JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.— This order will dispose of two criminal appeals No. 36 of 1984 (State of H. P. v. Khemti) and No. 15 of 1984 (State of H. P. v. Maghar Singh) which have arisen out of the judgments of acquittal passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, at Dalhousie, both of the same date, that is November 10, 1983. 2. In appeal No. 36 of 1984, the facts were that the Food Inspector, Shri C. B. Sharma, on August 8, 1981, after following due procedure, purchased 660 mis. of milk form the no respondent, Khemti (hereinafter referred to as the accused) for Rs. 1.30 for the purpose of analysis and put it into three clean and dry bottles after adding preservative and sealing and stoppering them in accordance with the provisions of the Prevention Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Rules framed thereunder (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), sent one of the bottles to the Public Analyst for analysis while the other two bottles were sent to the Local (Health) Authority. The report of the Public Analyst then revealed that the sample of milk was adulterated since the presence of milk«fat was deficient by 34% and the presence of milk solids-not-fat was deficient by 35% than the minimum prescribed standard. On receipt of the report of the Public Analyst, the Food Inspector launched the prosecution against the accused under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority and Local (Health) Authority then intimated the accused that the sample of milk had been found to be adulterated and he (accused) was also notified that the could take steps to send one of the samples in the possession of the Local (Health) Authority, within ten days of the - receipt of the intimation, to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, for analysis, if he so desired. The accused, however, did not exercise this option. He was then carge-sheeted for the offence under section 16 (1) a (i) read with section 7 of the Act to which he pleaded not guilty. The accused, however, did not exercise this option. He was then carge-sheeted for the offence under section 16 (1) a (i) read with section 7 of the Act to which he pleaded not guilty. After full trial of the case the learned trial Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the Public Analyst failed to send his report to the Local (Health) Authority within a period of 45 days as enjoined by the provisions of Rule 7 (3) of the Rules The finding of the trial Court was that although the sample was received by the public analyst on August 13, 1981, but he purports to have signed it on September 23, 1981 and though the said report purports to have been received in the office of the Local (Health) Authority on September 25, 1981 but this receipt accepted to be of doubtful character and therefore, it was doubtful whether the same was received in the office of the Local (Health) Authority within a period of 45 days. In the view of the trial Court, the provisions of Rule 7 (3) of the rules were mandatory in nature and, therefore, the violation of the said rule had vitiated the trial and it thus acquittal the accused. 3. In the second appeal No- 15 of 1984 the Food Inspector concerned had also purchased similar quantity of milk from the respondent (hereinafter called as the accused) for the purpose of analysis after following due procedure and the report of the Public Analyst revealed that the same was adulterated. 3. In the second appeal No- 15 of 1984 the Food Inspector concerned had also purchased similar quantity of milk from the respondent (hereinafter called as the accused) for the purpose of analysis after following due procedure and the report of the Public Analyst revealed that the same was adulterated. This fact was notified to the accused after the launching of the prosecution in accordance with the Act and the rules whereby he was also intimated that he could get one of the samples kept with the Local (Health) Authority, analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, if he so desired but he did not choose to do so The accused was accordingly charge-sheeted for the offence under section 16 f n (a) (i) read with section 7 of the Act to which he pleaded not guilty After trial of the case, the learned trial Court then held that since the report of the public analyst was received in the office of the Local (Health) Authority after a period of 46 days of the receipt of the sample by the public analyst and it was beyond the prescribed period of 45 days as enjoined by the Rule 7 (3) of the rules, there was a violation of the rule which being mandatory in nature, vitiated the trial and he thus recorded the order of acquitted against the accused. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case carefully and find no hesitation in my mind to accept the appeals and set aside the two impugned orders. 5. So far as the appeal No. 36 of 1984 is concerned I feel it difficult to understand as to how the learned trial Court has come to the conclusion that there was any doubt whether the report of the Public Analyst was received within 45 days of its receipt. Even if the date of receipt of the report in question, in the office of the Local (Health) Authority is taken as September 25, 1981, in that case too the report appears to have been received within a period of 42 days and there was no material on the record for the trial Court to conclude or even to presume that this report was received in the office of the Local (Health) Authority beyond a period of 45 days. Even if the trial Court entertained any doubt on this point it should have had further probe in the matter rather than acquit the accused on such a hyper technical point. 6. In the other appeal No. 15 of 1984, though the learned trial Court has came to the conclusion that report of the Public Analyst was received on the expiry of 46 days but since it was not within a period of 45 days, the provisions of Rule 7 (3) of the Rules were not satisfied as they were mandatory in nature. Thus a delay of one day has impelled the learned trial Court to acquit the accused holding that the Rule 7 (3) of the Rules was mandatory in character. Thus, this is the view of the learned trial Court in both these cases. 7. The learned trial Court, however, has allowed itself to fall into an error by holding this rule as mandatory. The law has been finally laid down by the Supreme Court as to in which circumstances a particular provision of law has to be considered as mandatory and in what cases as directory. The first case on the point is Dal Chand v. Municipal Corporation Bhopal and another, AIR 1983 SC 303, wherein the case before their Lordships was one under Rule 9 (j) which rule prescribed that the copy of the report of the Pubic Analyst was required to be sent to the accused within ten days and this rule has now been replaced by Rule 9-A wherein instead of ten days, the same is required to be sent immediately’. Therein it was observed that the period of ten days prescribed in the rules was merely incorporated with a view to sending the copy of the report to the person concerned with all despatch and expedition and giving the party sufficient time to challenge the said report by exercising his right to challenge the report of the Public Analyst by requesting the Court concerned to send the other sample in the possession of the Local (Health) Authority to the Director of Central Food Laboratory and thus their Lordships held that rule was merely directory in nature and not mandatory. Latter an even this Rule 9-A of the rules wherein the copy of the report was required to be sent immediately was also held by the Supreme Court as merely directory in Tulsi Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1984 Cr LJ 1731, wherein the report of the Public Analyst was sent to the accused after a period of 18 days and even then it was not held to be a violation of Rule 9-A of the rules. 8. The rational behind these dicta of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is that since the Act and the rules have been brought on the statute back to acheive a laudable purpose of grant public interest namely, to promote the public health by safeguarding it from ruthless adulterators, the provisions thereof should be construed in a manner which may further its aims and objects and not frustrate them. Thus where the Act and the rules lay down certain formalities to be observed so as to determine whether a particular item of food is free from adulteration, then if in carrying out these formalities, there is same minor lapse on the part of the authorities concerned, but there is substantial compliance thereof, the minor lapse should not be allowed to frustrate the object of the Act itself unless it is shown that the strict non-compliance of any of such formalities has resulted in prejudice to the accused. 9. In the instant cases none of the accused admittedly exercised their option to apply to the Court to get the samples lying with the Local (Health) Authority examined by the Director Central Food Laboratory, and, therefore, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the accused, wherein in one case the report of the Public Analyst was prima facie received within 45 days while in the other case it was received after the expiry of 46 days. Thus the rule in question being merely directory, there was substantial compliance thereof and the lower Court has committed an illegality by acquitting the accused on such a hyper technical point. 10. Thus the rule in question being merely directory, there was substantial compliance thereof and the lower Court has committed an illegality by acquitting the accused on such a hyper technical point. 10. It is also apparent from the record that both these cases were disposed of by the trial Court on this mere preliminary point, namely, that the provisions of Rule 7 (3) of the rules were not complied with and has not given his finding on the merits of the case which he ought to have done and under these circumstances this Court is left with no option but to remand the two cases for giving finding on merits. 11. In view of the above, I accept the two appeals, set aside the judgments, dated November 10, 1983, and remand the two cases (Criminal Appeals No. 36 and 15 of 1984) to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, at Dalhousie with the directions that on the receipt of the same, the Judicial Magistrate will hear the counsel for the parties on merits and then dispose of the two cases in accordance with law and the result of this judgment will be that the provisions of Rule 7 (3) of the rules Were duly complied with and cannot be questioned any more. The parties are directed to appear before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, at Dalhousie on 20th May, 1987. Appeal allowed.