JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---Though this is an appeal by both original defendants Nos. 2 and 7 against the concurrent finding of both the Courts below invalidating the Gift Deed in favour of original defendant No. 7. Two very neat and substantial questions of law arise herein and decision on either of them in favour of the appellants would be enough to strengthen the hands of this Court to allow this appeal by doing which this Court will be doing real and substantial justice between the parties. 2. The few necessary facts giving rise to the two questions are as follows : The suit property is a house situate at Kolhapur. There is no dispute that before the Gift Deed to which reference will be presently made, it belonged to one Kutubuddin Maner. He had four sons, the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 to 4, and two daughters, defendants Nos. 5 and 6. Defendant No. 7 is the son of defendant No. 2, that is to say, the grand - son of Kutubuddin. It is not seriously disputed that the old man Kutubuddin had some love and affection for his grand son, defendant No. 7, who was very much of a minor at the particular time. On 3rd June, 1972, therefore, Kutubuddin executed a Registered Gift Deed in favour of his minor grand son, defendant No. 7. By the Gift Deed, the donor left no room for doubt that he had completely washed his hands off the suit house as from the date of the gift. But, in the Gift Deed, there was an averment made as follows : ^^eh Loeuksokus rqtyk vlys ifjLfFkrhr c{khl fnyh vlwu rq>s djrk rq>s vkbZaus fupk fLodkj dsyk vkBs rjh fupk rw laiwuZ ekydh gDdkus oa'kijaijk miHkksx ?;kok- fups [kkus rw rw>s ukokus d:.k ?ksÅu fupk E;w oxSjs vkdkjiVh iko iq<s nu tkch ;k xks"Vhl ek>h dcqyh vkgs] vkrk ;karhy feGdrhoj ek>k ek>s bLVsV okjlkapk dks.krsgh izdkjs gDd lca/k jkghGsyk ukgh-** Translated into English, this means that the donor had voluntarily made a gift of the property in the condition in which it existed at that time and that the same was accepted by the donee's mother . 3. It is possible to hold that there is some ambiguity about this expression "accepted", viz, whether the acceptance was in respect of the gift or was in respect of the possession of the property. 3. It is possible to hold that there is some ambiguity about this expression "accepted", viz, whether the acceptance was in respect of the gift or was in respect of the possession of the property. The further portion of the Marathi document means that as per the Gift Deed, the minor had become absolute owner of the gifted property. He was given all the right to have his name transferred in the Government Khatas and responsibility of payment of Municipal Taxes etc., was put upon him. It further means that the donor had unequivocally declared that he had ceased to have any interest in the suit property as from that date. In other words, he had completely washed his hands off it so far as the gifted property was concerned. 4. As will be presently pointed out, it appears though, apparently, the "acceptance", whatever it might mean, was by the donee's mother, factually the possession and control of the gifted property was given to his father. The donee was very much of a minor at that time and the father would be the lawful guardian. There is no dispute about this legal position. The father of the minor donee, it appears, was himself in occupation of a portion of the house, which was the subject-matter of the Gift Deed, and he was doing some business in that portion. This might be perhaps the reason why the donor was advised or persuaded to show that the formal acceptance of the gift was given by the donee's mother and not by his father. But the course of events shows that the minor's father, defendants No. 2, was given control of the suit house property on behalf of his minor son, the donee, and started collecting rent from the tenants of the house in question. There is no dispute that the entire house was in possession of various tenants, barring the portion, which was in possession of defendant No. 2 himself. He tried to collect rent from those tenants on behalf of his minor son. They did not pay him rent. It appears that the donor Kutubuddin was away at that time. There is no dispute that the entire house was in possession of various tenants, barring the portion, which was in possession of defendant No. 2 himself. He tried to collect rent from those tenants on behalf of his minor son. They did not pay him rent. It appears that the donor Kutubuddin was away at that time. Defendant No. 2, therefore, wrote to him a letter informing him that although the donor Kutubuddin had empowered him, defendant No. 2, to collect the rent from the tenants on behalf of the minor, the tenants were just not paying the rent. To this letter, his father, the donor, gave a reply, which is of a most crucial character so far as this appeal is concerned. It is produced at Exh. 63. Translated into English, this is what the relevant part of the letter says: --- " In your letter you have written that the tenants have not paid rent as yet. However you need not worry about the same. I have received advance rents from them. This must have been the reason why they have not paid the rent. Now, henceforth, the rent should be received by you and they too will pay it. I have personally told them that the entire building has been gifted by me to Abdul Rashid and that the subsequent rent should be paid by them to his father, and hence, I think, now they will not make any dispute in the matter of payment of rent. The document of the Gift Deed will not be received at an early date and you will not be able to show the same to the tenants. Hence this letter should be shown to them and rent should be demanded from them." (Emphasis supplied) This letter thus leaves no room for doubt that even though the gift or the possession of the property was apparently accepted by the minor's donees mother, in reality the entire control over the suit house and in effect the possession of the suit house was given by the old man, the donor, to the minor's father, not to this mother. It is worthwhile stating at this stage itself that the effect of this letter has been kept out of consideration by the lower Court. 5. It is worthwhile stating at this stage itself that the effect of this letter has been kept out of consideration by the lower Court. 5. This position is further corroborated by the fact that from the year 1972 onwards the taxes in respect of the property were paid not by the minor donee's mother, but by the minor donee's father, viz., present defendant No. 53 and those taxes have been paid in the name of the minor; not in his personal name. This means that in reality it was the father, the real and natural guardian of the minor, who was in complete control, and virtually in possession, of the suit house, for all practical purposes. I may mention here at this stage itself that there is not as much as a little of evidence to show that the minor' mother did any act indicative of her possession of the suit house. Assuming that the Gift Deed is construed to mean that she had "accepted" the gift of the house on behalf of the minor in reality that the word "accepted" in the document was not a misnomer, her entire subsequent conduct shows that in reality the possession was taken on behalf of the minor donee by his father only and not by his mother. The non-application of mind to these most crucial fact emanating from the above mentioned letter, Ex. 63, and from the receipts of payment of taxes, Exhibits 68 to 70, has resulted in the lower Court' s failure to apply the correct law to the facts of the case. 6. On 19th December, 1972, Kutubuddin died. As mentioned above, the Municipal Taxes for the house have been paid consistently from the date of Gift Deed, at all material times, by defendant No. 2 as the guardian of his son defendant No. 7, the donee. There is no dispute that apart from the suit house, many other items of property were owned by Kutubuddin and all the parties have received their share in the same. The curious aspect of this litigation, however, is that on 1st September, 1973, the plaintiff, one of the sons of Kutubuddin, filed the present suit purporting to be an administration suit but in effect, for his share in the suit house only. The other properties left behind by the deceased are not the subject-matter of the suit. The curious aspect of this litigation, however, is that on 1st September, 1973, the plaintiff, one of the sons of Kutubuddin, filed the present suit purporting to be an administration suit but in effect, for his share in the suit house only. The other properties left behind by the deceased are not the subject-matter of the suit. It is not the plaintiff's case that defendants Nos. 2 and 7, have been given their shares in those properties. I must hasten to add that it is not even the grievance of the contesting defendants (of defendants Nos. 2 and 7) in this suit that they have not received their due share in the remaining property. That question may not have been directly raised in this suit. All the same, the present suit is filed by the plaintiff for administration of the suit property and the factual position remains that the plaintiff has chosen just one piece out of the various properties left by the deceased and has filed an "Administration Suit" for possession of his share only in that piece of the property. But the gravamen of the plaintiff's contention in the plaint is that the Gift Deed, Ex. 65, executed by Kutubuddin in favour of present defendant No. 7 is not a valid Gift Deed. I will presently mention the reasons advanced by the plaintiff in support of that contention. The point to be noted at this stage is that both the plaintiff as well as the courts below have pin pointed their attention only to the question of the validity of the Gift Deed; they have not taken care to consider whether the suit in the present form for administration of just one of the many items of the property of the deceased was maintainable at all. 7. We are concerned with the defence of defendants Nos. 2 and 7, only. Defendant No. 2 filed his Written Statement, Ex. 70, whereas defendant No. 7 has filed his written statement through his legal guardian, who is none other than his father, defendant No. 2 himself. The main defence of them was the obvious one viz., that the Gift Deed was a valid document. But is was also contented by way of defence that the administration suit just for one of the various piece of the property left by the deceased was not, maintainable. 8. The main defence of them was the obvious one viz., that the Gift Deed was a valid document. But is was also contented by way of defence that the administration suit just for one of the various piece of the property left by the deceased was not, maintainable. 8. On these pleadings, issues were framed by the trial Court and the parties went to trial. I say mention here that the actual position regarding (a) the intention of the donor to make the gift of the property to his grandsons, the donee, (b) the fact that, ostensibly, the gift was accepted not by defendant No. 2, the father of the donee, but by his mother, that is to say, by the wife of defendant No. 2. (c) the fact that thought the gift appeared technically to have been "accepted by the donee's mother, the possession of the property was, in fact, taken by defendant No. 2, the father as the guardian of the minor donee, and (d) the fact that during all the relevant times, from the date of the gift till the date of the suit and even thereafter, the property was being managed by defendant No. 2, the father of the donee, on behalf of the minor donee, defendant No. 7, stood fully established by the evidence on record. In this connection, I have also mentioned the factual position established by the evidence led by the parties. No doubt, in the Gift Deed, it was mentioned that the gift was "accepted" by the minor's mother, but even the Gift Deed does not state that the possession of the property was taken by the mother. Clinching evidence is led by defendants Nos. 2 and 7, to prove that the property was transferred in the municipal and other records to the name of the minor donee, the taxes have been paid by defendant No. 2 on behalf of the minor donee, the donor has retained no interest whatsoever in the suit property and there is every indication that all the world around, excepting perhaps, the plaintiff, has been treating the property to be belonging to the minor donee. The observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of its judgment reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court p 275 apply with all the vigour in the instant case to prove that the donor had intended to and, in fact, did divest himself of the property in favour of the minor donee. In spite of this position the learned trial judge held that the gift purporting to have been made by the donor to the donee was invalid and hence, he decreed the plaintiff's suit for partition and possession of his share in the suit house. 9. Defendants Nos. 2 and 7 filed an appeal to the District Court. I do not propose to give the reasons for and the grounds on which the gift was held by the trial Court to be invalid. I will, however, discuss the grounds and the reasons given by the appeal Court, presently. At this stage, I may only state that the appeal Court took the same view as regards the validity of the gift and the appeal was therefore, dismissed by him. Hence, this second appeal. 10. Let me briefly mention the points that appealed to the District Court for coming to the above conclusion. In the first place, the Court appears to have been impressed by the fact that the Privy Council had held a gift to be invalid because the acceptance was not by the father, the natural guardian of the minor, but by someone else. Reliance was placed also on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R 1964 Supreme Court p.275 where the Supreme Court had held that both the parents of the minor were dead and that, hence, acceptance by the minor's husband who was himself the donor, was valid. The implication according to the lower Court, is that if the parents of the minor were alive, acceptance by the husband of the minor donee would be invalid. The Appeal Court found that the acceptance of the gift in the present case was by the mother of the minor donee when his father was very much alive. The implication according to the lower Court, is that if the parents of the minor were alive, acceptance by the husband of the minor donee would be invalid. The Appeal Court found that the acceptance of the gift in the present case was by the mother of the minor donee when his father was very much alive. The Court further observed in paragraph 11 of its judgment that acceptance can be made expressly or impliedly by conduct; but the Court also held that it was not the intention of the donor that the gift should be accepted by his own son , that is to say , by the minor donee's father , but not by the minor donee's mother. The Court further held that the intention of the donor was not that his own son, defendant No.2 should accept the gift on behalf of the minor donee. The learned Judge held that "we shall have to see the intention of the donor first, rather than the intention of others". The learned Judge also observed that the donor had every intention to relinquish his interest in the suit property in favour of the minor donee. Reference was also made by him to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Abdul Kareem's case A.I.R 1971 Madras p.182 where the donor had constituted himself the minor's guardian and had delivered possession to her represented by himself as her guardian. The Madras High Court held in that case the gift to be valid. The learned Judge distinguished this case by holding that in the present case the donor had not allowed the minor's mother to accept the gift with the concurrence of his natural guardian (the present defendant No.2). According to the learned Judge, the gift could be accepted only by the father of the minor and not by the mother and the acceptance made by the mother invalidated the gift. 11. In my opinion, the view cannot be sustained. In the first place, I cannot subscribe to the opinion that this is the case where the acceptance of the gift by the mother can be gathered only by the Deed of gift. As mentioned ,above, in paragraph 2 of this judgment, the Deed of Gift, no doubt, shows that the mother had accepted the gift; but this averment in the gift deed is not a term of document. As mentioned ,above, in paragraph 2 of this judgment, the Deed of Gift, no doubt, shows that the mother had accepted the gift; but this averment in the gift deed is not a term of document. All the surrounding circumstances cry hoarse in this case that when the mother ostensibly accepted the gift, she did perform that acceptance on behalf of her husband, the minor's father. There is evidence