Judgment Kalliath, J. : - This appeal concerns a brutal murder. Nelson aged 32 sustained stab injures with a dagger, cut injuries with chopper and fatal blows with an iron rod. He has sustained as many as thirty injuries. He succumbed to the injuries. According to the prosecution this unfortunate event happened on 21-3-1983 at 6.45 p.m. The fateful incident commenced from the southern room of the house of the deceased Nelson. It ended in the pathway on the western side of his house. 2. The prosecution alleged that the three appellants before us are responsible for the injuries inflicted on the body of the deceased. They were indicted for the offence of murder of Nelson and also for trespass under S.452, I.P.C. They stood the trial before the Sessions Court, Trivandurm. They were convicted for the offence of murder under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C. and for the offence of trespass under S.452. I.P.C. The Sessions Court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under S.302 I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence under S.452. I.P.C. Now, the accused appeal. 3. The facts are these: Accused No.1 is the first cousin of the deceased (Nelson’s fathers’s brothers’s son). Accused 2 and 3 are close associates and friends of accused No. 1. It is said that a persistent enmity which was continuing for three years existed between accused and the deceased. Further, it is stated that about 1 1/2 years prior to the incident, there was a criminal case against accused Nos. 1 to 3 at the instance of the deceased wherein the trial court convicted the accused and the appellate court reversed the conviction. At me time of the incident, the said matter was pending before the High Court. 4. On the fateful day while the deceased was taking his meals sitting in the southern room, the 1st accused trespassed into the room through the southern door, armed with an iron rod, (the Sessions Court calls this M.O. 1, as a crow-bar) and beat Nelson on his head with the iron rod. At once, Nelson stood up. By that time, A2 and A3 entered the room through the eastern door, A2 carrying M.O. 3 dagger and A3 carrying M.O.2 chopper. Nelson immediately ran out of the room. He was chased by the accused. The pathway was on the western side. At once, Nelson stood up. By that time, A2 and A3 entered the room through the eastern door, A2 carrying M.O. 3 dagger and A3 carrying M.O.2 chopper. Nelson immediately ran out of the room. He was chased by the accused. The pathway was on the western side. When he reached the pathway, accused 1 to 3 overtook the deceased, and inflicted a large number of injuries (the medical evidence shows that the deceased sustained as many as 30 injuries); A1 by beating with the iron rod, A2 stabbing with the dagger and A3 cutting with the chopper. Nelson fell down at the commencement of the attack and when Nelson was lying with his face to the ground on the pathway, all the accused attacked him and inflicted the injuries. 5. As soon as Nelson ran away from the room, P.W.2 his wife, and P.W.4, his son, who were also in the room, followed him crying. They cried aloud. P.W.3 Visalan reached the scene of occurrence and heard the loud cry of P.Ws. 2 and 4. He saw part of the incident. By that time, P.W.5, the father of the deceased also reached the scene of occurrence. He was also able to see the latter part of the incident. After inflicting several injuries on the body of Nelson, the accused ran away with the weapons. 6. A neighbour fetched a taxi car and also informed P.W.1, the uncle of Nelson. He also arrived at the scene of occurrence. The injured was taken to the Medical College Hospital by P.Ws. 1 to 5 . On reaching the hospital, the doctor examined Nelson and said that he was dead. It is said by P.W.I that Nelson was taken to the hospital about 8.30 p.m. and they reached the hospital by 10 p.m. 7. P.W.1, on the next day at 8.45 a.m., lodged the First Information statement, Ext.P1. It was recorded by P.W.12, the Sub Inspector of Police, he registered a crime. Subsequently P.W.13, the Circle Inspector of Police took over the investigation. He went to the Medical College and conducted the inquest and prepared the inquest report, Ext.P.6. He then proceeded to the scene of occurrence and prepared Ext.P.4 scene mahazar. He questioned some of the witnesses. He did not Complete the investigation because he was transferred. Subsequently P.W.13, the Circle Inspector of Police took over the investigation. He went to the Medical College and conducted the inquest and prepared the inquest report, Ext.P.6. He then proceeded to the scene of occurrence and prepared Ext.P.4 scene mahazar. He questioned some of the witnesses. He did not Complete the investigation because he was transferred. P.W.11 took over the investigation on 2-6-1983 and on the same day accused 1 to 3 were arrested. He recovered M.Os. 1 to 3 under Ext.P.5 mahazar. 8. P.W.6 is the doctor who conducted the postmortem. In the postmortem certificate he said that Nelson died of multiple injuries he has sustained. 9. The prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 13 to bring home the guilt of the accused, marked Exts. P1 to P6 and produced M.Os. 1 to 6. The accused examined D.Ws 1 and 2 marked Ext.D.1, a C.D. statement of contradiction. 10. The Sessions Court after considering the evidence in the case came to the conclusion that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and so convicted the accused. 11. Counsel for the appellants raised before us arguments on the merits of the case and also a legal technical point that the charge framed in the case is so bad that the accused are entitled to an acquittal or, at any rate, this Court should direct a retrial of the case. We are bound to examine the questions raised by the counsel for the appellants. We shall consider first the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellants on the merits of the case. 12. The case of the accused is one of total denial. This they have made it clear in their statements under S.313, Crl. P.C. The counsel submitted that the incident has taken place not as attempted to be proved by the prosecution. Broadly he said that because of the enmity entertained by the deceased and his men against the accused they have foisted a false case on the accused. (Paras. 13 to 21 omitted being appreciation of evidence) 22. From the evidence it is clear that ail the accused were armed with weapons and that too with deadly weapons. The manner in which they have committed the crime unequivocally declares that they have entertained with them the common intersection to kill the deceased. (Paras. 13 to 21 omitted being appreciation of evidence) 22. From the evidence it is clear that ail the accused were armed with weapons and that too with deadly weapons. The manner in which they have committed the crime unequivocally declares that they have entertained with them the common intersection to kill the deceased. We have no hesitation to hold that the accused inflicted the injuries on the body of Nelson with the common intention to kill Nelson. There is also clear evidence that they trespassed into the room with this intention. 23. We hold that on the facts proved in the case the accused are liable to be convicted for the offence of murder under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C. From the evidence it is proved that they are also liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under S.452. 24. Now we shall consider the question of the defect in the charge framed by the Court. Counsel for the appellants submits that as against accused numbers 2 and 3 there is an omission to frame a charge under S.452 of the I.P.C. and in regard to all the accused the charge framed under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C. is incurably defective in so far as the materials given in the charge framed do not disclose the essential details that are necessary to enable sufficient notice as regards their culpability of the offence. Counsel submits that there is no mention of one of the weapons used by one of the accused, namely, the chopper. Counsel submits that there is no mention of one of the weapons used by one of the accused, namely, the chopper. In order to understand this contention we shall quote the second part of the charge framed by the Sessions Court: “that on the same date and time, due to the previous enmity towards the deceased and in furtherance of your common intention and with the intention to cause death of the deceased Nelson caused fatal injuries on the head and several part of his body by beating with an iron rod and cut injuries with a dagger in your hand and thereby deceased Nelson sustained injuries on his various parts of his body and he succumbed to his injuries at about 10 p.m. on 21-3-1983 and thereby you have committed an offence punishable under S.302, I.P.C. read with S.34 of I.P.C. and within the cognizance of this Court.” It has to be noted that the charge begins with these words, I.....charge you, Raghavan Nadar Raghu,.....Lekshmanan Surendran.....Madhavan Vasavan,.....accused Nos.1 to 3 as follows: 25. Counsel submitted that since the charge framed is not in accordance with law, the trial is vitiated and so the conviction is illegal. He claims that the accused must either be acquitted or at the worst retried. He adds that in the circumstances of the case the court should not exercise that discretion of ordering a retrial. 26. Counsel cited before us a number of decisions which according to him will support his argument He referred us to Krishnan v. The State, A.I.R. 1958 Ker.94, Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C.415:1956 Crl. L.J. 855; Azizul Haq v. State, (1980) 1 Crl. L.J.448 and V.C. Shukla v. C.B.I., 1980 S.C.C. (Cri) 695. He also referred us to W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 116 and tried to explain that case in the light of the observations in V.C. Shukla v. C.B.I., 1980 S.C.C. (Cri.) 695. Counsel though referred to these decisions and wanted us to rely on these decisions, vary fairly reminded us against standing by previous decisions by a too rigid application of the doctrine of precedent. He pointed out the following passage from W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1956 S.C. 116: (1956) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 100: 1956 S.C.J. 182: (1955) 2 S.C.R.1140: (1956) Crl. L.J. 91: 1956 M.W.N. 391. He pointed out the following passage from W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1956 S.C. 116: (1956) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 100: 1956 S.C.J. 182: (1955) 2 S.C.R.1140: (1956) Crl. L.J. 91: 1956 M.W.N. 391. “But these are matters of fact which will be special to each different case and no conclusion on these questions of fact in any one case can ever be regarded as a precedent or a guide for a conclusion of fact in another because the facts can never be alike in any two cases however alike they may seem. There is no such thing as a judicial precedent on facts though counsel, and even judges, are sometimes prone to argue and to act as if there were”. It reminds us these lines: ‘That codeless myraid of precedent, That wilderness of single instances”. (Vide Aylmeir Field) The precedents are quoted because the practice has got a peculiar fascination. If a judge feels to accept the precedent quoted, it gives him a way of escape. It relieves him to the difficulty to think for himself or even decided for himself. He feels that the matters to be considered have already been decided by the previous authority. 27. Anyhow, precedent is law only in regard to certain binding principles. In regard to facts decided in the precedent it will have its own peculiarities and we have to remember that facts” can never be alike in any two cases, however alike they may seem”. 28. We do not want to refer to all the cases cited by the counsel for the appellants. The counsel chiefly relied on principles laid down in Suraj Pal v. State of U.P. A.I.R.1955 S.C.419 and v. C. Shukla v. C.B.I.. 1980 S.C.C. (Cri.) 695. 29. Before considering the decisions cited by the counsel we shall briefly state the statutory mandate in regard to the framing of charges in the new Code. Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with ‘charge’. S.211 dictates the contents of the charge. It reads thus: “211. Contents of charge. (1) Every charge under the Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. (2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence may be described in the charge by the name only. S.211 dictates the contents of the charge. It reads thus: “211. Contents of charge. (1) Every charge under the Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. (2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence may be described in the charge by the name only. (3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. (4) The law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge. (5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. (6) The charge shall be written in the language of the Court. (7) ..........” S.212 further deals with the particulars as to time, place and person to be mentioned in the charge. We shall quote S.212 also. “212. Particulars as to time, place and person,-(1) The charge shall contain such particulars to the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. (2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money or other movable property, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum or, as the case may be, describe the movable property in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of S.219: Provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year“. From the above quoted sections, we may pose the question what all matters the accused person is entitled to know from the charge and in what may does the charge in this case fall short of that? From the above quoted sections, we may pose the question what all matters the accused person is entitled to know from the charge and in what may does the charge in this case fall short of that? According to us, all what the accused persons are entitled to get from the charge is (1) the offence with which he is charged (2) the law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed, (3) particulars of time, place and person against whom the offence is said to have been committed. Further it is provided under S.223 that if the nature of the case is such that those particulars do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose also should be given. The accused is not entitled to any further information in the charge. Illustration (e) to S.223 of the Code is instructive to resolve the specific point raised by the counsel. Illustration (e) states that ”A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state in the manner in which A murdered B“. From the illustration it is clear that if the charge is one of murder, the accused is not entitled to be told how he committed the murder. Considering this aspect of the matter Bose J. in W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., 1956 S.C. 116 at page 131 said: ”when the case is one of murder the accused is not entitled to be told in the charge how it was committed whether with a pistol or lathi or a sword. He is not entitled to know from the charge simpliciter any further circumstance. How then is he expected to defend himself? He has the police challan, he has the evidence recorded in the