JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J. 1. This is a defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23.8.1980 passed by the District Judge, Barabanki in Civil Appeal No. 57 of 1980 allowing the plaintiffrespondent's appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 14.3.80 passed by Munsif, Barabanki, arising out of Suit No. 90 of 1979 by which he dismissed the plaintiff s suit for permanent injunction. 2. The plaintiff, Swami Dayal, filled a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant, Smt. Barki, from selling plots nos. 79 and 136 of village Deokalia, Pargana and Tahsil Fatehpur, on the allegation that in a litigation between him and the defendant these plots were given to the defendant by a compromise dated 19.2 1968 entered into between the parties in the court of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and in the said compromise it was agreed that the defendant would not have any right of transferring the property given to her by virtue of the compromise, but would only enjoy its usufruct during her lifetime. The suit was contested by the defendant who, inter alia, took a stand that firstly, she did not want to sell the property in dispute and that secondly, the plaintiff had no cause of action on this score. It was also pleaded by her that she had, in fact, entered into no compromise as alleged and that, in any case, the suit having been instituted to harass her could not be maintained. By an amendment of the writtenstatement a further plea was added that the defendant, even if the compromise had been entered into, had become Bhumidhar of the land in dispute by virtue of amendment made to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by U.P. Act I of 1971 and the Bhumidhar being vested with the right, to transfer the property, the compromise was a restraint in contravention of the statute and, as such, it was unenforceable. The trial court on the pleadings of the parties framed issues & returned finding on issue no. 1 that the compromise was duly executed between the parties. On issue no. 2 pertaining to the cause of action a finding was returned that since it was not established that the defendant wanted to sell the land in dispute, in fact, no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff. On newly framed issue no. 1 that the compromise was duly executed between the parties. On issue no. 2 pertaining to the cause of action a finding was returned that since it was not established that the defendant wanted to sell the land in dispute, in fact, no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff. On newly framed issue no. 4 the trial court returned a further finding that the suit was not maintainable since the condition of the compromise restraining the defendant from transferring the land was against the law and, as such, could not be enforced any longer and bad become inoperative. With these findings the trial court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff came up in appeal and the District judge held that the trial court had erred in dismissing the plaintiff's suit on a finding that the terms of the compromise were binding on the parties and that Smt. Barki was bound by the same and her claim that she had unfettered right to transfer the property had no legs to stand. The District Judge further recorded a finding that there was a cause of action in view of the allegation made in the plaint that Smt. Barki wanted to transfer the plots given to her against the terms of the compromise. On these findings the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial court was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff decreed with costs throughout. The defendant, aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, ha up in second appeal before this Court. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that by compromise entered into between the parties on 19.2.68 in the Court of Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Barabanki, it was, inter alia, stated that Smt. Baiki was widow of Shri Krishna, the brother of Swami Dayal, and her name was agreed to be recorded in the Khata in question, she being entitled to the same by virtue of the fact that she was the widow of Sri Krishna. In clause 2 it was, however, provided that the appellant (Smt. Barki) would not be entitled to sell or transfer the said property. In clause 2 it was, however, provided that the appellant (Smt. Barki) would not be entitled to sell or transfer the said property. Learned counsel thus contended that clause 1 of the compromise, as detailed herein above, indicated that the disputed plots in the name of Smt. Barki were not given, to her in terms of compromise by way of maintenance or as a personal right conferred on her but it clearly indicated that she was entitled to the plots,, given to her in her own right being the widow of Sri Krishna and had share in the property. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that the compromise did not confer any right on the defendant appears to be unfounded and cannot be inferred from the terms of the compromise. 5. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is to the effect that by the amending Act of 1958 the widow became full owner of the property and since subsequently by Act 1 of 1971 she became a Bhumidhar, she became entitled to sell the land or transfer it and these rights could not be fettered by clause 2 of the compromise to be a restraint on her right to transfer since that would be a contract against law and would be unenforceable. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant cited a decision of this Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmad and others v. Munfait Ali and others (1979 All LJ 1077) which has been considered by the trial court and the trial court has distinguished the said decision and found that it was not applicable on the ground that the right given to Smt. Barki in the instant case was on the basis of the right that she had inherited by being the widow of Sri Krishna the brother of Swami Dayal, the plaintiff, who had died near about the year 1962 at which time under the amendment brought about by amending Act of 1958 in section 171 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the widow of a predeceased son had been given a right of inheritance which came into effect from 7.11.58 and, therefore, the right conceded in her favour was the right that she enjoyed under the provisions of the Act and that right was subject to the provisions of the subsequent amendment brought about by Act I of 1971 by which Bhumidhari rights were conferred. Learned counsel for the respondent has otherwise submitted that in view of the decision cited it was a mere personal right of enjoyment which was conferred in the case earlier decided by this Court. A perusal of the case cited would indicate that only life interest had been created by a compromise and not by operation of statute and the statute had not come in the way and, in fact, it appears that in that case Smt. Bhoori did not have any legal right of being entered as a Bhumidhar on the land but for the compromise entered between the parties. I hold that he trial court was right in holding that the right was not a right of personal enjoyment but the right conceded to her since she was widow of Sri Ksishna, the brother of Swami Dayal, who had a right to inherit the property in terms of the Amendment Act of 1958. The view taken by me is also supported by a decision of this Court reported in Sheo Lal Verma v. Smt. Sudamiya (1981 Allahabad Civil Journal 292) in which it was held that; The rights and obligations of tenureholder are those prescribed by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The view taken by me is also supported by a decision of this Court reported in Sheo Lal Verma v. Smt. Sudamiya (1981 Allahabad Civil Journal 292) in which it was held that; The rights and obligations of tenureholder are those prescribed by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. A Sirdar had not right to alienate the land. The Court further held that the right to sell after becoming Bhumidhar could be exercised by the widow with the aid of the provisions of section 138 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and in the instant case specific plots having been entered in the name of Smt. Barki, she had a right to alienate. 6. Another decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal ( AIR 1977 SC. 1226 ) in which it has been held that a contract against statute would be barred and would not be enforceable. This view has again been reiterated in a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Rajendra Prasad and others v. Joint Director of Consolidation and others (1966 RD 92) wherein the Court held that as Bhumidhar the right of transfer was available to the defendantappellant and could not be curtailed. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the appellant not having taken specific ground to the effect that the contract was in breach of the statute, it was not open to him to urge it before this Court in a second appeal, but a perusal of the trial court record indicates that a specific plea was raised to this effect by the defendant through her application under Order VI, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, paper no. Ka23 dated 2911980, which was allowed and to which a replication was also filed being paper no. Ka25. In this, paragraph 11 was sought to be added in the writtenstatement by which a specific plea had been taken that the defendant by the compromise got Sirdari rights which were not transferable, but by operation of the Statute she became Bhumidhar with effect from 1.1.70 and the land in dispute became one which could be transferred by her. This ground is, therefore, devoid of force and cannot be sustained. 8. This ground is, therefore, devoid of force and cannot be sustained. 8. Next, it was contended that the term of compromise restraining the transfer had not been hit by the provisions of section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act but it was covered by the provisions of section 6(b) of the Transfer Property Act and in this connection the learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Gurdit Singh and others v. Babu and others (AIR 1953 Punjab 282). In the case in hand a plea of her of section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act was in fact, not raised and the case as such does not, in any way, go to support the plaintiff respondent. 9. Lastly, it was contended that the defendant, on the principles of estoppel having entered into a compromise, could not say that she had a right to transfer by operation of law. No estoppel against law can be pleaded and the submission is devoid of force. 10. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court dated 23.8.80 passed in Civil Appeal No, 57 of 1980 is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court passed in Suit no. 90 of 1979 stands. The suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed in terms of the said decree of the trial court. (Appeal allowed)