on record that the father was very much present at the time of the ceremony of the gift. There is the further evidence to show that the possession of the property was never taken by the mother on behalf of the minor; it was tried to be taken in the first instance by the father by attempting to collect rent from the tenants of the property. When they would not pay the rent to him, he made a grievance about the same to his father, the donor. The letter written by him in that behalf and the answer given by the father to that letter are referred to above and they unequivocally show that minor's father, defendant No. 2 was trying to collect the rent not on his own behalf but on behalf of the minor donee. Ultimately he succeeded in collecting the rent from the tenants, through the good offices of the donor. As mentioned above, everything was done by him to show that he was in possession of the property on behalf of the minor donee , not on his own behalf. The totality of these circumstances unmistakably shows that the gift was, in fact, accepted by himself. It may be that the document mentioned his wife's name (the name of the donee's mother) as the acceptor; but the entire subsequent conduct of the parties shows that beyond the mention of her name in the Gift Deed as the acceptor, she has done mighty nothing by way of acceptance of the gift on behalf of the minor. In fact, it is possible to hold (although it would be unnecessary going to that extent) that when she "accepted" the gift, she was acting as the agent of her husband. If this was not so, the entire future conduct of both the husband and the wife (the donee's parents) is just ununderstandable. In my opinion, the implication of agency is not ruled out by the principle of Mohammedan law. If this was not so, the entire future conduct of both the husband and the wife (the donee's parents) is just ununderstandable. In my opinion, the implication of agency is not ruled out by the principle of Mohammedan law. This aspect of the matter has been fully discussed by the Supreme Court in the case reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court p. 275. 12. Let me now refer to some of the authorities discussed across the Bar. The first two judgments very naturally relied upon by Mr. Naik on behalf of the contesting .respondent, the plaintiff, are the two above mentioned judgments of the Privy Council (Musa Miya Walad Mohd. Shaffi anr. v. Kadar Bax Walad Khaj Bax and another)1, A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council p. 108, and of the Supreme Court Valia Umma's case, A.I.R 1964 S.C p.275. In the Valia Umma's, A.I.R. 1964 S.C p.275, the factual position was that the husband made a gift of immoveable properties by Registered Deed to his minor wife who had attained puberty and discretion and the gift was accepted on her behalf by her mother in whose house the husband (son-in-law) and the wife (the daughter) were residing. Neither the minor girl's father nor her grandfather was alive. The acceptance of the gift on her behalf by her mother was , in that case, held to be valid and complete, even though the deed of gift was handed over to the minor's mother and the possession of the property was not given to the guardian specially appointed for that purpose by the Civil Court. The Supreme Court held in that case as follows :- "There can be no question that there was a complete intention to divest ownership on the part of Mammotty and to transfer the property to the donee." In the Privy Council case, the factual position was that the maternal grand - father made the alleged gift to this grand - sons. It appears that he had announced to his friends at a dinner party that he had made the gift to his grand - sons who were minors. The minors and the parents of the minors were living in the house of the grand father and the minor were, more or less, maintained by the grandfather. It appears that he had announced to his friends at a dinner party that he had made the gift to his grand - sons who were minors. The minors and the parents of the minors were living in the house of the grand father and the minor were, more or less, maintained by the grandfather. But the point was that the possession of the property in question was not parted with by the grandfather and he continued to be in possession of and control of the property in question. In these circumstances, it was held that the gift did not come within the exceptions to the general rule (relating to the delivery of possession to the donee). Hence, the gift was not complete and, therefore, was invalid. But, while taking this view, the Privy Council has referred, with approval, to the statement of law on the question of validity of the gift under the Muslim Law contained in Chapter V of Macnaughten's Principles and Precedents of Mohammedan Law (1825 Edn.). It is the usual rule of law that gift must be accompanied by delivery of possession and that the seisin should take effect immediately has been referred to; but one of the exceptions to this rule which is referred to is that "formal delivery and seisin are not necessary in the case of a gift to a trustee having the custody of the article given , nor in the case of gift to a minor. The seisin of the guardian in the latter case is sufficient. I may state, at this stage itself, that the instant case is, in reality, falling already in the first part of the exception mentioned above. It can be readily said that the mother of the minor donee was after all the trustee. No doubt , she had not taken the possession, but the possession was taken by the minor's father who was also another trustee. The character of the transaction is such that there can be seen no difficulty in invoking the doctrine of trust. This Judgment was very strongly relied upon before the Supreme Court ; the Supreme Court distinguished the judgment by pointing out that at the time of the particular gift, both the father and the grandfather of the donee, were dead with the result that the donee's mother became the legal guardian of the donee. This Judgment was very strongly relied upon before the Supreme Court ; the Supreme Court distinguished the judgment by pointing out that at the time of the particular gift, both the father and the grandfather of the donee, were dead with the result that the donee's mother became the legal guardian of the donee. But while upholding the validity of the gift, the Supreme Court has not relied only upon the legality of the mother's guardianship. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of its judgment (which are set out below) are, my opinion most crucial. These observations have found out the soul of Muslim Law on the question of validity of any gift of immoveable property by a Mohammedan. 13. In my opinion, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Valia Peedikakkandi Umma's case, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court p. 275. should be held applicable even to the facts of the present case. It is true that in that case, when the gift was technically accepted by the mother of the minor wife of the donor, the father and the grandfather of the minor were not alive. But the entire tenor of the judgment show that the validity of the gift was not upheld by the Supreme Court only on the ground that in those circumstances the mother became the legal guardian. The soul and the ratio of the judgment is to be found from the observation made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 15 and 16 of its judgment. No doubt, the judgment of the Privy Council is only distinguished. The Privy Council, as reported in Musa Miya Walad Mahammad Shaffi and anr. v. Kadar Bax Walad Khaj Bax and another, A.I.R 1928 Privy Council p.108, held that the gift by the grand father to his minor grandson, when the father was alive, without delivery of possession to the father, was invalid. The Supreme Court has distinguished this judgment of the Privy Council by saying that the case involved the gift in favour of the minor whose father was alive and competent. But the observation contained in paragraphs 16 of the judgment which are of very crucial character show that the law on this point is much more broad-based. This is what it states:- "In our judgment the gift in the present case was a valid gift. But the observation contained in paragraphs 16 of the judgment which are of very crucial character show that the law on this point is much more broad-based. This is what it states:- "In our judgment the gift in the present case was a valid gift. Mammotty was living at the time of the gift in the house of his mother-in-law and was probably a very sick person though not in Marzulmaut. His minor wife who had attained discretion was capable under Muhammadan Law to accept the gift, was living at her mother's house and in her care where the husband was also residing. The intention to make the gift was clear and manifest because it was made by a deed which was registered and handed over by Mammotty to his mother-in-law and accepted by her on behalf of the minor. There can be no question that there was a complete intention to divest ownership on the part of Mammotty and to transfer the property to the donee. If Mammotty had handed over the deed to his wife, the gift would have been complete under Muhammadan law and it seems impossible to hold that by handing over the deed to his mother-in-law "in whose charge his wife was during his illness and afterwards. Mammotty did not complete the gift. In our opinion both on texts and authorities such a gift must be accepted as valid and complete……." Moreover, in the case with which the Privy Council was concerned (A.I.R.1928 P.C. p. 108), the father of the minor donee was alive; but the possession was not handed over to the father. In the instant case, there is unquestionable and undisputable evidence that though, very technically speaking, the gift as such was "accepted" by the minor's mother, still the possession was taken by the father on behalf of the minor and it was the father who was dealing with the property as the guardian of the minor son. Surely , this is quite an important feature. This case differs from the case decided by the Privy Council in Musa Miya's case, A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council p. 108. In Mohammedan Law, normal Ingredient or concomitant of "acceptance" of gift of property is taking of possession which flows from doner to the donee or to some one lawfully acting of behalf of the donee. This case differs from the case decided by the Privy Council in Musa Miya's case, A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council p. 108. In Mohammedan Law, normal Ingredient or concomitant of "acceptance" of gift of property is taking of possession which flows from doner to the donee or to some one lawfully acting of behalf of the donee. Taking possession by the minor donee's father on behalf of the minor donee is, in the ultimate analysis, acceptance by donee, in substance. 14. This apart, it is possible, in the contest of the admitted facts of this case that when she apparently accepted the gift, she was acting as her husband's (donee's father's) agent. If this was not so, it is quite unintel ligible as to how it was that the possession, which is, normally, the crux and quintessence of "acceptance" under the Mohammedan Law, was taken not by the mother, but by the father. No doubt, such "agency" is not pleaded. But all the facts giving rise to the legal inference are admittedly on record and there is no reason why the Court should not put two and two together and arrive at the correct answer. Admittedly, the mother did not move her small finger for management of the property after her so called "acceptance" of the gift. Possession remained with the; father ; rent was collected by the father; taxes were paid by the father. And all this on behalf of and as the guardian of the minor - son, the donee. In these circumstances, two legitimate inferences are possible : i) that the description of the mother as the acceptor was the misnomer; or ii) that the mother was accepting the gift on behalf of her husband, defendant No. 2, in substance as his agent who himself accepted it on behalf of his minor son. In either case, the fact that it was the father ( defendant No. 2) who, in reality, "accepted" the gift has got to be held as duly established. 15. There is the existence of the third element vouchsafing the validity of the gift, viz., the "concurrence" of the father (defendant No. 2) to what was being done by his own wife, the mother of the donee as also by the donor in constituting the mother as the apparent "acceptor" The effect of similar "concurrence" has been considered by the Madras High Court. Mr. Mr. Abhyankar rightly relied upon the said authority of the Madras High Court. In the case decided by the Madras High Court (Abdul Kareem v. Zuleika Bi)2,A.I.R. 1971 Madras p. 184, the position was even more difficult for the persons challenging the validity of the relevant gift .There the Mohammedan donor executed a Gift Deed in respect of his property in favour of his sister-in law's daughter's daughter who was the minor of the age of 9 years, but who had been brought up and maintained by the donor himself. The gift was executed by him with full concurrence of the minor's father who was her natural guardian ; but the gift, instead of being "accepted" by the minor's father; was accepted by the donor himself by constituting himself as the minor's guardian and delivered possession of that property to himself ,now in the capacity as the minor's guardian. But this was not all .Registration of the property in the Municipal record continued to be in the name of the donor and he continued to collect the rent also from the tenants. All the same, the fact that he was doing it on behalf of the minor donee was fully borne out by the evidence on record and, in those circumstances, the Madras High Court held that the gift was a perfectly valid gift under the Mohammedan law even though there was no delivery of possession of the gifted property to the minor's father who was her legal guardian The judgement of the Privy Council in Musa Miya's case, A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council p 108 was examined and explained by the High Court and the Madras High Court found that there was nothing in the judgement which invalidated the particular gift. The donor had completely divested himself of the property intended to be gifted by him to the donee merely because the possession was not given to the legal guardian of the minor. 16. In the instant case, the facts cry hoarse (a) that the donor had completely divested himself of the gifted property; and (b) the possession of the property was, in fact, with the natural guardian of the minor viz., the father. The acceptance of the gift apparently by the mother was, therefore, .an eventuality of no real consequence at all. 16. In the instant case, the facts cry hoarse (a) that the donor had completely divested himself of the gifted property; and (b) the possession of the property was, in fact, with the natural guardian of the minor viz., the father. The acceptance of the gift apparently by the mother was, therefore, .an eventuality of no real consequence at all. Evidence shows that the father was actually present at the time when his wife, the minor donee's mother, formally accepted the gift from the minor's grand-father. He (the father ) stood by the acceptance by her , went into the possession of the property on behalf of the minor, made attempt to collect the rent of the property from the tenants on behalf of the minor ,did everything in his hand to remain in possession of the property for and on behalf of the minor. Surely, the facts of the instant case are much more in favour of the validity of the gift than were the facts of the case with which the Madras High Court was dealing . In my opinion, the learned judge was not justified in dismissing the Madras judgment as being inapplicable to the facts of the case. 17. It is quite Illuminating to see the peculiar fact of the Rangoon case, upon which heavy reliance is placed by the lower Appellate Court for holding that the technical acceptance of the gift by the minor's mother invalidated the gift in the favour of the minor. In A.I.R. 1933 Rangoon p. 155 (Suna Meah v. S.A.S. Pillai and others)3 ,the factual position was that the father was very much alive. He was the natural guardian of the minor donee ;but all that was found by the Court in that case was that the mother of the minor donee took possession of the property, managed the same and, what is more important, disposed it of. It was in this context that the Rangoon High Court held that there was no gift made to the minor child because the minor had never got possession of the gifted property. An entirely different person, viz the minor's mother, enjoyed the property and disposed it of. The entire conduct of the party subsequent to the donation