Order: The petitioner, against whom an ex parte order of maintenance was passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras in M.C. No.25 of 1984 filed by the respondent herein underS.125, Crl. P.C., invokes the inherent powers of this Court, to set aside the above ex parte order, on the ground that summons had been served on him, in violation ofS.62(1), Crl. P.C. and that, therefore, the entire proceedings are illegal. 2. Facts necessary for the disposal of the petition are briefly as follows: On 20.2.1984 the respondent filed by an application underS.125, Crl.P.C. claiming monthly maintenance from the respondent, on the allegation that being his legally wedded wife and having no means to maintain herself and the petitioner, having means, had failed and neglected to maintain her. Learned Magistrate took the case on file as M.C. No. 25 of 1984 and ordered issuance of notice to the respondent by registered post with acknowledgement due, fixing next date of hearing as 17.4.1984. The petitioner received the above notice by registered post on 24.3.1984 and acknowledged the same. On 17.4.1984 the petitioner did not attend Court and the learned Magistrate, on being satisfied from the acknowledgement received from the petitioner, that notice of the proceedings had been received by the petitioner, set him ex parte and passed the impugned order, awarding maintenance at Rs.300 per month. Since the petitioner did not pay maintenance, the respondent took out proceedings to execute the order and distress warrant was initially issued. The same remained unexecuted, and finally on 26.12.1985 the learned Magistrate issued a non-bailable warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. Thereafter, on 23.1.1986 the petitioner had filed this petition, invoking the inherent powers of this Court, to have ex parte order passed on 17.4.1984 set aside. 3. It is alleged on behalf of the petitioner in the affidavit that when the petitioner received the notice by registered post on 24th March, 1984, he was laid up with jaundice and typhoid and, that therefore, he could not attend Court It is also contended that service of summons on the petitioner by registered post was not legal, and that, therefore, the petitioner was not legally aware of the proceedings. The learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to set him ex parte and the procedure being irregular, the ex parte order of maintenance could not be legally sustained. 4. The learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to set him ex parte and the procedure being irregular, the ex parte order of maintenance could not be legally sustained. 4. Thiru v. Krishnamurthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, while elaborating the above legal contentions, stated thatS.62(1) , Crl.P.C, which lays down the procedure for service of summons under the Code, requires that summons should be served by a Police Officer or subject to such rules as the State Government may make in this behalf, by an Officer of the Court issuing it or other public servant Learned counsel, therefore, contended that in the instant case, summons had not been served on the petitioner by any police officer and as such, any summons sent by registered post, is contrary to the express provisions of S.62(1) , Crl.P.C, and, therefore, in law the petitioner could not be taken to have been really served with summons and that therefore should not have been set ex parte under the proviso toS.125(2), Crl.P.C. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Thulasingam v. Padmavathiammal Thulasingam v. Padmavathiammal 1963 Crl.L.J. 546. 5. Per contra, Miss, R. Vaigai, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the nature of the proceedings underS.125, Crl. P.C, was essentially different from a criminal trial the former being more of a civil nature and strict Compliance ofS.62(1), Crl. P.C, was not called for. In the instant case, it was admitted that the petitioner had, in fact, received notice from court as early as on 24th March, 1984 and had failed to appear in court or make arrangements for his appearance through counsel and, therefore, he had been rightly set ex parte. Learned counsel also contended that when there was a specific provision in S.126(2), Crl.P.C, for having the ex parte order set aside the only course open to the petitioner, should have been to file an application under the above provision and not invoke the inherent power of this Court, which could be done only in the absence of any specific provision and that too only to secure the ends of justice. The present petition therefore was not maintainable. 6. The questions that arise for consideration are: 1. The present petition therefore was not maintainable. 6. The questions that arise for consideration are: 1. Whether the service of notice to the petitioner by registered post is contrary to the provisions of the Code and if so, whether it would render, all subsequent proceedings irregular ? 2. WhenS.126(2) , Crl.P.C specifically, provided for getting ex parte orders set aside, whetherS.482, Crl.P.C. could be invoked for the above purpose? 