JUDGMENT 1. - This is a defendant's second appeal in a suit for arrears of rant and eviction which was dismissed by the Munsif (North), Kota (trial court') though decreed by the Additional Civil Judge, Kota (lower appellate court'). 2. In brief. the facts giving rise to this second appeal are that, the plain- tiffs (Mangalchand & Bhuramal who died during the pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate court and is now being represented by his legal representatives brought on record) have tiled a suit for eviction of the suit premises as well as recovery of arrears of rent due against the defendant appellant The case of the plaintiff's is that the suit of mists was let out to the defendant-appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 35/-. The eviction from the suit premises was sought on the ground of default in payment of rent, and that the tenant (defendants has created a nuisance as defines in Section 13(l) (d) of the Rajasthan Premises control of Rent & Eviction) Act 1'1 "o (for short. 'the Act'). As regards the nuisance, it was averred in the plaint that the defendant and his family members used abusive language with the plaintiffs; on 9 8.73, the appellant's son had quarrel with Mangalchand in furtherance to giving heating to Mangalchand and on 10.8 .73, the son of the defendant also gave beating to Bhuramal (deceased-plaintiff) with a belt; and that, on account of such misbehaviour and misdeed on the part of the defendant-tenant the plaintiff's are unable to let out other vacant parts of the suit premises because looking to the conduct of the defendant and his family members no persons , are prepared to take premises on rent, as a result of which the plaintiffs area facing great loss. The plaintiffs have also given one incident which took place with Birdhi Chand who was also residing just near to the suit premises which was a part of the plaintiff's house. Birdhi Chand is alleged to have left the place on account of behaviour of the defendant a id his family members. 3. The defendant-appellant denied all the above mentioned allegations, averring it to be frivolous and that neither the defendants made any default in payment of rent nor he misbehaved with the plaintiffs or their family members. As regards Bridhichand. Birdhi Chand is alleged to have left the place on account of behaviour of the defendant a id his family members. 3. The defendant-appellant denied all the above mentioned allegations, averring it to be frivolous and that neither the defendants made any default in payment of rent nor he misbehaved with the plaintiffs or their family members. As regards Bridhichand. the defendant stated that Bridhichand left the premises of the plaintiffs at his own instance and because of Bridhichand being in near relations of the plaintiffs, this case is planned against the defendant. According to the defendant, the plaintiffs liked to increase the rent to which the defendant did not agree and as such, the present suit has been filed. 4. After framing of the necessary issues and recording the evidence adduced by the parties, and then hearing the parties, the learned trial court decided all the issues against the plaintiffs and rejected the ground of nuisance. Therefore, ultimately the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed. Against this dismissal, the plaintiffs went in appeal which was allowed by the first appellate court and the plaintiff's suit was decreed. Hence, this second appeal. 5. I have perused the entire record and have heard the learned councel. Shri Ajay Bajpai for the defendant-appellant and Shrt J.S. Rastogi on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents. 6. In the instant case, the only point considered by the Subordinate Courts and to be considered by this Court is whether the plaintiffs-respondents are/were entitled to a decree of eviction against the defendant appellant on the ground set forth in Section 13 (I) (d) of the Act? 7. Shri Bajpai for the tenant urged that mere using abusive language which was also not pleaded by the plaintiffs in their plaint, cannot provide shelter for getting a decree of eviction to the plaintiffs. Shri Bajpai submitted that while discussing the matter with regard to the incident of 9.8.73 & 10-8-73 the trial court came to the conclusion that the aforesaid dated incident has not been proved by the plaintiffs The plaintiffs have failed to prove the ingredients of nuisance. Mere hurling the abuses does not mean that the defendant has been creating any nuisance as embodied in Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act, Shri Bajpai added. 8. To substantiate his arguments, Shri Bajpai placed reliance on the decisions "1. Mere hurling the abuses does not mean that the defendant has been creating any nuisance as embodied in Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act, Shri Bajpai added. 8. To substantiate his arguments, Shri Bajpai placed reliance on the decisions "1. Gauri Shanker v. Bhikhalal Chagganlal (1978 (I) R. C. J. 45) "2. Amolak Singh v. Madanlal (1978 (I) RCJ 386) . 9. Shri J. S. Rastogi on the other hand on behalf of the respondents submitted that in the instance case, no substantial question of law is involved and the judgment of the first appellate court has been assailed on the ground that the findings arrived at by the first appellate court are not correct; inasmuch as the findings of fact cannot be challenged in second appeal. Shri Rastogi submitted that the first appellate court after an elaborate discussion of the entire evidence on record came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to get relict of eviction under Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act. 10. I have given my though full consideration to the argument canvassed by both the learned counsel and perused the entire record. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the cases, the question which arises for consideration is, whether the averments made by the plaintiffs-respondents against the defendant-appellant with regard to beating and hurling of abusive words, construe a 'nuisance' and if so, the plaintiff-respondents are entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendant. 