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1987 DIGILAW 249 (MP)

BRIJRAJ KUMAR TANDON v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL NAGOD

1987-08-14

K.K.ADHIKARI, N.D.OJHA

body1987
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS writ petition has been filed by the residents of Nagod, tahsil Nagod, District Satna, challenging the recovery of property tax by Municipal council Nagod, respondent No. 1. ( 2. ) BEFORE dealing with the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to give certain necessary facts. To start with, Nagod constituted part of gram Panchayat known as Gram Panchayat Nagod. This Gram Panchayat Nagod was declared to be a Notified Area on 15-6-1973. Subsequently, on 28-7-1982 Nagod notified area was declared to be a Class IV Municipality. The property tax which is sought to be realised from the residents of the Municipal area Nagod including the petitioners is, according to the return filed on behalf of the Municipal Council, on the basis of a notification dated 6th September 1976 which is referred to in the gazette notification dated 2-3-1978 published in the M. P. Rajpatra dated 21-7-1978. By this latter notification, rules framed for Khairagarh Municipality in regard to assessment and collection of property tax, were made applicable to the Notified Area Committee, nagod, as it then existed. The said notification reads as hereunder : "no. 137-XVIII-II-78 - In exercise of the powers conferred by the clause (b)of sub-section (1) of Section 341 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), the State Government hereby applies for the assessment, collection and refund of Property Tax within the limits of the notified Area Committee Nagod in district Satna imposed by this Department notification No. 500-XVIII-II, dated the 6th September 1976 under clause (a)of the said sub-section Khairagarh Municipality Property Tax (Assessment and Collection) Rules, 1976 for the time being in force for the Municipality khairagarh, in district Rajnandgaon. " From the recital made in this notification it is apparent that in the Notified Area committee, Nagod, as it then was, property tax was imposed by the State Government by notification dated 6th September 1976 in exercise of the powers conferred on it by section 341 (l) (a) of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). ( 3. ) IT has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that imposition of property tax by the aforesaid notification was illegal. After hearing learned counsel for i the parties, we find substance in this submission. ( 3. ) IT has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that imposition of property tax by the aforesaid notification was illegal. After hearing learned counsel for i the parties, we find substance in this submission. In this connection it would be seen that in view of the provisions contained in Madhya Pradesh Nagariya Sthawar Sampatti Kar adhiniyam, 1964, it was not open to any municipality or notified area committee to impose property tax. Reference in this behalf may be made to Section 9 of the M. P. Nagariya Sthawar Sampatti Kar (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1970 whereby after Section 35 of the Principal Act, a new section, being Section 36, was inserted. Sub-section (1) of section 36, which is relevant for purpose of this case, reads as hereunder : "36. Bar of imposition of property tax by any local authority - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law relating to. local authority or any other enactment for the time being in force, no local authority to which this Act is made applicable under sub-section (4) of section 1 shall as from the date of coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh nagariya Sthawar Sampatti Kar (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1970, impose or recover any tax in respect of any land or building or both which is subject to tax under this Act: provided that the tax recovered by a local authority in respect of any land or building or both for the financial year 1970-71 prior to the date of publication of the Madhya Pradesh Nagariya Sthawar Sampatti Kar (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1970 shall notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, be deemed to be the tax realised under this Act. " This ordinance was subsequently replaced by an Act being M. P. Act No. 3 of 1971. Section 36, as was inserted by the ordinance, was continued in the Act. Subsequently by section 13 of the M. P. Nagariya Sthawar Sampatti Kar (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1976 (3 of 1976), Section 36, as inserted in the Principal Act, was omitted. This ordinance, as is apparent from Section 2 (1) thereof, came into force on 1-4-1976. This ordinance was also subsequently replaced by an Act, being M. P. Act No. 49/76. The omission of section 36 of the Principal Act by the ordinance was maintained by this Act. This ordinance, as is apparent from Section 2 (1) thereof, came into force on 1-4-1976. This ordinance was also subsequently replaced by an Act, being M. P. Act No. 49/76. The omission of section 36 of the Principal Act by the ordinance was maintained by this Act. The date of enforcement of the Act also has been shown to be the same as was the date of the enforcement of the ordinance, namely, 1-4-1976. As a consequence of Section 36 being deleted, the bar created in regard to imposition of property tax by the municipalities or notified areas came to an end with