not even averred the deposits were made in time. Therefore, the first submission made on behalf of the petitioners must be rejected. ( 6 ) MR. Talukdar has mainly concentrated on the aspect, whether the petitions of complaints, ex facie, disclose any offence. His submission has been that in the petitions of complaints, there are mere bald statements that the petitioners are Directors of the Company and responsible to it for the conduct of its business. According to Mr. Talukdar such statements alone cannot disclose any offence on the part of the Directors, as they are sought to be made liable vicariously. It appears that there is considerable force in this argument. It is clear that the company is liable primarily. The Directors are sought to be made liable vicariously. To fix liability vicariously, it must be demonstrated that such persons were conducting the day to day business and they were responsible for commissions and omissions. In paragraph 5 of the petitions of complaints, it is set out that the accused Nos. 2 and 3, during the relevant period, were in-charge of the establishment and were responsible to it for the conduct of its business and they committed the offences under sections 14a (1) and 14 (1a) of the Act of 1952. As observed in the Supreme Court decision reported in A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 67, the Directors can be made vicariously liable only when there is mention of any act committed by them. As observed in the Supreme Court decision reported in A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 67, the Directors can be made vicariously liable only when there is mention of any act committed by them. In paragraph 15 of the decision, it is stated that there is not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable, So it is clear from the Supreme Court decision that the Directors cannot be made vicariously liable, unless there is some statement or something to show that there was some act committed by them, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be made vicariously liable. In other words, merely because some persons are Directors of a company, they would not be liable, unless it is stated or shown that they did some act for which an inference can be drawn that they could also be made vicariously liable. In the Supreme Court case, however, the accusation was that the accused were directors and as such they were liable. Thus in that case, there was a presumptive factor. In the cases before us, there is no deference to any such presumption. It is straightway stated that the petitioners were in-charge of the establishment and were responsible to it, for the conduct of its business. But even this mechanical assertion that they were in-charge of the establishment and were responsible to it for the conduct of its business, would not be sufficient averment from which an inference as to commission of the offence by the petitioners can be drawn. It has not been clarified in the petitions of complaints that the petitioners were conducting the day to day business. It is not set out that they were attending the offices and were responsible for all acts of commission and omission. Although it is sought to be made a little more specific by asserting that the petitioners were in-charge of the establishment and were responsible to it for the conduct of its business, it does not come to the precise statement that they were carrying on day to day business. Although it is sought to be made a little more specific by asserting that the petitioners were in-charge of the establishment and were responsible to it for the conduct of its business, it does not come to the precise statement that they were carrying on day to day business. In-charge of the establishment is a very broad expression and from that alone, the offences imputed cannot be inferred. So also the latter part that the petitioners were liable to it for the conduct of the business, leaves the matter vague. The petitioners might be responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, but that does not ipso facto imply that the petitioners were responsible for day to day act transacted in connection with that business. A Division Bench of this Court, on the basis of almost similar facts, decided that prosecution was incompetent. That is reported in 86 C. W. N. 180. That case was also under the Act of 1952. The allegations in the complaint in that case were that the petitioners there were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. It was further stated that the accused persons were during the relevant period in-charge of the said establishment and were responsible to it for the conduct of its business and/or the aforesaid offences were committed by the same establishment with their consent or connivance or attributable to their neglect. It is not seen that there is much distinction between the accusations made in that case and those made in the cases before me. Facts of that case being similar, I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench case reported in 86 C. W. N. 180. ( 7 ) MR. Ghosal appearing for the O. P. No. 2, has referred to a decision reported in A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 1947 and has submitted that as per the ratio of the decision the court cannot go into the merits of the allegations make in the petitions of complaint. ( 7 ) MR. Ghosal appearing for the O. P. No. 2, has referred to a decision reported in A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 1947 and has submitted that as per the ratio of the decision the court cannot go into the merits of the allegations make in the petitions of complaint. In that case, it has been set out that in the following cases an order of the learned Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside, (i) Where the allegations made or the statement of witnesses, taken at their face value make out no case at all; (ii) Where the allegations made are patently absurd and inherently improbable; (iii) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate is capricious and arbitrary; and (iv) Where the complain suffers from fundamental legal defects. It has further been observed that at that stage, the question has to be examined purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. These principles settled are no doubt the Jaw. But the petitioners here have submitted that even the petitions of complaints, on the face of them, do not make out any case of offences. Thus, according to the petitioners, the test laid down b, the Supreme Court is satisfied and so the order of the learned Magistrate issuing processes must be quashed, I have already adverted to the facts mentioned in the petitions of complaints. They are cryptic in nature and ambiguous and vague, so far as the liability of the petitioners is concerned. On such averments, no inference can be made that the petitioners were responsible for the lapses as to the deposits of Provident Fund money. On the basis of reading of the petitions of complaints and relying on the decision of the Division Bench reported in 86 C. W. N. 180, I think that the proceedings against the petitioners in the cases cannot be allowed to be dragged. ( 8 ) THE revisional cases 1711 to 1716 of 1982 are allowed. Orders of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dated 24. 12. 81, taking cognizance of the offences under sections 14a (I) and 14 (IA) and the subsequent orders on that basis, are quashed, so far as the petitioners are concerned. ( 8 ) THE revisional cases 1711 to 1716 of 1982 are allowed. Orders of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dated 24. 12. 81, taking cognizance of the offences under sections 14a (I) and 14 (IA) and the subsequent orders on that basis, are quashed, so far as the petitioners are concerned. Be it be made clear that the proceedings as against the company, the O. P. No. 1, are not quashed. The Rules are thus made absolute.