Committal Court, he hears the persecution witnesses and he is examined under S.342 of the Code. It is these proceedings that furnish him with all the necessary, and indeed vital, information, and it is his duty to look into them and defend himself. He has the police challan, he has the evidence recorded in the Committal Court, he hears the persecution witnesses and he is examined under S.342 of the Code. It is these proceedings that furnish him with all the necessary, and indeed vital, information, and it is his duty to look into them and defend himself. It will be seen that if the logic of the appellants’ contention is carried to its fullest extent the accused could Complain of prejudice because he was not told in the charge whether a pistol was used for the crime or a sword and if a pistol, its calibre and bore and the type of cartridge“. 30. We feel that the object of framing a charge is not to introduce a mandate in the statute that goes to the very root of the jurisdiction like the requirement of previous sanction under the stature for taking cognizance of certain offences, but is only to enable the accused to have a clear idea of what he is being tried for and of the essential facts that he has to meet In this connection, we would like to refer to S.215 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. It gives what the statute intends as the effect of an error in framing the charge. It reads thus: ”No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice“. It is plain and clear from what is stated in the above section that when there is a charge and there is either error or omission in the charge itself or both, and whatever the character of the error or omission, whether it is serious or trivial, it is not to be regarded as important unless two conditions are fulfilled both of which are in the realm of facts. (1) The accused has ‘in fact’ been misled by it and (2) the omission or error or both have occasioned a failure of justice. 31. (1) The accused has ‘in fact’ been misled by it and (2) the omission or error or both have occasioned a failure of justice. 31. Now, let us consider a case where there was an error or omission and that omission or error was not observed and corrected during the trial and the accused is convicted. In such a situation, the appellate court is empowered to direct a retrial only in case, in the opinion of the court of appeal, a failure of justice has in fact (emphasis added) been occasioned thereby. This we say because of the provisions contained in S.464 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The section deals with the effect of omission, error or irregularity in the charge or absence of it says, “464. Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in charge: (1) No finding, sentence or order by a Court of Competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (2) If the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision is of opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned, it may- (a) in the case of an omission to frame a charge, order that a charge be framed and that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after the framing of the charge; (b) in the case of an error, omission or irregularity in the charge, direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit: Provided that if the Court is of opinion that the facts of the case are such that no valid charge could be preferred against the accused in respect of the facts proved, it shall quash the conviction." The language used in the section is clear, plain and, in fact, very wide and emphatic. We say that it is emphatic since it has to be noted that even when a death sentence is under review in confirmation proceedings, the court is expressly directed not to regard any error, omission or irregularity or absence of a charge as fatal unless, in fact, it has occasioned a failure of justice. We say that it is emphatic since it has to be noted that even when a death sentence is under review in confirmation proceedings, the court is expressly directed not to regard any error, omission or irregularity or absence of a charge as fatal unless, in fact, it has occasioned a failure of justice. The earlier sections confined the limits within which the court may convict in spite of the fact that there is no charge for that particular offence. If S.464, Crl. P.C, is read side by side with other sections, it is clear that no finding, sentence or order by a court of Competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid on account of the fact that no charge was framed, or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge unless those matters in the opinion of the court of appeal have, in fact, occasioned failure of justice. 