JUDGMENT : Bharucha, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order of summary rejection of the writ petition filed by the Appellant. Pendse, J. gave no reasons for the rejection. Having heard counsel in detail we are satisfied that he was right in the conclusion to which he came. 2. The Appellant joined the service of the first respondent on 1st November 1967. On 1st October 1975 her services were terminated. It was the Appellants contention that Rule 16 of the National Safety Counsel Service Rules had not been complied with inasmuch as her services had been terminated without giving her three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof. It was also her contention that the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, which are, substantially, of the same nature, were breached. The Appellant, therefore, made an application to the Labour Court under the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for the payment of wages for the period October to December 1975. The first respondent put in a written statement in which it contended that it was not an 'industry', that the Appellant was not a 'workman' and that, in any event, the said rule 16 and Section 25F had been substantially complied with. On 12th July 1977 the Labour Court dismissed the application filed by the Appellant. It held that it could not adjudicate upon the questions which were raised. It pointed out that it was only upon the striking down of the order of termination that the Appellant could be considered to have an existing right to collect salary from the first respondent and this could not be done in the instant case as if it were an incidental matter. 3. It may be pointed out that, in the meantime, the Appellant had filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the order of termination. That writ petition was dismissed because it was found that the first respondent was not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 4. The Appellant then made a fresh application u/s 33-C(2) for the payment of wages from Oct. 1975 to Oct. 1979. The Labour Court dismissed the second application on the ground that it was barred by res judicata as well as upon the grounds upon which the first application had been rejected. 5. 4. The Appellant then made a fresh application u/s 33-C(2) for the payment of wages from Oct. 1975 to Oct. 1979. The Labour Court dismissed the second application on the ground that it was barred by res judicata as well as upon the grounds upon which the first application had been rejected. 5. This petition was filed to impugn the orders of the Labour Court rejecting both applications u/s 33-C(2). 6. We may mention that the Appellant has been paid her dues for the period between Oct. and Dec. 1975. We would have been much happier if this matter could in its entirety have been amicably settled, but our efforts in this regard have not been successful. 7. Mrs. Mhatre, learned Counsel for the Appellant, submitted that the termination or the Appellants service by the order dated 1st Oct. 1975 was contrary to the said Rule 16 and to Section 25F and was, therefore, void ab initio. The Labour Court had, therefore, jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) to consider and decide the applications filed by the Appellant and that'its failure to do so must be rectified. 8. Mrs. Mhatre referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal Vs. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd.,. It is not necessary to deal with it in any detail for the proposition that it makes cannot be disputed. Where the termination of service of a workman is in breach of the provisions of Section 25F, the termination is ab initio void invalid and inoperative. 9. The question before us really is whether in the process of considering the dues claimed by the Appellant in her applications u/s 33-C(2) the Labour Court could have decided the issue raised; namely, was, the first respondents an "Industry", the Appellant a "workman", and the order of termination contrary to the said rule 16 and Section 25F and, therefore, void ab initio, invalid and inoperative. 10. The terms of Section 33-C(2) themselves suggest that Mrs. Mhatre's submissions cannot be accepted. 10. The terms of Section 33-C(2) themselves suggest that Mrs. Mhatre's submissions cannot be accepted. Section 33-C(2) reads thus: "33-C(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government "within a period not exceeding three months". The phrase "where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit" therein suggests that there has to be no dispute between the workman and the employer in regard to the entitlement of the workmen for the provisions of Section 33-C(2) to apply. The only question that would then have to be resolved is in regard to the amount of money that was due or the amount at which the benefit should be computed. 11. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Vs. The Workmen and Another, is most opposite to the facts before us. A company, River Steam Navigation Co, Ltd., was in loss. A scheme of arrangement u/s 391 of the Companies Act was entered into between the Company and the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd., which was sanctioned. The staff of the Company was to be taken over by the Corporation at the latter's discretion and those not taken over were to be paid compensation. These latter employees made reference u/s 33-C(2) for the computation of retrenchment benefits u/s 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Corporation challenged the jurisdiction of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2), When the matter went to the Supreme Court it was held, after a review of the authorities, that a workman who had been dismissed was not entitled to so seek relief alleging that, his dismissal being wrongful, wages should be computed on the basis that he continued in service. 12. In The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., the S.C. observed that by merely making a claim in a loaded form the workman could not create jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2). 12. In The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., the S.C. observed that by merely making a claim in a loaded form the workman could not create jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2). A workman who had been dismissed was no longer in employment. The Industrial Tribunal could find on an investigation whether the dismissal was unjustified. But when the workman came u/s 33-C(2) he could not ask the Labour Court to disregard the dismissal on the basis that it was wrongful can compute his wages. In such cases a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified is the principal matter for adjudication, and the computation of wages is consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as incidental' to the computation. Moreover, if it was assumed that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court, after holding that the dismissal was wrongful, would have no jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) to direct reinstatement. If such jurisdiction was conceded it would be conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many times as the workman came before it without being reinstated. 13. Mrs. Mhatre relied strongly upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Suresh Chand and Another,. The Supreme Court noted that the principal question that arose was in regard to the effect of the contravention of Section 33-(2)((b) of the Industrial Disputes Acton an order of dismissal passed by an employer. Was the order of dismissal rendered void and inoperative s.o that the aggrieved workman could say that he continued in service and was entitled to receive wages from the employer? It was only if an order of dismissal passed in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) was null and void could the aggrieved workman maintain an application u/s 33-C(2) for determination of the amount of wages due to him on the basis that he continued in service despite the order of dismissal. It was only if an order of dismissal passed in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) was null and void could the aggrieved workman maintain an application u/s 33-C(2) for determination of the amount of wages due to him on the basis that he continued in service despite the order of dismissal. It was well settled, the Supreme Court said that the proceeding u/s 33-C(2) "is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. But the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman and his employer........" It was not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal and entertain a claim which was not based on an existing right but which right appropriately be made the subject-matter of an industrial dispute in a reference u/s 10. The Supreme Court then said, and this is the sentence upon which Mrs. Mhatre placed emphasis, "The application u/s 33-C(2) would be maintainable only if it can be shown by the workman that the order as passed against him is void ab initio." 14. In the instant case there is a dispute between the Appellant and the first respondent as to whether the first respondent is an "industry", as to whether the Appellant is a "workman", and as to whether the conditions of the said Rule 16 and of Section 25F were complied with. Until these questions are adjudicated upon and decided in favour of the Appellant, the Appellant cannot contend that the order of termination of her service was void ab initio. The Appellant has no existing right upon which she could base her claim u/s 33-C(2). The judgment in Punjab Beverages case, far from supporting the Appellants contention, indicates that the Labour Court was right in the conclusion to which it came. 15. Our attention was drawn by Mrs. The Appellant has no existing right upon which she could base her claim u/s 33-C(2). The judgment in Punjab Beverages case, far from supporting the Appellants contention, indicates that the Labour Court was right in the conclusion to which it came. 15. Our attention was drawn by Mrs. Mhatre to the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. The Labour Court, Nagpur and Others,. It was urged by the appellant therein that if a claim was made on the basis of a lay-off and the employer contended that there was a closure, it was not open to the Labour Court to refuse to proceed u/s 33-C(2). The High Court concluded that there had been no closure and the Supreme Court found the conclusion unexceptionable. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workmen's claim to the computation of benefits in terms of money; it had to go into the question and determine whether, on the facts, it had the jurisdiction to make the computation. It could not, however, give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on the jurisdictional plea. 16. Upon the pleadings before the Labour Court in the matter before us, there was no question but that the Labour Court did not have the jurisdiction to decide the question which had to proceed the calculation of the wages claimed by the Appellant. 17. A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.P.S.E. Board, Hyderabad v. Ikram Ahmed, 1979 L.I.C. 915 noted the decisions of the Supreme Court and various High Court on Section 33-C(2) and summarised the law as therein laid down. The Full Bench said that an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was maintainable where a workman claimed an amount of money, but such claim had to be based on an existing right. The existing right itself should have vested in the workman either under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of a statute. Once the right was shown to be existing under any of the above, the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application. The mere denial of such existing right by the employer did not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the application. Once the right was shown to be existing under any of the above, the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application. The mere denial of such existing right by the employer did not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the application. The denial of the right would only require the Labour Court to enquire whether the right was existing. The Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide and determine this jurisdictional question. The enquiry u/s 33-C(2) in such case would have to be proceeded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry was incidental to the main determination which had been assigned to the Labour Court by Section 33-C(2). Just as an executing Court was competent to interpret the decree, so also the Labour Court was competent to construe the settlement, award or statute under which the right was claimed. Matters such as the interpretation of an award, whether the workman fell within a particular class Of workmen entitled to benefits under a settlement, award or statute, the total amount due or the amount at which benefits should be computed were all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2). 18. it will be noted that the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court emphasised that the existing right which was required for the application of Section 33-C(2) had to be a right vested in the workman "either under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of any statute". Where such right was disputed by the employer, the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine whether such a right vested in the workman and, in so doing, to interpret the settlement, award or a statute under which the right was claimed. The conclusion of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court cannot support the case of the Appellant because her claim is not based upon a right vested under a settlement, award or statute. 19. In conclusion, therefore, the Labour Court was right in holding that it did not have the jurisdiction under the terms of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to decide issues the decision of which would have to precede the computation of the Appellants wages. 20. The Appeal is dismissed. 21. No order as to costs.