ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh, J.-1. What minimum price human life should fetch in today's money-market in this country? 2. In the context of jurisprudence of compensation for motor accidents, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. AIR 1979 SC 1666 , expressed vocally judicial concern for denial of social justice to the citizens of this country, hoping perhaps that no more they would be weighed like slaves. Thus he spoke: "................determination of the question must be liberal, not niggardly since law values life and limbs in this free country in generous scales". 3. I think, Legislature has responded for the judicial concern adequately, enacting section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the 'Act'. When any human-being perishes in a motor accident, DO matter how old he was, or what his station in life was, his legal representatives are to be paid atonce a sum of Rs.15,000/- and not a paisa less than that. I quote relevant portion of section 92-A : "92-A. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault-(1) (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of permanent disablement of any person shall be a them sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees". 4. In the instant case, the accident took place several years ago, in the year 1976, when section 92-A Was not even in the contemplation of the Legislature. Therefore, Shri Dubey, who appellants for the respondents, is right in submitting that the provision cannot be given retrospective effect and would not also apply otherwise to the instant lis litigated under section 110-A of the Act. Indeed, the question is, whether any amount, less than Rs.15,000/-, can be awarded for loss of human life? I have no doubt that it has ceased to be a question of Rupaye or Paise as it used to be the law before enactment of section 92 A. Although the Court cannot, in terms, enforce section 92-A, there is a Constitutional as also statutory duty on the Court to abide by the guidelines provided therein to award "just" compensation under Sec. 110-B in a claim preferred under section 110-A of the Act. 5. 5. Section 110.D provides for appeal by any person aggrieved by any award made by claims Tribunal under section 110-B and according to the provisions of 110•C (2) in dealing with a claim made under section 110-A of the Act the appellate Court, like the Claims Tribunal, is competent to follow mutatus mutandis the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Indeed, power of the Claims Tribunal and of this Court in appeal to devise its own procedure flows from section 1l0•C (1) which imparts sui generis character to the power. This view I took in Shahzad Khan 1986 (1) MPWN 28 would, therefore, hold it permissible to look immediately into rule 33 of order 41, C.P.C. which imposed a duty on the appellate Court, while conferring power thereunder to mould relief to suit circumstances obtaining on the date when the appeal is disposed of. Such circumstances, in my opinion, would also be changed in law affecting parties' right or conferment on any Court of any new power to deal with any pending matter in a particular way. This view I take on the authority of Kanhaiya Ram AIR 1985 SC 371 . 6. I also feel disposed to enforce the Constitutional imperative underwritten in Article 39-A of the Constitution by which is constitutionally ordained such legal system in this country as would promote social justice. Where the aged parents would find justice if Courts of law judicial "Hits do not issue to provide just recompense for their persona] loss which is irreparable? If poor parents suffer or tend to suffer a vacant future due to loss of their child whose company or support they can look to in old age, would they not stand deprived of social Justice? Such judicial writs unfortunately cannot bring back a lost life, but can still provide solid support to deceased child's parents in a limited way by providing them pecuniary relief to the maximum extent permissible under the law. It is duty, therefore, of the Court or Tribunal in deciding the appeal or claim to look at the guidelines provided in law, obtaining on the date on which the issue of payment of compensation for loss of a human-life comes up for its consideration. This duty flows directly from the statutory mandate of section 110•B envisaging payment of such “compensation” which must be "just". This duty flows directly from the statutory mandate of section 110•B envisaging payment of such “compensation” which must be "just". To expose the connotation of the term "compensation" used in section 110-B, I seek assistance from State of Gujrat v. Shantilal AIR 1969 SC 434.wherein it is said that compensation "means anything given to make things equivalent; a thing given to or to make amends for loss, recompense.......". A child may not be his parents' property, but the latter are definitely entitled to "just" awards for personal loss caused to them by a result of their being deprived of the company and support of their child. 7. What I would like to emphasise further is that in the appeal filed under section 110-D, the claimant is entitled to press his prayer for enhanced compensation on the footing that the Tribunal's award was deficient in that regard. It cannot be disputed that the power and jurisdiction in the appellate Court, acting under section 110-D, are co-extensive with those of the Claims Tribunal making the award under section 110-B wherein in explicit terms, the Legislature has made clear its intention that what is to be determined in an application for compensation made under section 110-A is "the amount of compensation which appears to it (Claims Tribunal) to be just". The Claims Tribunal as also this Court, in appeal, is accordingly mandated to heed the message of Article 14 of the Constitution to ensure that in making award, care is taken to follow statutory guidelines where and when available, to ensure that in no case the award is fanciful or whimsical. Death makes unequals equal. Courts are not insulated against prohibition of Article 14 in the grant of compensation. Discrimination by Courts would be patently hostile when equals are treated unequally. If for any child's death loss of dependency cannot be claimed, why not treat parents of all children alike? About edifying connotations of Article 14, E.P. Royappa AIR 1974 SC 555 is vocal : arbitrariness of any kind or extent is antithetic to the concept of Article 14. In Pradeep Jain AIR 1984 SC 1420 , State action for "making equal people who are factually unequal in wealth" is called for. Affirmative Court action too would be warranted in that direction. 