JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - In this second appeal although the question of law formulated is wide in its nature the following substantial question of law arises for consideration: Whether a decree against a party who has not preferred any appeal can be modified in its favour by the appellate Court when the decree is concerned against other parties preferring the appeal ? 2. Admittedly the disputed land belongs to the State of Orissa, which has been recorded to be in possession of the Plaintiffs, who sought for declaration of their title and permanent injunction against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 alleging interference with their possession. All the reliefs were granted to the Plaintiffs in the decree. State of Orissa (Defendant No. 4) did not prefer any appeal and the decree became final as against it. Appeal by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 was dismissed and the decree was confirmed. The appellate Court expressed as follows: 2. Apparently the Appellants are subsequent trespassers. The own records of the 'State speak of Plaintiffs' possession. A prior trespasser can maintain his suit for eviction against a subsequent trespasser and on that consideration the decree of the learned trial Court giving relief against Defendants 1 to 3 cannot be questioned. Defendant No. 4, in its written statement was admitted Plaintiff's possession. On that consideration as long as it has not removed Plaintiffs' horn the land, in my view, they can maintain the suit for removal of the trespass from the side of the Defendants 1 to 3. 13. The appeal accordingly is devoid of any merit and it is, therefore, dismissed with modification of the decree to the effect that the, declaration pi title given in favour of the Plaintiffs is set aside and so also the order permanently restraining Defendant No. 4 from entering upon the suit land. The Plaintiffs to continue in possession as long as they are not evicted from the sit land at the instance of the State under due process of law. 3. Mr. R.C. Ram, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Appellants in tis second appeal, submitted that having dismissed the appeal against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3, the appellate Court could not have modified the same in favour in Defendant No. 4, who did not prefer any appeal. Mr. Ganeswar Rath, he learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 3. Mr. R.C. Ram, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Appellants in tis second appeal, submitted that having dismissed the appeal against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3, the appellate Court could not have modified the same in favour in Defendant No. 4, who did not prefer any appeal. Mr. Ganeswar Rath, he learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, who have not filed any cross-objection, submitted that paragraph 7 of the judgment of the appellate Court would clearly indicate the meaning of the modification of the decree. However, I am not inclined to enter into the said question since the short question is the scope of modification of a decree. 4. Appeal is a creature of the statute. The power of appeal is to be exercised to he extent provided for. Where a specific appellate power has been provided for, the inherent power inconsistent with such power should not be exercised. Order 41, Rule 33, CPC is a power given to the appellate Court for giving relief to a party who has not preferred an appeal. It reads as follows: 33. Power of Court of appeal. - The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the Respondents or parties, although such Respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees ; Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order u/s 35A. in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. The scope and ambit of exercise of this power is no more resincegra. In Pannalal Vs. in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. The scope and ambit of exercise of this power is no more resincegra. In Pannalal Vs. State Bombay and Others it was observed: Even a bare reading of Order 41, Rule 33 is sufficient to convince anyone that the wide wording, was intended to empower the appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit not only as between the Appellant and the Respondent but also as between a Respondent and a Respondent. It empowers the appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the Appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the Respondents as 'the case may require ........." In Nirmala Bala Ghose and Another Vs. Balai Chand Ghose and Others it was observed: The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to be applied with discretion, and to cases where interference in favour of the Appellant necessitated interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the Court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the Court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the Court appealed from and in adjusting the right claimed by the Appellant it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by Order 41, Rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule, however, does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from. This Court had also occasion to examine the scope and ambit before the decision of the Supreme Court and thereafter. They ate not required to be enumerated. 5. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that the power of the appellate Court is wide and unlimited. However, wider is the power greater should be the restraint. Therefore, this power is to be exercised within a certain well-defined area. I am inclined to hold that a party who is aggrieved by a decree should prefer an appeal to escape from its operation. However, wider is the power greater should be the restraint. Therefore, this power is to be exercised within a certain well-defined area. I am inclined to hold that a party who is aggrieved by a decree should prefer an appeal to escape from its operation. However, where a party has not preferred an appeal, but other parties aggrieved by such a decree preferred appeal the appellate Court can exercise the power where as a result of interference in favour of the Appellants it becomes necessary to read just the rights of other parties including the party who has not preferred the appeal. Again where the relief granted is single and indivisible the right can be exercised in favour of a party not preferring the appeal. Where, however, a party although aggrieved by the decree has not preferred the appeal and the appeal preferred by other parties is dismissed there is no scope for granting the relief by modifying the decree which has become final as against the party not preferring the appeal. The present case comes within the last category. The appellate Court could not have exercised the jurisdiction in favour of Defendant No. 4 who had not preferred the appeal in spite of the decree of the trial Court being against it, when the appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3. 6. In the result, the second appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the appellate Court IS set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed