JUDGMENT - KHATRI S.N., J.:-In 1966 the respondents brought two suits against the defendants-petitioners for possession of two separate premises on the allegation that they are owners and the latter were mere trespassers. All the 6 plaintiffs are real brothers. It appears that the first two plaintiffs Madhukar and Madan died a number of years ago. Admittedly the surviving plaintiffs did not take out any proceedings in the lower Court for bringing legal representatives of the deceased plaintiffs on regard. Thereupon the defendants took out two Notices of Motion for an order that both suits should be disposed of as having abated. The lower Court dismissed those Motions. The defendants preferred two separate appeals to this Court from the lower Court's order. As the impugned order is not appealable, at the request of the appellants learned Advocate, they were converted into Civil Revision Applications. This order disposes of both these revisions. 2. The learned Judge has held that on the death of the first two plaintiffs, Plaintiff No. 3 Mahendra became the Karta of the Joint Family and as such he could continue the suit. He also held that even one co-owner could in law maintain such suits for possession and damages for wrongful use and occupation, and as such, the omission on the part of surviving plaintiffs to being the legal representatives of the deceased on record was inconsequential. In this view, he dismissed both Notices of Motion. 3. I find that both reasons given by the learned Judge are valid. It is a basic principle of law that where a property is owned by a number of co-owners, any one of them may successfully maintain an action for possession and mesne profits against a trespasser. It is not necessary to quote authorities in support of this elementary principle of law. If necessary, I may refer to an old decision of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 192, (Maganlal v. Bhudar and another)1, of Allahabad High Court reported in A.I.R. 1942 All. 358, (Ram Charan v. Bansidhar)2. It is not necessary to quote authorities in support of this elementary principle of law. If necessary, I may refer to an old decision of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 192, (Maganlal v. Bhudar and another)1, of Allahabad High Court reported in A.I.R. 1942 All. 358, (Ram Charan v. Bansidhar)2. Shri Doctor who appears for the defendants invited my attention to the Supreme Court decision reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, (Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P.)3 in support of his proposition that all co-owners must join in a suit to recover immovable property and if some co-owners refuse to sue, the proper course to adopt is to implead such co-owners as defendants. The decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. The Supreme Court had ruled in the aforesaid case that for the purposes of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of a fundamental right, it is not necessary that all the co-lessees must be joined as parties. The particular observation relied upon by Shri Doctor is: “The principle applicable to suits for possession, namely that all co-owners must join in a suit to recover property unless the law otherwise provides, and if some co-owners refused to sue, the proper course to adopt as to the rest is to make them defendants in the suit, can have no application by way of analogy to a petition under Article 32, which is not a suit for possession.” This observation finds place in paragraph 12 of the judgment in the backdrop of the contention raised by the respondents that the failure of the petitioner to join one of the co-lessees to the petition was fatal. The question whether a co-owner can or cannot maintain a suit for ejectment and mesne profits against a rank trespasser, was never before the Court for its decision. The decision is thus clearly distinguishable and cannot take defendants' case any further. The learned Judge was plainly right in holding that the suit did not abate against the surviving plaintiffs 3 to 6, assuming that they were just co-owners and not members of a joint Family. 4. The decision is thus clearly distinguishable and cannot take defendants' case any further. The learned Judge was plainly right in holding that the suit did not abate against the surviving plaintiffs 3 to 6, assuming that they were just co-owners and not members of a joint Family. 4. Shri Doctor also invited my attention to Rules 2 and 3 of Order 22 Civil Procedure Code and urged that inasmuch as the 6 brothers had initially opted for joining together in bringing the suit, it was not subsequently open to the surviving plaintiffs to fall back upon the proposition that even initially the suit would have been competent in absence of the deceased plaintiff. I do not find any substance in this particular contention. Sub-rule (2) of the aforesaid Rule 3 inter alia provides that where one plaintiff dies out of many and an application is not made for substitution of his legal representatives, the suit abates so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. The clear implication is that it does necessarily abate as a whole in every case. In this context, we must appreciate the distinction between what is known as initial abatement qua a deceased plaintiff alone under Rule 3(2) ibid and the abatement of the suit as a whole. There may be cases where notwithstanding the abatement of the suit against a particular deceased plaintiff, the suit does not abate as a whole and may be continued at the instance of the surviving plaintiff/plaintiffs. The present suits belong to this category. The only effect of the omission to bring legal representatives of deceased plaintiffs 1 and 2, will be to debar them from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Since even a single co-owner can successfully maintain a suit for possession and mesne profits against a rank trespasser, the two suits under consideration do not abate as a whole in spite of the death of two brothers. 5. There is also merit in the lower Court's second reason that on the death of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, plaintiff No. 3 became the Karta of the Joint Family and in that capacity he can effectively continue the suits. The two plaints which are almost identical, bear out that the deceased plaintiff No. 1 Madhukar had filed the suits as Karta of the joint family. 1 and 2, plaintiff No. 3 became the Karta of the Joint Family and in that capacity he can effectively continue the suits. The two plaints which are almost identical, bear out that the deceased plaintiff No. 1 Madhukar had filed the suits as Karta of the joint family. On the death of first two plaintiffs, plaintiff No. 3 who ranks in seniority became the Karta and as rightly held by the lower Court, can continue the suit by himself in this representative capacity. Shri Doctor relying on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1239, (Gurupad v. Hirabai)4, urged that plaintiff No. 1 had left behind some female heirs and as such the joint status of the family will have to be treated as disrupted on his death. In this context he referred me to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. This decision of the Supreme Court has been explained in a later decision of the same Court in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 716 (State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao)5. Dealing with a similar contention Their Lordships observed: “When a female member who inherits on interest in the joint family property under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act files a suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family she would be entitled to get both the interest she has inherited and the share which would have been notionally allotted to her, as stated in Explanation 1 to section 6 of the Act. But she does not cease to be a member of the family on the death of a male member of the family whose interest in the family property devolves on her without her volition to separate herself from the family.... But she does not cease to be a member of the family on the death of a male member of the family whose interest in the family property devolves on her without her volition to separate herself from the family.... It is no doubt true that the right of a female heir to the interest inherited by her in the family property gets fixed on the death of male member under section 6 of the Act but she cannot be treated as having ceased to be a member of the family without her volition as otherwise it will lead to strange results which could not have been in the contemplation of Parliament when it enacted that provision and which might also not be in the interest of such female heirs.” It is thus clear that simply because plaintiff No. 1 left behind certain female heirs, it does not automatically follow that they ceased to be members of the joint family or that the family was left after the death of the plaintiff No. 1 without a Karta. Thus even on this basis the lower Court's order is right that plaintiff No. 3 could effectively continue the suit in his representative capacity as Karta. 6. There is no merit in these two Revisions and accordingly I discharge the Rule. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged. -----