ORDER : R.C. MANKAD, J. 1. Petitioner has in this petition challenged the interim part Award dated April 23, 1986, passed by the Industrial Tribunal Gujarat at Baroda in a complaint filed under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act for short). The facts in the background of which this interim award came to be passed are as follows: 2. Petitioner company terminated services of the respondents workmen. A complaint, therefore, came to be filed under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(Act for short) challenging the orders of termination passed by the petitioner company. The Industrial Tribunal by its award dated May 29, 1985 reinstated the respondents in service with full back wages, This was a common award passed in all the complaints filed on behalf of the respondents. This common award passed by tribunal came to be challenged by the petitioner company by filing special civil applications in this Court. It was conceded by the petitioner company before this court that the termination orders passed by the petitioner company against the respondents were penal in nature and such orders could not have been passed without holding proper enquiry. However, no evidence was led before the tribunal to support the orders of termination. The parties in the aforesaid special civil applications agreed before this court that the matter be remanded to the Tribunal and opportunity be given to the petitioner company to prove misconduct of the respondents before the Tribunal by leading oral and documentary evidence. In other words, petitioner company was given an opportunity to prove legality and justifiability of the termination orders passed by it. This court, therefore, by its order dated March 4, 1986, quashed and set aside the common award passed by the Tribunal and directed it to dispose of the complaints made by the respondents within two months from the date of the receipt of the order. Liberty was given to the respondents to move the tribunal for interim relief and the tribunal was directed to consider the applications made by the respondents on merits and pass appropriate order. 3. After the matter came to be remanded, the respondents made application for interim relief. Liberty was given to the respondents to move the tribunal for interim relief and the tribunal was directed to consider the applications made by the respondents on merits and pass appropriate order. 3. After the matter came to be remanded, the respondents made application for interim relief. The respondents' prayer for interim relief was partly allowed by the tribunal and the Tribunal directed the petitioner company to pay to the respondents 50 per cent of their wages for the first three months from the date of the discharge that is from November 4, 1984 and 75 percent of the wages till final disposal of the complaints, petitioner company being aggrieved by this interim award made by the tribunal, has approached this court by way of this petition. 4. Mr. K.S. Nanavati, learned counsel for the petitioner company contended that the tribunal had power to grant interim relief. He however, submitted that the order terminating the services of the respondents would stand until the tribunal finds that they are bad in law. He further submitted that the respondents were not entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right and they would also not be entitled to claim back wages as a matter of right. Under the circumstances, the tribunal could not have granted interim relief awarding 50 per cent of the wages for three months and 75 per cent of the wages for the subsequent months till disposal of the complaints. According to Mr. Nanavati grant of interim relief by the tribunal would amount to allowing or at least partly allowing the complaints even before the petitioner company he opportunity to prove legality and justifiability of termination orders. In support of this contention, Mr. Nanavati relied on the observations made by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Lid v. Rameshwwar Dayal. (A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 689). 5. As pointed out above, it is not disputed that the orders terminating the services of the respondents were penal in nature. Such orders could not have been passed without holding domestic enquiry and giving an adequate opportunity to the respondents to defend themselves. It is also not disputed that under the relevant standing orders in case where the workman is suspended pending domestic enquiry, he is entitled to 50% of wages for first three months and 75% of wages for the subsequent months. It is also not disputed that under the relevant standing orders in case where the workman is suspended pending domestic enquiry, he is entitled to 50% of wages for first three months and 75% of wages for the subsequent months. In fact, it is relying on this standing orders that the tribunal granted interim relief in the manner stated above the respondents. We do not see that any error much less an error apparent on the face of the record is committed by the tribunal which calls for our interference in exercise of 'powers under Article 227 of the, Constitution of India. Termination of orders are prima facie bad in law inasmuch as no domestic enquiry was held by the petitioner company before passing them as required by the standing orders. Had the proper procedure been followed and domestic enquiry held and had the petitioner company suspended the respondents during the pendency of the domestic enquiry, the respondents could have been entitled to 50 per cent of the wages for the first three months from the date of the suspension and 75 per cent wages thereafter. If the tribunal has proceeded to grant interim relief, as if the respondents are suspended, pending domestic enquiry, we do not see any thing wrong in the approach of the tribunal. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. case supra, the Supreme Court observed that it is not open to the tribunal to order reinstatement as an interim relief for, that would be giving the workman the very relief which he could get only if on trial of the complaint. The employer failed to justify the order of dismissal. In the case before the Supreme Court, by interim relief, the tribunal had ordered the employer to permit the workman to work. In other words, he was ordered to be reinstated and in the alternative it was ordered that if the management did not take him back, they should pay him his full wages. It was in view of the order passed by the Tribunal than the supreme court came to make the observations as stated above. In the instant case, the tribunal has not ordered reinstatement, nor has it ordered to give full wages to the respondents for the period from the date of termination orders till final disposal of the complaints. It was in view of the order passed by the Tribunal than the supreme court came to make the observations as stated above. In the instant case, the tribunal has not ordered reinstatement, nor has it ordered to give full wages to the respondents for the period from the date of termination orders till final disposal of the complaints. It has granted relief, which the respondents would otherwise have been entitled to had have the petitioner company followed the procedure laid down in the standing orders and held domestic enquiry against the respondents. 6. No error of jurisdiction nor any other error apparent on the face of the record is committed by the tribunal in granting the interim relief which calls for our interference in exercise of the extra-ordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. In the result, this petition fails and is rejected. Notice discharged with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.