JUDGMENT - VAZE V.V., J.:—Does the termination of the services of a Headmaster of a Secondary School which receives air under the Grant-in-aid Code of the Government of Goa raise an issue of public law so as to be amendable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court? 2. Francis John was appointed as a Headmaster by the Calangute Don Bosco Educational Welfare Foundation in 1974 and by an order dated 12th July, 1984, the Director of Education of the Government of Goa agreed with the findings of the Disciplinary Committee and permitted the Principal of the school to terminate the services of Francis John as per Rule 74.3 of the Grant-in-aid (G.I.A.) Code. The Principal of the Don Bosco High School terminated the services of the petitioner as Headmaster by letter dated 26th July, 1984 which termination is being challenged by this writ petition. 3. According to the petitioner, the proceedings of the Disciplinary Committee contravened the principles of natural justice and fair play inasmuch as one of the Members of the Committee was biased against him. 4. Mr. Kakodkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, relied on (R. v. Panel on Take-overs)1, 1987(1) All.E.R. 564, for the proposition that in determining whether the decisions of a particular body were subject to judicial review, the Court was not confined to considering the source of that body's powers and duties but could also look their nature. Accordingly, if the duty, imposed on a body, whether expressly or by implication, was a public duty and the body was exercising public law functions the Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application for judicial review of that body's decisions even though the body is an unincorporated association not created by a statute. The Disputes Settlement Committee set up under Clause (vi) of para 74.3 of the G.I.A. Code may not be a statute body but the duty to give a hearing to both the parties and consider their written statements is impressed on the body by Clause (v) of para 74.2 of the G.I.A. Code. The body is charged with the functions of determining misconduct, if any, of the employee and in doing so discharges a public duty and is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. The body is charged with the functions of determining misconduct, if any, of the employee and in doing so discharges a public duty and is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Kakodkar drew sustenance from (R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd.)2, 1967(2) All.E.R. 770, where a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board appointed by the Secretary of State and administered on behalf of the Government was held to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction as the board were performing a quasi judicial function affecting the public, lawful authority for which was derived from the prerogative, though the creation of the board was not statutory. 5. A perusal of para 74.3 of the G.I.A. Code shows that the services of an employee cannot be terminated by the management “without prior approval” of the Disputes Settlement Committee which consists of representatives each of the Department of Education, the management of the School and the Association of the teachers. After the Disputes Settlement Committee reaches a decision after having given a hearing to both the parties an obligation case on the Committee by the G.I.A. Code itself the decision of the Committee is communicated by the Director of Education under Clause (x) of para 74.3 to the parties and it is provided that “it shall be final binding on both the parties”. The nature of the Committee and the functions which it discharges appear to us to partake the functions of a domestic Tribunal set up to resolve disputes between master and servant simpliciter. In Lain's case (supra) a scheme to award compensation to policy constables who were injured on duty was not statutory but was debated in Parliament and after amendment was announced in both the Houses, the dependants of the constables injured on duty were required to apply for a hearing before three members of the board and the board were charged with the duty of expending the public fund made available by the Parliament. After taking note of the fact that the board did not have a statutory base for its creation, Lord Parker, C.J. reiterated that private or domestic Tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is from the agreement of the parties concerned. After taking note of the fact that the board did not have a statutory base for its creation, Lord Parker, C.J. reiterated that private or domestic Tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is from the agreement of the parties concerned. But after noticing that the members of the board are “servants of the Crown charged by the Crown by executive instruction, with the duty of distributing the bounty of the Crown” Lord Parker, C.J., came to the conclusion that “the board are clearly, therefore, performing public duties”. As regards the second case of Panel on Take-overs, we find as the opening words of the Master of Rolls point out that “the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers is a truly remarkable body…………………….it overseas and regulates a very important part of the United Kingdom financial market.” The Master of Rolls after noticing that the Panel on Take-overs has no statutory, prerogative or common law powers and is not in contractual relationship with the financial market or with those who deal in that market noticed: - “Lacking my authority de jure, it exercises immense power de facto by devising, promulgating, amending and interpreting the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers, by waiving or modifying the application of the code in particular circumstances, by investigating the reporting on alleged breaches of the code and by the application or threat of sanctions. These sanctions are no less effective because they are applied indirectly and lack a legally enforceable base.” The Master of Rolls proceeded to say: - “The principal issue in this appeal, and the only issue which may matter in the longer term, is whether this remarkable body is above the law. Its respectability is beyond question. So is its bona fides. I do not doubt for one moment that it is intended to and does operate in the public interest and that the enormously wide discretion which is arrogates to itself is necessary if it is to function efficiently and effectively. While not wishing to become involved in the political controversy on the relative merits of self-regulation and governmental or statutory regulation, I am content to assume for the purposes of this appeal that self-regulation is preferable in the public interest. But that said, what is to happen if the panel goes off the rails? While not wishing to become involved in the political controversy on the relative merits of self-regulation and governmental or statutory regulation, I am content to assume for the purposes of this appeal that self-regulation is preferable in the public interest. But that said, what is to happen if the panel goes off the rails? Suppose perish the thought, that it were to use its powers in a way in which was manifestly unfair. What then? Counsel for the panel submits that the panel would lose the support of public opinion in the financial markets and would be unable to continue to operate. Further or alternatively, Parliament could and would intervene. May be, but how long would that take and who in the meantime could or would come to the assistance of those who were being oppressed by such conduct?”. The Panel on Take-overs and such wide powers that anyone who wishes to take advantage of the facilities of the securities market in the United Kingdom could not but observe the code specified by the Panel. The Code was measure of self-discipline but the sanctions which the panel could impose trying to work in the securities market were so annihilating that one would find it impossible so to do without subjecting himself unquestionably to the jurisdiction and authority of the Panel. Lain's case and the case of Panel on Take-overs thus raise general issues of public law such as the manner of distribution of compensation to the constables who suffered injuries while on duty or the impossibility of anyone operating in the securities market of the United Kingdom without acceding to the non-statutory code of the Panel on Take-overs. These cases which raise issues of great public importance like control of securities market or payment of compensation to injured members of a peace keeping force are as different from the present case as chalk from cheese. The issue which has come to surface in this writ petition appears to us to be an ordinary one of master and servant raising issues of private law. 6. The English case that comes nearest to the facts of the present one is (Reg. v. E. Berks Authority, Exp. The issue which has come to surface in this writ petition appears to us to be an ordinary one of master and servant raising issues of private law. 6. The English case that comes nearest to the facts of the present one is (Reg. v. E. Berks Authority, Exp. Walsh (C.A.))3, 1985 Q.B. 152, in which a senior nursing officer employed by the health authority under a contract which incorporated the Whitely Council agreement on conditions of service was denied judicial review upon being dismissed because the applicant was not seeking to enforce a public right but his private contractual right. The Master of Rolls observed that employment by a public body does not per se inject any element of public law and there is no warrant for equating public law with the interest of the public. May L.J. pointed out that in the great majority of cases involving disputes about the dismissal of an employee by his employers the most appropriate forum for resolving the dispute is an Industrial Tribunal. In Walsh's case also – as has happened in the present case a disciplinary hearing was held by a Committee which recommended his dismissal. 7. We are mindful of the cautionary words spoken by Lord Wilberfocee in (Davy v. Spelthorne Borough Council)4, 1984 A.C. 262 at 276 : “The expression 'private law' and 'public law' he said; “have recently been imported into the law of England from countries which, unlike our own have separate systems concerning public law and private law”. He added: “No doubt they are convenient expressions for descriptive purposes. In this country they must be used with caution.” 