Judgment :- 1. A young man by name Hassainar was stabbed to death on 5-12-1982 at 2 p.m. The macabre episode happened on the verandah of the shop of pw 1, Panku. The First Information of the incident was given to the Police by Pw.1. pw.12 recorded the statement at 6 p.m on 5-12-1982. On receiving the information, the Police came to the scene of occurrence on the same day. The accused surrendered before the Police. The Police investigated the case and indicted the accused for the offence of murder of Hassainar. The Sessions Court, Manjeri tried the accused, found him guilty of the offence of murder, convicted him and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. The Sessions Court also found the accused guilty of the offence under S.449, IPC. Now the accused appeals. 2. pws.1, 2 and 3 are the eye witnesses to the incident. Before the Sessions Court, these witnesses have stated with material details what has happened on 5-12-1982 on the verandah of the shop of pw. I which resulted in the death of Hassainar. 3. pw.1 has stated that the accused came to the verandah of the shop, where the deceased was sitting on a wooden plank, and stabbed him on the chest of the deceased. Immediately after the stabbing, the accused ran away from the scene. pws 2 and 3 also deposed that they also saw the accused stabbing the deceased. It is brought out in evidence that the accused stabbed the deceased saying that he bad attempted to molest the daughter of the accused. The daughter of the accused has been examined as pw. 7 in this case. 4. If the evidence of pws.1 to 3 is believed, there is no difficulty to find the accused guilty of the offence charged against him. pws. I to 3 plainly and clearly with material particulars said that they saw the accused stabbing the deceased. The Sessions Court has believed the evidence given by witnesses, pws.1 to 3, and found the accused guilty of the offence charged against him. 5. Counsel for the appellant argued two points. (1) The trial court has gone wrong in accepting the evidence of pws.1 to 3. The Sessions Court has believed the evidence given by witnesses, pws.1 to 3, and found the accused guilty of the offence charged against him. 5. Counsel for the appellant argued two points. (1) The trial court has gone wrong in accepting the evidence of pws.1 to 3. (2) The prosecution evidence in the case itself would show that the accused must have killed the deceased under the stress of grave and sudden provocation which gives him the benefit of the Ist exception to S.300, IPC. 6. The attack made against the credibility of the evidence of pw. I is on the basis of certain minor and trivial discrepancies in the evidence of pw. I given before the court and the statement he had made before the Police. Counsel pointed out that there is some mistakes in regard to the date on which the First Information Statement was given. As per Ext. P1, the statement was given by pw.1 on 5-12-1982 at 6 p.m. On Ext. P1 an endorsement of the Judicial First Class Magistrate is seen. It is dated 6-12-1982 and the time noted is 9 a. m. pw. 1, when examined before the court, deposed thus: Obviously the deposition quoted above was given in a confused state of mind. This is clear from his subsequent statements in cross-examination. We feel that instead of saying the witness said which can never be true since Ext. P1 shows that the statement was given on 5-12-1982 at 6 p.m. Further, it has to be noted that the Police came to the scene of occurrence and prepared the mahazar when pw.1 banded over the fatal weapon, MO1. pw.1 is a witness to this mahazar. Being a rustic witness, be was not able to make the difference between the mahazar, in which he signed, and Ext. P1 First Information Statement. This aspect of the matter was taken note of by the Sessions Court and it found that the witness was perplexed at the time of chief examination and be further stated that he lodged the complaint on the very same day of the incident and handed over the knife, MO1, to pw. 12. It has to be remembered that Ext. P1 as well as the mahazar for the recovery of MO1 was recorded by pw. 12. 12. It has to be remembered that Ext. P1 as well as the mahazar for the recovery of MO1 was recorded by pw. 12. The trial court had occasion to see the demeanour of the witness and has observed that pw.1 himself had stated that some mistake was committed by him in his chief examination as he was perplexed at the time of the chief examination. We feel that the mistakes are trivial and happened on account of some confusion in the mind of the witness. These mistakes which are seen corrected in his deposition themselves are hardly sufficient to cast any doubt about the veracity of the evidence given by this witness. We see no substance in the submission of the counsel for the appellant on this count. 7. Counsel for the appellant next contended that this witness, when, examined before the court, deposed that the injury was not on the chest, but on the stomach. This also is not a very serious defect to be taken note of, particularly in view of the fact that the description of the injury itself will indicate that the location of the injury is very near to the stomach portion of the body. In Ext. P5 the description of the injury is given and it read as follows: "Injury (ante mortem): Incised penetrating wound 4 x 1.3 cm, oblique, on the front of lower part of right chest, the upper right sharp cut end 9 cm below nipple at 5 O'clock position. The lower left rounded end was 2.5 cm from midline. The wound continued deep into the abdominal cavity cutting the 8th costal cartilage and transfixed the right lobe of liver. The injuries on the upper and lower surfaces of liver measured 4 x 1 cm each and were 5 cm apart. Then transacting the pylorus of stomach. The wound cut the front of right kidney for a length of 3 cm and pierced the inferior vena cava, the cut measuring 1.8 x 0.5 cm near the opening of the renal veins. The wound was directed backwards, downwards and to the left and was 9 cm deep." We do not think that the attack of the counsel for the appellant on this aspect is sustainable. The court below has believed the evidence of pw.1 and we feel no hesitation to accept the evidence of pw.1 as reliable and trustworthy. The wound was directed backwards, downwards and to the left and was 9 cm deep." We do not think that the attack of the counsel for the appellant on this aspect is sustainable. The court below has believed the evidence of pw.1 and we feel no hesitation to accept the evidence of pw.1 as reliable and trustworthy. There is of course no controversy as to the fact that he is a competent witness. We feel certain that be has deposed what he has seen. 8. The evidence of Pw.l is fully supported and corroborated by the evidence of pws. 2 and 3. In regard to these witnesses, counsel submitted that this court should not rely on the evidence of these witnesses since these witnesses are chance witnesses. We do not think that we have to discard the evidence of these witnesses on the ground that they are chance witnesses. It has to be remembered that the incident took place on the verandah of a shop in a shopping street and that it is only usual and normal for people to pass through in front of the shops and there is absolutely nothing strange in accounting the presence of these two witnesses on the scene of occurrence. Further it has to be noted that these two witnesses took the deceased to the hospital though he died on the way to the hospital. On an examination of the evidence of Pws.l to 3 we are convinced that these witnesses are reliable witnesses and their evidence can be accepted. As we said earlier, if the evidence of these witnesses are accepted, there is clean and clear proof to establish the responsibility of the accused for the injury inflicted on the deceased. So, we have to hold that the accused is responsible for killing the deceased Hassainar. Point No. 2-Provocation 9. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the facts disclosed in the prosecution case itself will enable the accused to claim the 1st exception to S.300 IPC. We do not think that the counsel can sustain this ground from the facts and circumstances unfolded in the case. Since the counsel argued this point at length, we feel that we must consider this point also. We do not think that the counsel can sustain this ground from the facts and circumstances unfolded in the case. Since the counsel argued this point at length, we feel that we must consider this point also. Exception.) to S.300, IPC reads thus: "Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self-control, by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident." The core of the rationale of the 1st Exception to S.300, IPC can be best understood from the words of the authors of the Code. They observe: "We agree with the great mass of mankind, and with the majority of jurists, ancient and modern, in thinking that homicide, committed in the sudden beat of passion, on great provocation, ought to be punished; but that in general it ought not to be punished so severely as murder. It ought to be punished in order to teach men to entertain a peculiar respect for human life; it ought to be punished in order to give men a motive for accustoming themselves to govern their passions; and in some few cases for which we have made provision, we conceive that it ought to be punished with the utmost rigour." The foremost and preeminent two sensibilities usually susceptible of in a good number of intentional killings are the feelings of anger and fear. In the criminal jurisprudential consideration, anger dominates the sphere of the law of provocation, fear that of the law of private defence. 10. If we examine carefully the integrants of the 1st Exception to S.300 IPC two sober propositions are clear. (1) The accused must have killed the deceased because he was provoked, "not merely because provocation existed". There must be a real inciting relationship between the provoking event and the killing. (2) It should not be the result of a deliberate decision to kill, but an impulsive killing in hot blood, that he must have acted in an "ungovernable passion" resulting in a "dethronement of reason" a temporary suspension of judgment'. In the evaluation of evidence, it boils down on the immediacy of the accused's response to the provoking event. (2) It should not be the result of a deliberate decision to kill, but an impulsive killing in hot blood, that he must have acted in an "ungovernable passion" resulting in a "dethronement of reason" a temporary suspension of judgment'. In the evaluation of evidence, it boils down on the immediacy of the accused's response to the provoking event. The provoking event must be grave and sufficiently recent for depriving the accused of his self-control and he should be passionately affected by the event at the moment of killing. 