ORDER T.N. Singh, J.-1. Two short grounds are strongly urged with great vehemence by appellants' counsel to impugn the Award passed by the Workmen's Compensation Court. 2. Shri Sinha Government Advocate, appearing for the appellants, bas firstly submitted that the Award is vitiated for non-compliance by the Court below with the provisions of Rules 23 and 25 of the Workmens' Compensation (Madhya Pradesh) Rules, 1962, for short, the 'Rules', He has also submitted that the learned Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in making the Award by admitting in evidence medical certificates without the doctors being examined in proof thereof. Counsel has cited further case-law to which I shall advert in due course. 3. First question first. The first thing to be stated about the first contention of Shri Sinha firstly is that Rules 23 and 25 are not to be read as mandatory provisions. The reason why I say so is that the power to examine the applicant under Rule 23 or the power to bold a preliminary enquiry on an application under Rule 25 is the discretionary power, Still, what is, however, to be noted is that when the Commissioner takes action under Rule 26 and exercises his power thereunder, he has to do so judiciously. In my opinion, there is a condition precedent envisaged under the law for exercise by the Commissioner of his jurisdiction under section 26 and I would, therefore, extract the provision in extenso : "26. Notice to opposite party-If the Commissioner does not dismiss the application under rule 24 or rule 25, he shall send to the party from whom the applicant claims relief (hereinafter referred to as the opposite party), a copy of the application, together with a police of date on which he will dispose of the application and may call upon the parties to produce upon that date any evidence which they may wish to tender". 4. The Commissioner, by the language of Rule 26, is saddled with the duty to consider whether the requirement of Rules 23 and 2 are to be dispensed with in any particular case. Indeed, notice to the opposite party is ordered when the Commissioner does not dismiss the application under Rules 24 or 25, after examining the applicant or holding preliminary enquiry into the application. Indeed, notice to the opposite party is ordered when the Commissioner does not dismiss the application under Rules 24 or 25, after examining the applicant or holding preliminary enquiry into the application. Indeed, before proceeding under Rule 26, if the Commissioner has not proceeded under Rule 23 or 25, he had to make an order dispensing with the "examination" or the "enquiry" contemplated thereunder. Although Rule 26 does nut explicitly contemplate such a requirement, it is so contemplate by the principles of natural justice and indeed by the constitutional imperatives of Arts. 39 (e), 39-A and 42. Indeed, any other view would make Rules 23 and 25 otiose besides impairing the right of parties to fair trial Recall I must, also, the duty of the Court not to construe any particular statutory provision in isolation but in its context and setting and to read it meaningfully to fulfil the object and purpose of the enactment itself. 5. It is necessary to refer not only to other rules of Part V (captioned "Procedure") but also to relevant provisions of the parent enactment, for short, the Act. Section 32 authorises the State Govt. to frame rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. Section 3 and 4-A contemplate that liability of the employer to pay compensation for personal injury caused to the workman by accident arises contemporaneously with the event and for default in timely payment an award by the Commissioner for penalty and interest as well. Section 22, which deals with application for claim, also provide settlement by agreement between parties. Section 25 contemplates recording of "memorandum of substance of evidence" of witnesses except that of a medical witness whose evidence has to be "taken down as nearly as may be word for word". Rule 20 enables an application (claim) being presented by post but as per Rule 21 such document, on which the "relief is based", must accompany it. Although Rule 27 contemplates inter-parte hearing, framing of issues under Rule 28 has to take place thereafter to enable judgment being delivered under Rule 32 by recording finding on each issue, giving reasons therefore. These several provisions of the Act and the Rules indicate unmistakably the Imperative necessitly of a summary and speedy (and indeed fair) trial of a workman's claim for compensation for injury suffered in accident, to match the objective underwritten in Arts.39 (3), 39-A and 42. 6. These several provisions of the Act and the Rules indicate unmistakably the Imperative necessitly of a summary and speedy (and indeed fair) trial of a workman's claim for compensation for injury suffered in accident, to match the objective underwritten in Arts.39 (3), 39-A and 42. 6. Reading Rules 23 and 25 as mandatory would result in a prolonged trial and dilatory award, defeating the constitutional objective. On the other band, if in terms of Rule 26 a duty is saddled on the Commissioner to apply its mind to the material available to take a decision as to whether the application was ripe for inter-parte hearing and neither side would be prejudiced in trial if Rules 23 and 25 are dispensed with, it shall serve a constitutional purpose. Indeed, if it appears to the Commissioner that there is any defect in the claim that can be cured before proceeding under Rule 26, by examining the applicant on oath or allowing him opportunity to adduce other evidence. In the instant case, the Commissioner did nothing except holding an inter-parte hearing. If he bad not ordered parties straightway under Rule 26 to produce evidence but bad applied his mind to the claim, he would perhaps have taken a different view. Because, the application was not in the prescribed form and as such it lacked requisite particulars as to notice under section 10 and it was also not accompained by the medical certificate required by Rule 21 (1). 