JUDGMENT The Contempt of Court Act, 1971 has been engrafted in the Statute Book only for the purpose of bringing in a feeling of confidence of the people in general that violation of the orders of court would not go unheeded. It is a statute which provides that if order of the courts are disobeyed, Law Courts have the power to punish the offender. It is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of the Courts but it must not be exercised without proper caution and in cases for the larger interest of the administration of justice and the Contempt of Court Act has been enacted in order to strike a balance between the rights of as individual and the interest of administration of justice. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 has used the expression "wilful disobedience or wilful breach". The Act, therefore, recognised as Act of contempt only in the event of there being a wilful disobedience. The issue, therefore, in the present context is, as to whether there is any wilful disobedience of the order of this Court? 2. It is at this juncture that the facts ought to be dealt with before proceeding further in the matter. 3. The applicants moved an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India being C.R. No. 692(W) of 1983 against the National Textile Corporation (W.B.A.B. & O.) and others having a grievance that the staff and sub-staff working at the mill premises are being discriminated against the staff and sub-staff on the Head Office. This Court on 21st March, 1986 disposed of the above noted writ application with the following observations:- "In the result, there is substance as regard the grievance of the writ petitioners and to redress the same, in my view, would be a plain exercise of judicial power and the law courts would be failing in its duties not to come in said where the grievances have been substantiated by positive evidence of inaction or non-action of the respondent-authority, though for the interest of justice the mandatory order probably would have served best, but by reason of some procedural aspect, the matter is sent back to the respondent-authority for consideration of the matter with utmost explanation so as to ameliorate the grievance of the petitioner in the light of the observation made herein." 4. Subsequently, however, an appeal was preferred from the order passed herein but since no step was being taken by the appellants/respondents herein, the petitioner mentioned the matter before this court for implementation of the orders of this court. The respondents, however obtained an extension of time to consider and the matter was eventually considered said to be in terms of the order of this court dated 21st March, 1986. It is this order which is said to be an act of contemtuous disregard of this court's order in the application for contempt moved by the petitioner. 5. The principal contention in this application for contempt is that the respondents, as a matter of fact, has sat on appeal over the judgment of this court and in any event, deliberately violated the order by circumvention in the garb of consideration of the matter in terms of the order. Circumvention of an order, if deliberate or wilful, whether can be termed to be a contumacious conduct would be presently dealt with, but before so doing, relevant extracts of the order and the true nature and purport thereof for which the matter was sent back to the respondent authority for consideration is set out hereinbelow. "In quality amongst the members of the staff as regards the employees of the Head Office and the Mills is the key point for consideration in this writ petition. It is now well-settled that equal pay for equal work ought to be the guilding factors in the matter of determination of scale and grade. Admittedly there is a desparity in the total emoluments in the matter of Mill's staff and Head Office staff. In a socialistic State desparity of income amongst the same class of employees cannot and ought not to be allowed to continue, simply because one is fortunate enough to be associated with the head office working in an identical fashion and manner than his counter part at the mills that would not entitle the fortunate one to have more fat pay packet at the end of the month. The action, in my view, is contrary to the socialistic approach. The contention of the respondent that employees at the head office from a class by themselves and question of discrimination would not arise neither would any desparity said to arise by reason of such classification cannot be accepted. The action, in my view, is contrary to the socialistic approach. The contention of the respondent that employees at the head office from a class by themselves and question of discrimination would not arise neither would any desparity said to arise by reason of such classification cannot be accepted. The classification, if any, between the head office employees and the mills staff is wholly misconceived. There cannot be any such classification, whether they are employee of the mills or the head office, they ought to be known as the employees of the National Textile Corporation provided of course they are discharging similar responsibilities either at the mill or at the head office. In the result, there is substance as regards the grievances of the writ petitioners and to redress the same, in my view would be a plain exercise of judicial power and the Law Courts would be failing in its duties not to come in aid where grievances have been substantiated by positive evidence of inaction or non-action of the respondent authority. Though in the interest of justice a mandatory order probably would have served best but by reason of some procedural aspect, the matter is sent back to the respondent authority for consideration of the matter with utmost expedition so as to ameliorate the grievance of the petitioners in the light of the observations made herein. The Rule is disposed of accordingly." 