Judgment :- 1. The first petitioner was the 'assessee' in ceiling proceedings under S.85 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/64), that is one, who in the opinion of the Taluk Land Board, was in possession of lands in excess of the ceiling limit applicable to his family. In suo mote proceedings initiated under S.85(7), the Board passed an order on 16-11-81 directing him to surrender 7.45 acres of land as excess. The order was passed without hearing him because despite service of draft statement and notice fixing the date of hearing, he had failed to appear before the Board at the appointed time. Within a matter of days, however, the assessee moved an application before the Board for setting aside that order: it was his case that he was prevented by sufficient cause, form appearing before the Board on 16-11-81. Objections to the draft statement were also filed along with the above application. The Board considered the matter, found that the assessee had shown satisfactory reasons for non-appearance, and set aside its "ex parte order." An order of stay was also issued, directing the Tahsildar not to take over the excess lands, pending reconsideration of the ceiling case. The objections were got enquired into, through the authorised officer and his report obtained. It is said that the matter was heard again, but in the meanwhile, the Taluk Land Board received two communications from the Land Board at Trivandrum. The first was to the effect that the Taluk Land Board bad no power either to review its own order or to stay it. The second stated that it had acted irregularly, illegally and without jurisdiction in having entertained the "application for review" and stayed further proceedings. It also directed the Taluk Land Board to enforce the earlier order, without reviewing it. And in the light of the above "instructions", the Taluk Land Board dropped all further proceedings for reconsideration, and held that its decision dated 16-11-81 would stand. It is this decision of the Taluk Land Board dated 25-3-83 which is now being sought to be revised. 2. Mr. And in the light of the above "instructions", the Taluk Land Board dropped all further proceedings for reconsideration, and held that its decision dated 16-11-81 would stand. It is this decision of the Taluk Land Board dated 25-3-83 which is now being sought to be revised. 2. Mr. Musa for the assessee raises three grounds: (1) S.85(8) of the Act empowers the Taluk Land Board to set aside ex parte orders, and the Land Board, Trivandrum was in error in thinking that that would amount to "review; (ii) even if S.85(8) is not attracted, the Taluk Land Board should be held to have the power to set aside an ex parte decision so long as such power is not denied to It by the statute or the Rules; and (iii) in any event, no power can be recognised in favour of the Land Board to issue binding directions to Taluk Land Boards in the matter of exercising their quasi judicial functions under the Act and the Rules. 3. According to the learned Government Pleader, ground (i) above is concluded against the petitioner by the decision of this Court in Rajagopalan v. State of Kerala (1977 KLT 114) which takes the view that only a person other than the assessee can apply under S.85(8); and this seems to be so. Mr. Musa would however submit that the decision requires reconsideration. Had this been the only question arising for decision, I would have referred the matter to a Division Bench; but as other questions are involved, it will at least be interesting to notice what Mr. Musa's contentions are, in this regard. 4. S.85(1) provides that where a person owns or holds lands in excess of the ceiling area, such land "shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided". Sub-s. (2) imposes an obligation on such person (who may be called the 'excess-holder' or the 'assessee') to file a statement before the Land Board giving the extent and other particulars of all such lands, and also exercising option in respect of the items he would like to surrender. Sub-s. (2) imposes an obligation on such person (who may be called the 'excess-holder' or the 'assessee') to file a statement before the Land Board giving the extent and other particulars of all such lands, and also exercising option in respect of the items he would like to surrender. Ignoring sub-ss.