JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. – As all these four writ petitions involve a common question of law with the consent of the parties these were beard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Mr. K.D. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that for the disposal of all these four cases the fact as mentioned in C.W.J.C. No. 368 of 1981 (R) may be considered. 3. The petitioner in this petition has challenged a notice as contained in Annexure 17 to the writ petition issued by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. By the notice dt. 30th September, 1980 the petitioner was directed to appear before him to show cause as to how he acquired this land and as to why the settlement of the land may not be cancelled. 4. In view of the order proposed by me it is not necessary to state the facts in details. 5. Suffice it to say that by a registered deed of settlement executed by the landlord on or about 16.3.48 a settlement was granted in favour of Smt. Bhagwati Devi and on the same date the said Smt. Bhagwati Devi executed a registered Kabuliat in favour of the landlord. Thereafter it is alleged that Smt. Bhaiwati Devi transferred 2 acres of the land out of the aforementioned settled land but (sic) one Thakur Jagdish Narayan Singh by a registered-deed of sate executed in the year1956. 6. It is further alleged that the said Bhagwati Devi also received the crop compensation from 1949 to 1960 and thereafter the said crop compensation was received by the transferees. The petitioner has further stated that even the ex-land lord has mentioned the name of the petitioner in the form 'K' prescribed under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 7. It is further alleged that the transferees also transferred the same land to the various persons in the year 1980. 8. The petitioner averred that the rent receipts were issued in the name of Smt. Bhagwati Devi by the State of Bihar and thereafter the names of the transferees were mutated by orders of Circle Officer after follow in: the procedure prescribed therefor and rent receipt were allegedly issued in favour of one Smt. lakhmi Devi. 9. It is further alleged that a portion of the land was acquired by the Dy. 9. It is further alleged that a portion of the land was acquired by the Dy. Commissioner, Ranchi and thereafter in the said proceeding at a later stage the lands however were derequisitioned. However 0.96 acres of land out of plot no, 4 was acquired for National Highway No. 33 and compensation therefore was paid to Smt. Lakshmi Devi. It is further alleged that the aforementioned Lakshmi Devi also filed an application praying therein to accept the rent wherefor reports were submitted by the Haka Karamchari and the Circle Officer. In that proceeding a report of the Circle Officer was also submitted. 10. It appears thereafter the impugned notice as contained in Annexure 17 to the writ petition was issued. 11. Mr. K.D. Chaterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that from the facts stated hereinbefore would be evident that the State of Bihar had all along been recognising the petitioner as a bonafide settlee in respect of the lands in question. He further submitted that the State of Bihar having accepted the rent from the petitioner, is now estopped and precluded from challenging the legality or otherwise of the settlement made in favour of Smt. Bhagwati Devi which took place as far back in the year 1948. 12. Mr. K.D. Chaterjee further submitted that the very fact that the settlement was made in the year 1948, the Land Reforms Deputy Collector should not have issued a notice after a period of about 32 years. A notice issued, according to him, after such long lapse of time itself shows ill motive on the part of the land Reforms Deputy Collector. 13. From a perusal of the impugned notice as contained in Annexure 17 to the writ petition it is evident that merely a notice has been directed to be issued as against the petitioner as to why a proceeding under section 4 (h) of the Bihar land Reforms Act should not be initiated. 14. In my opinion, a prerogative writ of prohibition should not be issued by this Court quashing the entire proceedings pending before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. 15. Mr. Chatterjee, when questioned, very fairly stated that in law there was no bar in initiating a proceeding under section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act after a long lapse of time. In my opinion, a prerogative writ of prohibition should not be issued by this Court quashing the entire proceedings pending before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. 15. Mr. Chatterjee, when questioned, very fairly stated that in law there was no bar in initiating a proceeding under section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act after a long lapse of time. He, however, submitted that the same merely is indicative of the fact that it was not done bonafide. Further the facts stated in the writ petition only give rise to a question for determination as to whether the State of Bihar would be estopped from passing an order as against the petitioner in terms of section 4(b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act or not, in view of the fact that orders of mutation have been passed, rents have been accepted and compensation for acquisition of the land has been paid. 16. In my opinion the adjudication on issue/issues of estoppel, waiver or other similar issue would be dependent upon a determination of the facts which may be arrived at after taking evidence adduced by all the parties. 17. In my opinion this Court, therefore in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution should not issue a writ of prohibition quashing such a notice. 18. Mr. Chatterjee placed before me a judgment of a learned Single judge of this Court in K.N. Farma Industries v. State of Bihar & ors in C.W.J.C. No. 410/78 (R) and submitted that this Court did interfere with the orders passed under section 4(h) of the Act on similar circumstances. 19. From a perusal of the said decision it will appear that in that case the matter was thrashed out not only before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector but also before the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner. In that case evidences were led and there were finding of facts for the purpose of showing that the settlement was not obtained for the purpose of defeating the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 20. Recently the Supreme Court of India in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shri Brahm Datt Sharma and another reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 943 held as follows : “The High Court was not justified in quashing the show Cause notice. 20. Recently the Supreme Court of India in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shri Brahm Datt Sharma and another reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 943 held as follows : “The High Court was not justified in quashing the show Cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a Government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause ordinarily the Govt. servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of bearing to the Government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Govt. to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submission placed by the Govt. servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the Court before that stage would be premature. The High Court in our opinion ought not to have interfered with the show cause notice.” 21. In the Management of Newspaper (Pvt) Ltd., Madras v. The Workers & ors, reported in AIR 1963 S.C. 569 , the Supreme Court held that although the High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to ask the Industrial Tribunal to stay its hand and to embark upon the preliminary enquiry itself and although the jurisdiction of the High Court to adopt this course cannot be disputed, but it would not be proper for the High Court to adopt such a course. The Supreme Court proceeded in that judgment to hold that normally the questions of fact, though they may be jurisdictional facts the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of evidence should be left to be tried by the said Tribunal constituted for that purpose. 22. In this view of the matter too, it is not possible for me to exercise my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. From the facts as stated above it would be absolutely dear that the notice issued by the respondent no. 3 does not suffer from the vice of an inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the authority issuing such notice. From the facts as stated above it would be absolutely dear that the notice issued by the respondent no. 3 does not suffer from the vice of an inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the authority issuing such notice. It is further evident that the notice has been issued only for the purpose of giving an opportunity to the petitioners to show as to why the settlements made in their favour shall not be cancelled. In my opinion as it would be open to the petitioner to raise all such contentions which have been raised in this application before the respondent no. 3, it is not expedient in the interest of justice to quash the notice. 23. In the result I do not find any merit in this application and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Applications dismissed.