R. G. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a Nationalised banking undertaking. In the year 1974 the erstwhile Banking Company catted "vijaya Bank Ltd. ," acquired a plot of land bearing No. 14, M. G. Road, Bangalore, on perpetual lease with the intention of housing its Administrative office. The Banking Undertaking of the "vijaya bank Ltd. ," was nationalised in 1980 and the new Bank (petitioner herein) became the owner of all its assets including the plot under reference. Upon the said plot, the petitioner-Bank constructed a 14storeyed building which houses the head Office of the Bank. The building was completed on 1-10-1984 and it was occupied by the petitioner- Bank from that date. By a special notice dated 26-6-85 issued by the Assistant Revenue officer, Bharathi Nagar Range, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, the building constructed by the Bank at the said plot No. 14, M G. Road, Bangalore, was proposed to be assessed on an annual rateable value of Rs. 75,26,000/-, On such basis, property tax and ceases in all aggregating Rs. 14,78,859-80 Ps. was sought to be levied and demanded with effect from 1-10-1984 from the petitioner-Bank. The copy of the said special notice has been produced by the petitioner as Annexure-A. The petitioner- bank lodged its objections to this proposal before the Commissioner of the bangalore City Corporation (respondent no. 1 herein) as per the original of annexure-B. After hearing the Bank, the appeal Officer and Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) of the Bangalore City Corporation (respondent No. 2 herein) passed an order dated 10-10-1985 rejecting the objections filed by the petitioner-Bank and confirmed the fixation of the annual rateable value at Rs. 75,26,000/- as per the original of Annexure-C. Against the said oider, the petitioner-Bank preferred an appeal before the Taxation Appeals committee respondent No. 3) under Rule 18 Schedule III to the Karnataka Municipal corporation Act 1976 (for short the 'act' ). The Taxation Appeals Committee reduced the annual rateable value to Rs. 55,00,000/- with effect from 1-10-1984 by its order a* per the original of annexure-E. On that basis, the demand notice as per Annexure D for Rs. 32,42,250/- from 1-10-84 to 31-3-87 was issued to the petitioner-Bank. The Taxation Appeals Committee reduced the annual rateable value to Rs. 55,00,000/- with effect from 1-10-1984 by its order a* per the original of annexure-E. On that basis, the demand notice as per Annexure D for Rs. 32,42,250/- from 1-10-84 to 31-3-87 was issued to the petitioner-Bank. Hence, this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner-Bank for quashing Annexures-C d and E by issuing of a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order or direction. ( 2 ) MR. G. P. Shivaprakash, learned counsel for the respondents, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition. According to him, as the petitioner haa an alternative and efficacious remedy under Rule 20 of schedule III to the Act, the writ petition has to be dismissed in limine. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision in Assistant Collector of Central excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Danlop India Ltd. , and others ( AIR 1985 sc 330 ). While considering the said question in the said case. His Lordship chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges, was pleased to observe thus :"article 226 is not meant to short- circuit or circumvent statutory procedures, It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution, But, then the Coutt must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. . . . ". But, the decision In M\s. Fllterco and another v. Commissioner of Safes tax M. P, and another ( AIR 1986 SC 626 ) is a complete answer to the contention of Mr. Shivaprakash. In the said case. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. . . . ". But, the decision In M\s. Fllterco and another v. Commissioner of Safes tax M. P, and another ( AIR 1986 SC 626 ) is a complete answer to the contention of Mr. Shivaprakash. In the said case. His Lordship Balakrishna Eradi, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court was pleased to observe that as Section 38 (3) of the M. P. General sales Tax Act requires that a substantial portion of the tax has to be deposited before an appeal or revision can be filed. The High Court ought to have considered and pronounced upon the merits by the parties and the summary dismissal of the writ petition was not justified. This, shows that where the Act requires the tax to be paid before filing an appeal or revision, it is not alternate or efficacious remedy and a writ petition can be entertained. In this case Rule 20 of Schedule iii to the Act provides that no such appeal shall be heard unless within a period of 30 days from the date of decision or order, the appeal has been presented and the tax has been paid within the said period. Therefore, I see considerable force in the contention of Sri S. G. Sunda- raswamy, learned counsel for the petitions that the remedy of appeal provided under rule 20 of Schedule HI to the Act is not an alternate efficacious remedy. That is also the view taken by the Division bench of this Court in (1) Khan Sahib abdul Shakoor v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore [1972 (1) Mys. L J. 238] (2) C. N. Gopal v. City of Bangalore municipal Corporation [1966 (1) Mys. LJ. 492}. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Shivaprakash is overruled. That is also the view taken by the Division bench of this Court in (1) Khan Sahib abdul Shakoor v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore [1972 (1) Mys. L J. 238] (2) C. N. Gopal v. City of Bangalore municipal Corporation [1966 (1) Mys. LJ. 492}. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Shivaprakash is overruled. ( 3 ) THE first contention urged by Sri s G. Sundaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the petitioner is an authority under Article 12 and the provisions contained in Banking Companies (Acquisition and transfer of undertakings) Act 1980 show that the Bank is to all intents part of the 'central Government' and the 'central Government* is the true owner of all its assets including the building in question and therefore the Bank cannot be taxed as per the provisions of Article 285 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to Section 6 of the said Act, the Central Government has paid the compensation to the erstwhile 'vijaya Bank Ltd. ,' at the time of its nationalisation. According to Section-7 of the said Act, the general superintendence and managemant of the affairs and business of the petitioner-Bank vests in a board of Directors to be appointed by the central Government. Section 8 of the said Ac. t states that the new Bank shall be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policies involving public interest as thecentral Government may after consultation wrth the Gpvernor of reserve Bank of India, give. Section 9 states that the Central Government has the power to make a scheme for the Bunk for carrying Out the provisions of the Act. According to Section 10 (7) of the Act, the Bank has to transfer the balance of profits to the Central Government. According to Section 18 of the said Act, the Bank cannot be placed in liquidation save by the order of the Central Government Referring to the said provisions, mr. According to Section 10 (7) of the Act, the Bank has to transfer the balance of profits to the Central Government. According to Section 18 of the said Act, the Bank cannot be placed in liquidation save by the order of the Central Government Referring to the said provisions, mr. S. G. Sundaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that the petitioner-Bank is completely owned and controlled by the Central Government and so it is in reality the Central Government itself or its agency to implement the government financial policies and the apparent corporate Cloak is only a veil and if this veil is lifted it will be obvious that two are one and the same and therefore, the imposition of the Municipal tax upon the buildings belonging to the Bank is unconstitutional and violatiue of Article 285 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision in (1) Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd , and ors. ( AIR 1986 SC 1370 ); (2) The Workmen employed in Associated Rubber Industry ltd. , Bhavanagar v. The Associated Rub" her Industry Ltd. , Bhavanagar and another (AIR 1986 SC page-1 ). In LIC's case, the Supreme Court was pleased to observe thus at para-90: "90. It was submitted that the thirteen caparo Companies were thirteen companies in name only, they were but one and the one was an individual Mr Swaraj Paul. One had only to pierce the corporate veil to discover mr. Swaraj Paul lurking behind. It was submitted that thirteen applications - were made on behalf of thirteen companies in order to circumvent the scheme which prescribed a ceiling of one per cent on behalf of each nonresident of Indian nationality or origin, or each company 60 per cent of whose shares were owned by non residents of Indian nationality/origin. Our attention was drawn to the picturesque pronouncement of Lord Denning M. R. in Wailersteiner v. Moir (1974) 3 All. Er. 217 and the decisions of this Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive co , Ltd. , v. State of Bihar (1964) 6 scr 885 : ( AIR 1965 SC 40 ), the commr. of Income Tax v. Meenakshi mills AIR 1967 SC 819 and Workmen v. Associated Rubber Ltd,, (1985) 2 scale 321 . While it is firmly established ever since Salomon v. A. Salomon and Co. of Income Tax v. Meenakshi mills AIR 1967 SC 819 and Workmen v. Associated Rubber Ltd,, (1985) 2 scale 321 . While it is firmly established ever since Salomon v. A. Salomon and Co. , Ltd. , 1897 AC 22 was decided that a company has an independent and legal personality distinct from the individuals who are its members it has since been held that the corporate veil may be lifted, the corporate personality may be ignored and the individual members recognised for who they are in certain exceptional circumstances. Pennington in his company Law (Fourth Edition) states :"four inroads have been made by the law on the principle of the separate legal personality of companies. By far the most extensive of these has been made by legislation imposing taxation. The Government, naturally enough, does