11. Under the provisions of Section 13 (I) (d) of the Act, a landlord can file a suit for eviction on the ground that the tenant has created a nuisance and if it is so proved then the landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction. Under the Act, the word, 'nuisance' has nowhere been defined. 12. Now, it is to be seen as to what construe a nuisance. The word, 'nuisance' is a word of a wide import. which in any case prejudices the right of an owner of a property or a thing to enjoy the benefit thereof. A nuisance will also be one which prejudicially affects the physical health or hurts legitimate emotions of a person. The word, 'nuisance' is a word of a wide import. which in any case prejudices the right of an owner of a property or a thing to enjoy the benefit thereof. A nuisance will also be one which prejudicially affects the physical health or hurts legitimate emotions of a person. Of course, the word, 'nuisance' used in Section 13 (I) (d) has been used in the sense of physical hurt, injury or emotional injury but it has been used in the first sense, i. e. preventing the owner from using for his own benefit and enjoyment of the property or thing owned by him. It is only when some malafide or wanton act is done by a party which is high handed and the manner of doing it would be of a nature which causes pain to the owner of a property which may amount to 'creating a nuisance'. Though it is not possible to enumerate the nature of the nuisance attracting the provisions of Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act which depends upon the facts and circumstances of each of the case. But, the following test must invariably be satisfied; (a) It must be of gross character; (b) It must be of an unusual character; (c) It must be frequent and persistent; (d) It must be one which ordinarily is not expected from a reasonable prudent man of house-hold; (e) It must be one which creates hinderance or it is not possible for the neighbours to lead a normal life peacefully. Thus, mere quarrel in family is not sufficient to quit the tenant, as quarrels amongst households are usual and abnormal (sic normal) phenomenon. The abovementioned test has also been laid down in Gauri Shanker v. Bhikhalal (supra) by the Gujarat High Court wherein petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground of nuisance was filed, and there the tenant who was married allegedly brought his sister-in-law in the house and went through a marriage with his sister-in-law which was deemed to be illegal, any there were children horn to the sister-in-law and there were quarrel between her and the wife of the tenant. In that case, the courts below passed a decree on the ground of nuisance but according to the High Court the decree was not sustainable as the conduct of the tenant did not amount to nuisance. In that case, the courts below passed a decree on the ground of nuisance but according to the High Court the decree was not sustainable as the conduct of the tenant did not amount to nuisance. It was further observed as under : "At any rate, quarrels in the domestic household of a tenant can never constitute nuisance or annoyance within the meaning of section 13 (1) (c) of the Rent Act. Quarrels and even frequent quarrels in the domestic household of citizens are a part of the social life. t cannot he made a ground for eviction for even those who are so unfortunate that there are domestic quarrels amongst their households yet they have to live and have to have roofs over their beads. And what can a tenant do to ensure that his family members never quarrel ? Quarrels amongst house holds is not an unusual or abnormal phenomenon and it would be unreasonable to believe that the legislature which in its compassionate wisdom was enacting a legislation to protect the tenants contemplated to punish them for such misfortunes." 13. In (3) Durga Prasad v. State (AIR 1962 Rajasthan p. 92) this court while dealing with the controversy about the applicability of Section 120 of the Indian Railways Act which provides for meaning of 'nuisance', in the case of Railway servants, observed as under : "Nuisance ordinarily means that which annoys or hurt or that which is offensive. If persons indulge in the act of beating on a railway platform it is bound to cause annoyance to other persons who happen to be there at that time. The case would come under clause (b) because it would amount to the comment of nuisance on the Railway platform. 14. In Amolak Singh v. Madanlal (1978 (1) RCJ 386) the Punjab & Haryana High Court held as under : "The language used in Section 13 (2) (iv) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 does not contemplate a single incident of a quarrel or exchange of abuses between a landlord and a tenant. There has to be a series of acts and conduct on the part of the tenant and the landlord or occupiers of the buildings in the neighbourhood so that nuisance can be inferred against the tenant. There has to be a series of acts and conduct on the part of the tenant and the landlord or occupiers of the buildings in the neighbourhood so that nuisance can be inferred against the tenant. The mere existence of ill-feelings between the landlord and his tenant could not have justified the ejectment in this provision of the Act. A sort of continuous or frequent nuisance committed by the tenant is contemplated and such a nuisance has obviously to interfere with the convenience or comfort of other persons living in the neighbouring buildings." 