6. Subsequently on the factual aspect the matter has been dealt with by the respondent and while dealing with the matter as appears from the intimation dated 24/27th October, 1986, the respondent noted that in order to ascertain similar responsibilities the following ought to be taken into account to come to a decision on the point of equal work; i) All things are equal; ii) All relevant considerations are the same; iii) Absence of dis-similar functions; iv) Absence of dis-similar powers; v) Absence of dis-similar duties. vi) Absence of dis-similar responsibilities; vii) Posts are the same rank and the nomenclature of the same will not be the criteria for equal pay for equal work. 7. It was further noted that each individual Mill before the nationalisation was a distinct and separate entity and had their respective pay pattern at the Mills and the city offices. vi) Absence of dis-similar responsibilities; vii) Posts are the same rank and the nomenclature of the same will not be the criteria for equal pay for equal work. 7. It was further noted that each individual Mill before the nationalisation was a distinct and separate entity and had their respective pay pattern at the Mills and the city offices. There were basically two categories of employees, viz., staff and sub-staff working in those Undertaking-both at the mill and at the city offices and in almost all the Undertakings the terms and conditions of service including the grades and scales of pay of the employees working in the City office are materially different from the employees working in the mills and the same were basically on the fact that the duties, responsibilities and functions are materially different at the mills from the city offices. The respondents further took recourse to section 14 of the Sick Textile Undertakings & Nationalisation Act in the above noted order and stated that as per section 14, the employment of certain employees would continue as that of the Notional Textile Corporation and the said employees shall hold office in the Corporation with the same rights and privilege as to pension gratuity and other matter as would have been admissible to them, it the rights in relation to such Sick Textile Undertakings had not been transferred to and vested in National Textile Corporation and shall continue to do so unless and until the employment is duly terminated or altered by the Corporation. The respondents further stated that the conditions of service including the grades and scales of pay applicable to staff and sub-staff working in all the Textile Mills of West Bengal are governed by Cotton Textile Award dated 27th May, 1958 passed by the First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal followed by Wage Board recommendations of 1959-60 and the Tripartite Settlement between the Management and vendors of Central Units of Textile Industries and Government of West Bengal. It is further stated that in all 18 mills were nationalised of which 14 mills are in the State of West Bengal and all the 14 mills are being paid in terms of the Textile Award followed by the Wage Board Recommendations and industry wise settlements. It is further stated that in all 18 mills were nationalised of which 14 mills are in the State of West Bengal and all the 14 mills are being paid in terms of the Textile Award followed by the Wage Board Recommendations and industry wise settlements. The respondent further rely upon the tripartite settlement dated 18th March, 1977 followed by bipartite settlement dated 13th May, 1978 and tripartite settlement dated 3rd August, 1982. 8. In the order dated 24/27th October, 1986, the respondents intimated that the legal position is now well-settled that the wage structure has to be fixed on the basis of Industrial Cum-Region having due regard to the financial capacity of the unit under consideration and the said position has been reiterated in the case of (1) Kamini Metal & Alloys Limited v. Their workmen, (1967) 2 LLJ 55 . The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Remington Rand of India v. Their Workmen was also taken recourse to in the order. The respondents further drew a comparable picture with the Jute Textile Industry and noted as follows :- "In the Jute Textile Industry it appears that in public and private Jute Industry also there is desparity between mill staff and the city head office staff. (emphasis supplied) The respondents thereafter detailed out the work elements in the mill as well as the work element in the head office. In conclusion the respondents stated that the financial capacity to pay ought to be looked into and added. "It is also evident that the work in the mill is limited for a particular unit cerelated with the functioning of the mill and no analogy whatsoever can be drawn with the working in the head office. The work in the mill is also limited to the 8 hours shift duty and the wages are also correlated with the same. There is material difference between the work in the mill and in the head office viewed from the context of nature of work and the responsibility. The differences as already shown was a pre-existing one before nationalisation and basically the same is due to the fact that the Textile Award and the sub-subsequent settlement govern the grades and scales in the mills whereas the same is not the case in the head office which is governed by bi-partite/tripartite settlements. The differences as already shown was a pre-existing one before nationalisation and basically the same is due to the fact that the Textile Award and the sub-subsequent settlement govern the grades and scales in the mills whereas the same is not the case in the head office which is governed by bi-partite/tripartite settlements. Reference may be made to M/s. Mohini Mills (not nationalised yet) where the difference exists in respect of grades and scales and total emoluments of the staff on the head office and the mills. The said differences have assumed the character of condition of service. Historically practically and from the chain of events resulting in nationalisation there is no escape from the fact that the difference is governed by and based upon germane grounds. If the concept of nomenclature is extended to the extent the persons where-ever posted having the same nomenclature would be paid equally would lead to a position of absurdity which is not possible, factually und legally." It is evident that there are no similarities between the functions, duties and responsibilities of the staff and sub-staff at the head office with the staff and sub-staff at the mills and if the company is required to bring about parity although the principle of equal pay for equal work has no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the case the same would involve and heavy and unusual financial burden which the company can hardly bear and the existence of the mills which have already lost their economic viability and which were taken over as Sick Textile Undertakings would be in serious jeopardy and the said consideration is a primary factor to be reckoned with and kept in view. It is apparent that this may affect the other subsidiaries of this corporation situated in different regions of the country. Not only this, it may have very wide repercussions on other State Government Central Government Industries also. From the aforesaid it will be evident that the employees of the mills and those of the head office are not equally situate; and their duties, functions and responsibilities are totally dissimilar. The two groups do not belong to the same class of employees nor do they work in identical fashion or manner nor do they discharge similar responsibilities. From the aforesaid it will be evident that the employees of the mills and those of the head office are not equally situate; and their duties, functions and responsibilities are totally dissimilar. The two groups do not belong to the same class of employees nor do they work in identical fashion or manner nor do they discharge similar responsibilities. As such the position of the two groups of employees is not comparable and the question of inequality or disparity or discrimination between the two groups of employees does not arise. Thus having all regards to the judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Umesh Chandra Banerjee and in view of the facts mentioned above the management of NTC (WBABO) Ltd. having considered the different pros and cons of the matter, is not in a position to concede to your demands i.e. parity in the scale of pay with subsidiary head office staff and sub-staff for the reasons state above." 9. It is this order which has been very strongly commented upon by Mr. Chakraborty appearing for the applicants and in my view, rightly so, since the finding of the court has already been arrived at as regards the existence of a desparity. Plain reading of the order in effect can be termed to be an Appellate Order as has been submitted by Mr. Chakraborty. Is it conceivable that after a finding of this court that there exists a desparity between the Head Office and the Mill staff and sub-staff, the person concerned has the jurisdiction to pass an order stating therein that there exists no desparity. In my view the answer ought to be in the negative. 10. The issue, therefore, arises as to whether the Managing Director and the Director (Personnel) are guilty of contemtuous conduct within the meaning of Contempt of Court Act, 1971? Can it be said that there was an intentional circumvention of the court order and that the alleged contemnors have in fact sat on appeal over the judgment of this Court and by passed the order of the High Court? The other issue which also arise for consideration in this application is whether circumvention of the order of this court falls evenly and squarely within the ambit of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 so as to confer jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter appropriately? 11. Dr. The other issue which also arise for consideration in this application is whether circumvention of the order of this court falls evenly and squarely within the ambit of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 so as to confer jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter appropriately? 11. Dr. Banerjee appearing for the alleged contemners submitted that question of committing contempt would not arise since the matter has been considered by the respondents in accordance with the order of this Court. Mr. Chakraborty, on the other hand, submitted that dealing with the matter in the manner as it has been done by the alleged contemnors to a gross violation of the order and as a matter of fact the respondents have transgressed the limit and jurisdiction since there is no scope of a finding that there is no desparity existing between the staff and sub-staff of the Mill and the Head Office. It was submitted that this court remitted the matter back to the respondent authority for consideration of the matter not with a cryptic order, but this court directed that the matter ought to be dealt with in the light of the observations made in the judgment. Therefore, it was submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that it is a deliberate attempt to whittle down the orders of this court by sitting on appeal over the judgment that there is in fact such a desparitly which Mr. Chakraborty submitted, amounts to a gross contempt of this court. It is now well-settled that in the event the court comes to a finding that there is in fact scant respect or in the event there is delay in complying with the order to defect the court's order by adoption of ingeneous devices and subterfuges, the court can take proceedings for contempt against that particular person Vide in (3) Shrikrishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1981) 4 SCC 419 . 12. The Supreme Court in the case of (4) Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta, (1983)4 SCC 125 observed that it is the right and interest of the public in the due administration of justice that has to be protected. The same view was also expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of (5) Advocate-General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries Ltd., (1980) 3 SCC 311 . The same view was also expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of (5) Advocate-General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries Ltd., (1980) 3 SCC 311 . In that decision the Supreme Court further observed: "It may be necessary to punish as a contempt of Courts of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extend its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest and abiding and a real interest and a vital step in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is peril of all rights and liberty perishing. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for the Contempt of Court not in order to protect the dignity of the court against interest or injury as the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public with the administration of justice shall not be prevented, pre-judiced, obstructed or interfered with. It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage. The law should not be seem to sit by imply while those would defy to go gree and those who seeks protection loose hope." 13. While it is true that the matter has been remitted back to the Respondents for consideration but there was no doubt whatsoever as to the extent of consideration by the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. "To amelieorate the grievances of the petitioners" and "in the light of the observations made above" go to suggest the extent and the limited jurisdiction, since the court has already found that there exists a desparity between the mills’ staff and head office staff. Question of further taking to account of the stock of the situation and pass an order that there is no desparity does not and cannot arise. Error in the exercise of jurisdiction is not to be confused with the lack of jurisdiction. The matter has been dealt with by the opposite party No. 5 in a manner contrary to the order passed by this court. Error in the exercise of jurisdiction is not to be confused with the lack of jurisdiction. The matter has been dealt with by the opposite party No. 5 in a manner contrary to the order passed by this court. It is, therefore, to be noted as to whether this is a subterfuge or a devise to frustrate the order of the court does that mean that the opposite party No. 5 can in fact go into the issue over again in a manner as it has sought to have been done. Jugglery of words and narration of detailed functions have been introduced with a deliberate motive to avoid the rigorus of the High Court order. Another redeeming feature is the withdrawal of the appeal. 14. On this aspect of the matter. I find sufficient justification in Mr. Chakraborty's submission that withdrawal of the appeal is a factor which ought not to be ignored by the court while dealing with the application for contempt. It was further submitted that the respondents on a second thought withdrew the appeal only because of the fact that they would be taking an unnecessary chance before the Appeal Court when in fact they can by themselves in the garb of consideration nullify the effect of the order. The conduct of the respondent justify such a submission. 15. In the first blush the opposite party thought it fit to prefer an appeal against the order. But subsequently opposite party obviously thought it fit to abandon the appeal since the order of the High Court can be trifled with by a dubious method in the grab of consideration of the matter. Faith and belief in the administration ought to be the key note in a socialistic country like ours. Contra belief would lead to a situation which cannot be termed to be palatable. The whole approach of the opposite parties seem to review the entire order of the High Court and sit on judgment over it which is not permissible for the administration of justice. The concept of justice cannot be restricted on a straitjacket formula but it must rise to the occasion whenever justice demands it to be so. The whole approach of the opposite parties seem to review the entire order of the High Court and sit on judgment over it which is not permissible for the administration of justice. The concept of justice cannot be restricted on a straitjacket formula but it must rise to the occasion whenever justice demands it to be so. The state of mind of the opposite parties in the matter of preferring the appeal and subsequent withdrawal thereof would go to show as to whether there was any intent to abide by the order of the court. According to me, the intent as depicted in the conduct of the opposite party would exhibit otherwise than to abide by the decision of this Court. 16. Simply because of the fact the Contempt of Court Act uses expression "wilful disobedience of the Court's order" does that mean that if there is a deliberate circumvention and dubious method adopted with ingenious brain-wave, the courts are powerless to proceed against the person adopting such a method? In my view, the answer ought to be in the negative. The prime consideration for the court is for administration of justice and to create a feeling in the mind of the public in general that law courts exist for such an administration and any departure therefrom would confer on the court the power to punish an offender who seeks to throttle the course of justice by adoption of unknown unfair and dubious methods. The order of the opposite party No. 2 suggests that the matter has been dealt with after very careful consideration-even reported decisions of the courts of law have been taken recourse to justify his conduct. I am afraid, law courts are concerned mainly with the contempt of justice-not the method of avoiding the justice. 17. Contempt of Court Act does not curb power of the High Court to punish the offender in the event such a punishment is required for the purpose of administration of justice. This power though to be exercised with utmost caution and sparingly for the ends of justice but that does not mean and imply that voidance of a judicial process would be permissible, if done intentionally to bring the orders of the High Court into a mockery. This is exactly what the opposite parties have done in the case under consideration. This power though to be exercised with utmost caution and sparingly for the ends of justice but that does not mean and imply that voidance of a judicial process would be permissible, if done intentionally to bring the orders of the High Court into a mockery. This is exactly what the opposite parties have done in the case under consideration. It is a deliberate attempt to reduce the order of the court into mockery and in my view, Contempt of Court Act, does not in any way limit the exercise of powers of the High Court to punish an offender in the event of there being such a state of affairs. 18. Judicial decorum, however, prompts me to record the submission of Mr. Chakraborty that even assuming the work element in the mill as well as head office are correct, in that event as well, the order of the respondent No. 5 on its merit does not stand to reason. A clerk in the mill discharges the function of a clerk as is entrusted to him and peculiar to the mills. The clerk in the head office also discharges the function as is entrusted to him peculiar to the head office. But both of them discharge the clerical function and as such cannot be said to form a separate class from the other. The duty is clerical in nature both at the mills and at the head office. As such, on his own showing the order cannot stand. I however express no opinion on that score in this application for contempt. 19. The conduct of the contemners ought to be considered with a serious note and it would be a travesty of justice if the court allow such a conduct to go unpunished without an adequate sentence. It is not a judicial hypersensitivity but by reason of the method adopted to thwart the course of justice that has prompted this court to come to such a finding. There is no mitigating circumstances whatsoever in the case under consideration-neither any attempt has been made on the part of the contemners. 20. Since however there is no sufficient evidence in regard to contumacious conduct on the part of the respondent Numbers 2 and 3 viz. Sri G.K. Roy Chairman-cum-Managing Director and Sri N. Bose, Manager, Administration and Industrial Relations. There is no mitigating circumstances whatsoever in the case under consideration-neither any attempt has been made on the part of the contemners. 20. Since however there is no sufficient evidence in regard to contumacious conduct on the part of the respondent Numbers 2 and 3 viz. Sri G.K. Roy Chairman-cum-Managing Director and Sri N. Bose, Manager, Administration and Industrial Relations. National Textile Corporation (WBAB & O), the Rule is discharged as against the above noted respondents. 21. I however commit Mr. M. Chakraborty Director (Personnal and Administration) for Contempt of Court and sentence the contemner to simple imprisonment for a period of seven days 2nd to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine, the contemner would undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of seven days. 22. Let a copy of the ordering portion be forwarded to the Deputy Sheriff of this court in course of this day for taking necessary action and record. 23 The Inspector of Police is directed to arrange for necessary conveyance and escort. Prayer for stay of operation of this order made but refused.