JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall govern the disposal of Misc. Petition No. 2381 of 1983, Misc. Petition No. 714 of 1984, Misc. Petition No. 734 of 1984 and Misc. Petition no. 1023 of 1984 also. All these five writ petitions seek quashing of an order dated 19th august 1983 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior. ( 2. ) THE necessary facts as emerge from a perusal of the writ petitions and the impugned order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 19th August 1983 are that consequent upon the amendment in Section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) inter alia inserting sub-section (7) in the said section whereby State Transport Authority for the purpose of promoting tourism was authorised to grant permits valid for the whole or any part of India in respect of such tourist vehicles as the Central Government may in respect of that State specify in this behalf, the Central Government allotted 50 permits to the State of Madhya Pradesh. Out of these 50 permits 25 permits were initially sought to be granted and the State transport Authority for this purpose invited applications vide notification published in the Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra dated 17th September 1976. Out of these 25 permits, 15 were to be issued for buses having seating capacity of not more than 29 and 10 having seating capacity of more than 29. Copy of this notification has been filed along with the writ petitions. This notification inter alia stated that applications were to be filed within thirty days of the publication of the notification and applications not received within the said period of thirty days shall not be considered. When the applications which were received within thirty days of the publication of the notification were placed before the state Transport Authority for consideration, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the State Road Transport Corporation to the grant of permits on the ground that the applications were not maintainable because of the bar created by Section 68-F (1-D) and Section 68-FF of the Act. This objection was repelled by the State Transport authority and the matter was taken up in revision before the State Transport Appellate tribunal. During the pendency of the revision, proceedings for grant of permit were stayed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. This objection was repelled by the State Transport authority and the matter was taken up in revision before the State Transport Appellate tribunal. During the pendency of the revision, proceedings for grant of permit were stayed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The revision was, however, ultimately dismissed on 4th October 1981. lt is thereafter that in the month of December 1981 on various dates the petitioners of these five writ petitions also made applications for grant of permit. These applications had obviously been made after more than five years of the publication of the notification inviting applications in the Gazette dated 1/th September 1976 when the said notification contemplated applications being made within thirty days of the date of publication. An objection was raised to the maintainability of these applications on the ground that these applications not having been made within thirty days of the publication of the notification inviting applications, were not maintainable. This objection has ultimately found favour with the State transport Appellate Tribunal and the applicants of these applications have been held not to be entitled to the grant of permits vide the impugned order passed by the State transport Appellate Authority on 19th August 1983. As pointed out above, it is the validity of this order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which has been challenged in these writ petitions. ( 3. ) IT has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that the term "tourist vehicle" has been defined in Section 2 (29-A) of the Act to mean a contract carriage constructed or adapted and equipped and maintained in accordance with such specifications as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, and that since tourist vehicle meads a contract carriage, the same procedure which was applicable for grant of a contract carriage permit was to be adopted for the grant of tourist vehicle permit also. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, since there was no provision either in the Act or in the Rules thereunder for inviting applications by publishing a notification in the Gazette for grant of contract carriage permits, the procedure adopted by the State Transport Authority in the instant case in inviting applications by getting a notification published in this behalf in the gazette dated 17th September 1976 was contrary to law and consequently even if the applications of the petitioners had not been made within thirty days of the aforesaid notification, they could not be held to be not maintainable. In this connection our attention was invited to Sections 49, 50 and 51 of the Act which deal with contract carriage permits. Emphasis in this behalf was also placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on Section 57 of the Act. It was urged that even though sub-section (2) of section 57 which dealt with a stage carriage permit or a public carriers permit provided for a time limit to the making of an application for such a permit, no such time limit was prescribed in sub-section (1) thereof which dealt with an application for a contract carriage permit or a private carriers permit. On the other hand, the said sub-section clearly contemplated mailing of an application at any time. Our attention was also invited to Rule 80-A of the M. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1974, as inserted vide notification dated 2nd August 1976 published in M. P. Rajpatra (Asadharan), dated 3rd march 1976, and it was urged that even this rule did not provide for any limitation in the matter of making an application for grant of permit in respect of tourist vehicles. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find it difficult to agree with this submission. ( 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find it difficult to agree with this submission. ( 4. ) SUB-SECTION (7) of Section 63 of the Act, which contains the relevant provision in regard to the grant of such permits as in the instant case, reads as hereunder : " (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (i) but subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, any State Transport Authority may, for the purpose of promoting tourism, grant permits valid for the whole or any part of India, in respect of such number of tourist vehicles as the Central government may, in respect of that State, specify in this behalf, and the provisions of Sections 49, 50, 51, 57, 58, 59, 59-A, 60, 61 and 64 shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such permits : provided that preference shall be given to applications for permits from - (i) the India Tourism Development Corporation; (ii) a State Tourism Development Corporation; (iii) a State Tourist Department; (iv) such operators of tourjst cars, or such travel agents, as may be approved in this behalf by the Ministry of the Central Government dealing in tourism. " On a plain reading of sub-section (7) aforesaid, it is apparent that the provisions of the various sections including Sections 49, 50, 51 and 57 have not been made applicable in their entirety in the matter of grant of permits by the State Transport Authority under sub-section (7 ). They have been made applicable "as far as may be. " Keeping in view the nature and purpose of the grant of contract carriage permits, there obviously is neither any occasion nor necessity for inviting applications. Even though tourist vehicle has been defined to mean a contract carriage constructed in the manner contemplated by section 2 (29-A) of the Act, it is to be seen that permits for tourist vehicles in pursuance of sub-section (7) of Section 63 were to be granted by the State Government for the first time. As seen above, 50 permits had been allotted by the Central Government to the state of Madhya Pradesh, out of which only 25 permits in the manner indicated above were to be granted initially. As seen above, 50 permits had been allotted by the Central Government to the state of Madhya Pradesh, out of which only 25 permits in the manner indicated above were to be granted initially. The fact that the Central Government had allotted 50 permits to the State of Madhya Pradesh and that permits were intended to be granted under sub-section (7) of Section 63, were facts which indeed could not have been known to any one interested in having such permits unless these facts were made known by some method of publication which is normally adopted by the transport authorities in the matter of grant of permits. Publication of a notification in the Gazette is a recognised and well known method for this purpose. In regard to the nature of such permits as are contemplated by sub-section (7 ). of Section 63, it was held by Karnataka high Court in D. P. Sharma vs. The Karnataka State Transport Authority AIR 1983 Kar. 178 : "if the legislature intended that the provisions of only sub-section (1) of section 57, should apply in relation to All India Permits, a reference would have been made in Section 63 (7) only to sub-section (1) and not to the entire section 57. Of the two different procedures set out in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 57, the one appropriate to the nature of the All India permits should be adopted. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge, contract carriage permits and private carriers permits stand on a different footing from All India Permits. As regards contract carriage permits and private carriers permits, there are no quotas for such permits and such permits can be granted at any time as and when applications therefor, are made. As regards All India Permits, the number of permits that can be granted is fixed. Further, a responsibility is cast upon the S. T. A. to select the best transport operators for granting such permits but no such responsibility is cast on Transport Authorities while granting contract carriage permits and public carrier permits. As regards All India Permits, the number of permits that can be granted is fixed. Further, a responsibility is cast upon the S. T. A. to select the best transport operators for granting such permits but no such responsibility is cast on Transport Authorities while granting contract carriage permits and public carrier permits. It is only when applications are invited by the S. T. A. for grant of All India Tourist Permits that transport operators in the field will come to know of the availability of such permits and will apply therefor, and the S. T. A. will be in a position to select the best amongst them for grant of the limited number of such permits, also taking into account the priorities under the proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 63. " ( 5. ) WHEN the State Transport Authority contemplated to grant 25 permits, it was not open to it to ask 25 persons of its choice to make applications to it for grant of such permits and to grant permits to those 25 persons. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The international Airport Authority of India and others AIR 1979 S. C. 1628. In that case notice was issued inviting tenders which required that only a person running a registered second class hotel or restaurant and having at least five years experience as such shall be eligible to tender for purposes of granting contract for running a second class restaurant. The contract, however, was granted to the 4th respondents of the case who did not satisfy the conditions of eligibility. After referring to the observations made in the case of Krusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1975 sc 266 to the effect that the democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions as referred to therein and that the activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality and that the State need not enter into contract with anyone but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure, it was held : "this proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with the public, where the interest sought to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of larges, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevent. The power of discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc. , must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would. be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. " Dealing with the facts of that case, it was further held : "admittedly the standard or norm was reasonable and non-discriminatory and once such a standard or norm for running a IInd class restaurant should be awarded was laid down, the 1st respondent was not entitled to depart from it and to award the contract to the 4th respondents who did not satisfy the condition of eligibility prescribed by the standard or norm. If there was no acceptable tender from a person who satisfied condition of eligibility, the 1st respondent could have rejected the tenders and invited fresh tenders on the basis of a less stringent standard or norm, but it could not depart from the standard or norm prescribed by it and arbitrarily accept the tender of the 4th respondents. When the 1st respondent entertained the tender of the 4th respondents even though they did not have 5 years experience of running a iind class restaurant or hotel, it denied equality of opportunity to others similarly situate in the matter of tendering for the contract. When the 1st respondent entertained the tender of the 4th respondents even though they did not have 5 years experience of running a iind class restaurant or hotel, it denied equality of opportunity to others similarly situate in the matter of tendering for the contract. There might have been many other persons, in fact the appellant himself claimed to be one such person, who did not have 5 years experience of running a IInd class restaurant, but who were otherwise competent to run such a restaurant and they might also have competed with the 4th respondent for obtaining the contract, but they were precluded from doing so by the condition of eligibility requiring five years experience. The action of the 1st respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents, even though they did not satisfy the prescribed condition of eligibility, was clearly discriminatory, since it excluded other persons similarly situate from tendering for the contract and it was also arbitrary and without reason. The acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents was, in the circumstances invalid as being violative of the equality clause of the Constitution as also of the rule of administrative law inhibiting arbitrary action. " ( 6. ) IN view of the law laid down above in the case of Ramana (supra) and in view of the fact that permits contemplated by subjection (7) of Section 63 were sought to be granted for the first time by the State Transport Authority and in view of the nature of such permits as enunciated by the Karnataka High Court in the case of D. P. Sharma (supra) it was obligatory on the part of the State Transport Authority in order to ensure fair play in the matter of grant of permits to invite applications and lay down norms for making applications. What the State Transport Authority did in publishing the notification inviting applications in the Gazette dated 17th September 1976 was not something in compliance with a statutory provision but for ensuring fair play. Inasmuch as the words "as far as may be" were used in sub-section (7) of Section 63 adopting of such a procedure to ensure fair play was not ruled out or prohibited either specifically or by necessary implication. Inasmuch as the words "as far as may be" were used in sub-section (7) of Section 63 adopting of such a procedure to ensure fair play was not ruled out or prohibited either specifically or by necessary implication. In this view of the matter, neither the publication of the notification inviting applications nor the norm laid down therein that applications not made within thirty days shall not be considered can be said to be unreasonable. When applications were being invited for consideration fixation of a time limit within which applications could be filed was in the very nature of things necessary. In the absence of any time limit being fixed for making applications, it would not have been possible for the State Transpoort Authority to fix any date for consideration of the applications. This being so, it was obligatory on the State Transport Authority to conform with the norm laid down in the aforesaid notification in the matter of entertainment of applications. Apparently, therefore, applications not made within thirty days of the publication of the notification could not be considered. As in the case of Ramana (supra ). in the instant case also for aught we know, there may have been persons better suited than any of the petitioners of these writ petitions who for some reason could not make applications within thirty days of the publication of notification and were thus deprived of getting permits. Had they known that applications would be entertained even beyond the period of thirty days specified in the notification as was done in the case of the petitioners, they may also have made applications for grant of permits. Such an opportunity was obviously denied to them by the procedure adopted by the State transport Authority in entertaining applications of the petitioners even though made after about five years of the publication of the notification without extending the period for entertainment of the applications and making the fact of extension known to the public by getting it published in the Gazette in the same manner as the initial notification fixing time limit of thirty days was published. The procedure adopted by the state Transport Authority in entertaining the applications made by the petitioners was thus apparently both discriminatory and arbitrary and the State Transport Appellate authority, in our opinion, was right in taking the view which it did that these applications were not maintainable. The procedure adopted by the state Transport Authority in entertaining the applications made by the petitioners was thus apparently both discriminatory and arbitrary and the State Transport Appellate authority, in our opinion, was right in taking the view which it did that these applications were not maintainable. ( 7. ) AN alternative submission was made by learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in Patiala Bus (Sirhind) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal Punjab and others AIR 1974 SC 1174 that stage carriage permits are not a largess and that the grant of permits in the instant case even to those who had made applications within thirty days of the publication of the notification including the corporations specified in the proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 63 of the act deserve to be quashed inasmuch as these permits had been granted as if they were a largess. It was also urged that in so far as the corporations referred to in the proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 63 are concerned, they were entitled to only "preference" which meant that if all other considerations were equal, preference would be given to them but in the instant case the Tribunal has granted permits to Corporations without going into the question as to whether compared with the remaining applicants, other considerations were equal. On its basis it was urged that all permits may be quashed and the State Transport Authority may be required to invite fresh applications for grant of permits. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Firstly, the petitioners did not challenge the grant of permits to the other applicants including the corporations by filing appeals against those grants on the aforesaid ground. Secondly, even in the writ petitions no such facts have been stated which may indicate that the corporation stood in an inferior position than the remaining applicants and other considerations were not equal. There is even no prayer in these writ petitions for quashing the permits granted to other applicants. It is for all these reasons that we are of the view that the alternative submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners for quashing all the permits cannot be accepted. ( 8. ) NO other point has been pressed. ( 9. There is even no prayer in these writ petitions for quashing the permits granted to other applicants. It is for all these reasons that we are of the view that the alternative submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners for quashing all the permits cannot be accepted. ( 8. ) NO other point has been pressed. ( 9. ) IN the result, we find no merit in any of these writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. There shall however, be no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security may be refunded to the petitioners. Petitions dismissed.