7. It is admitted by both parties that summons had been issued by the learned Magistrate on 20.2.1984 and the next date of hearing was 17.4.1984. Summons had been sent by court, by registered post with acknowledgement due and it is also admitted by the petitioner that on 24.3.1984 he did receive the summons and acknowledge the same. On 17.4.1984 when the court below was satisfied from the acknowledgement of the petitioners that he had really been served with summons and when the Court found that the petitioner was absent, the court set him ex parte and passed the impugned order. 8. The question as to whetherS.62, Crl. P.C. would apply to proceedings under chapter 9 of the Code, would largely depend upon the nature of the proceedings contemplated underS.125, Crl.P.C. This in turn would depend upon the object with which Chapter 9 has been incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Code. The Criminal Procedure Code (for Short, the Code) is not a penal enactment. It lays down the procedure to be followed, not only in punitive trials under the penal enactments and other enactments containing penal provisions, but it also confers certain powers on Courts, Executive Authorities and Police Officers, to take certain types of action to meet certain situations, in the larger interests of the general public. Chapter 8, Crl.P.C, therefore empowers the Magistrate to take proceedings to get security for keeping the peace” and for good behaviour. Chapter 10 of the Code, for the purpose of maintaining public order and tranquillity, empowers an Executive Magistrate to take proceedings for dispersal of unlawful assembly, for removal of nuisance, issue orders under Ss.144 and 145, Crl.P.C, in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehend danger, even when they relate to disputes concerning land or water. Along with these Chapters, we find Chapter 9, empowering the Criminal Courts to award maintenance to destitute wives, children and even parents. Along with these Chapters, we find Chapter 9, empowering the Criminal Courts to award maintenance to destitute wives, children and even parents. The procedure laid down in Chapter 9 enacted as a measure of social justice has, therefore, to be essentially different from the procedure laid down in the subsequent Chapters of the Code for a punitive trial. The Supreme Court in Shri Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamala Devi Shri Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamala Devi (1975) 2 S.C.R. 483 , while referring to this Chapter, observed as follows- “The jurisdiction of a magistrate under Chapter IX of the Code is not strictly a Criminal Jurisdiction. While passing an order under that Chapter asking a person to pay maintenance to his wife, child or parent, as the case may be, the Magistrate is not imposing any punishment on such person for a crime committed by him. Chap.IX of the Code contains a summary remedy for securing some reasonable sum by way of maintenance, subject to a decree, if any, which may be made in a civil Court in a given case provided the personal law applicable to the person concerned authorises the enforcement of any such right to maintenance. The Code, however, provides a quick remedy to protect the applicant against starvation and to tide over immediate difficulties.” In a later decision in Savitri v. Shri Govind Singh Rawat Savitri v. Shri Govind Singh Rawat 1986 L.W. Crl. 1, the Supreme Court observed: “… Their object is to Compel a man to perform the moral obligation which he owes to society in respect of his wife and children… The jurisdiction conferred by the section on the Magistrate is more in the nature of a preventive rather than a remedial jurisdiction; it is certainly not punitive.” 9. Keeping in mind the object with which Chapter IX was enacted and the nature of the proceedings under it, it follows that, the rigid rules laid down for serving summons on an accused, facing a punitive trial, cannot be applied to a respondent husband called upon to discharge a moral obligation to maintain his dependants. The Kerala High Court in a recent Full Bench decision in Balan Nair v. Bhawani Balan Nair v. Bhawani 1987 Crl. The Kerala High Court in a recent Full Bench decision in Balan Nair v. Bhawani Balan Nair v. Bhawani 1987 Crl. L.J. 399 (F.B.) after considering the different provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the decisions on the aspect, has expressed the view that what is really sent to the respondent in a proceeding underS.125, Crl.P.C, could not strictly be described as “summons”, but is really in the nature of a notice or an intimation to the respondent, that a claim has been preferred against him and he is put on notice of the same. Whereas under the Code, be it a summons case or a warrant case, the accused has necessarily to be brought before Court, either through summons or through warrant, we do not find any such requirement under Chapter IX. Even Ss.113, 134 and 145 (2), Crl.P.C, require summons to be served in the manner provided under the Code, on the persons against when the executive authority proposes to take action. Chapter 9 is significantly silent. WhileS.126(2), Crl.P.C. requires that evidence in such proceedings should be