15. In view of the aforesaid discussions, now it is to be seen as to whether the plaintiff-respondents have successfully proved the acts alleged against the defendant-appellant. The learned trial Court found that the use of abusive language by the defendant was not pleaded in their plaint by the plaintiff and so, the trial Court was of the opinion that the evidence of those facts which have not been mentioned in the plaint cannot be relied upon. The first appellate court on the other hand, observed that each and every act is not to be mentioned in the plaint and in the present case, the plaintiff-respondents have stated that the behaviour of the tenant is not fair and the conduct of the family members of the tenant construed a 'nuisance'. I agree with the view expressed by the lower appellate court that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to mention all the incidents or the wrongful acts which have been committed by the tenant or by his family members; so, the evidence of plaintiffs-respondents cannot be rejected on this sole ground, alone. 16. The trial Court considered the incidents of 9th & 10th Aug, 1973 and critically examined the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the alleged two incidents were not proved by the plaintiil Bhuranial (PW 1) who in his statement has given a series of incidents of misbehaviour on the part of the defendant Kishanial's son. Ram Singh (PW 2) has stated that there was quarrel in between the ladies of the landlord and the tenant but in his cross-examination he admitted that he did not identify the ladies. Ramsingh (PW 2) has given statement with regard to the incident of 10.8,1973. Pannalal (PW 3) has also stated that there was quarrel in between the ladies names of whom he did not disclose. Ramsingh (PW 2) has given statement with regard to the incident of 10.8,1973. Pannalal (PW 3) has also stated that there was quarrel in between the ladies names of whom he did not disclose. Pannalal (PW 3) has also given the evidence with regard to the incident which had not either been disclosed by any of the witnesses of the plaintiff. Birdhi Chand (PW 4) deposed that he left the house of the plaintiff because of harassment by the defendant-tenant and his family members. This much of the statement has not been corroborated by any other evidence. Daulatram (PW 5) is a witness for the incident of 10.8.1971. Mangal Chand (PW 6) is the plaintiff's son and who has given evidence with regard to the aforesaid two incidents. After going through the entire evidence of the plaintiff, this much is clear that no allegation has been levelled against the defendant. It has nowhere been stated by the plaintiffs witnesses that the behaviour of the defendant is objectionable The plaintiff and his witnesses have levelled the allegation only against the defendant's son, that too with regard to the incident of 9th & 10th August, 1973. Neither the plaintiffs nor their witnesses have deposed that the family members of the defendant are regularly misbehaving with the plaintiffs and their family members or that their misconduct is frequent and persistent or that, their wrongful acts put hinderance to the neighbours to lead as normal life peacefully. No one of the persons from neighbourhood has come forward to say that the act of the defendant-tenant is of such a nature so as to construe nuisance as observed above. Quarrels in families are abnormal (sic normal) phenomenon and no family is free from such quarrels even after that, fancily life is not disturbed. Any conduct of the tenant which amounts a nuisance in the eyes of landlord, alone even if he happens to occupy the premises in the neighbourhood or even in the same premises is not sutlicient to justify the eviction under this clause (d). It must be equally nuisance to those residents in the same vicinity but, they must come forward to prove the nuisance. 17. It must be equally nuisance to those residents in the same vicinity but, they must come forward to prove the nuisance. 17. The finding in appeal if it is not supported by evidence, it can be questioned in second appeal and in that case, if any decree is based on such finding which discloses substantial defect or an error in procedure, and the evidence accepted by the first appellate court if it appear. unreasonable then in that situation the High Court is fully competent to interfere with the findings arrived at by the first appellate court. For the above observations. I find support from the decision of the Supreme Court in (4) Ramchandra v. Ramalingam ( AIR 1963 SC 302 ) wherein it has been observed as under : "If a finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate court without any evidence that finding can be successfully challenged in second appeal, because a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence, questioned under S. 100 and in that connection it may be said that the decree proceeding on such a finding discloses a substantial defect or error in procedure. This, however, does not mean that wherever the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate court could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate court. All that it means is that it should be a case where the evidence which is accepted by the lower appellate court no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence." As I have already observed that the evidence produced by the plaintiffs-respondents was not sufficient to construe a nuisance and to make a ground of evidence as is envisaged in Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act. I agree with the findings of the learned trial court which has considered the evidence in its right perspective. The first appellate court misread the evidence and ignored the material points. And, in this view of the matter. I am of the opinion that the learned first appellate court committed errors in allowing the first appeal. 18. I agree with the findings of the learned trial court which has considered the evidence in its right perspective. The first appellate court misread the evidence and ignored the material points. And, in this view of the matter. I am of the opinion that the learned first appellate court committed errors in allowing the first appeal. 18. In view of the foregoing discussions, I. in the result, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment & decree passed by the first appellate court and restore the judgment & decree passed by the trial court ; and consequently, the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents is dismissed. 19. There would be no order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******