7. Now, few facts which have prompted me to take the view that the impugned award has to go and there has to be a retrial. There was an imperfect claim though there was a written statement also. There was evidence in the proceeding though it was taken on different dates, and on each side, one witness was examined. The applicant examined himself on 12th December, 1985 and the opposite party examined an Assistant Engineer in support of his case, on 13th November, 1985. What is not disputed is that whatever evidence has come on record, is comprised of two xeroxed copies of certificates of two doctors and one application of the applicant, addressed to the Sub-Engineer with endorsements thereon. These documents have come through the applicant who tendered the same in the course of his evidence and proved also the endorsements on Ex. P/3, said to be those of Sub-Engineer (AA) and Time-Keeper (BB) respectively. These documents have come through the applicant who tendered the same in the course of his evidence and proved also the endorsements on Ex. P/3, said to be those of Sub-Engineer (AA) and Time-Keeper (BB) respectively. It is true that in his evidence, the witness of the opposite party deposed that at site where the accident took place, neither the Sub-Engineer, nor the Time-Keeper is expected to be present, but the fact of the matter is also that this witness bad come on transfer from Ujjain to Gohad in August, 1986 and the accident had taken place at Gohad on 27-2-1985. His evidence, therefore, is worthless and useless. But that did not absolve the claimant of his duty to prove his case or excuse the Commissioner of his duty to examine the evidence and to come to the conclusion that claimant’s case had been proved duly in accordance with law. Because at no stage the claimant had adequate opportunity to produce his evidence as no preliminary enquiry was held, he suffered as he could not examine the doctors in the inter-parte bearing who are said to have given him the certificates, proved and exibited as P/1 and P/2. Because Ex. P/3 never came in any form and the facts alleged therein never came before the Commissioner in any form in the pleadings, the opposite party suffered as it was denied opportunity of rebuttal. These are the reasons which have prompted me to take the view that both sides have suffered and the trial has been vitiated. 8. Now, the case law. I proceed to examine first the decision cited by Shri Sinha. The Bench decision in Ali Akbar AIR 1937 Cal. 697 does support the contention pressed by Shri Sinha that the provision embraced by Rule 23 as to examination of the applicant was a mandatory provision, but with due respect I reiterate what I have earlier stated. The parent provision for submission of application for compensation before the Commissioner is section 22. Therein, I read no requirement of the applicant being examined by the Commissioner and indeed, a claim for compensation can be lodged in the manner prescribed under the Rules by filing an application in the appropriate form accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed. The parent provision for submission of application for compensation before the Commissioner is section 22. Therein, I read no requirement of the applicant being examined by the Commissioner and indeed, a claim for compensation can be lodged in the manner prescribed under the Rules by filing an application in the appropriate form accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed. Sub-section (2) postulates this requirement, while sub-section (3) of section 22, on the other hand, envisages that when the applicant is illiterate and is unable to furnish the required information in writing, the application may be prepared under the direction of the Commissioner. Indeed, even at this stage, there is no requirement of the applicant being examined on oath in person. On the other hand, in both the Rules have vested discretionary power in the Commissioner which is indicated clearly by the fact that not only dispensation of the provision of Rules 23 and 25 is impliedly contemplated under Rule 26, envisaging optional power under those rules, but the word "may" used in both Rules leaves no doubt about the discretionary nature of the power. 9. The Bench decision in the case of Panchanan Ghose AIR 1950 Cal. 261 and the decision of a learned Single Judge in Burhwal Sugar Mills v. Ramjan 1982 Lab. IC 84 appertains to the question of non-examination of the Doctor giving medical certificate and the effect thereof. Both decisions also fully support Shri Sinha's contention and with the view expressed in both decisions, I am in respectful agreement. Harries, C.J., in the case of Panchanan Ghose (supra) speaking for the Court, observed that "medical certificates are the worst form of hearsay evidence" and the Commissioner was not entitled to base his finding even on his own observation of the injured workman. Shri A. K. Upadhyaya, appearing for the respondent, has cited Bhagwandas v. pyarelal AIR 1954 MB 59, wherein it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that the preliminary enquiry under Rule 25 was discretionary and, as earlier alluded, for reasons stated, I have no hesitation to say I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed. An application for compensation cannot be rejected, it was held, for non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 20 or 25 and that indeed is my view which bas prompted me to take a remand of the case for retrial. 10. An application for compensation cannot be rejected, it was held, for non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 20 or 25 and that indeed is my view which bas prompted me to take a remand of the case for retrial. 10. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner for re-trial. Opportunity shall be granted by the Commissioner to both sides to adduce evidence in support their respective case. Counsel have taken an agreed date to appear before the Commissioner on 24th August, 1987 to take a date of re-bearing thereat. Within two months, the matter shall be finally disposed of by passing a fresh award, as may be warranted on the evidence on record. No costs.