(2A), (3),(3A) and (4) which are not material for the present, Sub-s. (5) provides that the statement submitted by the assessee will be transferred by the Land Board to the appropriate Taluk Land Board which shall (a) cause the particulars mentioned in the statement to be verified, (b) ascertain whether the assessee holds any other lands; and (c) by order, determine the extent and the indentity of the land to be surrendered. Sub-s. (6) stipulates that in determining the identity of the land to be surrendered by the assessee, his choice is to be accepted, subject to the two provisos that follow. And the second among them is to the effect that where the interests of other persons are likely to be affected by such determination, they too must be given an opportunity of being heard. Sub-s. (7) deals with cases of persons failing to submit statements as required by Sub-s. (2) in such cases, action can be taken suo mote by the Taluk Land Board to determine the extent and other particulars of land to be surrendered. The proviso to this sub-section also insists that before "such determination", the persons interested in the land are to be heard. The proviso to this sub-section also insists that before "such determination", the persons interested in the land are to be heard. Then comes sub-s. (8), reading as follows: "Where the Taluk Land Board determines the extent of the land to be surrendered by any person without hearing any person interested, such person may, within sixty days from the date of such determination, apply to the Taluk Land Board to set aside the order and, if he satisfies the Taluk Land Board that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing before the Taluk Land Board it shall set aside the order and shall proceed under sub-s.(5) or sub-s. (7), as the case may be." On an analysis of the above provisions, it was said in Rajagopalan (1977 KLT 114) that S.85(8) makes a clear distinction between the person who has excess land (i.e. the assessee) and other persons interested in such land, and that the latter class of persons alone could apply under the sub-section to set aside the Taluk Land Board's order, and not the assessee himself. R.12 to 14 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules, 1970 were also referred to suggest that they were in accordance with the construction suggested, though they could not totally govern or influence such construction. 5. There is no doubt that the first part of S.85(8) refers not only to The person liable to surrender excess land, but also to "any person interested" in the determination by the Taluk Land Board of the extent of land to be surrendered by such person. To this extent, the opening part of the subsection involves the kind of dichotomy emphasised in Rajagopalan. But there is difference, it is pointed out, between the 'determinations' in sub- s.(6) and (8): under the former, the determination is about the Identity of the land to be surrendered, whereas under the latter, it is about the extent. Again, while the 2nd proviso to sub-s. (6) speaks of other persons likely to be affected, sub-s. (8) makes mention of any person Interested. Again, while the 2nd proviso to sub-s. (6) speaks of other persons likely to be affected, sub-s. (8) makes mention of any person Interested. If these distinctions are kept in mind, and the further circumstance that the statute itself (as distinct from the Rules which will be separately examined) does not specifically provide for a hearing of the assessee before making the determination under Sub-s. (5), is it necessary or desirable, asks counsel to so narrowly construe "any person" in sub-s. (8) as to keep out the assessee? After all, is not the assessee the person most interested in the determination of the extent of land to be surrendered by him, and therefore one who could legitimately be given the right to apply for setting aside an order passed in his absence, if sufficient cause could be shown for such absence? It is argued that when the Board is satisfied with the cause shown for non-appearance, what it has to do is to set aside the order under sub-s. (5) or under sub-s. (7), as the case may be: that is, the order determining the extent of land to be surrendered by the assessee. If what is to be set aside is only the fixation of identity, it may be possible to suggest that interested persons other than the assessee will be equally, if not more, concerned; but if what is to be set aside is the decision about the extent, the assessee should evidently be more concerned. The circumstance that what really happens when an application under sub-s.(8) is allowed is the commencement of de novo proceedings against assessee, also suggests, according to counsel, that sub-s.(8) is not designed to exclude the assessee from the category of "any person" mentioned therein. 6. I am not prepared to say, without further examination, that the above contentions are without substance. 7. S.1000 of the Act confers on the Taluk Land Board, for the purpose of performing its functions under the Act, the powers of a civil court in respect of matters like summoning witnesses, requiring discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence of affidavit and "any other matter which may be prescribed." Under S.129(1), the Government can make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act; and in particular, sub-s.(2) provides for prescription of the procedure to be followed by Taluk Land Boards. The Kerala Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules, 1970 are made by the Government in exercise of power under S.129; and R.9 to 15 in Chap.3 are relevant, as regards the procedure to be adopted by a Taluk Board in proceedings under S.85 of the Act. R.9 and 9A provide for verification of the statement filed by the assessee under S.85(2). After such verification, a draft statement is to be drawn up by the Board, as prescribed in R.10. R.1 provides for publication of draft statements. R.12(1) enjoins that the draft statement shall be served on the assessee, inviting objections; and sub-rule.