not willingly suffer schemes for the avoidance of taxation which depend for their success on the employment of the principle of separate legal personality, and in fact legislation has gone so far that in certain circumstances taxation can be heavier if companies aie employed by the tax payer in an attempt to minimise his tax liability than if he uses other means to give effect to his wishes. Taxation of companies js a complex subject and is outside the scope of this book. The reader who wishes to pursue the subject is referred to the many standard text books-on Corporation Tax, Income tax, capital gains tax and Capital transfer Tax. The other inroads on the principle of separate corporate personality have been made by two sections of the companies Act 1948, by judicial disregard of the principle where the protection of public interests is of paramount importance, or where the company has been formed to evade obligations imposed by the law, and by the courts implying in ceitain cases that a company is an agent or trustee for its members. In Palmer's Company law (Twenty third Edition) the present position in England is stated and The occasions when the corporate veil may be lifted have been enumerated and classified into fourteen categories. Similarly in Cover's Company Law (Fourth Edition), a chapter is devoted to 'lifting the veil' and the various occasions when that may be done are discussed. In Tata Engineering and Locomotives Co. Similarly in Cover's Company Law (Fourth Edition), a chapter is devoted to 'lifting the veil' and the various occasions when that may be done are discussed. In Tata Engineering and Locomotives Co. , Ltd. , (supra) the company wanted the corporate veil to be lifted so as to sustain the maintainability of the petition, filed by the company under Art. 32 of the Constitution, by treating it as one filed by shareholders of the company. The request of the company was turned down on the ground that it was not possible to treat the company as a citizen for the purposes of Art. 19. In commr. of Income Tax v. Meenakshi mills (supra) the corporate veil was lifted and evasion of income tax prevented by paying regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade. In Workmen v. Associated Rubber industry (supra) resort was had to the principle of lifting the veil to prevent devices to avoid welfare legislation. It was emphasised that regard must be had to substance and not the form of a transaction. Generally and broadly speaking, we may say that the corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates lifting the veil, or fraud or improper conduct is intended to be prevented, or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute is sought to be evaded or where associated companies are inextricably connected as to be in reality, part of one concern. It is neither necessary nor desirable to enumerate the classes of cases where lifting the veil is permissible, since, that must' necessarily depend on the relevant statutory or other provisions, the object sought to be achieved, the impugned conduct, the involvement of the element of the public interest, the effect on parties who may be affected etc. ,"in case No (2), the Supreme Court was pleased to observed that it is the duty of the Court, in every case where ingenuity is expended to avoid taxing and welfare legislations, to get behind the smoke-screen and discover the true state of affairs. The Court is not to be satisfied with form and leave well alone the substance cf a transaction. The decision in Western Coalfields Ltd. , v. Special Area Development Authority, korba and another ( AIR 1982 SC 697 ) relied upon by Sri Shivaprakash, learned counsel for respondents, is a complete answer to the said contention of Mr. The Court is not to be satisfied with form and leave well alone the substance cf a transaction. The decision in Western Coalfields Ltd. , v. Special Area Development Authority, korba and another ( AIR 1982 SC 697 ) relied upon by Sri Shivaprakash, learned counsel for respondents, is a complete answer to the said contention of Mr. Sundaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner. In the said case, while considering the contention that since the appellant-Companies are wholly owned by the Government of India, the lands and buildings owned by the Companies cannot be subjected to property taxes, his Lordship CHANDRACHUD, C. J. (as he then was), speaking for the Bench was pleased to observe thus : "the short answer to this contention is that even though the entire share capital of the appellant companies has been subscribed by the Government of india it cannot be predicted that the companies themselves are owned by the Government of India. The companies, which are incorporated under the companies Act, have a corporate personality of their own district from that of the Government of India. The lands and buildings are vested in and owned by the companies, the Government of india only owns the share capital. In Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ) (The Bank nationalisation case), it was held :"a company registered under the companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property of the Company is not the property of the share-holders. A share holder has merely an interest in the Company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability and by a share in the profit". In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1970 SC 82 ), the heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. , was incorporated under the Companies Act and the entire share capital was contributed by the Central Government. It was therefore a Government Company under s. 617 of the Companies Act. On the question as to whether the Corporation carried on an industry under the authority of the Central Government within the meaning of S. 2 (a) of the I. D. Act, 1947. It was held by the Supreme Court that an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person, sepanie and distinct from its members. It was held by the Supreme Court that an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person, sepanie and distinct from its members. The mere fact that the entire share capital of the respondent company was contributed by the Central government and the fact that all it's shares were held by the President and certain officers of the Central Government did not make any difference to that position. . . . ( 5 ) IN Andhra Pradesh State Road transport Corporation v. Income Tax officer ( AIR 1964 SC 1486 ), the Andhra pradesh Road Transport Corporation claimed exemption from taxation under art. 299 of the Constitution by which the property and income of a State is exempt from Union taxation. The Supreme Court while rejecting the Corporation's claim, held that though it was wholly controlled by the State Government it had a separate entity and its income was not the income of the State Government. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. (as he then was) while speaking for the Court, referred to the judgment of Lord Denning in tamlin V. Hansaford 1950 KB 18 in which the learned Judge observed :"in the eye of the law, the corporation is its own master and is answerable as fully as any other person or corporation. It is not the Crown and has none of the immunities or privileges of the Crown. Its servants are not civil servants. , and its property is not Crown property. It is as much bound by Acts of Parliament as any other subject of the King. It is of course, a public authority and its purposes, no doubt, are public purposes, but it is not a Government Department nor do its powers fall within the province of Government". ( 6 ) MR. Sundaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner, fairly conceded that the petitioner-Bank isassessed to Income tax under the Income-tax Act. According to Section 11 of the Banking Companies (A and T) Act 1980 the petitioner Bank is deemed to be an Indian Company and a Company in which public are substantially interested for the purposes of income Tax Act. This also shows that the petitioner-Bank is not a part of the central Govt. and it is treated as a distinct entity. This also shows that the petitioner-Bank is not a part of the central Govt. and it is treated as a distinct entity. In view of the said reasons, although the petitioner-Bank may be an 'authority for the purposes of article-12 of the Constitution, it is not a central Government or a part of the Central Government and the building owned by the petitioner-Bank cannot be treated as Government building. Therefore, I see no force in the said contention of mr. Sundaraswamy. ( 7 ) THE second contention of Mr. Sundaraswamy is that the building belongs to the Central Governmerrt and is used for the purposes of the Government and not for commercial purposes but for-implementation of the fiscal policies of the Central Government and therefore the said building is exempted under Section 110 (j) of the Act. ( 8 ) SECTION 110 (j) of the Act reads thus :"buildings or lands belonging to the central Government or any state government used for purposes of government and not used or intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes". It is already held by me while considering the first contention of Mr. Sundaraswamy that the building in question cannot be said to be belonging to the central Government and that it belongs to the petitioner-Bank. According to section-2 (13) of the Act "government" means State Government. In this case the building is not used for the purposes of the State Government. More over, "commercial purposes" would cover an undertaking the object of which is to make a profit out of the undertaking. According to Section 3 (5) of the Banking companies (Aandt) Act 1980, every corresponding new bank shall carry on and transact the business of banking as defined in clause (b) of Section 5 of the banking Regulation Act 1949 (10 of 1949) and may engage in one or more forms of business specified in sub-section (1) of Section 6 of that Act, According to clause (b) of Section 5 of the banking Regulation Act 1949, ''bank'' means the accepting, for the purpose of fending or investment; of deposits of money from public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawal by cheque, draft, order or otherwise. Looking to the forms of business in which the Banking company may engage as stated in sub- section (1) of Section-6 of the Banking regulation Act 1949, it can be easily