JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 4-8-1986 passed by learned Single Judge in M. P. No. 3766 of 1985 allowing the writ petition and setting aside the orders of termination of services of the respondents and directing that they be treated as continuing in service as Aarakshaks (Constables ). ( 2. ) APPELLANT No. 1, Director General of Police, issued an advertisement dated 24-4-1984 inviting applications from persons to be appointed as Aarakshaks in government Railway Police. The posts were temporary having a scale of pay of Rs. 515-800. Candidates were required to appear for their test and interview with their original testimonials before the Selection Board consisting of appellant No. 2, Superintendent of railway Police, and two Deputy Superintendents of Police. These 26 respondents had applied for the posts and they had undergone physical and medical tests and were also personally interviewed by the Selection Board. These respondents were selected and appointment orders were issued on 14-8-1984 appointing them as Aarakshak temporarily until further orders, liable to be terminated by giving one months notice. Thereafter the respondents joined their places of posting and served in Government railway Police for about 15 months. In the meanwhile complaints were received about serious irregularities committed in selecting the respondents and that large amounts were paid to the then Superintendent of Railway Police, medical test was not got done by Civil Surgeon but by an Assistant Surgeon against the rule for which also money was paid. The matter was enquired into by the Vigilance Department and though no evidence was led to show that money actually passed but there were serious irregularities committed in selecting the candidates. Those candidates who did not pass the requisite tests were given appointment orders. In view of this report, the appellant no. 2 terminated the services of the respondents on 29-11-1985 by offering one months salary in lieu of notice. ( 3. ) THESE 26 respondents filed the writ petition challenging order of termination of their services. According to them, most of them have passed Higher Secondary examination and some of them are Graduates and Post-Graduates. 2 terminated the services of the respondents on 29-11-1985 by offering one months salary in lieu of notice. ( 3. ) THESE 26 respondents filed the writ petition challenging order of termination of their services. According to them, most of them have passed Higher Secondary examination and some of them are Graduates and Post-Graduates. They were duly selected for being appointed as Aarakshaks in clear vacancies on permanent posts and they had worked honestly and diligently in their posts for more than 15 months and no adverse remark was communicated to any one of them, but their services have been terminated arbitrarily without affording any opportunity to show cause merely because there were some lapses or irregularities in the selection and there is violation of principles of natural justice and offends Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as their jun iors are still continuing in service. Their termination amounts to punishment. The respondents have become overage and they could not have been penalised for the irregularities committed by the Selection Board. There is mala fide exercise of power by the appellant No. 1 at whose instance services have been terminated. The respondents have not been given one months salary in lieu of one months notice. ( 4. ) THE appellants in their return submitted that Aarakshaks are to be recruited under Regulation No. 50-B of M. P. Police Regulations as per rules and orders issued by the State Government from time to time. The State Government issued a notification dated 12-5-1980 requiring that candidates for the post of Aarakshak should undergo two types of tests, first relating to physical fitness and endurance and the other relating to personal interview, each test carrying 100 marks. To qualify for being selected, a candidate must secure 60% of marks in both the tests. The appellants appended with the return a chart showing that none of the respondents, except respondent No. 25 Rishi kumar Yadav, qualified in the tests and as such none of them could have been selected for being appointed as Aarakshaks. After the appointments were made, reports were received by the Director General that the Government rules and instructions were not followed in giving appointment orders and there were gross irregularities committed. Candidates were selected who did not get 60% of marks in the tests as required. After the appointments were made, reports were received by the Director General that the Government rules and instructions were not followed in giving appointment orders and there were gross irregularities committed. Candidates were selected who did not get 60% of marks in the tests as required. The matter was enquired into by the Vigilance Department and the complaints were found to be true and, therefore, the services of the respondents were terminated as per appointment order by giving one moqths salary in lieu of notice and under Rule 12 of m. P. Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi Permanent) Rules, 1950. Some of the respondents received the payment, other refused and they would be paid when they come to demand the same. Since the posts were temporary, the respondents were not entitled to any show cause notice. Besides, the appointments itself being irregular and contrary to Government instructions, the respondents got no right under such invalid appointment orders. No irregularities were found in respect of selection of candidates for the reserved quota of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. There is no mala fide exercise of power by the appellants. None of the respondents were found outstanding workers and there were complaints against them. ( 5. ) THE learned Single Judge found that the respondents were appointed temporarily but on clear vacant permanent posts and their services were abruptly terminated by the impugned order without giving any show cause notice or an opportunity of being heard in that behalf on the ground that the selection was irregular and inconsistent with the recruitment rules which are nothing but executive instructions. Non-compliance with such instructions does not vitiate the selection. In any case, the services have been terminated by violation of principles of natural justice. By citing several decisions of the Supreme Court it was observed that in administrative matters also the executive must act fairly and consistently with the rules of natural justice. Articles 14 and 16 strike at the arbitrariness. Even if there is no rule for giving show cause notice, such a requirement is