8. For the purposes of the present case we are effecting a dichotomy by drawing a line between (a) ordinary employment and (b) offices which are statutory in the sense that the power to dismiss is restricted by statute and that only the latter belonged to public law. Thus in (Lavelle's)5, 1983(2) A.C. 237 judicial review was refused to challenge an internal disciplinary procedure of the B.B.C. at the instance of the dismissed employee because prerogative remedies always were, and still remain, inappropriate remedies for enforcing a master's ordinary obligations to his servant, and the judicial review ought not to be extended to “a pure employment situation”. Thus in (Lavelle's)5, 1983(2) A.C. 237 judicial review was refused to challenge an internal disciplinary procedure of the B.B.C. at the instance of the dismissed employee because prerogative remedies always were, and still remain, inappropriate remedies for enforcing a master's ordinary obligations to his servant, and the judicial review ought not to be extended to “a pure employment situation”. But in (R. v. Home Secretary ex parte Benwell)6, 1984(3) W.L.R. 843 certiorari was granted when a Prison Officer holding as such office of a constable and not in contractual employment was dismissed by Secretary of State in breach of natural justice. 9. In contrast with Walsh's case which was merely a matter between the employer and employee, in (GCHQ's)7, 1984(3) W.L.R. 1174 where the power of Crown to alter the conditions of service of civil services at the Government communications center at Cheltenham, by forbidding them to be members of trade unions was being challenged the House of Lords held that prerogative power was in principle just as amenable to judicial review as a statutory power. Criticising this decision Professor H.W.R. Wade in his (Fifth Child Company's Oxford Lecture)8, 1985(101) L.Q.R. 180 at 199 observes: “It is questionable whether, as the House of Lords decided in the GCGQ's case crown employment is held under the royal prerogative. By holding that it is, and that it therefore falls within public law and the procedure for judicial review, the House has gone counter to the trend of other decisions which have established, it is submitted correctly, that terms and conditions of employment are a matter of private law. There was therefore two contradictory judicial policies.” 10. Professor Wade suggests that Crown's power to control the civil service is not prerogative power at all but merely the ordinary power which everyone has to employ and to tell them what to do. The King's servants were originally simply parts of his household and the fact that they now number some seven lacs is a difference of degree but not of number. This criticism is being referred to only for the limited purpose of showing a trend in academic thinking that disputes arising out of pure master and servant relationship ordinarily belong to the courts or Industrial Tribunals and should not be amenable to judicial review by prerogative writs. 11. The Supreme Court in (Commr. Lucknow Divn. This criticism is being referred to only for the limited purpose of showing a trend in academic thinking that disputes arising out of pure master and servant relationship ordinarily belong to the courts or Industrial Tribunals and should not be amenable to judicial review by prerogative writs. 11. The Supreme Court in (Commr. Lucknow Divn. v. Prem Lata)9, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 334 in a similar situation had ruled that a writ petition challenging the termination of a teacher of a college was not maintainable as neither the Managing Committee of the college nor the principal was a public authority nor were the impugned orders made in the exercise of any statutory function. Mr. Kakodkar had placed reliance on (Tikaram v. Mundikota Shikshan Prasaram Mandal)10, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1621 in support his proposition that a writ petition would be maintainable in the case of a Headmaster of a private school who is dismissed by the management of a private school. In Tikaram's case, the petitioner was not seeking any relief against the management on the basis of the clauses in the Schools Code. But the Court has observed : “In the instant case the appellant is seeking a relief not against a private body but against an officer of Government who is always amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court.” Obviously, no decision of an officer of the Government is being challenged in he present case and hence, Tikaram's case is easily distinguishable. 12. We are aware of some judgments like (Cochin Dewaswom Board v. Akileswara)11, A.I.R. 1961 Kerala 282 and (Kumkum v. Principal, Jessus Marry College)12, A.I.R. 1976 Delhi 35 in which a view was taken that the office of the Principal is a public office because the powers and duties relate to a larger section of the public and would be subject to the mandamus and certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court. However in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Lata's case, we feel that these cases are of doubtful authority. 13. A reading of the petition shows that grave bias has been imputed by the petitioner against one Member of the Disputes Settlement Committee and if his allegations are correct one may say that bias is writ large on the face of the proceedings of that Committee and may give rise to a sympathetic consideration. 13. A reading of the petition shows that grave bias has been imputed by the petitioner against one Member of the Disputes Settlement Committee and if his allegations are correct one may say that bias is writ large on the face of the proceedings of that Committee and may give rise to a sympathetic consideration. Though we may have sympathies for the petitioner for the manner in which he has been dismissed by a Committee one Member of which was allegedly biased against him, we are not in a position to indulge them as we have held that the present petition itself is not maintainable in this Court as it does not raise issues of public law. The petition fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.