Judgment :- 1. The appellant sought leave to sue as an indigent person. He was unsuccessful. Relief was declined, not because he was not indigent but because the court below thought 'that a suit to enforce such a claim is not maintainable'. Presumably, the court below had R.5(d) or (f) of 0.33 CPC in view. 2. The appellant was called for an interview on 14-7-1981 for the post of an Excise Guard after qualifying in the written test and physical fitness test. The interview card reached him at 4 p. m. on that day, by which time the interview was over. The appellant says, he lost his last chance to secure a job. He avers gross negligence on the part of the Post Office which received the card on 6-7-1981 but delivered it only nine days later, on 14-7-1981. He wanted to sue for damages. The Union of India opposed the application relying on S.6 of Indian Post Office Act, 1898 which exempts the Government of India from liability by reason of loss or misdelivery. The Section is in these terms: "6. Exemption from liability for loss, misdelivery, delay or damage: The Government shall not incur any liability by reason of the loss, misdelivery or delay of, or damage to, any postal article in course of transmission by post, except in so far as such liability may in express terms be undertaken by the Central Government as hereinafter provided; and no officer of the post office shall incur any liability by reason of any such loss, misdelivery, delay or damage, unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default." The appellant challenges the view of the Court below and contends that the section aforesaid will not attract 0.33 R.S. He would further say that it is not as if there is no cause of action. The appellant relies on the decisions reported in Union of India v. Mohammed Nazim (AIR 1980 SC 431), Union of India v. Ramji Lal and Others (AIR 1965 All. 184), Union of India v. Sri Narayan Agarwalla (AIR 1955 Cal. 371), Machiraju Parthasarathy v. The Tobacco Export Promotion Council and Others (AIR 1976 AP 321) and Union of India and another v. Yelgum Veeraswamy and Others (AIR 1979 NOC 126). 184), Union of India v. Sri Narayan Agarwalla (AIR 1955 Cal. 371), Machiraju Parthasarathy v. The Tobacco Export Promotion Council and Others (AIR 1976 AP 321) and Union of India and another v. Yelgum Veeraswamy and Others (AIR 1979 NOC 126). The first four cases offer no parallel to the case of the appellant, and hence is of no assistance to him. Those decisions deal with the expression 'loss' occurring in the section and take the view that 'loss' means loss of the article altogether, not to the claimant alone but to the Government also. The question whether the exemption would extend to such cases of loss was considered in those cases. The case on hand is not one of loss, but of delayed delivery and the meaning of the expression'loss' therefore is of no matter in considering this question Admittedly, there is delayed delivery in this case. The question is whether the immunity under S.6 would save the Government. It would, for, the section centers complete immunity as far as Government is concerned, though the position is different as far as an Officer of the Post Office is concerned, if delay was caused fraudulently or by wilful act or default. The decision reported in Union of India & Another v. Yelgum Veeraswamy & Others (AIR 1979 NOC 126) appears to take the view that even in such cases, liability would arise. We do not have the benefit of the reasoning of the learned judges as the text of the judgment is not available. But, on the language of the section, we are inclined to think that the immunity ensuring to the Government, is complete. A similar view was taken in Triefus and Co. v. Post Office (1957-2 All ER 387) referring to S.13 of the Post Office Act, 1898. 0.33 R.5(d) requires rejection of an application where 'the allegations do not show a cause of action." When the section in clear terms confers an immunity on the Government against action for damages, it is a case where no cause of action is shown. We are expressing this view in the context of 0.33 R.S. This will not preclude the appellant from remedies, if any or making representations before a competent authority. 3. We are expressing this view in the context of 0.33 R.S. This will not preclude the appellant from remedies, if any or making representations before a competent authority. 3. Counsel for appellant submits that this is a hard case where the appellant has been put to great prejudice and loss on account of the wrongful action of the department or one of its servants. We are inclined to agree with him, and we are indeed unhappy when we consider the consequences that have befallen the appellant. But, this is a region in which we cannot extend relief. Judicial sentiment must stay within the limitations of judicial options. In the words of Cardozo, J: "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence." 4. Probably, it is for the Government to devise ways and means by which such situations are obviated. It is a matter of policy. We recall the words of Pathak, J. as his Lordship then was, in the Dhandhumukthi case (AIR 1984 SC 802): "Court cannot find itself involved in policy making of a quality and to a degree characteristic of political authority and indeed run the risk of being mistaken for one." 5. Whether the Section aforesaid requires change is for the policy makers to decide. May be there are considerations that stand against exonerating Government from tortuous liability. May be change is not called for, because Billions of letters are carried by the Post and if loss would attract actions, Government would find itself faced with a spate of actions. 6. However, we notice provisions in the Act where for loss of Value Payable Postal articles and insured articles, Government is liable to compensate (S.33 and 34). The Public Service Commission, Government or like bodies which presumably charge a fee for application might do well to send letters of this nature by registered post. If financial consideration mandates so, additional postage charges could be collected. Suffering or prejudice as has been occasioned in this case, could then be obviated. The Public Service Commission, Government or like bodies which presumably charge a fee for application might do well to send letters of this nature by registered post. If financial consideration mandates so, additional postage charges could be collected. Suffering or prejudice as has been occasioned in this case, could then be obviated. We think that this is a matter which should be considered by those in charge of administration who with their experience should be able to devise satisfactory solutions. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Public Service Commission, Trivandrum and the Chief Secretary to the Government of Kerala, Trivandrum. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.