said that the said building is used for commercial purposes. Therefore, Section 110 (j) of the Act is not applicable to the building in question and the petitioner is not entitled to claim exemption under it. ( 9 ) THE third contention Mr. Sunda- raswamy is that the method of computation of annual rateable value is contrary to the taxing provision under the Act and in particular to the proviso to Section 109 (2) of the Act. Section 109 (2) of the act reads thus ;"the rateable value of a building or land shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which such building or land may at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to let from month to month or from year to year less a deduction in the case of buildings only of sixteen and two-thirds per cent of such annual rent and the said deduction shall be in lieu of all alowance for repairs or on any other account whatever : provided that- (a) in the case of- (i) any Government or railway building; or (ii) any building of a class not ordinarily let, the gross annual rent of which cannot in the opinion of the commissioner be estimated, the rateable value of the premises shall be deemed to be six per cent of the total of the estimated market value of the land at the time of assessment and the estimated cost of erecting the building at such lime after deducting for depreciation a reasonable amount which shall in no case be less than ten per cent of cost, and (b) machinery and furniture shall be excluded from valuations under this section. "in this case, the building in question cannot be said to be a Government building and it belongs to the petitioner- bank. No doubt, Mr. Sundaraswamy, stated that the said. building cannot be let out to anybody. But, according to the Commissioner, in this case, the gross annual rent of the building can be estimated So, the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 109 of the Act cannot be made applicable to the building in question. No doubt, Mr. Sundaraswamy, stated that the said. building cannot be let out to anybody. But, according to the Commissioner, in this case, the gross annual rent of the building can be estimated So, the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 109 of the Act cannot be made applicable to the building in question. Therefore, the question is whether the fixing of the annual rateable value of the building in question at Rs. 55,00,000 by the third respondent can be said to be arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal regard being had to the principles on which the best judgment assessment is to be made. In State of Kerala v. C. Velukutty 1966 vol 17 Sales Tax Cases, 465, the Supreme Court was pleased to observe thus :"under Section 12 (2) (b) of the travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax act 1125, M E , power is conferred on the assessing authority in the circumstances mentioned thereunder to assess the dealer to the best of his judgment. The limits of the power ere implicit in the expression ''best of his judgment". Judgment is a faculty to decide matters with wisdom truly and legally. Judgment does not depend upon the arbitrary caprice of a judge, but on settled and invariable principles of justice. Though there is an element of guess-work in a best judgment assessment, it shall not be a wild one, but shall have a reasonable nexus to the available material and the circumstances of each case. Though, sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the act provides for a summary method because of the default of the assesses, it does not enable the assessing authority to function capriciously without regard for the available material. . . . "from the order-Annexure-C of respondent No. 2, it is clear that the assessment in this case has been based on the prevailing rental value of similar buildings in M. G. Road and UIso or road. Respondent No. 2 has stated that the rental value in respect of public utility building which has 22 floors is fixed at Rs. 3. 25 per sq. feet and the rental value in Ulsoor road which is just behind the petitioner's building was fixed at Rs. 3 50 per sq. feet in 1983. There is no material produced by the petitioner to show that the rateable value is fixed according to the floors of the building in case of multistoreyed buildings. 3. 25 per sq. feet and the rental value in Ulsoor road which is just behind the petitioner's building was fixed at Rs. 3 50 per sq. feet in 1983. There is no material produced by the petitioner to show that the rateable value is fixed according to the floors of the building in case of multistoreyed buildings. Moreover, in this case, the whole building is used for office purposes and it is provided with the facility of lifts. Honce, there is no reason to fix different rateable value for different floors of the building. Under the circumstances, the rateable value fixed at Rs. 3/- per sq. feet for the building of the petitioner cannot be said to be arbitrary merely because it is about one K M. away from the Utility Building and as both the buildings are on the M. G. Road. ( 10 ) IN the result, the writ petition is dismissed and the the Rule is discharged. No costs. Writ petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .