Judgment :- Petitioner's husband and two others had been permitted to use fifteen cents of land belonging to the second respondent in, Sy. No. 97/6/2/2 of Varapuzha Village, for running a theatre. That was in the year 1979. Subsequently the petitioner's husband acquired the rights of his partners and became the sole proprietor of the theatre. After the death of the husband in March, 1983, the petitioner was running the theatre. It is admitted that the relationship between the petitioner and the second respondent is that of licensee and licensor (vida para 5 of O.P.). Petitioner states that a theatre was accordingly put up with a total investment of Rs. 2,12,000/-. The licence agreement was from year to year in the first instance. The latest agreement (a copy of which has been produced by the second respondent as Ext. R2(a)) was however, only for a period of eleven months, expiring on 30 IM986. 2. The licence agreement Ext. R2(a) permits the petitioner and her son to exihibit cinematograph films in the theatre in the property described take away the materials and the machineries therein and to vacate the premises without raising any objection at the expiry of eleven months from January 1,1986. It is also stated that possession of the property in question continued to be with its owner, the second respondent. 3. Sometime prior to the expiry of the licence, on October 22, 1986, the second respondent issued notice, Ext. R2(b) to the petitioner and her son through lawyer, with copy to the licensing authority under the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958 namely the first respondent, stating that the licensee should surrender vacant possession of the property after demolishing and removing the temporary cinema, at the expiry of the period of licence on 30-11-1986. I may mention here that the theatre erected pursuant to the licence agreement was a "temporary cinema" as defined in Rule 3(1)(h) of the Kerala Cinemas" (Regulation) Rules, 1975 (in short, the rules ). On receipt of copy of this notice Ext. R2(b), the licensing authority, namely the Executive Officer of the Panchayat, issued the notice Ext. P1 dated 29-11-1966 to the petitioner stating that the cinematograph licence in her favour will not be renewed beyond 30-11-1986 unless she produced a consent letter from the land owner, the second respondent. 4. On receipt of copy of this notice Ext. R2(b), the licensing authority, namely the Executive Officer of the Panchayat, issued the notice Ext. P1 dated 29-11-1966 to the petitioner stating that the cinematograph licence in her favour will not be renewed beyond 30-11-1986 unless she produced a consent letter from the land owner, the second respondent. 4. At this juncture, I may mention, that Rule 23A of the Rules,- read with Rule 17 thereof, requires the applicant for renewal of a cinematograph licence to produce documentary evidence pertaining to the ownership and possession of the site, and, if he is not the owner, documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipments to the satisfaction of the licensing authority. 5. After receipt of Ext. R2(b), the petitioner had written to the first respondent oo 24-11-1986 pointing out that the land-owner-second respondent was not agreeable to continue the licence in her favour for conducting the cinema theatre, that she was indebted, that she will incur heavy loss in case the exhibition of films was stopped, and hence praying that she may be allowed to continue the theatre for some more time after 1-12-1986. This letter is seen in the files of the first respondent. Simultaneously she also filed petition Ext. P2 before the Revenue Divisional Officer, namely the 3rd respondent, requesting him to give necessary directions to the licensing authority to renew the licence in her favour. The grounds stated in this petition were that it was impossible to remove the theatre building in a short time without alternate sites being obtained, that the land-owner did not require the site for her own 'needs' and that the petitioner was in lawful possession of the site and hence entitled to renewal of the licence under "Rule 17". She supplemented this petition with a further representation Ext. P3, in which she stated that she bad, acting upon the licence, executed work of a permanent character and incurred expenses therefor, and therefore the licence was irrevocable, under S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. She also stated that she continued to be in possession of the site, of which she had come into possession lawfully. P3, in which she stated that she bad, acting upon the licence, executed work of a permanent character and incurred expenses therefor, and therefore the licence was irrevocable, under S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. She also stated that she continued to be in possession of the site, of which she had come into possession lawfully. She produced in support a statement purporting to be details of the investments made in the theatre and also a certificate from the Assistant Executive Engineer, Buildings Sub Division, Alwaye giving a description of the theatre. 6. The Revenue Divisional Officer, who heard the matter, referred to the term in the agreement Ext. R2(a) by which the licensee had undertaken to vacate the premises at the expiry of 11 months after demolishing the theatre and removing the materials and equipments and held that their continuance in the premises was in clear violation of the said undertaking and therefore their possession cannot be deemed to be lawful. The petition Ext. P2 and the representation Ext. P3 were rejected by the order Ext. P6. Petitioner challenges Exts. P1 and P6 in this original petition. 7. Petitioner claims that she has executed a work of a permanent character in the property and incurred expenses in the execution, and therefore the second respondent was not entitled to revoke the licence in her favour. The building bad been put up in the year 1979 and though it was a temporary cinema as defined in the Rules, still it was a work of a permanent character for the purpose of S.60(b) of the Easements Act. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Mohammad Abdul Jamil v. Mansoor Ahmed, AIR. 1982 Allahabad, 572, Dwarka v Gourishankar Thakur, AIR. 1943 Nagpur 77 and Gopalan Nair v. Thevi Amma Thankamma, AIR. 1969 Kerala 23, to contend that even such buildings could be treated as works of permanent character. It is the further case of the petitioner that the licence arrangement was being renewed from year to year, and lastly for II months, that the theatre had stood for over seven years as it was constructed in 1979, and that the intention of the parties was not to insist on vacant possession from the petitioner, but to allow her to go on running the theatre subject to payment of licence fee as mutually agreed upon. 8. 8. Rule 23A read with Rule 17 enables a licensee under the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act to get renewal of the licence on condition that she produces documentary evidence of lawful possession of the site. Petitioner's contention is that she had been inducted into possession lawfully under the licence agreement, and in view of the irrevocability of the licence under S.60(b) of the Easements Act, her possession continued to be lawful. Therefore, she says, the licensing authority was bound to renew the licence. The petitioner also contends relying on the decisions in Kumarappan v. Secretary, Home Department 1960, KLT. 636, and job v. Vice-President, Kothamangalam Panchayat. 1973 KLT. (SN) 23, that the landowner has no locus standi at all to object to the renewal of the licence under the Rules and that the licence ought to be renewed if other conditions are satisfied. 9. I do not feel impressed with this last submission. As stated by the Division Bench in Vamakshy v. State of Kerala (1983 KLT. 53), if the grant of licence is to be made without reference to he owner, it would result in persons without any vestige of right in the land walking away with the licence to the detriment of the owner of the land. I may point out that Rule 23A read with Rule 17 requires the applicant to establish his lawful possession of the land. It is not possible to decide this question without reference to or hearing the landowner. He is therefore entitled to object to the renewal of the licence and to be beard and unless the applicant is able to establish his lawful possession he is not entitled to renewal. 10. I do not also feel impressed with the petitioner's contention that the arrangement between the parties was one intended to be continued, so long as the theatre existed. The parties have been renewing the licence from year to year, and lastly for eleven months. If it was intended to be a permanent arrangement, as contended, one wonders why the parties should enter into successive agreements of limited duration, 11. Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the second respondent bad filed a suit O. S. No. 178 of 1987 in the Munsiff Court, Parur. If it was intended to be a permanent arrangement, as contended, one wonders why the parties should enter into successive agreements of limited duration, 11. Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the second respondent bad filed a suit O. S. No. 178 of 1987 in the Munsiff Court, Parur. wherein the question whether the petitioner is entitled to benefit under S.60(b) of the Easements Act is stated to be in issue, and that therefore, this question should be left open for decision in that suit. This argument is based on his earlier submission that the landowner has no locus standi to object to renewal of the licence and therefore, the question of applicability or otherwise of S.60(b) does not arise for decision in these proceedings. However and since I have already overruled this contention of the petitioner, I have necessarily to go into the question of any benefit arising to the petitioner under S.60(b). That was a point specifically raised and argued before me. Whether the petitioner is in lawful possession and therefore, whether she is entitled to renewal of the licence necessarily depends on the question whether the petitioner is entitled to benefit under S.60(b), I therefore, proceed to consider this aspect of the matter. 12. S.60(b) of the Easements Act renders a licence irrevocable by the grantor, if the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character, and incurred expenses in the execution. The question whether the petitioner has executed a work of a permanent character is itself disputed by the second respondent land owner. Assuming that there is such a work, the question is whether the licence in question has become irrevocable. S.60 bars the grantor for revoking a licence, in the circumstances specified in clause (b) thereof. However, if the parties themselves have entered into an agreement, for the licence to expire or terminate by efflux of time; or on the happening of any particular event or contingency, S.60(b) doss not apply. S.60 bars the grantor for revoking a licence, in the circumstances specified in clause (b) thereof. However, if the parties themselves have entered into an agreement, for the licence to expire or terminate by efflux of time; or on the happening of any particular event or contingency, S.60(b) doss not apply. This is because quite apart from the law of easements and licences, the parties are at liberty to enter into any contract of their choice, and when they have arrived at a solemn agreement that the licence shall be only for a particular duration or shall stand terminated on a particular eventuality or contingency, the licensee is bound by the engagement, and shall not be entitled to continue the licence in derogation of the contract. Such termination of licence as under the terms of the contract between the parties, is not a "revocation" of the licence by the grantor under S.60, but one relatable to the agreement. The rule of irrevocability has its foundation on the principle of 'an implied grant, and there fore has no operation when there is an express contract between the parties. It was not pointed out to me, and so far as I am aware, there is no provision in the Easements Act or elsewhere which precludes parties from entering into any such agreement. Such a contract is not vitiated or rendered invalid in any manner even if it makes inroads into the conditions of irrevocability provided in S.60. 13. The High Court of Allahabad dealt with this question in Bhaewauna. Sheikh Anwaruzzaman 1980 Allahabad Law Journal 368. The transaction in that case was of the year 1929, and thereunder a piece of land "was taken for raising a house and for keeping a malba" and others. The grantee, who had undertaken to vacate the land whenever it was needed by the owner and to remove the malba sought protection under S.60(b). The court overruled the flea and held that the licensee was bound by the terms of his solemn undertaking and precluded from seeking irrevocability of the licence under S.60(b). The grantee, who had undertaken to vacate the land whenever it was needed by the owner and to remove the malba sought protection under S.60(b). The court overruled the flea and held that the licensee was bound by the terms of his solemn undertaking and precluded from seeking irrevocability of the licence under S.60(b). After referring to certain decisions of that Court, A. Banerji, J. observed: "It is therefore, clear from the above that where there are certain terms whether in a rent note or a quabuliate or in any other such paper and it limits the right of a licensee while making a construction of a piece of land owned by the other party, he is bound by the terms thereof. If he has undertaken to vacate the land on the happening of some event„ then he is precluded from raising the plea that his constructions are protected by virtue of S.60(b) of the Easements Act. The undertaking given by the licensee is a solemn undertaking and I see no reason why should a court lean in favour of such a person to flout the under taking. In my opinion, that would not be an action guided by justice, good conscience or even equity. The undertaking given by such a person would be binding on him and he would be estopped from pleading to the contrary. " 14. Madholkar, J. (as he then was) of the Bombay High Court had upheld the validity of a contract between parties by which they had agreed that the licence will be irrevocable. The grantor had contended contrary to agreement, that the licence was revocable on the ground that irrevocability attached only to the two classes of cases mentioned in S.60 and no more. The learned judge observed: 'In my opinion, the argument advanced by the learned Counsel is not sound. It is no doubt true that S.60 mentions only two classes of cases in which the licence could be regarded as irrevocable. This means that where a case falls in either of these categories the licence is made irrevocable by operation of law, that is the Easements Act. It is no doubt true that S.60 mentions only two classes of cases in which the licence could be regarded as irrevocable. This means that where a case falls in either of these categories the licence is made irrevocable by operation of law, that is the Easements Act. But apart from the Easements Act, there is the law of contract, and if parties enter into a contract and arrive at a solemn agreement to the effect that the licence shall be irrevocable or shall be limited for a particular duration, it follows that the licensor will be bound by his engagement and will not be entitled to terminate the licence or revoke the licence at his sweet will and pleasure." To hold otherwise, it was stated "would be nothing else than putting the seal of approval of the court to a breach of contract" (Souza v. Childrens E. U. Society, AIR. 1959 Bombay 533). 15. the position is well summarised by Katiyar in bis treatise on the Law of Easements and Licences (Tenth Edition) as follows at page 895: 'As the rule (of irrevocability) is based on the principle of an implied grant arising from,the conduct of the licensor which estops him from claiming his right of revocation, it applies only in cases of grants of an unlimited character by persons possessing an unlimited power of disposition. But where the power of disposition is limited in character or duration, or where the right of revocation is expressly reserved, or where the licence is granted only for a limited term, or where the act licensed is found to have such injurious consequences as could not have been contemplated by the licensor in its inception, or where there are any other circumstances which make the inference of an irrevocable grant or the application of the principle of estoppel by conduct impossible, or at any rate improbable, this rule does not apply." (See also Mukammed Ziaul Haque v. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, 55 Cal. W.N. 232). The petitioner has expressly undertaken in Ext. R2(a) to demolish the theatre and vacate the premises on the expiry of the term of the licence. This agreement is binding on her and precludes her from claiming the benefit of S.60(b). The claim based on S.60(b) of the Easements Act has therefore, to fail. 16. W.N. 232). The petitioner has expressly undertaken in Ext. R2(a) to demolish the theatre and vacate the premises on the expiry of the term of the licence. This agreement is binding on her and precludes her from claiming the benefit of S.60(b). The claim based on S.60(b) of the Easements Act has therefore, to fail. 16. The petitioner relied on the decision of this court in Jacob v. Executive Officer, 1981 KLT. 742 to contend that in similar circumstances this court had upheld the claim of a cinematograph licensee to have his licence renewed, on the basis of irrevocability of the licence of the site under S.60(b) of the Easements Act. Balagangadharan Nair, J. held that when the theatre owner is entitled to continue to use the premises by virtue of the protection afforded by S.60(b) of the Easements Act, his possession roust be treated as lawful for the purpose of renewal of the cinematograph licence. The applicability of this decision therefore depends on whether the theatre owner is entitled to protection under S.60(b) or not. The statement of facts contained in the said decision shows that there was dispute between the parties as to whether there was any time limit for the licence. The facts do not disclose that the licensee therein had undertaken to demolish the structures and to vacate the premises at any particular time as in this case. According to roe, this makes all the difference. Further the question whether S.60(b) could apply to licenses for a term was not raised or dealt with in that case. The decision in Jacob's case is not therefore applicable, or of any assistance to the petitioner. 17. If the petitioner is not entitled to any protection under S.60(b), it has to be held that his possession after the expiry of the terra of the licence is not lawful. It is an accepted proposition of the law that the possession of a licensee is only such possession as is required to enable him to use the premises for the purposes permitted. Apart from that in Ext. R2(a) itself it is agreed that the possession of the land in question continues to be with the second respondent. In these circumstances. I am unable to accede to the petitioner's contention that she is in possession of the land, and that her possession is lawful. Apart from that in Ext. R2(a) itself it is agreed that the possession of the land in question continues to be with the second respondent. In these circumstances. I am unable to accede to the petitioner's contention that she is in possession of the land, and that her possession is lawful. When she has no juridical possession, and the term of the licence has expired, her continuance to use the premises for exhibiting cinematograph films will not be lawful. 18. Counsel for the second respondent had a contention that the "appeal" Ext. P2 filed by the petitioner was not maintainable under S.5(7) of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958 and that in any event the petitioner bad an effective alternate remedy by way of revision to the District Collector under S.5(8) of the said Act. He also contended that in any event, renewal of the licence was not automatic and hence the petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed for. I do not however, find it necessary to adjudicate on these points in the view that I have taken about the petitioner's rights. The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed without however, any order as to costs.