taken in the presence of the person against whom an order of maintenance is proposed to be made or in the presence of his pleader the Chapter does not require that any process to Compel the attention of the respondent, should be issued. Even the “service” referred to, in the proviso to S.126(2), Crl.P.C. is not equated with summons. The respondent is put on notice that a claim has been made against him, and, if he chooses, he could appear in court and contest It is left to the respondent either to attend the court and contest or refrain from doing so. In case, the respondent chooses not to contest the proceedings and if the Court is satisfied under the proviso to S.126(2), Crl.P.C. that the respondent is either wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court. The court could set him ex parte. In a criminal trial if the accused is absent, he has to be brought before the Court, if necessary through coercive steps. An accused cannot be set ex parte, while the respondent in a proceeding underS.125, Crl.P.C. can be set ex parte if he chooses to absent himself. This marks the fundamental difference in the way in which the framers of the Code have chosen to treat the two proceedings. An accused cannot be set ex parte, while the respondent in a proceeding underS.125, Crl.P.C. can be set ex parte if he chooses to absent himself. This marks the fundamental difference in the way in which the framers of the Code have chosen to treat the two proceedings. Just as in civil case summons have to be sent to the defendants by registered post with acknowledgement due, and on receipt of summons if the defendant does not appear in court, the Civil Court has to set him ex parte and proceed to hear the claim of the plaintiff and grant relief, so too, under Chapter 9, Crl.P.C. a Criminal Court is empowered to set the respondent ex parte and proceed to hear the claim of the petitioner and grant relief. It can, therefore, be stated that what is sent to the respondent could not strictly be described as “summons”, within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code, thereby attracting S.62, Crl.P.C. The mode of giving him notice of the proceedings need not be by taking out a summon to him in Form-I described as “summons to an accused person issued under S.62(1), Crl.P.C. As already stated the respondent in an application under S.125 , Crl.P.C. is not an accused person and hence S.62, Crl.P.C, would not apply to him.” 10. It follows that in an application under S.125, Crl.P.C. causing notice to be served on the respondent, by registered post with acknowledgement due, is not illegal. The Magistrate had jurisdiction to adopt any mode of service of notice to the respondent. The decision in Thulasingam v. Padmavathiammal Thulasingam v. Padmavathiammal (1963) 2 Crl. L.J. 546, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application, to the present case, since in that case service of summons itself was disputed. In the instant case it is admitted that the petitioner did receive the notice by registered post and had also acknowledged the same. Setting the petitioner ex parte on 17.4.1984 when he failed to appear in Court, is a legal order and has to be sustained. 11. In the instant case it is admitted that the petitioner did receive the notice by registered post and had also acknowledged the same. Setting the petitioner ex parte on 17.4.1984 when he failed to appear in Court, is a legal order and has to be sustained. 11. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, viz., that it is not open to the petitioner to invoke the inherent powers of this Court under S.482, Crl.P.C. When the Code itself specifically provides a remedy in cases where the respondent is set ex parte, cannot be brushed aside as without force. S.127(2) proviso enables the respondent in such a case to apply within thirty days to have the ex parte order set aside. When there is a specific provision in the Code under which the petitioner could have sought relief, it is not now open to the petitioner, after a delay of one year and nine months, to invoke the inherent powers of this Court for the same relief. Further as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner the inherent powers of this Court ought to be exercised in promoting the interest of justice and not to defeat it the petitioner is employed in the Postal and Telegraphic Department and it is not his case that the respondent has any means to maintain herself. Application has been filed in 1984 and the petitioner had received summons and had chosen to remain ex parte. He had not taken any steps to have the ex parte order set aside. Finally when all attempts to realise the amounts through distress warrant failed, the Court was constrained to issue non-bailable warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. It is only then, that the petitioner had acted. The only plea of the petitioner is that he had no “legal knowledge” about the proceedings. This would certainly not be a fit case wherein the Court would be justified in invoking its inherent powers to set aside the order of the lower court. 12. In the result, the petition is dismissed. B.S. ----- Petition dismissed.