Judgment SATYA BRATA SANYAL, J. 1. The Review is directed against an order dismissing a writ petition. The moot question in this case is whether such a petition is maintainable, if so, under what circumstances. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that power of review inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. On the other hand, learned lawyer for the State submits that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. Prior to amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure review petitions were entertained under Order 47, Rule 1 or S.151, C.P.C. treating the writ proceeding as Civil Proceeding. But, after the Amendment Act 104 of 1976 in the Code of Civil Procedure, the said power is no more obtainable, in view of Explanation to Sec.141 of the Code of Civil Procedure which specifically provides that, the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply to a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution. 3. A Court has no power of review except when it is granted by Statute is axiomatic by long line of decisions. In the case of M.J. Kutinha V/s. Mrs. Nathal Pinto Bai, AIR 1941 Madras 272 it was observed that unless statute provides a remedy by way of review the Court cannot review its own judgement except in very exceptional circumstances such as for example "when it passed an order inadvertently or on account of some false representation by the officers of the Court". In the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi V/s. Pradyuman Singhji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 it was observed "the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication". The same is the view expressed in other cases also. (See AIR 1974 SC 1791 at 1793; 1976 BBCJ (HC) 647). 4. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, Art.137 of the Constitution of India confers on the apex Court power to review any judgement or order pronounced or made by it. There is no such similar provision to be found in the Constitution as far as the High Court is concerned. Civil Procedure Code is inapplicable to a writ proceeding by virtue of Explanation to S.141, C.P.C. 5. There is no such similar provision to be found in the Constitution as far as the High Court is concerned. Civil Procedure Code is inapplicable to a writ proceeding by virtue of Explanation to S.141, C.P.C. 5. It will be useful at this stage to have a look at the decided cases under Article 137 of the Constitution and what limitations have been laid down for exercise of the said statutory power. In the case of P.N. Eswara Iyer V/s. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, AIR 1980 SC 808 , while considering the scope of Art.137 the Court opined "that the substantive power is derived from Art.137 and is as wide for criminal as for civil proceeding". Their Lordships have, however, hastened to add that even though such a power is conferred "it must be remembered that review is not a second dose of the same argument once considered and rejected. The rejection might have been wrong but that cannot be helped". In substance, a review application must not be an attempt to obtain a reconsideration of the judgement of the Court disposing of the substantive proceeding. In the case of M/s. Northern India. Caterers (India) Ltd. V/s. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 Justice Pathak, as he then was, while considering the scope of Art.137 of the Constitution, observed that "the normal principle that a judgement pronounced by the Court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. If a view adopted by the Court in the original judgement is a possible one it cannot be held that there is an error apparent on the face of it." In the case of Sow Chandra Kanto V/s. Sheik Habib, AIR 1975 SC 1500 , while considering the scope of Art.137, it was held that "a review of a judgement is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility". A second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import is obviously insufficient. This, therefore, is the scope of review under Art.137 of the Constitution of India. 6. A second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import is obviously insufficient. This, therefore, is the scope of review under Art.137 of the Constitution of India. 6. However, there is an exception to the rule of statutory power of review, where the Court is called upon to act ex debito justitiae to correct its own mistake or orders inadvertently passed or to prevent gross miscarriage of justice. In the case of Chandrika Sah V/s. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, 1981 BBCJ 106 . Agrawal, J. as he then was, held "for that matter every authority is entitled to correct its own mistake ....... taking any other view is bound to work out gross injustice and result in procedural imbalance". The question whether an order passed under Art.226 of the Constitution could be reviewed came to be considered in the case of Shivdeo Singh V/s. State of Punjab; AIR 1963 SC 1909 , which was decided on 8th February, 1961. The Supreme Court held, while rejecting the submission that the High Court has not such power to review its judgement passed under Article 226 of the Constitution, that "there is nothing in Art.226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it". In this case the order sought to be reviewed was passed against a person who was not a party to the proceeding. Subsequently, the person affected filed an application to implead him in the earlier writ and for rehearing the whole matter, which was allowed by the High Court. In those circumstances it was observed that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction in reviewing its previous order in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice and the High Court did what principles of natural justice required it to do. In a subsequent decision of 26th March, 1962 in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh V/s. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 , the question whether an order passed under Art.226 of the Constitution could be reviewed under O.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if not under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court refrained from expressing any opinion. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 , the question whether an order passed under Art.226 of the Constitution could be reviewed under O.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if not under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court refrained from expressing any opinion. The ratio of Shivdeo Singh, case (supra) in my opinion is that every Court of plenary jurisdiction has power to correct ex debito justitiae its judgement and order to prevent abuse of its process and grave and palpable errors. Shivdeo Singhs case was noticed in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma V/s. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 . In that case the High Court reviewed an order passed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power conferred under O.47, R.1 and S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of review was passed prior to incorporation of S.141 in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the grounds, on the basis of which the review was sought, are not permissible, since plenary jurisdiction relates to preventing miscarriage of justice and to correct grave and palpable errors committed by the Court. This has its own limits. 7. What then is this plenary power possessed by the High Court in reviewing its judgement or order pronounced or made by it under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Much light is obtainable from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. V/s. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606 . It was held in that case that the expression "review is used in two distinct senses, namely, "(1) A procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a mis-apprehension by it, and (2) a Review on merits when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Patel Narshi Thakershis case AIR 1970 SC 1273 (supra) held that no review lies on merit unless a statute specifically provides for it. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Patel Narshi Thakershis case AIR 1970 SC 1273 (supra) held that no review lies on merit unless a statute specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae, to prevent the abuse of its process and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal" 8. From the conspectus of the decided cases, referred to above, the power of reviewing judgements or orders pronounced and/or made under Art.226 of the Constitution is somewhat analogous to S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confers no new right on Courts but furnishes legislative recognition of an age old and well established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This power is inherent in a Court which may be termed as a "procedural review" to correct orders passed under some misapprehension or inadvertently or in breach of principles of natural justice or on account of some false representation and or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. This is an ancillary and incidental power necessary to discharge Courts function effectively and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. This power however, cannot be invoked for reconsideration of the judgement on merits and/or for re-hearing or fresh decision of the case and/or a routine review but a serious step only to be resorted to in very exceptional circumstances. The view petition, therefore, is maintainable only in the circumstances referred to above. 9. In the present case learned Counsel wants us to consider the merit once again as would be evident from the petition itself. This is not a case of exceptional circumstances where the Court is required to act ex debito justitiae. Hence, the review petition is dismissed in limine. RAM NANDAN PRASAD, J. 10 I agree.