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1987 DIGILAW 252 (PAT)

Sunaina Devi v. Shyam Sao

1987-08-13

S.N.JHA

body1987
JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. – This application has been filed for quashing the anticipatory bail granted to opposite party no. 1 by an order dated 27.11.1986 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nawadah. 2. The opposite party no. 1 is an accused in a case under section 328/302 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. It appears that the opposite party no. 1 Shyam Sao filed an application for anticipatory bail on 25.8.1986 and on 26.8.1986, the case diary and the post mortem report were directed to be produced by the learned Public Prosecutor. The application was finally heard on 5.9.1986 and the application for anticipatory bail was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge. 4. It further appears that inspite, of the rejection of the anticipatory bail on 5.9.1986, another application for anticipatory bail was again filed on behalf of the opposite party no.1 on 9.9.1986 i.e. only after four days of the rejection of the earlier application. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the second application for anticipatory bail only after an interval of four or five days was not at all maintainable and the provisional anticipatory bail granted to opposite party no. 1 on 10.9.1986 which was subsequently confirmed by an order dated 27.11.1986 without any fresh ground was an abuse of the process of the Court and fit to be cancelled. 5. At the time of admission of this application, notice was issued to the opposite party no. 1 to shaw cause as to why the anticipatory bail granted to him be not cancelled but inspite of the notice the opposite party did not appear und then the application was admitted for final hearing. In the final bearing, the opposite party no. 1 appeared and filed show cause. 6. It was contended on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that earlier anticipatory bail application was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge on 5.9.1986 because some materials which were very important and relevant were not placed before him. Therefore, only after four or five days, another anticipatory bail application was filed on 9.9.1986. According to the learned counsel, there was fresh, ground for fresh prayer for bail. The allegation against the opposite party no. 1 is that he administered poison and murdered Baso Sao. Therefore, only after four or five days, another anticipatory bail application was filed on 9.9.1986. According to the learned counsel, there was fresh, ground for fresh prayer for bail. The allegation against the opposite party no. 1 is that he administered poison and murdered Baso Sao. According to the learned counsel, this fact was falsified from the First Information Report which was lodged about a month earlier to the present First Information Report in which the opposite party no. 1 is an accused. It was further contended that there is no bar in law to file another application for anticipatory bail if there were some fresh grounds for the same and the learned Sessions Judge considered all the fresh materials which were not earlier placed before him and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Sessions Judge on 10.9.1996 directed the petitioner to be released on provisional bail in the event of his arrest or surrender which was subsequently confirmed by the impugned order dated 27.11.1986. It was submitted that the Sessions Judge was completely within his jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. 7. Apart from this, it was also contended that the opposite party no. 1 has never misused the privilege granted to him. Therefore, that privilege should not be cancelled in absence of any case made out by the petitioner for cancellation of the same. 8. It is well settled that cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only if there are materials to show that the accused enlarged on bail has misused the privilege of his liberty and there is apprehension that he would interfere with the cause of justice. In my opinion, no such case has been made out by the petitioner to this extent. Without such proof, a bail once granted to a person should not be cancelled. The power to take back in custody an accused who has been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection. As I have already indicated above that the petitioner has not made out any case for cancellation of bail granted to opposite party no. 1. 9. Accordingly, I do not find it a fit case for cancellation of bail already granted to opposite party No.1. The application is accordingly dismissed. 10. As I have already indicated above that the petitioner has not made out any case for cancellation of bail granted to opposite party no. 1. 9. Accordingly, I do not find it a fit case for cancellation of bail already granted to opposite party No.1. The application is accordingly dismissed. 10. However, on the point of maintainability of the second application, I may indicate here that there is no principle like resjudicata in entertaining the second application by the Sessions Judge once it has been rejected earlier. But, generally this practice should not be encouraged. Once the Sessions Judge has rejected the anticipatory bail application, he should not pass fresh order releasing the petitioner on anticipatory bail. At best, the Sessions Judge can direct the accused to move the High Court. 11. In the instant case, as it appears from the order-sheet, the earlier application was rejected on 5.9.1986 and just after four days on 9.9.1986 the Sessions Judge entertained the second application. This, in my view, is quite objectionable. What is objectionable is that when he bad already refused anticipatory bail, the Sessions Judge should have refrained his hand from entertaining the second application within a week. The conduct of the Sessions Judge may create some misgivings in the minds of the public. Rightly or wrongly once the Sessions Judge had rejected the application, generally the Sessions Judge should refrain his hand from entertaining the second application. 12. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Sessions Judge concerned.