Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This First Appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 30th August, 1976 passed by Shri Kamla Prasad Sinha, IVth Additional subordinate Judge, Ranchi in T. S. No.174/1973.227/1976 whereby and where under the said learned court dismissed the plaintiff appellants suit. 2. The plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit claiming inter alia, the following reliefs : (a) That it be declared that the order dated 13-11-1972 passed by the circle Officer, Mandar in Tana Case No.2 of 1971-72 is illegal and without jurisdiction and the possession of the plaintiff be confirmed over the lands in suit or in the alternative, if the court finds ; that the defendants have taken possession in pursuance of the order passed, a decree for recovery of possession be passed. (b) That the defendant Nos.1 and 2 be permanently restrained from taking possession of the lands in suit in pursuance of the impugned order. (c) That a decree for the cost of the suit be passed. (d) That a decree for such other further relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff is entitled be passed. 3. In view of the points which arise for consideration in this appeal it is not necessary for me to state the facts of the case in details. 4. Suffice is to say that one Bhosa Uraon was the recorded tenant in respect of the lands in question. The said lands were sold in auction in execution Case No.324 (R)/9/1942/43 and in the said auction one Alfons Kajur purchased the lands, held on 27/10/1942 and took delivery of possession thereof on 11/1/1943. It would not be out of place to mention that the aforementioned auction took place in execution of a decree passed for recovery of rent. The said decree was passed in a suit filed by the landlord Rameshwar Marwari. 5. It is alleged that Alfons Kajur sold the land to one Victor Kandey by a registered deed of sale dated 10/6/1944 but in his turn he sold the same to one rev. Robert Minz by virtue of registered sale deed dated 26/8/1955. 6. The plaintiffs further case is that the aforementioned Rev. Robert minz made a gift of the said land in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of a registered deed of gift dated 8/9/1965 which was accepted by the plaintiff do fee. Robert Minz by virtue of registered sale deed dated 26/8/1955. 6. The plaintiffs further case is that the aforementioned Rev. Robert minz made a gift of the said land in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of a registered deed of gift dated 8/9/1965 which was accepted by the plaintiff do fee. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the aforementioned Bhosa Uraon had been claiming possession of the lands in question, as a result whereof a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated. The said proceeding under Sec.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code ended in favour of the aforementioned Bhosa Uraon by an order dated 27-9-1948 as a result whereof a suit was instituted by Rev. Robert Minz being T. S. No.227 of 1949 for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 7. In the said suit, it is alleged that the defendant thereof, namely, Bhosa uraon did not take any plea in his written statement that either he was a Tana or the lands in question were sold in auction as he stopped payment of rent consequent upon his participation in the freedom movement. The aforesaid Title suit was decreed in favour of the aforementioned Rev. Robert Minz. The said bhosa Uraon purported to be being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforementioned judgment and decree passed in the aforementioned Title Suit No.227 of 1949 (Judgment ard decree dated 21-12-1950) preferred an appeal but later on withdrew the same. 8. It is further alleged that the delivery of possession was effected throughout. Thereafter the aforementioned Bhosa Uraon filed an application before the circle Officer, Mandar purported to be under the provisions of Ranchi District tana Bhagat Raiyats, Agricultural Land Restoration Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 2 of 1948) hereinafter referred to as the said Act, and the said Circle Officer in his capacity as a Deputy Commissioner under the provision of the said Act purported to have held that the auction sale in respect of the lands in question had taken place in the aforementioned Execution Case No.324 (R)/9/1942 43 in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due to default in payment of the said arrears made by the said Bhosa Uraon, who was a Tana Bhagat, in pursuance of the freedom movement. The Circle Officer, Mandar, therefore, by an order dated 13/11/1972 in Tana Case No.2 of 1971-72 directed that the suit land be restored in favour of defendants Nos.1 and 2 who are the sons of aforementioned Bhosa uraon. 9. Mr. Debi Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below is wholly erroneous in so far as it held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the order dated 13/11/1972 passed by the Circle Officer, Mandar in view of the provisions of Sec.8 of the said Act. He firstly submitted that the civil Courts jurisdiction is not ousted by reason of Sec.8 of the aforementioned Act for the purpose of examining as to whether the Circle Officer, Mandar lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing the impugned order or not. He further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case it was open to the Civil court also to consider as to whether Bhosa Uraon was a Tana Bhagat or not or whether the land in question was sold in auction in terms of the provisions of section 4 of the said Act or not. 10. Mr. Debi Prasad further submitted that the Civil Courts jurisdiction is not ousted in terms of Sec.8 of the said Act if the plaintiff was able to show that there had been total non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of the said Act. 11. Mr. S. K. Chattopadhyaya, learned Government Pleader No. I appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 and Mr. L. N. Deo learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2 on the other hand submitted that Sec.8 imposes as a complete bar on the exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Court. The learned counsels further submitted that the said Act is a complete Code in itself and in that view of the matter the plaintiff had no other remedy any other forum except to pursue the remedies provided for in the Act itself. In this connection ray attention has been drawn by the learned counsels to the provisions of Sec.7 of the said Act which provides for a forum of appeal from the decision of the original tribunal. 12. In this connection ray attention has been drawn by the learned counsels to the provisions of Sec.7 of the said Act which provides for a forum of appeal from the decision of the original tribunal. 12. On behalf of the plaintiff appellant it was further contended that as in t. S. No.227 of 1949 Bhosa Uraon did not raise any plea that either he was a tana Bhagat or that the lands in question wese sold in auction by reason of his taking part in a freedom movement and he did not pay the rent to the landlord pursuant thereto ; the finding of the learned Circle Officer, Mandar as also the finding of the learned Court below that Bhosa Uraon was a Tana Bhagat or that he participated in freedom movement between 1913-42 or the lands in question were sold in auction in execution of a decree for arrears of rent are apparently bad in law as they had no jurisdiction to decide the said questions in view of the fact that Bhosa Uraon himself and consequently his heirs in view of the facts mentioned in paragraph 6 hereinbefore was/were estopped and precluded from raising the said plea. 13. In supporte of his submission Mr. Debi Prasad relied upon the decisions in the case of Kishun Sah V/s. Harinandan Prasad Sah and others, 1963 BUR 95 ; Addinki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu (since deceased) and after him his legal representatives V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, AIR 1964 SC 807 ; Magulu Lai and others V/s. Bhagban Rai and anothers, AIR 1975 Orissa 219 and a recent Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Paritosh Maity V/s. Ghasiram Maity, AIR 1987 Patna 167 : 1987 BLT (Rep.) 131 (FB ). Mr. Debi prasad also drew my attention to an unreported decision of this Court in S. A. No.96 of 1979 (R) Padam Sahu and others V/s. Langra Kharia and others decided on 22nd July, 1985. 14. Mr. S. K. Chattopadhyaya the learned Government Pleader No. I, on the other hand, pleaced strong reliance upon the decision fof the Supreme Court reported in Srce Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadharan Pandhulu Bahadur guru (dead) by his legal representativee V/s. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others, air 1971 SC 71 . Mr. 14. Mr. S. K. Chattopadhyaya the learned Government Pleader No. I, on the other hand, pleaced strong reliance upon the decision fof the Supreme Court reported in Srce Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadharan Pandhulu Bahadur guru (dead) by his legal representativee V/s. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others, air 1971 SC 71 . Mr. Chattopadhyaya has also drawn my attention to the Full bench decision of this Court itself in Paritosh Mattys case (supra) and submitted that the said decision also goes in favour of the contention that in the circumstances of this case the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. 15. For the purpose of decision whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction or not to adjudicate upon the aforementioned question, as in other words whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under. Sec.8 of the said Act the same, in my opinion, have got to be decided taking into consideration the relevant decision referred to by the learned counsel and as mentioned hereinbefore but also keeping in view the scope purport and object of the Act. In this connection reference may be made to a case of Wolver hampton New Water Works Co. V/s. Hawkesford, 1859 (6) CB NS 336. The aforementioned decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in various judgments including the case of the Premier automobile V/s. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others, AIR 1973 SC 2238. 16. In the aforementioned decision it has clearly been laid down that were (sic) at the right has been created for the first time by reason of the provisions contained in special statute and remedy to enforce such right has also been provided thereunder by constituting a forum ; invariably the rights and obligation of the parties arising under such statute have got to be adjudicated in the forum provided for in the said Act and no other court or tribunal will have jurisdiction to decide the same. In this connection the following passage from the aforementioned decision may be quoted which reads as follows : - "there are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established by statute, There is that class where there is a liability existing at common law, and which is only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy; there, unless the statute contains words necessarily excluding the common law remedy, the plaintiff has his election of proceeding either under the statute or at common law. Then there is a second class, which consists of those cases in which a statute has created a liability but has given no special remedy for it, there the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. The third class is where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . With respect to that class it has always been held that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute. " 17. The said Act was enacted to provide for restoration of Tana Bhagat raiyats on certaiu agricultural lands in the district of Ranchi sold in execution of decree for arrears of rent in pursuance of any freedom movement launched or believed to have been launched in any of the year between 1913-42, it would be evident from the preamble of the Act. Sec.2 (1) defines Tana Bhagat in relation to the agricultural lands in the district of Ranchi sold in execution of a decree for arears of rent, means a raiyat or under raiyat who defaulted in payment of arrears of rent or any decree for such arreas in pursuance of any freedom movement launched or believed to have been launched in any of the years 1913-42. Sec.2 (3) defines a deputy Commissioner as meaning the deputy Commissioner of Ranchi or any Officer notbelow the rank of a Sub-Deputy Collector who is empowered by the Deputy Commissioner to discharge any of the functions of the Daputy Commissioner Sec.2 (4) defines holding as meaning a parcel or parcel of land held by a Tana Bhagat raiyat within a separate tenancy and includes a portion or undivided share in such land. Sec.3 of the said Act provides for effect ol provisions of law to the effect that the provision thereof shall have ellect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Sec.4 of the said Act lays down thefprocedures for effecting restoralion of the holding which reads as follows :- "section 4. Procedure for effecting restoration of holdings sola for arrears of rent.- (1) If the holding of any Tana Bhagat raiyat has been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due to the default, in payment of such arrears of decree, made by such raiyat in pursuance of any freedom movement launched or believed to be launched in any of the year 1913 to 1942, the Deputy commissioner shall, on an application made in the prescribed form and in the prescribed manner by the Tana Bhagat raiyat or if he is dead, his legal representative or any other person duly authorised in this behalf by such Tana Bhagat raiyat or his legal representative, for the restoration of such holding to the ownership and possession of the Tana Bhagat raiyat or, as the case may be his legal representative, make an , inquiry in the prescribed manner after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) If after the inquiry under sub-section (1), the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied about the claim of such Tana Bhagat raiyat or his legal representative he may require him to deposit with the Deputy commissioner within the time allowed by him such sum may be determined by him having regard to the amount for which the holding was sold to the auction purchaser of alienated, in any of the ways specified in sub-section (2) of Sec.6 to the person in possession of the holding, either in whole or in part for valuable consideration and the amount of any compensation for improvrnents effected to the holding which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable. (3) It the Tana Bhagat raiyat, or as the case may be, his legal representative makes the deposit required under sub-section (1) the Deputy commissioner shall make an order in writing restoring the holding to the ownership and possession of such Tana Bhagdt raiyat or his legal representative. (3) It the Tana Bhagat raiyat, or as the case may be, his legal representative makes the deposit required under sub-section (1) the Deputy commissioner shall make an order in writing restoring the holding to the ownership and possession of such Tana Bhagdt raiyat or his legal representative. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Deputy commissioner may, on receipt of any information, or on his own knowledge, that the holding of any Tana Bhagat raiyat has been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent ior the reasons stated in sub-section (1) initiate of his own motions proceedings for restoration of such holding to the ownership and possession of such Tana Bhagat raiyat or, if he is dead, his legal representative and thereupon the provisions of sub sections (1), (2) and (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis to such proceedings ; Provided that no proceedings shall be initiated under sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) after the 31st day of march, 1962. " The other provisions which require notice for the purpose of disposal of this appeal are Sections 7 and 8 of the Act which are as follows :- "section 7. Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie from an order passed under section 4- (i) If such order is passed by an Officer, other than the Deputy commissioner, to the Deputy Commissioner ; (ii) If such order is passed by the Deputy Commissioner, to the commissioner ; and the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner or of the Commissioner or any such appeal shall be final. (2) Appeals under this Section shall be heard and disposed of in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Sec.8. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court and High Court.-Neither the High Court nor any Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in any matter which the Deputy Commissioner is empowered to dispose of under this Act and the order of the Deputy Commissioner under any provision of the Act shall, subject to the provisions of Sec.7, be final and shall not be questioned in any Court," 18. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions it would be evident that not only a right has been created in favour of a Tana Bhagat Raiyat, which right evidently did not exist prior to coming into force the aforementioned Act, but a forum to enforce such right has also been provided thereunder. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions it would be evident that not only a right has been created in favour of a Tana Bhagat Raiyat, which right evidently did not exist prior to coming into force the aforementioned Act, but a forum to enforce such right has also been provided thereunder. From the provisions of the aforementioned Act as mentioned hereinbefore it would be absolutely clear that the said Act is a self-contained Code and in my opinion, comes within the third category of cases referred to in the case of Welver Hampton New water Works Co. (supra ). 19. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil Court to try all suits if civil nature excepting such suits, which is expressly or impliedly barred. 20. From a perusal of Sec.8 of the said Act it would be evident that the same imposes a complete embargo upon the exercise of jurisdiction of the civil Court. In this connection it is useful to refer to Sec.8 of the said Act whereby and whereunder not only bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has expressly been created but also it has specifically been declared that the order of the deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Act shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court. (Underlining is mine ). It is has not been contended that the impugned order dated 13/11/1972 passed by the Circle Officer, mandar in Tana Case No.2 of 1971-72 was not an order passed under the provisions of aforementioned Act. For the purpose of giving a true and effective interpretation of this Sec.8 of the said Act, the same has to be gathered not only with reference to the wordings mentioned thereunder but also after taking into consideration the acheme of the entire Act. In my opinion, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is complete ousted by reason of the provisions of section 8 aforementioned, inasmuch as the orders passed thereunder are absolutely final and cannot be questioned in any court whatsoever. In my opinion, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is complete ousted by reason of the provisions of section 8 aforementioned, inasmuch as the orders passed thereunder are absolutely final and cannot be questioned in any court whatsoever. The Supreme Court of India in the case of the State of Kerala V/s. M/s. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1738 , clearly laid down that the question with regard to the bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court should be decided on the basis of the Scheme of the Act and further when the legislature set up a special tribunal to determine the question relating to the rights which by necessary logical corollary includes the liability of the othev patties to the lis which have been created by reason of the provisions of the statute the jurisdiction of the civil Court would be deemed to be excluded by necessary implication. 21. As seen hereinbefore not only the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred expressly but in view of the fact that new right has been created in favour of a class of persons and a forum has also been prescribed for determination of such rights and liabilities, there is therefore, absolutely no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by reason of the provision contained in section 8 of the said Act. In the decisions cited by Mr. Debi Prasad this aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration. 22. Further it is useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadharao Panthulu Bahadur Guru (dead) by his legal representative V/s. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1971 SC 71 wherein it has been held, while following the decision of that Court in dhulabhai V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 , that where the statute gives a finality of the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil courts would normally do in a suit. 23. As seen hereinbefore that the order of the Deputy Commissioner can be challenged in an appeal under the provisions of Sec.7 of the said Act. 24. 23. As seen hereinbefore that the order of the Deputy Commissioner can be challenged in an appeal under the provisions of Sec.7 of the said Act. 24. However, in a recent decision in C. W J. C. No.1624 of 1981 (R) it has been held by this Court that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is not ousted by reason of the provisions of Sec.8 of the said Act. 25. In the recent Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Paritosh maity V/s. Ghost ram Maity and another (supra) it has been held in paragraph I8 of the judgment as follows ;- "on the other hand, primal reliance by the learned counsel advocating the bar to the Civil jurisdiction was placed on Hatti V/s. Sunder Singh, air 1971 SC 2320 . Therein on a construction of the provisions ot the Delhi Land Reforms Act, it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts was ousted. However, what fell for consideration by their Lordships in that case was Sec.185 (1), Delhi Land Reforms act, which is in the following terms:- Except as provided by or under this Act, no Court other than a Court mentioned in Col.7 of Schedule 1 shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, take cognizance of any suit application or proceedings mentioned in col.3 thereof. Now plainly enough, the aforesaid section in unequivocal terms bars the jurisdiction of any other court including a Civil Court in spite of Sec.9, Civil Procedure Code. There is no provision even remotely similar to the aforesaid one in the present Act. Consequently, it is inapt to invoke the ratio of the said case in the context of the provisions of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, which have been discussed in detail. " 26 So far as the unreported decision of this Court in Padatn Sahus case (supra) it does not appear that any argument was advanced therein that the Civil court had no jurisdiction to decide the correctness or otherwise of an order passed under the provisions of the said Act. As the aforementioned question did (1)BLJ 41 not fall for consideration in Padam Sahus case, in my opinion, no reliance can be placed thereon for the purpose of showing that the Civi. As the aforementioned question did (1)BLJ 41 not fall for consideration in Padam Sahus case, in my opinion, no reliance can be placed thereon for the purpose of showing that the Civi. Court will have jurisdiction if the procedure laid down under the said Act have not been followed. It is now will settled that a decision is an authority for which it decides and not what can logically be deduced from it. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of Quinn V/s. Latham, 1900-3 AER re-print page-1 at page 6 (Per speech of Lord Halsbury ). 27. From the perusal of the said decision in Padam Sahus case it appears that neither the question with regard to the ouster of the Civil Courts jurisdiction in terms of Sec.8 of the said Act was ever raised or answered, even remotely there is no discussion in the said judgment about the implication of the provisions of Sec.8 of the said Act. 28. In view of the fact that similar provisions like Sec.8 of the said act has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in its various decisions and as referred to hereinbefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court will be completely barred. In my opinion, the aforementioned judgment of Padam Sahus (supra)strongly relied upon by Mr. Debi Prasad, therefore, can not be said to have any application in the facts and circumstances of the case. 29. In view of rny findings that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction, I have on option but to dismiss the appeal. However, on the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 30. It is however, made clear that in view of my findings aforementioned i have not discussed the other points raised by Mr. Deli Prasad which were raised before the court below.