11. In considering the application of Exception.) to S.300, IPC, the Supreme Court has said clearly how the courts should approach the question of granting the exception. The Supreme Court said that the question that the court has to consider is whether a reasonable person placed in the same position as the accused was, would have reacted to the incident which has exacerbated the provocation. In Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1942 AC 1 at p. 9) Viscount Simon, L. C.. stated that it is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of the murder to manslaughter. Provocation, to have that result, must be such as temporarily deprives the person provoked of the power of self-control, the result of which he commits the unlawful act which causes death. The test to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man. as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Lesbini (1914-3 KB 1116) so that an unusally excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular importance to (a) consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool down and (b) to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected, for to retort, in the heat of passion induced by provocation dealt a simple blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a concealed dagger. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter. Again, in 1946 AC 588 Viscount Simon stated that the whole doctrine relating to provocation depends on the fact that it causes, or may cause, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereby malice, which is the formation of the intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, is negatived. 12. Now we shall discuss the evidence which the counsel for the appellant relied on to advance the argument that the accused committed the offence on account of sudden and grave provocation. Counsel mainly relies on the evidence of pw. 7. As we said earlier, pw. 7 is the daughter of the accused. From her evidence, it is seen that she had complained to her father about some mischiefs caused by the deceased which may perhaps amount to molesting her. pw. 7 deposed that she bad complained to her father that the accused had on some occasion caught hold of her hand and dragged her. But it has to be remembered that there is no clear statement as to when exactly this happened. It cannot be said that the said incident took place proximate to the time of stabbing the deceased. We say so since pw. 7 has said From what we have quoted from the deposition of pw.7, it is difficult for us to accept the counsel's suggestion that the said incident of dragging the girl by catching hold of her hand took place on the previous day of the incident. Anyhow, we are of the opinion that at any rate there was no incident to cause any provocation for the accused on the day on which the accused stabbed the deceased. 13. In the case reported in Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 605) the alleged provocation happened three hours prior to the murdering of the deceased The Supreme Court said, when the wife of the accused confessed to him that she had illicit intimacy with the deceased who was not present there, it can be assumed that he bad momentarily lost his self-control. But then after this when he drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there, and drove to his flat, went straight to the bed-room of the deceased and shot him dead and between the time when be left his house, and the time when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, there was sufficient time for the accused to regain his self-control, even if he had not regained it earlier. 14. In this case, we have to remember that the accused, even if be was provoked when his daughter made complaint, had sufficient time to get himself cooled and could have regained his self-control and so, there is no point in saying that the accused was deprived of his self control on account of sudden and grave provocation. The most important aspect in considering the question of provocation has been stated in R. v. Thomas ((1837) 7 C & P 817) It has been extracted in Russell on Crime, 11th Edn. Vol.1 at p. 593. We quote the same: "But the law requires two things; first that there should be that provocation; and secondly that the fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation". We cannot accept the contention of the appellant that the stabbing can be traced to the influence of passion arising from provocation that was caused by the complaint of pw. 7 to her father, the accused. We see no reason to accept this contention of the counsel for the appellant. We reject it. The appeal is only to be dismissed and we do so. The judgment of the court below is confirmed. Allowed.