showed that the gift in favour of the minor was thoroughly inconsequential matter and that nobody was serious about the same. An entirely different person, viz the minor's mother, enjoyed the property and disposed it of. The entire conduct of the party subsequent to the donation showed that the gift in favour of the minor was thoroughly inconsequential matter and that nobody was serious about the same. Any Court would have held that there was no gift in favour of the minor child. The facts of this case make all the difference in the law to be formulated in connection with the facts of the present case. 18. It is unnecessary to go on multiplying the examination of the authorities. In my opinion, even in the case of Mohammedan Law, there is the wealth of authority pointed out by the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court p. 275 which shows that you have to look to the substance and not to the mere form. Moreover, as stated above, the principle of Mohammedan Law does not totally exclude the theory of agency. In the instant case, if the mother "accepted" the gift on behalf of her minor son and her husband, the minor's father, stood by her, allowed her to accept the gift and went into possession on behalf of the minor, the totality of these circumstances must give rise to the inference of agency given by the minor's father to the minor's mother, who accepted the gift. She accepted the gift for her son on behalf of her husband. I do not think that much of stretching of legal imagination is called for arriving at this legal conclusion by taking recourse to such legitimate ratiocination. 19. Then remains the question about the maintainability of the suit in the present form. The contesting defendant's contention has been and is that the suit for administration of property of the deceased could not be maintainable vis-a-vis just the item of the property. Alternately it was also contended that if the suit was regarded as one not for administration of the estate but for sharing the particular suit property only, the suit would have been valued on the market value of the property and Court fees would have to be paid accordingly. This contention was negatived by the trial Court. Alternately it was also contended that if the suit was regarded as one not for administration of the estate but for sharing the particular suit property only, the suit would have been valued on the market value of the property and Court fees would have to be paid accordingly. This contention was negatived by the trial Court. The learned Extra Assistant Judge has dealt with this contention in paragraph 13 of his judgement and he has held that bringing all the properties in the hotch - pot is a concept of Hindu law not applicable to the suit filed for administration of the property left by a deceased Muslim. The learned Judge has not held that the deceased left no other property. It is nobody's contention that defendants Nos. 2 and 7 or, for the matter of that, any other defendant has received any particular share in any of the other properties. What the plaintiff has done is that he has picked up the suit property and to ask for his share in the same by filing an administration suit. In my opinion, such suit is patently not maintainable. If the suit is filed as an administration suit, it must embrace all the properties left by the deceased. It may be that a Muslim heir can file a suit for possession of his share in a particular piece of property left by the deceased by dividing the same, in proportion of his share, by metres and bounds. I do not wish to express any opinion on the validity of such a suit for sharing a single item of the property left by the deceased. Point is that the instant suit is an administration suit and the very concept of administration suit means that the entire estate left by the deceased has got to be administered with the ultimate view of giving to each of the shares his due share in the same. If a suit is to be filed for sharing a particular property, then the valuation of the property has to be made in an entirely different manner and the Court fees have to be paid ad valorem, not the fixed Court fee as has been paid in this case. No doubt, this is a purely technical point. If a suit is to be filed for sharing a particular property, then the valuation of the property has to be made in an entirely different manner and the Court fees have to be paid ad valorem, not the fixed Court fee as has been paid in this case. No doubt, this is a purely technical point. Normally, I am not impressed by technicalities and I do not like technicalities to come in the way in the matter of administration of justice; but in the instant case , the plaintiff has himself come to the Court for enforcement of sheer technicality and technicality must be met with technicality. Even though there is every indication that the gift was accepted by minor's father; that the property was possessed by the minor's father and was held by the minor's father on behalf of the minor, still on the technical ground that the Gift Deed mentions the donee's mother's name to be acceptor, the gift is sought to be invalidated. If that is so, then the plaintiff must cross the first hurdle as to how the suit, is maintainable at all. In my opinion, the administration suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable for the reasons mentioned above. The suit deserves to be dismissed even on this ground all by itself. 20. The appeal, therefore, succeeds; the decree passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the Appeal Court is set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout. Order accordingly. -----