32. If we trace the history of these sections, it is easy to understand the reason behind these provisions. At one point of time it was thought that the provisions of the Code which mandated the procedure prescribed in the matter of trial were so vital as to make any deviation therefrom an illegality that could not be rectified. Later, it was thought that such an illegality applies only when there is an express prohibition and there is actual prejudice. These ideas are clear from the decision reported in Subramonia Iyer v. King Emperor, 28 I.A.257 (P.C.). The Privy Council said: "The remedying of mere irregularities is familiar in most systems of jurisprudence, but it would be an extraordinary extension of such a branch of administering the criminal law to say that when the Code positively enacts that such a trial as that which has taken place here shall not be permitted that this contravention of the Code comes within the description of error, omission or irregularity." This dictum was again considered in Abdul Rahman v. Emperor, A.I.R.1927 P.C.44. The Privy Council again said: "The procedure adopted was one which the Code positively prohibited, and it was possible that it might have worked actual injustice to the accused." Viscount Summer in Atta Mohammed v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 57 said: "In the Complete absence of any substantial injustice, in the Complete absence of anything that outrages what is due to natural justice in criminal cases, their Lordships find it impossible to advise. His Majesty to interfere." The remedial provision, particularly the provision in S.464, Crl. P.C, finds rationale, we feel in what the Privy Council has said in Babulal Choukhani v. Emperor, A.I.R.1938 P.C. 130: "It must be hoped, and indeed assumed, that magistrates and judges will exercise their jurisdiction fairly and honestly. Such is the implied condition of the exercise of judicial power. It they do not, or if they go wrong in fact or in law, the accused has ‘prima facie’ a right of a recourse to the superior courts by way of appeal or revision; and the case show how vigilant and resolute the High Courts are in seeing that the accused is not prejudiced or embarrassed by unsubstantial departures from the Code and how closely and jealously the Supreme Court guards the position of the accused. These safeguards may well have appeared to the Legislature to be sufficient when they enacted the remedial provisions of the Code and have now left them substantially unaltered in the new Code recently introduced." The ultimate analysis of these provisions would make the matters very clear and plain. It is that the whole question is whether the accused had a fair trial. Did he get the knowledge about what he was being tried for and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. Further, if the accused had a fair trial for the offence with which he was charged and no prejudice is established, the conviction must stand ‘whatever the irregularities’, whether traceable to the charge, or to a want of one. The predominant devoir of the Code is to ensure that an accused person is given a full and fair trial on the basis of the well established and well understood norms that accord with our precept of natural justice. The predominant devoir of the Code is to ensure that an accused person is given a full and fair trial on the basis of the well established and well understood norms that accord with our precept of natural justice. The Code is designed to streamline the ends of justice and it has no design to frustrate the ends of justice by introducing into it unsubstantial didactic subtleties. Finally, the matter has to be decided on the facts whether the accused has been prejudiced by any error, omission or irregularity in the charge or the absence of one. 33. With these preliminaries, we shall examine the question of law raised by the Counsel for the appellants. He referred us to Surajpal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1955 S.C.419. That was a case under S.307/149 and S.302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. There were a number of accused in that case. The finding was that there was no common object to kill. Hence all the accused were acquitted under S.149, I.P.C. The offence in that case revealed that the appellant had himself made an attempt on the life of one man and had himself shot another dead. So, the High Court convicted that accused under Ss.307 and 302, I.P.C. In the charge framed there was no separate charge under either of those sections. The conviction was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said that the omission to frame a charge is a serious lacuna. The Supreme Court did not stop it there. It said that the real question is whether that lacuna had caused prejudice to the accused. The learned Judges examined the evidence to decide the question of prejudice. The Supreme Court then finally found on facts that prejudice was caused to the accused and so ordered acquittal. The facts here are totally different. Here, in the charge, there is specific mention of the offences under S.302 read with S.34 of the Indian Penal Code. The only irregularity, if at all it can be said to be an irregularity is the nondisclosure of the essential facts disclosing how the offence has been committed and that the charge does not disclose clearly the weapons used by each of the accused. 34. The only irregularity, if at all it can be said to be an irregularity is the nondisclosure of the essential facts disclosing how the offence has been committed and that the charge does not disclose clearly the weapons used by each of the accused. 34. The essential requirement of the charge is that the accused should be told that they are charged for the offence of killing Nelson with the common intention to kill him under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C. We do not think that the case reported in Surajpal v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 955 S.C.419 will be of any assistance or help to the accused in this case. Considering the dictum of Surajpal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 419, the Supreme Court in W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1956 S.C.116 said that in Surajpal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 955 S.C.419 the learned Judges decided the case on the facts disclosed in that case and came to the conclusion that the accused was prejudiced. 35. Now, in this case, the question whether the accused was prejudiced or not, as far as the main charge, namely, the charge under S.302 read with S. 34, I.P.C., is concerned, is really a secondary question. We shall consider the question of prejudice separately. 36. Counsel for the appellants referred us to the decision reported in v. C. Shukla v. C.B.I. 1980 S.C.C. (Cri.) 695. This case related to an order of the Special Judge appointed under the Special Courts Act, 1979. By the order, the learned Judge directed a charge to be framed against the appellant before the Supreme Court under S.120-B, I.P.C, read with Ss.5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and also under S.5(2) read with S.5(1) (d) of the said Act The appeal was filed by the accused under S.11(1) of the Special Courts Act. A preliminary objection was raised by the prosecution as to the maintainability of the appeal since the framing of the charge is purely an interlocutory order within the meaning of S.11(1) of the Special Courts Act and no appeal would lie against such an order. A preliminary objection was raised by the prosecution as to the maintainability of the appeal since the framing of the charge is purely an interlocutory order within the meaning of S.11(1) of the Special Courts Act and no appeal would lie against such an order. The question was referred to a larger Bench even at the stage of preliminary hearing, the larger Bench ultimately held that the order impugned in the case was an interlocutory order and the appeal filed against that order before the Supreme Court was clearly not maintainable. The appeal was dismissed. Several questions were considered in the case. Counsel referred us to Para110 from the judgment of Desai J. who concurred with the majority opinion of the court. In Para110 he said: “Charge serves the purpose of notice or intimation to the accused, drawn up according to specific language of law, giving clear and unambiguous or precise notice of the nature of accusation that the accused is called upon to set in the course of a trial. S.211 clearly prescribes what the charge should contain and a bare reading of it would show that the accused must be told in clear and unambiguous terms allegations of facts constituting the offence, the law which creates offence with a specific name, if given to it, and the section which is alleged to be violated with the name of the law in which it is contained. The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. It is thus an intimation or notice to the accused of what precise offence or what allegations of facts he is called upon to meet The object of a charge is to warn an accused person of the case he is to answer.” After stating thus, Desai J. relied on the observation of Bose J. in W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 116 that “the importance of framing the charge need not be overemphasized and that this should be shunned.....” Desai J. further quoted Bose J. in W. Shenoy v. State M.P., A.I.R.1956 S.C.I 16. It reads thus: "We see no reason for straining at the meaning of these plain and emphatic provisions unless ritual and form are to be regarded as of the essence in criminal trials. It reads thus: "We see no reason for straining at the meaning of these plain and emphatic provisions unless ritual and form are to be regarded as of the essence in criminal trials. We are unable to find any magic or charm in the ritual of a charge. It is the substance of these provisions that count and not their outward form. To hold otherwise is only to provide avenues of escape for the guilty and afford no protection to the innocent." In short, we feel that the passages relied on by the counsel for the appellants from the decision of Desai J. in v. C. Shukla v. C.B.I., 1980 S.C.C. (Cri) 695 are practically of no support to substantiate the case that the charge framed in this case under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C. is so defective a to persuade a court to hold the conviction under the said charge as invalid and hence requires the case to be retried. 