JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27th September, 1978 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Bahraich, affirming the judgment and decree dated 15th November, 1968 passed by Munsif, Qaiserganj at Bahraich dismissing the plaintiff's suit. 2. The facts giving rise to the appeal, in short are that Sukhnandan, the appellant herein filed a suit in the Court of Munsif, Qaiserganj at Bahraich praying for a declaration that the compromise decree passed in Original Suit No. 98 of 1950 on 5.5.50 in re Nageshwar v. Murli Manohar was void and ineffective and that the plaintiff was the adopted son of Nagashwar son of Ishwardeen. It was, inter alia, asserted that the plaintiff was the adopted son of Nageshwar, having been adopted by a registered deed dated 11.5.48. Subsequently, entries in the revenue records were made to the effect. Thereafter, it appears that Nageshwar filed regular suit no. 98 of 1950 praying for setting aside the registered deed of adoption by declaring it to be void on the ground that it had been got executed by misrepresentation and fraud on 6.5.50. The suit was compromised on the basis of an application filed by the plaintiff Nageshwar and the defendant No. 1, Murli Manohar, stating that the registered deed of adoption be declared to be nonexistent and that the land in the possession of the defendant no. 2, Sukhnandan, the adopted son who was a minor at that time was being surrendered back to the plaintiff, Nageshwar. It will be pertinent to note that Sukhnandan, the plaintiff, in the instant suit never signed the said application for compromise on the basis of which the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise, nor he could so sign, he being undisputedly a minor at the time the suit was decreed by compromise. Subsequently, after attaining majority Sukhnandan filed a suit giving rise to the present appeal in which he prayed that the decree passed in the earlier suit by which the registered deed of adoption had been declared to be void be set aside and that it be declared that he was the adopted son of Nageshwar in terms of the deed of adoption referred to herein above. The suit was dismissed by the trial court which recorded a finding that the plaintiff was not the adopted son of Nageshwar and that the deed of adoption was sham. The trial court further held that the decree of 5.5.50 in the earlier suit was binding on the plaintiff. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff filed a first appeal before the lower appellate court which allowed the appeal on 20th February, 1970. Thereafter the defendant no. 1, Bhikhari, who is stated to be a reversioner of Nageshwar filed a second appeal in this court, being Second Appeal No. 177 of 1970, and this second appeal was decided by judgment and decree of this Court dated 5.7.76. The Court was pleased to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and remanded the case to the said court with a direction that the lower appellate court is specifically directed to record a finding as to whether the plaintiff is or is not the adopted son of Nageshwar. After this finding is recorded, the lower appellate court will decide other questions involved in the appeal. 4. On remand the lower appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 28th September, 1978 dismissed the appeal with costs, recording a finding thereon that Sukhnandan was not the adopted son of Nageshwar and that the adoption deed executed on 11.5.48 was not legally and validly executed. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. None has appeared on behalf of the defendantrespondents who are duly served. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant has made twofold submissions. The first contention raised by him is that under the provisions of Order XXXII rule 7of the Code of Civil Procedure which is extracted as under: 7. Agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian for the suit: (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into the agreement or Compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. Agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian for the suit: (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into the agreement or Compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. (1A) An application for leave under subrule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend or the guardian for the suit, as the case may be, and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, by the certificate of the pleader, to the effect that the agreement or compromise proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor: Provided that the opinion so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the Court from examining whether the agreement or compromise proposed is for the benefit of the minor. (2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without he leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor. An application containing an agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian on behalf of a minor in a suit can only be filed after leave of the Court has been obtained under subsection (1 A) of the said section from the Court and after the Court on consideration of affidavit filed along with the application feels satisfied that the agreement or compromise proposed was, in the opinion of the Court, for the benefit of the minor. There is no gainsaying the fact that in case in hand there was no leave of the Court obtained before the compromise had been filed by Murli Manohar, the father of the plaintiffappellant and that in any case the question as to whether the compromise was for the benefit of the minor was never taken into account. This fact has also been found by the lower appellate court in its judgment under appeal which has observed when it stated True it is that in the absence of guardian ad item of the plaintiffappellant and in the absence of the leave of the Court being granted, the compromise decree passed against the plaintiff on 5.8.1950 in original suit No. 98 of 1950 cannot be held to be binding and effective as against the plaintiff. In view of this finding recorded by the Court below and also in view of the undisputed question of law laid down in Order XXXII, rule 7 of the Code of Civil procedure, I have no hesitation in holding that the compromise was not binding on the plaintiff Sukhnandan and in any case was not a legal and valid document on the basis of which a decree in suit no. 98 of 1950 could be passed. 7. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the factum of adoption, it will be pertinent to point out that the plaintiff had placed on the record of the trial court certified copy of the registered deed of adoption dated 11.5.48. This certified copy is admissible in evidence under the provisions of section 90 A of the Evidence Act which has been inserted by U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act 34 of 1954 which provides about the admissibility of certified copies and documents and it lays down: 90A (1) Where any registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of the record of a court of justice, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the original was executed by the person by won it purports to have been executed. (2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. 8. The deed of adoption having been admitted in evidence, there was a presumption about the factum of adoption as provided in section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and this presumption can only be repelled by the person challenging adoption by the evidence brought on record. Section 16 of the Act states : 16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoptions: Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. 9. 9. The plaintiff has brought on record documentary evidence in support of the factum of adoption though it was not very much material in view of the provisions of section 16 of the Act to prove the factum of adoption. The only evidence relied upon by the trial court in holding that the adoption did not take place is the evidence of defendant no. 1 Bhikhari who being a reversioner of Nageshwar was the person to benefit in case adoption was held to be invalid and there was no question of relying on the solitary evidence of Bhikhari in view of the documentary evidence brought on record by the plaintiff, Sukhnandan. Even otherwise, the deed of adoption having been duly registered and the compromise decree in the earlier suit No.98 of 1950 being of no consequence it was too late in the day to hold that on the basis of the evidence of Bhikhari alone who was an interested person the factum of adoption of the plaintiff was disproved as contemplated under section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. 10. In the result, the second appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgments and decrees of the two courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed. (Appeal allowed)