8. In Pradeep Jain AIR 1984 SC 1420 , State action for "making equal people who are factually unequal in wealth" is called for. Affirmative Court action too would be warranted in that direction. 8. I propose to extract now the relevant portion of section I-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, with the object mainly to demonstrate that the provisions thereof do not relieve the Claims Tribunals or this Court of its duty of making an award for "just" compensation: “I-A. Wherever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act. neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in. respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured ………… ………… ………… and in every such action the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought......... ...." It is true in C.K. Subramania Iyer (infra), the claim for compensation of the parents for death of their child arose out of a motor accident in which the child died, though it is not very clear from the facts stated in the judgment as to where the claim was preferred. In any case, I am of the view that the words "suit or action" which figure in section I•A afore-quoted would not cover proceedings under section 92-A or 110-A as such a proceeding could not have been in contemplation of the Legislature when the Fatal Accidents Act was enacted in 1855. Therefore, the Claims Tribunal, subsequently constituted in virtue of the legislative exercise undertaken in 1956, should be deemed not to have its jurisdiction circumscribed by the provisions of section I-A and indeed, in no manner, it can be said that the provisions of said section I-A would prevail against those of section 92-A or section 110•B of the Act. In this context, relevance of section 110-F, having import similar to that of section 92-E, must be fully emphasised. In this context, relevance of section 110-F, having import similar to that of section 92-E, must be fully emphasised. The purport of both provisions is that the new forum excludes civil Court's jurisdiction and the same is vested with jurisdiction defined in sections 92-A, 110-A and 110-F et. al by which the Tribunal is evidently relieved of the duty to try a "suit of action" as contemplated under section I-A of the Fatal Accidents Act. The Claims Tribunal is required to make award under Ss. 92•A and 110•B and in latter case, to "determine" what has to be "just" compensation. It is not required to "give such damages as it may think proportionate to the loss resulting from such death" as envisaged under the aforesaid section 1 A, but it is required to do that which section 92-A or section 110-B mandates. Thus, notwithstanding anything contained in said section I-A, the Claims Tribunal, in answering the question as to what should be just compensation to be awarded would be required to consider what should be the just compensation for the loss of any human life and for that, the Tribunal would be required to look at section 92-A. 9. Because the view which I have taken is seriously contested by Shri Dubey, I have to do justice to his arguments also They cover a wide spectrum, though Dot of bright, but of desolate colours shrouding claimants valuable and salutary right to just compensation. In support of his contention that I may not, need not and I should not look at section 92-A. counsel has cited authorities to which [would immediately refer. In Yashoda Kumari 1984 ACJ 716, a learned Single Judge of the Rajastan High Court has taken the view that section 92-A enacting the principle of no-fault liability cannot be given retrospective operation. To the same effect is a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Mani Gupta 1985 ACJ 476. In Yashoda Kumari 1984 ACJ 716, a learned Single Judge of the Rajastan High Court has taken the view that section 92-A enacting the principle of no-fault liability cannot be given retrospective operation. To the same effect is a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Mani Gupta 1985 ACJ 476. But, as earlier alluded, even accepting the principle which the decisions enunciate, I have taken view which has nothing to do with the enforcement of the liability under section 92-A. I have made it clear at the very outset that it is not open to me, today, to enforce any liability in terms of section 92-A in this case of anterior origin but I am required at the same time to consider why this Court shall not follow the criteria indicated therein so far as it concerns quantum of compensation payable for the loss of human life. I do not, therefore, think that the decisions cited militates against the view taken by me. 10. A great mass of case-law has also been cited by Shri Dubey, submitting that the compensation which the claimants are to be held entitled under section 110-B would be for their loss of dependency and nothing more than than that and it has, therefore, to be assessed with reference to that requirement of law. Indeed, in all the cases cited, the Court was only required to consider as to what should be the minimum amount to be fixed for loss of dependency, and not for loss of a human-life, after section 92-A bad come on the Statute Book. Reliance is placed by Shri Dubey on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Subramania lye, 1970 ACJ 110 with which I have already dealt earlier. In that case, it was held that damages are not to be given as solatium, but that actual pecuniary loss has to be assessed under section I-A of Fatal Accidents Act. Accordingly, their Lordships held that compensation awarded by the High Court in appeal of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for the death of a child aged 8 years was just compensation. 11. Accordingly, their Lordships held that compensation awarded by the High Court in appeal of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for the death of a child aged 8 years was just compensation. 