implicit. The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is fully applicable here. The appellant No. 2 had the authority to make the appointments and the services could not have been terminated without giving any notice to show cause. The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is fully applicable here. The appellant No. 2 had the authority to make the appointments and the services could not have been terminated without giving any notice to show cause. Merely because the appointments were contrary to executive instructions, the same cannot be cancelled automatically. Respondent No. 25 Rishi Kumar Yadav had qualified in both the tests by securing more than 60% of marks and it is true that he did not produce any document to show his NCC record for which he was given 10 marks but in any case the appointment of respondent No. 25 cannot be said to be inconsistent with the recruitment rules. ( 6. ) AFTER having heard the parties, we are of the opinion that the appeal has to be allowed. Shri Rajendra Tiwari learned Dy. Advocate General contended that the notification dated 12-5-1980 issued under Regulation No. 50-B has the same force as the regulation itself and the respondents could not have been appointed as they did not get qualifying marks of 60% in both the tests. Since the appointments were invalid, the same could be set aside and gave no right to the respondents. So there was no question of giving any show cause notice. In any case, the appointments were on the temporary posts sanctioned for one year only and could be terminated at any time by giving one months notice or salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 25 got 67 marks in physical fitness and endurance test and 60 marks in the interview including 10 marks for NCC but no certificate has been produced even by way of rejoinder to the writ petition to make him eligible to get additional 10 marks. If these 10 marks are deducted, then he also did not qualify. Shri V. S. Shroti learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the instructions issued under Regulation 50-B on 12-5-1980 are merely executive instructions and have no statutory force. Even if the appointments were in violation of those instructions, the same would not be rendered invalid. Regulation 53 lays down the requisite qualifications which the respondents possess. Since civil consequences followed from the termination of their services, the respondents were entitled to show cause notice before terminating their services. Even if the appointments were in violation of those instructions, the same would not be rendered invalid. Regulation 53 lays down the requisite qualifications which the respondents possess. Since civil consequences followed from the termination of their services, the respondents were entitled to show cause notice before terminating their services. After serving for over 15 months successfully, their services could not be terminated as the appellants are estopped by the principle of promissory estoppel since the respondents have now become overage. ( 7. ) IT appears that the learned Single Judge assumed that the respondents were appointed temporarily on permanent vacancies merely on the assertion of the respondents without any document being placed on record. Their appointment order shows that they were appointed temporarily until further orders and could be terminated at any time by giving one months notice. In this appeal the appellants have produced the Government order showing creation of the posts of Aarakshak for one year only. Even if this document is ignored, the appointment order shows that the appointments were temporary. Under the appointment orders, the services of the respondents could be terminated by giving one months notice which has been done. This is also the requirement of M. P. Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-permanent) Rules, 1960, of giving one months notice or salary in lieu thereof. Under rule 2 (d) "temporary service" means officiating or substantive service in a temporary post and officiating service in a permanent post under State Government. So even if the respondents were appointed temporarily in permanent posts, still they were temporary servants. The Supreme Court in P. L. Dhingra vs. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 36 has held as under : - "if the servant has no right to the post, as where he is appointed to a post, permanent or temporary either on probation or on an officiating basis and whose temporary service has not ripened into a quasi-permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, the termination of his employment does not deprive him of any right and cannot, therefore, by itself be a punishment. One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. If he had a right to the post, the termination of his service will by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the protection of Art. 311. " Therefore, the services of the respondents were validly terminated by order dated 20-11-1985 as the respondents have no right to hold the posts and as per appointment orders their services could be terminated by giving one months notice. ( 8. ) REGULATION 50-B of M. P. Police Regulations lays down that Constables have to be selected as per procedure to be laid down by the Government rules and orders. By notification dated 12-5-1980 the State Government directed that each candidate has to undergo two tests, one physical fitness and endurance test and the other personal interview. He has to secure 60% marks in each test to qualify himself for being selected. The notification issued under Regulation 50-B has the same force as the Regulation itself and was binding. Admittedly, none of the respondents, except respondent No. 25 rishi Kumar Yadav, qualified in me test. Though the respondent No. 25 got 67 marks in physical fitness and endurance test and 60 marks in the interview which included 10 marks for NCC but he did not produce any certificate showing his entitlement for the additional marks. Even by way of rejoinder in the writ petition such a certificate was not filed, so if these 10 marks are deducted, he also did not qualify for being selected. Personnel of the Police Department have tobe a disciplined force and a candidate must succeed in the strict physical fitness and endurance test to qualify himself for the appointment, that was the purpose of the notification dated 12-5-1980. The government cannot be forced to take persons who did not fulfil the requisite qualifications. What has been done by the impugned order is the cancellation of the appointments itself which were invalid, being contrary to the Government instructions issued under Regulation No. 50-B. The appointments being invalid, it gave no right to the respondents to hold the posts. The government cannot be forced to take persons who did not fulfil the requisite qualifications. What has been done by the impugned order is the cancellation of the appointments itself which were invalid, being contrary to the Government instructions issued under Regulation No. 50-B. The appointments being invalid, it gave no right to the respondents to hold the posts. A Division Benoh of this Court in Bherusingh vs. State 1986 MPLJ 617 held as under :- "the term of employment contrary to the provision could be changed as soon as it was brought to the notice of the authority concerned. The appointments having been made against the provisions violating the statutory rules, there did not arise any question of application of doctrine of promissory estoppel. There can be no estoppel against the statute. On discovery of mistake or incompetency in passing the appointment order, to rectify the same even if services are terminated, that cannot be an act of discrimination violating articles 14 and 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution. " The Superme Court in Union of India vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. AIR 1986 SC 806 has held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel will apply against an order which is a valid order in all respects but not against an order which is invalid. The doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and endorse the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. In the present case, the appointments were invalid, being contrary to the Notification issued under Regulation 50-B and, as such, any such invalid appointment order would not give rise to promissory estoppel against the appellants. ( 9. In the present case, the appointments were invalid, being contrary to the Notification issued under Regulation 50-B and, as such, any such invalid appointment order would not give rise to promissory estoppel against the appellants. ( 9. ) THE learned Single Judge relied on certain decisions of the Supreme Court for the proposition that without giving a show cause notice and hearing the incumbent, no order can be passed adversely affecting him, but those are cases of employees who were validly appointed and not Cases of invalid appointments. In case of invalid appointments, no such right accrues to the employees and it is open to the appointing authority to cancel such appointments. In Jaishankar. vs. State, AIR 1965 SC 402 the supreme Couret held that removal of a Government servant from service for overstaying his leave is illegal even though it is provided by the Service Regulation. That was a case of permanent employee and it was held that discharge from service of an incumbent by way of punishment amounts to removal from service and the constitutional protection of Art. 311 cannot be taken away. In State of Orissa vs. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 the respondent was a permanent Assistant Surgeon in orissa Medical Service but unilaterally her date of birth was corrected without notice to her which was struck down as in violation of principles of natural justice. Similar is the case in Sarjoo Prasad vs. General Manager, AIR 1981 SC 1481 . In Shiv Shankar vs. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 514 , the Supreme Court set aside forfeiture of past service for participation in illegal strike as no opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action was given to the concerned employees and neither para 1301 nor para. 1304 of Railway Establishment Manual excludes observation of principles of natural justice either expressly or by necessary implication. In the present case, invalid appointments of the respondents have been quashed by the appellant which is not by way of punishment nor any stigma has been cast. Rightly it has been pointed out by the learned Dy. Advocate General that as and when vacancies arise, it would be open to the respondents to apply afresh and compete for the selection provided they are eligible to apply for the post. Rightly it has been pointed out by the learned Dy. Advocate General that as and when vacancies arise, it would be open to the respondents to apply afresh and compete for the selection provided they are eligible to apply for the post. It appears that the learned Single Judge mainly relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in P. Guravaiah vs. State of A. P. , 1974 Lab and Ind. Cases 1048 that appointment in violation of administrative instruction is not invalid and, as such, the incumbent has a right to hold the post and must be heard before any adverse order is passed. That case is clearly distinguishable. In that case, there was an administrative instruction not to make permanent appointment as Village Munsif. Initially the appointment should be on a temporary basis but the Sub-Collector appointed the petitioner as a permanent Village Munsif straightaway. The administrative instruction was not issued under any statute. Here, the notification in question was issued under Regulation 50-B of M. P. Police Regulations framed under section 46 read with Sections 2 and 7 of Police Act, 1861 and, therefore, the notification had the statutory force. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on a Single bench decision in K. Jagannadham vs. Dist. Collector, AIR 1966 A. P. 59 and a Division bench decision in Delhi University vs. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1968 Delhi 131. These decisions are based on a decision of the Supreme Court in Haribhajan Singh vs. Karam singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 . These are cases of cancellation of admission already given to students. The Supreme Court held that silence and inaction on the part of the University authorities for such a long time and particularly when the petitioners-students were all the time studying, paying fee and appeared and succeeded in the examination held at the end of first year, amounts to a representation by conduct on the part of the university that admission of the petitioners were approved by them. The only inference that can be drawn is that the University authorities by their conduct by remaining silent held out or represented to the concerned students that their admissions were approved by the University. These cases have no application to the facts of the present case. Here, the case is of cancellation of invalid appointments and not of cancellation of admissions given without proper verification. ( 10. These cases have no application to the facts of the present case. Here, the case is of cancellation of invalid appointments and not of cancellation of admissions given without proper verification. ( 10. ) IN regard to the nature of Regulatioa 50-B of the Madhya Pradesh Police regulations and the instructions issued thereunder, it would be useful to refer to State of u. P. vs. Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 . While dealing with the U. P. Police Regulations it was held by the Supreme Court that Rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of constructions or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. Subject to the overriding power of the President or the governor under Art. 310 of the Constitution as qualified by the provisions of the statute whereunder they are made, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions thereof. The statutory rules cannot be described as, or equated with, administrative directions. Rules made under the Police Act are not administrative directions. The police Act and the rules made thereunder constitute a self-contained Code providing for the appointment of police officers and prescribing the procedure of their removal. It was also held in that case that under Art. 313 of the Constitution the Police Act and the police Regulations made in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government under that Act, which were preserved under Section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, continue in force after the Constitution so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. ( 11. ) IN Govind vs. State of M. P. , AIR 1975 SC 1378 the question as to whether regulations 855 and 856 of the M. P. Police Regulations had the force of law or not came up for consideration before the Supreme Court and it was held that since the regulations were framed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh under Section 46 (2) (c) of the police Act they had the force of law. There seems to be no doubt that for the same reason as stated in case of Govind (supra) Regulation 50-B also shall have the force of law. There seems to be no doubt that for the same reason as stated in case of Govind (supra) Regulation 50-B also shall have the force of law. The notification in question in the instant case was issued in exercise of the power conferred in this behalf by Regulation 50-B. On the principle enunciated by the supreme Court in the case of Babu Ram (supra) these instructions shall partake of the same nature as Regulation 50-B the same having been issued under the said regulation. In fact they are to be read as a part of Regulation 50-B. ( 12. ) THE matter can be looked into from another angle. In Union of India vs. K. P. Joseph, AIR 1973 SC 303 it was held : - "generally speaking, an administrative order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, like all other general rules, is subject to exceptions. This Court has held in Sant Ram Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan, (1968)1 SCR 111 =air 1867 sc 1910 that although, Government cannot supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions yet, if the rules framed under Art. 309 of the constitution are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed and these instructions will govern the conditions of service. In Union of India vs. M/s. Indo Afghan Agencies Ltd. , (1968) 2 SCR 366 at p. 377 = AIR 1968 SC 718 , this Court, in considering the nature of the Import Trade Policy said: granting that it is executive in character, this Court has held that Courts have the power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the Schemes upon the departmental authorities. To say that an administrative order can never confer any right would be too wide a proposition. There are administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties. It is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that we have imported the principle of natural justice of audi alterant partem into this area. A very perceptive writer has written : let us take one of Mr. Harrisons instances, a regulation from the British war Office that no recruit shall be enlisted who is not five feet six inches high. A very perceptive writer has written : let us take one of Mr. Harrisons instances, a regulation from the British war Office that no recruit shall be enlisted who is not five feet six inches high. Suppose a recruiting Officer musters in a man who is five feet five inches only in height, and pays him the Kings shilling, afterwards the Officer is sued by the government for being short in his accounts; among other items he claims to be allowed the shilling paid to the undersized recruit. The Court has to consider and apply this regulation and, whatever its effect may be, that effect will be given to it by the Court exactly as effect will be given to a statute providing that last wills must have two witnesses. (John Chipman Gray on the Nature and Sources of the Law ). ( 13. ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the instructions in question are for the sake of argument not taken to have statutory force, they are still binding and enforceable not being in any way inconsistent with any statutory provision in this behalf. Indeed they are consistent with Regulation 50-B having been issued under that regulation and form part of the said Regulation as already pointed out above. ( 14. ) AS regards the submission that a notice to show cause ought to have been given to the petitioners in the writ petition, it may be pointed out that the facts on the basis of which the impugned order was passed do not seem to have been disputed at any stage including the writ petition. Those facts for all intents and purposes stand rather admitted. In similar circumstances although in a different context it was held by the supreme Court in Shahoodul Haque vs. Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1896 as hereunder : "in any case, on the facts before us, we think that it will be useless to afford any further opportunity to the appellant to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post of duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient grounds for his absence, is so glaring that giving him further opportunity to disprove what he practically admits could serve no useful purpose. The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post of duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient grounds for his absence, is so glaring that giving him further opportunity to disprove what he practically admits could serve no useful purpose. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. It would only prolong his agony. " ( 15. ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter. Since the effect of allowing the writ petition obviously was to force upon the Police establishment Aarakshaks who were not qualified for being appointed as such, it was not a fit case for interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 16. ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the learned Single judge is set aside and the writ petition of the respondents is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.