Judgment :- 1. Revision petitioner is the respondent in MC 34 of 1982 before the Additional Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Kozhikode. The challenge is against the order of the Sessions Judge granting maintenance reversing the order of the trial court. 2. The parties will be referred to in this order by their ranking before the trial Court. 3. First petitioner claiming herself to be the wife of the respondent filed the petition for maintenance for herself and her minor son (second petitioner). It is alleged in the petition that she was taken into the house of the respondent as a helper to the inmates of his house, that she and the respondent fell in love, that she became pregnant, that she informed his parents about it, that at the intervention of mediators the marriage was conducted on 5-10-1981 and that the second petitioner was born on 27-12-1981. Respondent filed counter disputing the marriage and paternity of the child. 4. It is contended by the respondent that he was forcibly taken to the house of the first petitioner and he was compelled to put his signatures in some papers and a book and only later he knew that it would be utilised against him. It is the admitted case that the respondent had sent Ext.P1 letter to the first petitioner's father informing him that he had divorced his daughter. Ext.P1 letter amounts to an acknowledgment of the fact of his marriage with the first petitioner on 5-10-1981. In the laconic communication evidenced by Ext.P1 there is no whisper that the respondent was subjected to pressure and coercion to have the marriage with the first petitioner. Respondent has also not cared to examine any witness to establish that he married the first petitioner on account of compulsion, threat or intimidation and without his consent. It is significant to note that he wrote Ext. P1 letter several months after the marriage. In view of total lack of evidence with regard to any force that was exerted on the respondent by any one, his contention that he was forced to marry the first petitioner much against his will can never be accepted. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly upheld the case of the 1st petitioner that she was married by the respondent and that the second petitioner was born to him. 5. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly upheld the case of the 1st petitioner that she was married by the respondent and that the second petitioner was born to him. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that OS 258 of 1982 filed by the respondent for a declaration of the nullity of the marriage was dismissed by the Munsiff Court and the appeal filed was also dismissed by the Appellate Court. This is not disputed by the counsel for the respondent. That being the position the respondent can no longer urge that his marriage with the first petitioner is void on account of compulsion or coercion exerted on him by the parents of the first petitioner. 6. The respondent contended that the petitioners cannot claim any maintenance in view of the commencement of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Preamble of this Act shows that it has been enacted to protect the rights of Muslim Women who have been divorced by, or have obtained divorce from, their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act came into force on 19-5-1986. The order of the Sessions Judge was pronounced long prior to the commencement of the Act. 7. S.7 of the Act reads: Every application by a divorced woman under S.125 or under S.127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of this Act, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in that Code and subject to the provisions of S.5 of this Act, be disposed of by such Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Counsel for the respondent contended that the revision before this Court is a continuation of the proceedings before the Magistrate and the Sessions Court and therefore the matter cannot be decided by this Court and it should be remanded to the trial Court for proper consideration in accordance with the Act. There is no merit in the above contention as S.7 of the Act makes it explicitly clear that matters pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of the Act alone need be disposed of by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Act. A reading of the Section makes it explicitly clear that once a case has been decided by the Magistrate S.7 cannot have any application. A reading of the Section makes it explicitly clear that once a case has been decided by the Magistrate S.7 cannot have any application. S.7 is a transitional provision. It makes the position abundantly clear that pending cases before a Magistrate on the commencement of the Act have to be decided under the Act and not cases already disposed of. As the Sessions Judge has passed the order on 31-7-1984 it is impossible to hold that the application was pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of the Act. As only pending proceedings before a Magistrate are saved by S.7 of the Act contention of the respondent that the order of the Sessions Judge should be set aside and the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration in accordance with the provisions of the Act can never be accepted. 8. The Sessions Judge has fixed the quantum of maintenance taking into account the respective financial position of the parties as revealed from the evidence. No interference is warranted against the said finding. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the Sessions Judge. The Criminal Revision Petition is hereby dismissed and the order of the Sessions Judge is confirmed.