11. If I have to say anything more, the best I can say is to state that if the statutory guideline is not followed, then there may arise grievance of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution as in different cases coming before the Claims Tribunals, awards may be passed arbitrarily, applying virtually the rule of thumb. Support for this view, I find in the ratices of several cases cited by Shri Dubey himself. They are listed below: 1. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Yasin 1974 ACJ 358 . 2. Nandram v. Union of India 1978 ACJ 215. 3. S.J. Joshi v. Union of India 1975 ACJ 518 . 4. Afghan Bus Service v. Gurbachan Singh 1981 ACJ 299. 5. Shabbir Ahmad v. M.P.S.R.T.C., Bhopal AIR 1984 MP 173 . 6. C.K. Subramania Iyer v. Kunhi Kuttan Nair (supra) 1978 ACJ 215. No wonder that different views are taken by different High Courts awarding different amounts of compensation, even in like circumstances, as I find reading the decisions cited. In D.B. decision of this Court In the case of Shabbir Ahmad (supra) for death of a child aged 15 years, a some of Rs.12,000/was awarded, while two other Courts have given awards of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs.6,000/- respectively for death of a child in each of the same age of 13 years. This Court itself in the case of V, Yasin (supra), has awarded Rs. 5000/- for the death of a child aged 12 years. I find it very difficult to reconcile the decisions of this Court in 1974 ACJ 358 and AIR 1984 MP 173 as in one case an award is for Rs. 5,000/- and in another case, it is for Rs.12,000/-. Just now, in the course of my dictating the judgment, Shri Dubey has passed on to me another D.B. decision of this Court in the case of Nandram (6). In that case, this Court awarded a compensation of Rs. 6,000/- for the death of a boy aged 6 years. 5,000/- and in another case, it is for Rs.12,000/-. Just now, in the course of my dictating the judgment, Shri Dubey has passed on to me another D.B. decision of this Court in the case of Nandram (6). In that case, this Court awarded a compensation of Rs. 6,000/- for the death of a boy aged 6 years. What remains only to be impressed is that in all these several decisions, who died was a child and who died was a person who could not have evidently entitled the claimants, parents, to claim loss of dependency in the real sense of the term as the child could not have been an earning member of the family. 12. I would think that the case-law discussed so far would suffice for the day though I am not inclined to depart from the view already taken which I owe to the Constitutional imperative underlying Court's duty to dispense social justice. Few more words I add to assert that "law" and "justice" are not value-less absolutes, divorced from social realities of life. Both must serve the same purpose, fulfil each other, uphold Constitutional values imbibing social justice. If I may say so, with due respect, the decisions cited unfortunately expose the danger and inexpediency of following blindly principles laid down in uncodified English Law of Torts which tend to blur the vision of our Republican Courts bound to accord primacy to the Directive Principles of the Constitution. "Damages" in terms of section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act are awarded and not "just compensation" which is evident from the fact that what enters consideration of Courts in determination of compensation is social status and station in life of child's parent though such an exercise is interdicted by Articles 38 and 39-A of the Constitution. Affluent parents losing child are awarded higher compensation in the footing that they are expected to bring up the child, educationally and otherwise, to attain high standard of excellence so that a bright future and bright career is ensured for him. It is my view that Articles 38 and 39-A of the Constitution do not permit such an approach. 13. Affluent parents losing child are awarded higher compensation in the footing that they are expected to bring up the child, educationally and otherwise, to attain high standard of excellence so that a bright future and bright career is ensured for him. It is my view that Articles 38 and 39-A of the Constitution do not permit such an approach. 13. In the instant case, a sum of Rs.3,000/- has been awarded to the parents of a child aged 12 years and the finding which is conclusive and is not challenged is that he died in a motor accident and that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle which, of course, was duly insured. I have no hesitation to take the view, for reason earlier alluded, that just compensation has not been awarded to the claimant and that they are entitled to an award of compensation of Rs.15,000/- for death of their child. 14. For all these foregoing reasons, I have no hesitation to allow the appeal and to modify the award. I direct that the claimants shall be paid a sum of Rs.15,000/- as compensation for the death of their child Ali Sher Khan who died in the motor accident that took place on 7-12-1976. I also hold that the claimants would be entitled to interest and that shall be paid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application to the date of payment. About award of interest, Shri Dubey bas raised a serious contest, but I find myself bound by the supreme judicial dicta pronounced in Narachinva Kamar AIR 198 SC 1281 and Jagbir Singh AIR 1987 SC 70 . The claimants are also entitled to their costs. Council's fee Rs. 100/-, if certified. Payment of compensation, interest and costs awarded herein shall be made by the Insurer (respondent No 3) within two months. 15. However, I add not an epilogue but a further order in this case as I am of the view that the question mooted in this appeal raises "a substantial question of law of general importance" which indeed involves also interpretation of Articles 14 and 39-A of the Constitution in the context of the provisions of sections 92-A. 110-A, 110-B et. al of the Motor Vehicles Act and section I-A of Fatal Accidents Act. al of the Motor Vehicles Act and section I-A of Fatal Accidents Act. Accordingly, the case is certified for appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 134-A read with Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution.