( 1 ) THE opposite party instituted Title Suit No. 140 of 1978 in the Court of the Munsif, First Court, Cuttack, seeking a decree for permanent injunction restraining the petitioners from entering upon the disputed property which was plot No. 743 in mouza Bisinabar in the town of Cuttack and from interfering with his possession. On a motion for temporary injunction, the trial court after hearing both the parties issued an order of temporary injunction on 18-1-1979. The petitioners have their plot on plot No. 745 which is adjacent to the disputed plot No. 743. The opposite party alleged that despite the order of temporary injunction, the petitioners entered upon the disputed property around 11 a. m. on 31-3-1981, broke the eastern wall of one of the rooms standing on plot No. 743. The opposite party thereupon filed an application under Order 39, Rule 2a of the Code of Civil Procedure for punishing the petitioners for disobedience of the order of temporary injunction. In course of the proceeding, a pleader Commissioner was deputed to submit a report. He opined that the eastern side wall of the room had been broken within a month previous to his visit on 23-4-1981. An opening had been made in the wall etc. The petitioners opposed the motion for punishment alleging that the land had not been demarcated. Inasmuch as reference to the pleader Commissioner was made in relation to plot No. 745 and inasmuch as only status quo had been ordered and they were in possession, there was no violation as alleged. Four witnesses were examined on behalf of the opposite party and one on behalf of the petitioners. ( 2 ) UPON a consideration of the evidence, the learned Munsif rejected the application seeking punishment on the petitioners. On appeal by the opposite party, the learned Additional District Judge, Cuttack, reversing the decision of the trial court and accepting the appeal, held that the petitioners had violated the order of temporary injunction and directed attachment of the property of the petitioners for one year and in case of further disobedience, the property attached would be sold in public auction and compensation as deemed proper would be awarded to the injured party. This revision is directed against the appellate order. ( 3 ) MR. This revision is directed against the appellate order. ( 3 ) MR. M. M. Sahu, the learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that an appeal against an order refusing to take action under Order 39, Rule 2a was incompetent and the evidence on record did not justify the conclusion. Mr. B. H. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the opposite party, repelled the submission contending that an appeal was competent and having regard to the scope of revisional jurisdiction, it is not open to the petitioners to assail the conclusion of the appellate court on pure question of fact. Let me dispose of the second contention first. It is said that there were discrepancies in the evidence adduced by the opposite party. There were inconsistencies; material witness was not examined; contradictions did abound but were ignored by the appellate court and the probabilities were ignored. ( 4 ) IT should not be forgotten that the petitioners have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Question of fact not involving jurisdiction or illegal exercise of jurisdiction, howsoever erroneous the conclusion of the final court of fact may be are not available to be canvassed. Reappreciation or reappraisal of evidence is out of bounds of the revisional court unless the finding can be demonstrated to be perverse. Sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence is but another aspect of reappraisal of evidence. That is also not permissible. It has not been urged that the appellate court while reversing the decision of the trial court omitted to take into account any material fact which, had that been taken into consideration, would in all probability upset the decision of the appellate court. It has not been contended that the appellate court took into account any material which was not relevant or committed any errors of record. Therefore, the strenuous argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners for overturning the finding of the appellate court that the petitioners violated the order of injunction is of no avail to them. I have been taken through the judgements of the courts below. I fail to perceive any infirmity in the order of the appellate court. Non-examination of the alleged material witness has been considered but the argument did not appeal to the appellate court. The appellate court scanned the entire evidence and reached the conclusion. I have been taken through the judgements of the courts below. I fail to perceive any infirmity in the order of the appellate court. Non-examination of the alleged material witness has been considered but the argument did not appeal to the appellate court. The appellate court scanned the entire evidence and reached the conclusion. The conclusion is not vulnerable even if I scrutinise the same as an appellate court. ( 5 ) THEN to the controversy as to the maintainability of the appeal before the appellate court. It is contended relying upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Saraswati v. Pratap Narain, AIR 1977 All 173 that an order passed under Rule 2a of Order 39 is not appealable. Reliance is misplaced. Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) was considering the appealability of an order passed under Rule 2-A as incorporated in Order 39 by the Allahabad High Court with effect from 27-9-1941 by way of amendment. Inasmuch as the case arose before the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act of 1976, the Allahabad High Court was not called upon to consider the provisions of Rule 2-A read with Order 43, Rule 1 (r) as introduced by the C. P. C. Amendment Act of 1976. Rule 2-A referred to in the judgement is not Rule 2-A as incorporated by the Amendment of 1976 but by the Allahabad High Court in 1971. Order 43 Rule 1 (r) providing for appeal as it stood prior to the C. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, was as follows : order 43, Rule 1 (r) - an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX. " hence the Allahabad High Court held : ". . . . . . an order under R. 2-A of O. 39, itself is not made appealable either by Section 104 or under Clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 4. . . . . . . . . The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that an order refusing to take action under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is not appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. . . . . . . . . . " ( 6 ) AS I have indicated above, the reliance was not apt. . . . . . . . . The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that an order refusing to take action under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is not appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. . . . . . . . . . " ( 6 ) AS I have indicated above, the reliance was not apt. By the amendment of 1976 an order passed under Rule 2-A as incorporated by the amendment is appealable under Clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43. Though a faint argument was made that assuming that an order passed under Rule 2-A was appealable under Clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43, an order refusing to take action was not appealable. This submission is not tenable. Clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43 says that an order passed is appealable. An order can partake either of the two characters; taking action or refusing to take action. The language shall not be given a restricted meaning, see AIR 1914 Mad 141 (2) and AIR 1917 Mad 448. Hence, an appeal lies from an order passed under Rule 2-A of Order 39 whether the order is one of inflicting punishment or refusing to take action. ( 7 ) IN the result, I see no merit in this revision which is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed. .