JUDGMENT : B. P. Singh, J.–In this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, Smt. Manorma Devi, petitioner no. 2 herein, is the widow of late Jai Govind Prasad. It is her grievance that the Central Coalfields Limited has not paid to her husband and thereafter to her the amount of gratuity which was payable to her late husband. Petitioner no. 2 made an appeal to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India and she was directed to contact the Secretary of Law (Legal Aid Department) Secretariat, Patna. The petitioner no. 2 was thereafter directed to contact the Secretary of the Bihar State Legal Aid Committee, Ranchi. Ultimately, petitioner no. 2 sought the aid of the Ranchi Legal Support Centre which is petitioner no. 1 herein in the instant writ application and which has spoused the cause of petitioner no. 2. 2. The late husband of petitioner no. 2 was a Lower Division clerk in the Bhurkunda colliary and retired from service in the year, 1978. According to petitioner no. 2., her husband was entitled to gratuity on the basis of continuous service from 1944 to 1978, i.e. on the basis of continuous service for thirty four years. The respondents, however, paid a very small sum by way of gratuity and made a certain deduction which was not permissible in law. It is not necessary to state the other facts in detail as they are not necessary for the disposal of the instant writ petition. 3. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and 6, it has been stated that the husband of petitioner no. 2 was working on daily wages from 1944 to 1956. He was taken into permanent service with effect from 26.5.56 and he ultimately retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation on 1.7.1978. It is the case of the respondents that the period of service on daily rated cadre does not count towards the qualifying service for computation of gratuity. As such, the period during which the husband of petitioner no. 2 was working on daily wages i. e. from 1944 to 1956 cannot be taken into consideration for computation of the amount of gratuity payable to him. In this view of the matter the respondents calculated the gratuity only for the period from 26.5.1956 to 30.6.1978 which amounted to Rs. 5,611.50 paise. 2 was working on daily wages i. e. from 1944 to 1956 cannot be taken into consideration for computation of the amount of gratuity payable to him. In this view of the matter the respondents calculated the gratuity only for the period from 26.5.1956 to 30.6.1978 which amounted to Rs. 5,611.50 paise. The husband of petitioner no. 2 was paid this amount and a sum of Rs. 3,000/- was held up towards the interest of employees share of Coal Mines Provident Fund. After adjusting the interest it is stated that a sum of Rs. 219.90 paise is lying with the respondents which the petitioner no. 2 has not cared to collect. 4. The main question that fall for determination in the instant case is whether a workman working on daily wages basis is entitled to count his service as a daily rated workman for the purpose of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 5. Mr. Dilip Jerath appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the Act does not make any distinction between a person working on daily wage basis and a person working on monthly wage basis. According to him the crucial test is whether the employee concerned has rendered continuous service and was actually employed within the meaning of the terms under the Act. It matters little whether his wages were paid daily or monthly as long as his service was continuous and amounted to continuous service within the meaning of that terms under the Act. Mr. Jerath relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills v. P. C. Malavankar (1979 Labour and Industrial Cases 562) and also upon the JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court in Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textiles Mills, 1981 (1) LLJ. 308 . Sri Debi Prasad appearing on behalf of the respondents reiterated the plea raised in the counter affidavit which has been stated earlier. 6. In my view, Mr. Jerath is correct in his submission. It must be held that the husband of petitioner no. 2 was entitled to payment of gratuity by reckoning his service also for the period from 1944 to 1956 during which period he was working on daily wage basis in the colliery in question. 6. In my view, Mr. Jerath is correct in his submission. It must be held that the husband of petitioner no. 2 was entitled to payment of gratuity by reckoning his service also for the period from 1944 to 1956 during which period he was working on daily wage basis in the colliery in question. In view of the JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court in the case of Lalappa Lingappa (supra) this question has been authoritatively decided in favour of the petitioner. 7. In the case of Lalappa Lingappa (supra) the Supreme Court having considered the scheme of the Act, particularly the definition of "continuous service" held that the expression "actually employed' in explanation (1) of section 2(c) of the Act must in the context in which it appears, means "actually worked'. Even though two different expressions were used by the Legislature, for referring to the context and purpose with which they had been enacted, they were synonymous. In substance, "actually employed" really mean "actually worked". The crucial test laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision was whether the employee concerned had actually worked and had rendered continuous service. The Court observed : "In construing a social welfare legislation the Court should adopt a beneficient rule of construction, if a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the person in whose interest the Act has been passed. When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, as here, we must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. When the language ii explicit its consequence are for the Legislature and not for the Courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction were the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are two methods of construction. In their anxiety to advance beneficient purpose of legislation, the Courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none. Craies on Statutes, 6th Edn. pp. 84-91. In dealing with interpretation of sub-section (1) of S. 4, we must keep in view the scheme of the Act. In their anxiety to advance beneficient purpose of legislation, the Courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none. Craies on Statutes, 6th Edn. pp. 84-91. In dealing with interpretation of sub-section (1) of S. 4, we must keep in view the scheme of the Act. Sub-section (1) of S. 4, of the Act incorporates the concept of gratuity being a reward for long, continuous and meritorious service. The emphasis there is not on "continuity of employment" but on rendering "continuous service". The Legislature inserted the two explanations in the definition to extend the benefit to employees who are not in uninterrupted service for one year subject to the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. By the use of the legal fiction in these explanations, an employee is deemed to be in "continuous service" for purposes of sub-section (1) S. 4 of the Act. The Legislature never intended that the expression "actually employed In Explanation I and the expression ''actually worked" in Explanation II should have two different meanings because it wanted to extend the benefits to an employee who "worked" for a particular number of days in a year in either case. In a case falling under Explanation I an employee is deemed to be in continuous service if he has been actually employed for not less than 190 days if employed below the ground in a mine, or 240 days in any other case except when he is employed in a seasonal establishment. In a case falling under Explanation II, an employee of a seasonal establishment is deemed to be in continuous service if he has actually worked for not less than 75 per cent of the number of days on which the establishment was in operation during the year." 8. On this reasoning, the Supreme Court held that even the permanent employees, who had remained absent without leave, and had actually worked for Jess than 240 days in a year, were not entitled to gratuity. On the other hand, in the case of Badli employees who were employed only in case of absence to permanent employees, the gratuity was not found payable to them since they did not fulfil the conditions requiring that they should have worked for not less than 240 days in a year to qualify for gratuity. On the other hand, in the case of Badli employees who were employed only in case of absence to permanent employees, the gratuity was not found payable to them since they did not fulfil the conditions requiring that they should have worked for not less than 240 days in a year to qualify for gratuity. The test, therefore, is not whether the employee is described as permanent or temporary or whether ho is paid daily or monthly wages. The test is whether he has actually worked for the number of days in a year as provided under the Act. If he was actually employed and had actually worked for not less than the specified number of days in a year, he will be entitled to payment of gratuity under the Act. 9. In the instant case, the respondents have not pleaded that the husband of petitioner no. 2 had not worked for the specified number of days in a year. All that is said is that since his employment was on daily wage basis he was not entitled to gratuity. This contention is obviously incorrect in view of the aforesaid JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court. I, therefore, hold that the husband of petitioner no. 2 wag entitled to payment of gratuity calculated on the basis of service rendered by him also during the period from 1944 to 1956, which was to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the gratuity payable to him. 10. It is not possible in the instant proceeding to determine what exactly was the amount due to the husband of the petitioner no.2 which petitioner no.2 is entitled to receive from the respondents. Having held that the husband of petitioner no.2 was entitled as also to count his service for the entire period from the year 1944 to 1956 for purpose of computation of gratuity. I direct that the Controlling authority under the Act shall determine the amount due to petitioner no. 2. I direct petitioner no. 2 as well as the respondents herein to appear before the Controlling authority who, upon an application being made for this purpose by petitioner no. 2 and after hearing the respondents, shall calculate the exact amount payable to petitioner no. 2 after taking into account the amount already paid to her. The Controlling authority shall calculate the gratuity payable to petitioner no. 2 and after hearing the respondents, shall calculate the exact amount payable to petitioner no. 2 after taking into account the amount already paid to her. The Controlling authority shall calculate the gratuity payable to petitioner no. 2 on the basis of service of the husband of petitioner no.2 for the period from 1944 to July 1, 1978. The respondents shall deposit before the Controlling authority the amount of gratuity which, according to them, would be payable to petitioner no. 2 if the service of her husband for the period from 1944 to 1956 is taken into account, which was not done when the gratuity was calculated earlier. The respondents shall deposit the said amount within two months from the date of this ORDER :without waiting for any further direction from the Controlling authority. The Controlling authority shall permit petitioner no. 2 to withdraw the amount so deposited and shall proceed to calculate and award the balance amount of gratuity, if any, the Controlling authority shall see to it that the full payment of gratuity is paid to petitioner no. 2 as expeditiously as possible. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. The petitioner no. 2 shall have her costs from respondent no. 1 which I quantify at Rs.1000/-. 11. Before parting with this case I must express my appreciation for the help rendered by the Ranchi Legal Supports Centre and the keen interest /taken by its counsel, Shri Dilip Jerath in presenting the case of petitioner no. 2, a helpless woman, who deserved the help she received. Application allowed.