effect from 1-4-1976. ( 4. ) HOWEVER, simultaneously, another Act was passed, being M. P. Municipal laws (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act No. 50 of 1976 ). Part II of this Act contains the amendments in the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. By Section 3 of this Amendment act, a proviso was added after clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 127 of the Act as follows: "provided that property tax under this clause shall not be imposed except in respect of Class IV Municipality. " this we have quoted from the English Version of the Amendment Act published in M. P. Rajpatra dated 6-10-1976. The Hindi version of the said proviso, as published in the gazette of the same date, reads as hereunder : "parantu is khand ke adhin sampatti kar chaturth shreni ki Nagarpalikaon ke sambandh me ke sivay adhiropit nahin kiya jayega. " the amendment also came into force on 1-4-1976 as is apparent from Section 1 (2) of the amendment Act. The effect of this amendment was that right from 1-4-1976, when the bar created by Section 36 of the M. P. Nagariya Sthawar Sampatti Kar Adhiniyam, 1971 was removed, the bar created by the proviso inserted in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 127 of the Amendment Act was simultaneously imposed. ( 5. ) THERE has been a controversy in regard to the actual import of the proviso. For the petitioners, it has been urged by their learned counsel that in the proviso, the word except seems to be superfluous and added due to some inadvertence. According to him, in the Hindi version also ke sivay was literally translated for the word except and the words ke sivay are, for the same reason, superfluous. For the petitioners, it has been urged by their learned counsel that in the proviso, the word except seems to be superfluous and added due to some inadvertence. According to him, in the Hindi version also ke sivay was literally translated for the word except and the words ke sivay are, for the same reason, superfluous. For the Municipal Council, on the other hand, it has been urged by its learned counsel that it is not the word except which is to be taken as superfluous, but the word not is to be taken as superfluous. According to him, for the same reason nahin in the Hindi version is superfluous. ( 6. ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, we are 01 tne opinion that the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners has substance inasmuch as there is intrinsic evidence in the Amendment Act No. 50 of 1976 itself which provides a clue in regard to the intention of the Legislature in inserting the proviso. By the same Act, new section, being Section 127-A was inserted in the Municipalities Act. The relevant portion of sub-section (1) of this newly added Section 127-A reads as hereunder: "127-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, as and from the financial year 1976-77, there shall be charged, levied and paid for each financial year, a tax on the lands or buildings or both situate in a municipality other than class IV municipality at the rate specified in the table below. . . " Even though Section 127-A inserted by the Amendment Act No. 50/76 lays down the rate of tax in regard to Municipalities of Class I, II and III, the rates have been specifically made inapplicable to a Class IV Municipality. ( 7. ) IT was urged by learned counsel for the Municipal Council that the intention of the proviso was that even though under the main Section 127, it was discretionary on the municipalities to impose or not to impose property tax it was in so far as municipalities falling under Class I, II and III are concerned, it was made mandatory for them to impose property tax, whereas as regards Class IV municipalities, it was left in the discretion of such municipalities either to impose or not to impose property tax. In our opinion, had it been the intention of the Legislature, it would also have certainly provided for the rate on which property tax was to be imposed by a Class IV municipality. Obviously for Class I, II and III municipalities, the purpose of the. Legislature was to lay down a uniform rate of tax. That being the purpose, we see no reason why even if the matter of imposition of property tax was to be left in the discretion of Class IV Municipality, the rate of tax should not have been provided. If uniformity of rate of tax was considered to be a virtue for the municipalities of Class I, II and III, certainly it would have been equally a virtue in regard to class IV Municipality also. Even if therefore, for the sake of argument, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners was to be accepted that the proviso meant to make it mandatory for Class I, II and III municipalities to impose property tax and leave it to the discretion of Class IV municipality either to impose or not to impose tax, the rate which a Class IV municipality chose to impose, ought to have been laid down. Since this was not done, it appears that the intention of the Legislature was that property tax was to be imposed only by municipalities of Class I, II, III and a municipality of Class IV. If the word except in the English version of the proviso and ke sivay in the Hindi version are deleted, then it is apparent that the proviso contemplated that the property tax under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 127 of the Act shall not be imposed in respect of class IV Municipality. ( 8. ) IN our opinion there is another ground which perhaps weighed with the legislature in making an exception in regard to Class IV municipality in the matter of imposition of property tax. Section 4 of the Act provides the basis for classification of the Municipalities. Class I municipality is a municipality with population exceeding 50,000; Class II municipality is one having a population exceeding 20,000 but not exceeding 50,000, Class III municipality. on the mother hand, is one with population exceeding 10,000, but not exceeding. 20,000, whereas a Class IV Municipality is a municipality with a population not exceeding 10,000. Class I municipality is a municipality with population exceeding 50,000; Class II municipality is one having a population exceeding 20,000 but not exceeding 50,000, Class III municipality. on the mother hand, is one with population exceeding 10,000, but not exceeding. 20,000, whereas a Class IV Municipality is a municipality with a population not exceeding 10,000. From this classification, it is apparent that a Class IV Municipality is a municipality where the population is sparse, i. e. in no case exceeding 10,000 and that may have been one of the reasons that weighed with the Legislature in providing that no property tax shall be imposed by a Class IV municipality. ( 9. ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that so far as a Class IV municipality is concerned, it was not open to it to impose property tax even on the date on which the notification relied on by learned counsel for the municipality purports to impose the same. ( 10. ) WE would like to add a word here as to whether it is permissible to take the view that the word "except" in the English version and the words ke sivay in the Hindi version of the proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 127 of the Act are a mere surplusage. In Aswini Kumar vs. Arbinda Base, AIR 1952 SC369 it was held "it is not a sound principle of constructon to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute". (Emphasis supplied ). From this decision it is apparent that in the normal course no words should be brushed aside as being inapposite surplusage but in a case where the said word cannot have any appropriate application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute, it is possible to construe that word as being inapposite surplusage. (Emphasis supplied ). From this decision it is apparent that in the normal course no words should be brushed aside as being inapposite surplusage but in a case where the said word cannot have any appropriate application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute, it is possible to construe that word as being inapposite surplusage. In the instant case, it is clear that if the proviso aforesaid is construed along with Section 127-A which was inserted by the same Amendment Act, namely, M. P. Act No. 58 of 1976, it is obvious that if the word "except" in the English version and the words "ke sivay" in the Hindi version are not treated as being inapposite surplusage, the proviso conveys a meaning just contrary to the purpose for which it was inserted was to provide that it is only the municipalities of Classes I, II and III which shall be entitled to impose property tax at the rates prescribed in Section 127-A and the Municipalities of Class IV shall not be entitled to impose property tax. If the proviso both in the English version and in the hindi version as printed in the Gazette is read as it stands, it conveys a meaning that it is only a Class IV Municipality which shall be entitled to impose property tax and in respect of which no rate has been prescribed in Section 127-A. We are of the opinion that this could not have been "conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. " ( 11. ) IN support of the imposition of the impugned property tax, it was lastly urged by learned counsel for the municipality that since at the relevant time when the notification dated 2-3-1978 was published, Nagod was not a Class IV Municipality but only a Notified Area, the bar created by the proviso inserted in Section 127 (1) of the Act would not be applicable. In our opinion, the notified area having been declared to be a municipality, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the said tax was or was not recoverable from the residents of the notified area till it was declared to be a municipality. In our opinion, the notified area having been declared to be a municipality, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the said tax was or was not recoverable from the residents of the notified area till it was declared to be a municipality. Suffice it to say for the purpose of the writ petition that at any rate with effect from the year 1982 when the notified area Nagod was converted into a Class IV municipality, the said tax in view of the specific bar created by the proviso to clause (i)of sub-section (1) of Section 127 of the Act could not be continued. This being so, the residents including the petitioners of the Municipal Council Nagod are not liable to pay the property tax imposed by the notification dated 6th September 1976 referred to above in regard to Notified Area Committee, Nagod, as it then existed. ( 12. ) IN the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Proceedings for assessment of property tax against the petitioners as also the notices requiring them to pay property tax are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The outstanding security amount be refunded to the petitioners. Petition allowed.