JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Plaintiff is the Appellant against a reversing judgment in a suit for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land and for confirmation of, possession or alternatively for recovery of possession of Plot Nos. 420/A and 711/A., 2. Plaintiff is the fourth son of the common ancestor Gandaram and Defendants represent Harekrushna's branch. Harekrushna's son Parikhita being Defendant No. 1 and Parikhita's children being Defendants 2 to 5. Plaintiff alleged that in the year 1928 there had been an amicable partition between the four sons of Gandaram and in the said partition, the suit properties fell to the Plaintiff's share. Plaintiff was so recorded in 1938 settlement and his other brothers were also similarly recorded in the Record-of-Rights in respect of the lands fallen to their shares. So far as Gharbari is concerned, though it was recorded jointly, yet separate possession was noted. Plaintiff further alleged that in the last settlement parcha had been issued in his favour in respect of the suit land and taking advantage of the fact that Plaintiff is an old man, the Defendants created disturbance in the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff and even constructed a house and dug a manure pit over plot No. 420/A and, therefore, the necessity for filing the present suit arose. 3. Defendants in their written statement denied the allegation of earlier partition of the year 1928 as well as separate note of possession and according to them though after the growth of the family members belonging to different branches, they are cultivating lands separately according to their convenience and are living in separate mess, but there has been no division of property by metes and bounds and, therefore, Plaintiff's suit is not maintainable. 4. On these pleadings, the learned Munsif framed as many as five issues and came to hold that the house with a cow-shed and everything were separate and dealings of the brothers were also separate and in view of admission of d. w. 1 there was no doubt that there was a partition as alleged by the Plaintiff. 4. On these pleadings, the learned Munsif framed as many as five issues and came to hold that the house with a cow-shed and everything were separate and dealings of the brothers were also separate and in view of admission of d. w. 1 there was no doubt that there was a partition as alleged by the Plaintiff. It was further found that the suit lands were in possession of the Plaintiff till the cause of action arose and though plot No. 711 appertaining to Ghar and Bari lands was recorded in the joint names of both parties, yet evidence disclosed that the Plaintiff was in possession of the suit lands even till now. On these findings, the learned Munsif decreed the suit and Plaintiff's possession over the suit lands was confirmed. 5. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge formulated the point for consideration to be as to whether there was a partition in the' year 1928 between the parties by metes and bounds and whether the suit land fell to the share of the Plaintiff and he remained in possession of the same from that time. Thereafter, on consideration of the materials on record, he came to the conclusion that there was no partition between the parties as alleged by the Plaintiff and the possession of the Plaintiff in respect of the land was only for the take of convenience. Accordingly he set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif. 6. In this Court, though there has been due service of notice of Second Appeal on the Defendants-Respondents, yet there has been no appearance on their behalf. Mr. P. K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, contends that the conclusion of the lower appellate Court on the question of partition is based on certain obvious error of law and, therefore, cannot be sustained by this Court in second appeal. 7. Partition consists in a numerical division of the property in defining the shares of the coparceners in the joint property and an actual division of the property by metes and bounds is not necessary. (See Ram Parshad Singh v. Lakhpat Koer ILR Cal. 231) If the shares are defined whether by an agreement between the parties or otherwise then the partition is complete. (See Ram Parshad Singh v. Lakhpat Koer ILR Cal. 231) If the shares are defined whether by an agreement between the parties or otherwise then the partition is complete. After the shares are defined if there has been no division of property by metes and bounds then it is the mode of enjoyment of the property that is only effected but not the tenure of the property. The property ceases to be 'joint immediately after the shares are defined. Partition means a severance of joint status and, therefore, it is a matter of individual volition. What is necessary to constitute a partition is, therefore, a definite, unequivocal indication of the intention of a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. The Supreme Court examined this point in Addagada Raghavamma and Another Vs. Addagada Chenchamma and Another Minor P. Rajendran Vs. State of Madras and Others and Smt. Krishnabai Ganaparao Deshmukh v. Appasaheb Tuliaramarao Nimbalkay and Ors. AIR 1979 S.C. 1880 , and held that to constitute severance there must be an intimation, indication or representation of such intention and what form t hat manifestation should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case. It is implicit in this principle that this manifestation or declaration of intention should be to the knowledge of the persons affected for a mere uncommunicated declaration may amount to no more than merely harbouring an intent to separate. It is immaterial in such a case, whether the other members assent. Once a member of a joint family has clearly and unequivocally intimated to the other members his desire to severe himself from the joint family, his right to obtain and possess his share is unimpeachable whether or not they agree to a separation) and there is an immediate severance of the joint status. This intention to separate may be evinced in different ways, either by explicit declaration or by conduct. There cannot be any manner of doubt that a partition can also be effected by an agreement between the parties. It has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Appovier v. Ram Subba Aivan (1866) 11 M.I.A. 75 (P.C.), that the true test of partition of property according to Hindu Law is the intention of the members of family to become separate owners. It has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Appovier v. Ram Subba Aivan (1866) 11 M.I.A. 75 (P.C.), that the true test of partition of property according to Hindu Law is the intention of the members of family to become separate owners. Intention being the real test, it follows that an agreement between the members of a joint family to hold and enjoy the property in defined shares as separate owners operates as a partition) although there may have been no actual division of the property by metes and bounds, It is no doubt true that a person who claims partition has to prove the same, but it may not be necessary in every case to prove the same by a document of partition and the burden can be discharged by other acts and conducts though standing by themselves not conclusive proof of partition yet may lead to the conclusion that there has been partition in conjunction with ether facts. Separate occupation of portions of the joint property division of the income of the joint property, definement of shares in the joint property in revenue records, independent dealings with the joint family property, are some such evidence from which a conclusion can be arrived at that there had been a partition in the family. 8. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, if the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is scrutinised it appears that the learned Subordinate Judge has committed an error of law in coming to the conclusion that the Plaintiff has failed to establish his case of partition of the year 1928. A reading of the impugned judgment indicates that the Subordinate Judge has been observed with the idea that unless there is a partition by metes and bounds and unless an Amin goes, measures and demarcates the lands) it would be a case- of separate possession according to convenience and not partition. This conclusion is totally erroneous. A reading of the impugned judgment indicates that the Subordinate Judge has been observed with the idea that unless there is a partition by metes and bounds and unless an Amin goes, measures and demarcates the lands) it would be a case- of separate possession according to convenience and not partition. This conclusion is totally erroneous. The fact that the alleged partition is of the year 1928, admission of the Defendants' witnesses that the respective branches are possessing property separately ever since then definement of their shares in revenue records, independent dealings by separate branches with the property that fell to their shares, are some of the considerations which were weighed by the learned Munsif in corning to the conclusion that the Plaintiff established his case of prior partition and the suit properties falling to Plaintiff's share. The learned Subordinate Judge has not discussed these aspects and has merely reversed the judgment on the basis of a finding" that there has been no partition by metes and bounds. In this view of the matter, the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that there was no partition in the year 1928 as alleged cannot be sustained. 9. In the net result, therefore, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court are affirmed. The Plaintiff's suit is decreed and the second appeal is allowed, but since there has been no appearance on behalf of the Defendants, there would be no order as to costs.