(2) provides for similar service on other persons who may also have any interest in the lands concerned. R.13 deals with "enquiry" and "determination of the extent and identity" of the land to be surrendered by the assessee. The details of the rule are not material for the present, except shat there is provision for hearing of objectors, including the assessee. R.14 and 15 deal with applications under S.85(8) and R.15, in particular, reads:- " Re-determination of extent and identity of land. Where an order is set aside under sub-s.(8) of S.85 at the instance of a person on whom the draft statement has been served under R.12, the Taluk Land Board may, if it thinks fit so to do, proceed to determine, without recourse to the preparation of a fresh draft statement, the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered after issue of a notice in Form No. 7 to the persons specified in sub-rule (1) of R.12 and to such other persons who have preferred any claim to ownership or possession or both, of the lands indicated for surrender in such draft statement:" The first thing that emerges from an examination of the above rules is that the details of the procedure to be followed by the Taluk Board, in making the determination under Sub-sec.(5) of S.85, are all to be found in the rules. A draft statement is to be first drawn up, after due verification of the particulars furnished by the assessee, in his statement; and that has to be served on him and others interested so that they get an opportunity of raising appropriate objections. A draft statement is to be first drawn up, after due verification of the particulars furnished by the assessee, in his statement; and that has to be served on him and others interested so that they get an opportunity of raising appropriate objections. The objections are then to be gone into, if necessary, after further verification, at an enquiry at which the objectors are allowed to adduce evidence and given an opportunity of being heard. In other words, it is the Rules which provide for a full-fledged quasi-judicial enquiry about the extent of land held by the assessee, exemption claims raised by him, the size of his family, the ceiling limit applicable to him, and the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered. It cannot therefore be said that the powers and duties of the Taluk Land Board, in so far as they relate to the procedure to be adopted in discharging its functions under S.85, have to be found exclusively in the statute itself, and not the Rules. Again, the first part of R.15 specifically contemplates exercise of power by the Board, under S.85 (8), at the instance of a person on whom draft statements are served under R.12, and that includes the assessee also. A combined reading of S.1000, S.129 and R.15 may therefore support the view that the power under S.85(8) which pertains to the realm of procedure only, can be exercised on an application filed by the assessee also. 8. As already indicated, it will not be proper for me, sitting single, to interpret S.85(8) in a manner different from Rajagopalan (1977 KLT 114); and the conclusion herein cannot therefore rest on such an interpretation; but it is necessary to observe that in Rajagopalan, this Court's attention does not appear to have been drawn to the combined effect of S.1000 and 129 of the Act, and R.15 of the Ceiling Rules. In fact the discussion in the case stops with a reference to R.14. Again, the view of the Land Board that what the Taluk Land Board had attempted in this case was to "review" its earlier order also does not appear to be correct: in law, 'review' is different from restoring an application dismissed for default, or setting aside an ex parte decision. Again, the view of the Land Board that what the Taluk Land Board had attempted in this case was to "review" its earlier order also does not appear to be correct: in law, 'review' is different from restoring an application dismissed for default, or setting aside an ex parte decision. The power under S.85(8) is one to set aside an order passed against a person, without hearing him, when he shows sufficient cause for his failure to appear for the hearing at the appointed time. It is evidently more in the nature of setting aside exparte, than review. 9. Assuming that S.85 (8) does pot confer power on the Taluk Land Board to set aside its order under S.85(5), at the instance of an assessee, I still think that such power should be recognised in its favour, if that is necessary for it to effectively perform its adjudicatory functions in accordance with the rules of fairplay and justice. In Cheru Ouseph v. Kunhipathumma (1981 KLT 495) I had had occasion to discuss at some length the nature of the powers exercised by Special Tribunals in modern days, and the role played by them in the administration of justice, and to observe: "Two or three important things follow from what has been seen so far. First, the administration of justice, or at any rate, a substantial part of it is now patterned in a manner different from what it was some half a century ago. Second, the special tribunals which constitute the core of this new pattern are exercising judicial functions inherent in the sovereign state. Third, the powers exercised by them are in many cases in distinguishable in content from those exercised by courts of justice. Further, exercise of such powers by them is vital to the citizen despite the supervisory powers of superior courts over such exercise. Third, the powers exercised by them are in many cases in distinguishable in content from those exercised by courts of justice. Further, exercise of such powers by them is vital to the citizen despite the supervisory powers of superior courts over such exercise. If this be the true position, the reality which cannot be overlooked from the functional point of view, how are we to proceed in delimiting the powers of these bodies in matters of procedure, at least in areas not directly covered by statutes?" And after having posed the question, I ventured to answer it by suggesting that "in respect of procedural matters, all powers which are not specifically denied by the statute or the statutory rules should be vouchsafed to a statutory tribunal so that it may effectively exercise its judicial function." The above approach was noted with approval by Bhat J., in Abdulla v. Rent Controller (1984 KLT 865). My attention has not been drawn to any provision in Act 1/64 or the Ceiling Rules which seeks to deny, expressly or by necessary implication, the power to a Taluk Land Board to set aside its order passed without hearing an assessee, when it is satisfied that the assessee had sufficient cause for non-appearance, and that if will be unjust, in the circumstances disclosed, to allow the ex parte decision to stand. If that is so, I am definitely of the view that even if S.85(8) was not attracted, the Taluk Land Board in the present case was well within its bounds in setting aside the order dated 16-11-81 and proceeding to reconsider the master. 10. In Kalyani Amma v. Ouseph Varkey (AIR 1967 Ker. 287) a Full Bench of this Court, while dealing with the powers of a Land Tribunal, refused to make any "compartmental distinction" between powers and procedure, and indicated that even procedure might involve the exercise of powers. This observation appears to be apt to the situation arising from a combined reading of S.1000(d), S.129(2)(e) and the prescription of the Ceiling Rules already referred to. The Full Bench was also of the view that the logical consequence of holding that a Tribunal had no power to restore an application would be to hold that it had no power to dismiss for default also. The Full Bench was also of the view that the logical consequence of holding that a Tribunal had no power to restore an application would be to hold that it had no power to dismiss for default also. Neither S.85 nor the relevant Ceiling Rules confer any power on the Taluk Land Board to make the concerned determination 'ex parte'; and if it is to be held that the Taluk Land Board has no power to set aside an ex parte decision at the instance of an assessee, be might be justified in asking: where is the power of the Taluk Land Board to pass an ex parte order? 11. If the view is taken that the Taluk Land Board has power to set aside its order passed without hearing an assessee, even if S.85(8) is not attracted to such cases, the next question whether the Land Board can issue directions to or control the working of Taluk Land Boards in the matter of exercising their quasi-judicial functions under the Act, need not be examined, except perhaps to observe that ordinarily, the Land Tribunals, Appellate Authorities and Taluk Land Boards constituted under the Act have their own independent statutory functions to discharge, uninfluenced by any directions from the Land Board. It is doubtful whether the "superintendence" referred to in S.101(2) includes judicial superintendence, or a power of any other nature to give directions to or place fetters on the Taluk Land Boards, in the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions. The two letters written by the Land Board to the Taluk Land Board in this case can however be understood as an attempt to draw the latter's attention to the view expressed by this Court in Rajagopalan's case (1977 KLT 114). As I said, it is unnecessary to pursue the matter any further, on the facts of the present case. The proper course to be adopted, in the light of the above discussion, is to set aside the order impugned and remit the matter to the Taluk Land Board with a direction to continue the proceedings it had initiated after setting aside its earlier order dated 16-11-81, and re-determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered by the assessee herein, on the footing that it has power to do so and that exercise of such power does not amount to "review". Revision disposed of with such an order. Revision disposed of with such an order. No costs.