B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner with twenty-three co-accused persons stood trial in the Court of Session being charged under Ss. 147, 337, 323 and 436 read with S. 149 of the Penal Code (for short, the 'code') and under S. 7 (d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. The accused persons, it was alleged, set fire to the houses of Khadika Bewa and Kashi Naik in the Harijan Bustee and pelted stones and assaulted some of the Harijan people by being armed on Mar. 24, 1980. The plea of the petitioner and the co-accused persons was one of denial and false implication. On a consideration of the evidence of thirteen witnesses examined for the prosecution and the other materials placed before the trial court, the Court held that the charge of arson against the present petitioner had been established He was convicted under S. 436 of the Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay fine, of Rs. 151, - and in default of payment thereof to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. He was also convicted under S. 337 read with S. 149 of the Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. Six other co-accused persons were convicted under S. 337 read with S. 149 of the Code and each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. The trial court acquitted the rest of the accused persons of all the charges. On appeal, the order of conviction under S. 436 of the Code and the sentences passed against the petitioner thereunder were maintained. But the order of conviction and the sentences passed against the petitioner and the other convicted person under S. 337 read with S. 149 of the Code were set aside. ( 2 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 was not worthy of credence and disinterested and independent persons had not been examined. Attention of this Court has also been invited to some discrepancies appearing in the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and2. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the order of conviction is illegal and misconceived. 1 and 2 was not worthy of credence and disinterested and independent persons had not been examined. Attention of this Court has also been invited to some discrepancies appearing in the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and2. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the order of conviction is illegal and misconceived. It has been further submitted that in the alternative, in case this Court upholds the order of conviction recorded against the petitioner, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for about four months undergone by the petitioner would serve the ends of justice. The learned Standing Counsel has supported the order of conviction. He has left the question of sentence to the discretion of this Court. ( 3 ) BOTH the trial and appellate courts have, on an elaborate discussion of the evidence on record, concurrently found that it was the petitioner who had set fire to the houses of Khadika Bewa and Kashi Naik by means of a burning bicycle tire which had resulted in the fire spreading over a number of other houses in the Harijan locality. Reliance has been placed by the two courts mainly on the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 coupled with some corroborative evidence including the seizure of burnt articles on the spot. It is not disputed at the Bar that a number of houses belonging to the harijans including those of Khadika Bewa and Kashi naik had caught fire. The question is as to whether the petitioner was the author of arson. ( 4 ) THE finding recorded by the courts cannot be said to be infallible merely because they are concurrent. But the court exercising revisional jurisdiction is not to judge the case as if it is hearing an appeal. It has been a settled principle of law that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court in revision is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. When neither the trial court not the appellate court has committed any error of fact or law in arriving at the conclusion, this Court is not to upset their concurrent findings in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. ( 5 ) I have been taken through the evidence of P. Ws. When neither the trial court not the appellate court has committed any error of fact or law in arriving at the conclusion, this Court is not to upset their concurrent findings in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. ( 5 ) I have been taken through the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 who are independents and disinterested witnesses and have unequivocally named the petitioner as the author of the crime as their evidence would unmistakably indicate that the petitioner set fire to the two houses intentionally for causing loss to the owners thereof by means of a burning bicycle tire. No doubt, there have been some inconsequential discrepancies in the testimony of P. Ws. 1 and 2 with regard to the details of the occurrence. But discrepancies are bound to occur in human testimony. Material discrepancies in the evidence may render it unreliable, but the evidence of withnesses cannot be thrown out merely because of some minor discrepancies here and there. The best evidence is that which is honestly discrepant. ( 6 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 has intrinsic worth and it has also found support in some other evidence to which reference has been made by the appellate court which has discarded a part of the prosecution story and the evidence of some witnesses with regard to some parts of the occurrence. It cannot be said that the findings recorded by the two courts are unreasonable or perverse and that such findings could not have been recorded on the evidence adduced at the trial. The order of conviction is unassailable and there is no ground for interference in revision. ( 7 ) AS to the sentences, it is noticed that the petitioner had set fire to two houses. The fact, however, remains that after a sudden quarrel and on the spur of the moment, the petitioner had set fire to the two houses which had resulted in the fire spreading to some other houses. The petitioner was aged about 19 years at the time of occurrence and was thus a young boy. It would meet the ends of justice if the petitioner is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The petitioner was aged about 19 years at the time of occurrence and was thus a young boy. It would meet the ends of justice if the petitioner is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. ( 8 ) IN the result, the order of conviction passed against the petitioner under S. 436 of the Penal Code is maintained, but the sentence passed against him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years is reduced and he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The sentence of fine passed against the petitioner is set aside. With the reduction and modification in the sentences passed against the petitioner, the revision fails and is dismissed. Order accordingly. .