JUDGMENT - H.H. KANTHARIA, J.:---Petitioner No. 2 jointed the services of respondent No. 1-Air India as an Assistant Flight Purser from 4th February, 1956. He was confirmed in that post on 1st August, 1956. He was promoted to the post of Flight Purser with effect from 1st April, 1960 and was confirmed in said post on 1st April, 1961. His services came to be terminated by a letter dated 12/14th April, 1965. Therefore, an industrial dispute was raised on his behalf by the first petitioner-union under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), for reinstatement with full back wages and other service benefits. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation, by order dated 3rd June, 1975 referred the said dispute to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2 at Bombay (the second respondent) in the following terms :--- "Whether the action of the management of Air India in terminating the services of Shri Aubrey De'Sylva, Flight Purser of Air India with effect from 12th April, 1965 was justified ? If not, to what relief is the said workman entitled ?." 2. Considering the evidence adduced before him, the second respondent came to the conclusion that termination of the services of the second petitioner, even though on account of loss of confidence, amounted to retrenchment but since the conditions precedent for a valid retrenchment were not complied with at the time of retrenching him, the said retrenchment was bad in law and as such the second petitioner continued to be in the services of the first respondent till the date of the impugned Award. In other words, the second respondent declared that the termination of the services of the second petitioner was illegal having been brought about without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under section 25-F of the Act. In conclusion, he made the following Award on 11th May, 1982 in Reference No. CGIT-2/10 of 1975. "The workman shall be deemed to have been retrenched from service on the date of this order, shall be entitled to all the back wages from the date of impugned termination till this date and further shall be entitled to compensation with equivalent to 15 days pay for every completed period for continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months as laid down in section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Award accordingly. Award accordingly. No order as to costs." Thus, the second respondent refused the relief of reinstatement to the second petitioner because, according to him, the termination was bona fide and the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant reinstatement. It is the said Award that has been impugned by the second petitioner and the first petitioner-union representing him, in this petition. 3. Mr. Ramaswamy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted in this Court that the second respondent having held that the termination order made against the second petitioner was illegal, he ought to have given the consequential relief of reinstatement with full back wages to the second petitioner because, in the submission of Mr. Ramaswamy, in the eyes of law the second petitioner's services had not at all been terminated and he all along continued to be in service notwithstanding the purported order of termination. Mr. Ramaswamy, therefore, urged that the impugned Award be modified and the second petitioner be granted relief of reinstatement with full back wages. We are not able to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Ramaswamy for the simple reason that there were very good, reasonable and justifiable grounds for the first respondent to have lost confidence in the second petitioner on account of his alleged smuggling activities while working as Flight Purser with the first respondent. 4. Thus, the record shows that a close watch was kept on the movements of the second petitioner and it had come to the notice of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence that the second petitioner was indulging in smuggling activities during the course of his official duties. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence had, therefore, apprised the first respondent of this fact in the correspondence exchanged between the authorities. As per the evidence on record, there was reliable information that the second petitioner was smuggling in India large quantities of diamonds and other goods from Beirut whenever he used to go there as a member of the flying crew. He had smuggled gold into India from Beirut on 23rd December, 1962. There was specific information that he was to smuggle into India 5 kilos of gold but because of the delay in the flight and before he could be searched, he successfully threw away the contraband valued at Rs. 50,000/- below a sofa in the Customs Examination Hall. He had smuggled gold into India from Beirut on 23rd December, 1962. There was specific information that he was to smuggle into India 5 kilos of gold but because of the delay in the flight and before he could be searched, he successfully threw away the contraband valued at Rs. 50,000/- below a sofa in the Customs Examination Hall. Even after 24th December, 1962 he continued to be in close contact with the Beirut syndicate of smugglers and had introduced another Assistant Flight Purser for that criminal and anti-national activity. Mr. Dewan, Commercial Manager, Customers Service Air India, who was holding the post of Deputy Directorate, Revenue Intelligence, before April 1968, reported that the second petitioner had come to the adverse notice of the Revenue Intelligence on a number of occasions. On 29th June, 1963, the second petitioner was to clandestinely import 7 kilograms of platinum and, therefore, a watch was kept on his movements but to platinum was detected on his person on account of the slip-shod manner in which the search was carried out. All these circumstances clearly point out that the second petitioner was a security risk from all points of view and that he was an undesirable person to be retrained in the employment of the first respondent and he was bound to bring a slur on the good name of the organisation. Therefore, the first respondent was justified in losing confidence in the second petitioner and it was immaterial whether is services were terminated under Regulation 48, which was then valid but now invalid as held by the Supreme Court, or by a discharge simpliciter. 5. The second respondent was, therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that the second petitioner be deemed to have been retrenched but, since when the retrenchment was effected the mandatory procedure envisaged under section 25-F of the Act was not complied with, the retrenchment was not valid. He was also, therefore, right in holding that instead of reinstatement, the second petitioner should be granted compensation as and by way of full back wages upto the day of the Award plus retrenchment compensation as per the provisions of section 25-F of the Act. We are informed that an amount of Rs. 3,64,950/- under the Award and as and by way of the terminal benefits has already been paid to the second petitioner. We are informed that an amount of Rs. 3,64,950/- under the Award and as and by way of the terminal benefits has already been paid to the second petitioner. The first respondent was more than kind and considerate to the second petitioner in withdrawing its own counter writ petition against the second petitioner and to further grant such benevolent relief of full back wages for the entire period till the date of the Award plus retrenchment compensation. The benefits received by the second petitioner are more than deserving particularly in the context of his distressing conduct and activities while in service. We are, in all the circumstances, not inclined to interfere with the impugned Award. 6. Mr. Ramaswamy was quite insistent in urging that once the retrenchment of the second petitioner was held to be not in accordance with law, the relief of reinstatement should not have been refused to him. It is no doubt true that when the retrenchment is held to be invalid, relief of reinstatement with full back wages should normally be granted to the workman. But there are exceptions to this general proposition. It is not always that in every such case reinstatement must necessarily be granted. Each case has to be decided on its own merits depending upon the facts and circumstances obtaining therein. There cannot be absolute and hard and fast rule that whenever retrenchment is held to be invalid, reinstatement should automatically follow. Mr. Bharucha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent, brought to our notice a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2567 of 1982 dated 17th July, 1982 (1983 Vol. 46 F.L.R. 95) (Shankar Krishna v. Bhide and Sons Pvt. Ltd.)1, in which it was held that no doubt non-compliance with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act makes the retrenchment void ab-initio but reinstatement with back wages is not a must in every case of retrenchment effected without payment of the retrenchment compensation which is required to be paid under section 25-F of the Act. It was further held in that case that courts have always relaxed the rule whenever such relaxation was found justified. In our opinion, the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case certainly do not warrant relief of reinstatement. It was further held in that case that courts have always relaxed the rule whenever such relaxation was found justified. In our opinion, the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case certainly do not warrant relief of reinstatement. Indeed, reinstating a member of the crew of Air-India against whom there were very good, reasonable and justifiable grounds to believe that he was indulging in smuggling activities on an international scale will be outrageous to judicial conscience. We are more than convinced that the second petitioner did not deserve reinstatement. The otherwise very substantial relief granted to him by the second respondent more than meets the ends of justice. There is thus no merit in this writ petition. 7. In the result, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. Rule stands discharged but with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----