37. As against accused Nos.2 and 3, there is an omission to frame a charge under S.452, I.P.C. The Public Prosecutor referred us to certain decisions to emphasis the fact that the defect of an omission to frame a charge is a defect which ought to have been pointed out at the outset at the first stage of the trial and that if it has not been done, the court has to consider the question of prejudice in the light of the fact that the defect has not been taken at the first stage of the trial. 38. Now, we shall consider the question of prejudice. In considering the question of prejudice, the Supreme Court has said that the court is bound to examine whether actual prejudice has been caused in the trial of the case. What exactly is prejudice in the context has been said by Bose J. in W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1956 S.C.116 thus: "Every reasonable presumption must be made in favour of an accused person; he must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt The same broad principles of justice and fair play must be brought to bear when determining a matter of prejudice as in adjudging guilt. But when all is said and done what we are concerned to see is whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself." Truly, the court iis bound to look at the substance of the matter. It is the prime duty of the court to administer justice. To punish the guilty is part of that administration of justice and is as important as giving protection to the innocent "Neither can be done if the shadow is mistaken for the substance and the goal is lost in a labyrinth of unsubstantial technicalities. Broad vision is required, a nice balancing of the rights of the State and the protection of society in general against protection from harassment to the individual and the risks of unjust conviction." Vide W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1956 S.C.I 16. 39. Considering the facts of this case, we hold that no prejudice has been caused to the accused in the matter of an omission to frame a specific charge under S.452, I.P.C. as against accused 2 and 3 and the non-disclosure of the specific instruments used by each accused for the omission of the offence in regard to the charge under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C. The charge under S.452 is a minor or rather a secondary charge when the accused are primarily charged with the offence under S.302 read with S. 34 and convicted for the same. 40. It is seen that the accused were represented by a lawyer before the trial court No Complaint was raised as regards the omission to frame a charge under S.452 or the irregularities in regard to the charge under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C. The ocular evidence in this case clearly established the specific criminal acts alleged against each of the accused. The eye witnesses have said clearly that all the accused trespassed into the southern room of the deceased and other individual acts of the offence. These witnesses were cross-examined at length. The evidence given by these witnesses were analysed by the court below and put to the accused in the form of questions under S.313, Crl. P.C. The case of the accused was a case of total denial. These witnesses were cross-examined at length. The evidence given by these witnesses were analysed by the court below and put to the accused in the form of questions under S.313, Crl. P.C. The case of the accused was a case of total denial. Further, it has to be noted that the accused examined two defence witnesses to establish the fact that the time of death alleged by the prosecution is incorrect and also that one of the eye witnesses was not in the locality at the time when the incident took place. But the accused were not successful in establishing these facts. Bose J. on behalf of himself and B.R. Das, Ag. C.J., said in W. Shenoy v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1956 S.C.I 16: ".....but if, on a careful consideration of all the facts, prejudice, or a reasonable and substantial likelihood of it, is not disclosed the conviction must stand; also it will always be material to consider whether objection to the nature of the charge, or a total want of one, was taken at an early stage". Further, his Lordship said, "If it was not, and particularly where the accused is defended by counsel, it may in a given case be proper to conclude that the accused was satisfied and knew just what he was being tried for and knew what was being alleged against him and wanted no further particulars, provided it is always borne in mind that ‘no serious defect in the mode of conducting a criminal trial can be justified or cured by the consent of the advocate of the accused." 41. On the facts disclosed in the case, we feel that no prejudice is caused in fact to the accuse in the omission to frame a specific charge under S.452. Assuming that there are some irregularities in the framing of the charge under S.302 read with S.34, I.P.C., the facts unfolded in the case tell us that the accused have not in fact sustained any prejudice. We feel that there is no merit in the technical point raised by the counsel for the appellants on the basis of the defect in the charge or the absence of a charge under S.452 as against accused 2 and 3. 42. In the result, we see no merit in this appeal and the appeal is only to be dismissed. We do so.