JUDGMENT Gulab C. Gupta, J. 1. This second appeal is by plaintiff/landlord and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 14/10/1982 passed by Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge. Khandwa in Civil Appeal No. 62-A/8 arising out of judgment and decree dated 9/10/1980 passed by III Civil Judge. Class-II. Khandwa in Civil suit No. 95-A/80. 2. The case of the appellant was that he was the owner and landlord in relation to suit-premises. which was in occupation of the respondent as his tenant. The suit-premises is a two storeyed building whose ground door is used by the respondent for his business, while the first-floor is used for residential purposes. According to the appellant, the tenancy was joint, i.e., for residential as also non-residential purpose. He submitted that he needed the suit-premises for his residence and business of his son Arun Kumar. He also submitted that the respondent has acquired a two storeyed house and has established a flourmill on its ground door. It was also his case that the respondent has started living in the first-floor of this newly acquired building and, therefore, docs not need the suit-premises any more. The trial Court was of the opinion that the need of the appellant was not bona fide. He also held that it was wrong that the respondent has started living in his own house. On these findings, the suit was dismissed. The learned lower appellate Court was of the opinion that the appellant has tailed to prove the need of the suit-housefor residential purpose. He however, held that the need of the house for starling business of his son Arun Kumar was established by evidence on record. Inspite of it. the learned lower appellate Court held that the appellant was not entitled to get the suit-house vacated as the tenancy being for joint purposes, could not be splitted. As regards acquiring another accommodation, the learned lower appellate Court held that the appellant has not pleaded in his plaint that the suit-accommodation was suitable for residential purpose and. therefore, the evidence in that regard cannot be looked into. That is how, the appeal was dismissed. 3. This Court, while admitting the appeal for final hearing on 24.2.1983. As regards acquiring another accommodation, the learned lower appellate Court held that the appellant has not pleaded in his plaint that the suit-accommodation was suitable for residential purpose and. therefore, the evidence in that regard cannot be looked into. That is how, the appeal was dismissed. 3. This Court, while admitting the appeal for final hearing on 24.2.1983. framed the following two substantial questions of law for its consideration :- (i) "Whether on the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court, a refusal to grant a deeree for eviction under section 12 (1) (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act is bad in law ?" and (ii) "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower appellate Court erred in law in not granting a decree under section 12(1 )(a) & (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act ?" 4. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the lower appellate Court has not properly appreciated pleadings in para-4 of the plaint and has illegally and unjustifiably held that the appellant was not entitled to benefit of section 12(1) (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act as the suitability of the new house for residential purposes was not specifically pleaded. According to the learned counsel. since the appellant had pleaded that the new house was being used by the respondent for his residence, the fact that it was suitable for residential purposes was implicit. The learned counsel further submitted that since the need for starting business of appellant's son Arun Kumar has been found to be real and bona fide, a decree for eviction of whole of the suit-premises should have been passed. Reliance is placed on Jeevanlal Kalabhai v. Anant Govind 1972 M.P.L.J. 113. Relying on Mohanlal Mintoolal and another v. Hakimsingh Gopal Singh and another 1980 M.P.L.J. 361. it is submitted that at least the non-residential portion of this house should have got vacated to satisfy the non-residential bona fide need. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that the trial Court has, on consideration of evidence on record, clearly and specifically held that the tenancy was for residential purpose only and, therefore, the appellant is not entitled to get the suit-premises vacated for non-residential purpose. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that the trial Court has, on consideration of evidence on record, clearly and specifically held that the tenancy was for residential purpose only and, therefore, the appellant is not entitled to get the suit-premises vacated for non-residential purpose. As regards section 12(1)(i) of the Act, it is submitted that the appellant was bound to plead that the new house was suitable for residential purpose and since the same has not been pleaded, no evidence could be looked into. It is further submitted that the respondent has sold the new house during the pendency of the appeal and. therefore, section 12(1)(i) of the Act has no application. 5. Section 12(1)(i) of the Act permits a land-lord to gel a tenant evicted from the tenanted premises if the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted an accommodation suitable for his residence. The purpose of the provision appears to be to withdraw the protection from a tenant, who has a house of his own. The Act has been held to be a welfare legislation intended to protect weaker section of the community, i.e. tenant Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1924. The object that is sought to be achieved by this statute is to provide housing on reasonable terms to those who are not able to build houses for themselves. Inspite of it, the statute cannot be treated anti-landlords. Its provisions definitely indicate that it strikes a balance between two conflicting interests, i.e., the interest of those possessed with resources and able to construct and interests of those without such resources and unable to construct. Interest of capable persons are protected by making them available the accommodation for their hone-fide requirement, residential or non-residential. The object seems to have been carried further by inserting clause 12(1)(i), which disentitles a tenant, who has conic to possess a house of his own or acquires or is allotted another accommodation suitable for his residence. The intention of this provision clearly is not to permit a person to remain a tenant when he has a house of his own suitable for his residence. Similarly, the object also appears to be not to permit a tenant to remain a tenant in respect of a tenanted permises if he has acquired or has been allotted another accommodation. The intention of this provision clearly is not to permit a person to remain a tenant when he has a house of his own suitable for his residence. Similarly, the object also appears to be not to permit a tenant to remain a tenant in respect of a tenanted permises if he has acquired or has been allotted another accommodation. In view of this object and purpose of the provision, any interpretation of it by a court of law will have to be such as to bring out this intention and prove its efficacy. 6. Inspite of it, it is clear that section 12(1)(i) of the Act applies only to residential accommodation and not to non-residential accommodation. In Dr. Gopaldas Verma v. S.K. Bhardwaj and another A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 337, this provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that it was applicable in relation to accommodation let out tor residential purposes. It was held that the landlord would be entitled to eject the tenant from the suit house, once it is shown that the tenant has acquired another accommodation suitable for residence. The requirement is that the tenant must have suitable residence. Both words of the requirement are significant what he has acquired must be residence, i.e. to say the premises, which can be used for residence and the said premises must be sunable for that purpose. If the premises from which ejectment is sought, are not used only for residence, but also for profession, one of the purposes for which the tenancy is required being professional use. acquisition of premises, which are suitable for residential alone cannot satisfy the provision of the section. It was. therefore, held that it would be unreasonable to hold that the tenancy, which has been created or used both for residence and profession can be successfully terminated merely by saying that the tenant has acquired a suitable residence. This case, is, therefore, the authority for the proposition that where tenancy is joint, as in the instant case, acquiring a residential accommodation by the tenant would not be sufficient to evict him. Under the circumstances. if the tenancy is joint as contained in the plaint, the appellant must be held disentitled to a decree for eviction under section 12(1)(i) of the Act. Under the circumstances. if the tenancy is joint as contained in the plaint, the appellant must be held disentitled to a decree for eviction under section 12(1)(i) of the Act. It was perhaps for this reason that the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court has found that the accommodation was let out for residential purposes alone, which finding has not been set-aside by the lower appellate Court. According to him, this being a concurrent finding, it must now be accepted that the purpose of tenancy was residential. Surprisingly, the learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the finding of the trial Court that the tenancy was created for residential purpose alone is final and binding on this Court in this second appeal. A perusal of para-6 of the judgment of the trial Court clearly indicates that the trial Court had not accepted the appellant's plea that the tenancy was created for residential and also non-residential purposes. The learned lower appellate Court has considered this in paras 13 & 14 of the impugned-judgment, but has said nothing about its correctness or otherwise. On the contrary, the learned lower appellate Court has observed that the view taken by the trial Court was in accordance with law (para-13). This observation gives weight to the submission of the learned counsel for the parties that the finding recorded by the trial Court that the suit-accommodation was let out for residential purpose has not been disturbed. Inspite of it, the learned lower appellate Court has found that part of the suit-accommodation was used for business purpose. Now, if the accommodation was let out for residential purpose and is used for non-residential purpose, it will be an act inconsistent with the pupose for which the tenant was admitted to the tenancy and would furnish another ground under section 12(1)(c) of the Act to the appellant to see his eviction. Since the present suit is not filed on this ground, it is really not neccessary to consider this aspect of the matter. Inspite of it, it is clear that both the Courts have held that the accommodation was let out to the respondent for residential purpose. This being the common submission of the parties, it presents no difficulty to this court to hold that it is final and binding on it while considering the second appeal. Inspite of it, it is clear that both the Courts have held that the accommodation was let out to the respondent for residential purpose. This being the common submission of the parties, it presents no difficulty to this court to hold that it is final and binding on it while considering the second appeal. Now, if the accommodation was let out to the respondent for residential purpose and he has acquired or built another accommodation suitable for his residence, he will be liable to he evicted from the suit-premises under section 12(1)(i) of the Act. 7. The learned lower appellate Court has held that the new house was built by the respondent. This was also admitted by the respondent. His only case was that the groundfloor of the house is used by him for running his flourmill, while the first-floor was lying vacant, as it was unsuitable for residence. According to him, it was unsuitable because it has tin-roof, which was rather low. The trial Court has accepted his plea but the learned lower appellate Court did not consider its correctness or otherwise. In the opinion of the learned lower appellate Court, section 12(1)(i) of the Act was not available to the appellant because he had not pleaded that the new accommodation was suitable for residence. It may, therefore, be examined whether it is the correct view. As is well-known, the object of pleadings is to narrow the parlies to definite issues and achieve expeditious trial. It appears to be settled that the Court cannot, either by itself make out a new Case for the party nor permit the party to prove a case not pleaded. Order 6. Rule 5 C.P.C. provides that every pleading shall contain a statement in a concised form of the material facts on which the party relies for his claim and thus indicates that material and necassary facts alone are to be pleaded. Order 6. Rule 5 enables the other side to obtain belter particulars. if necessary. Rule-7 contains what is known as "departure in pleading" rule and requires every new ground to be introduced by way of an amendment. Inspite of this requirement, it has been held that where a parly is not taken by surprise and the parties go to trial fully understanding the question at issue, the decision is not vitiated Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip and others A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 164,. Inspite of this requirement, it has been held that where a parly is not taken by surprise and the parties go to trial fully understanding the question at issue, the decision is not vitiated Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip and others A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 164,. It may therefore, be considered if this law remains complied with in the instant case. While, scrutinising the facts on racord, this Court will have to keep in mind that it is not required to scrutinise the pleadings with such meticulous care as may result in genuine claims being defeated on trivial ground Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram & another A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 461,. Pleadings will have to be interpreted not with formalistic rigour, but with latitude or awareness of the legal literacy of our people. This Court is remined of the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Manjushri Raha and others. v. B.L. Gupta and others A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1158. where their Lordships held that where it can definitely be interred from the averments in pleadings that a plea of ouster was taken, the more fact that the word ouster was not used in pleadings, it cannot be said that there was no pleading of ouster. 8. Section 12(1)(i) of the Act permits eviction of the tenant only if he has built, acquired or been allotted an accommodation suitable for his residence. It will, therefore, be the burden of the appellant to plead and prove that the accommodation in possession of the respondent was suitable for his residence. There is. however, no magic in the words 'suitable for residence'. If a plain reading of the allegations in the plaint reasonably suggest that the accommodation was suitable for residence, the requirement of this section would be deemed to have been satisfied. A perusal of para 4 of the plaint indicates that it was alleged by the appellant that the respondent has kept the tenanted premises vacant since last 2-3 years, as he has built a house of his own and was staying in the said house with family members. In reply to this allegation, the respondent denied that the suit house was kept vacant or that he was staying in the new house with his family members or even using the ground-floor of the house for his Hour-mill. In reply to this allegation, the respondent denied that the suit house was kept vacant or that he was staying in the new house with his family members or even using the ground-floor of the house for his Hour-mill. He also denied that the appellant has become entitled to the suit-house on this ground (para 4). In para-14 of the written statement, he admitted that he had a one-and-a half storeyed house of his own and was using the ground-floor of that house for his flourmill. He. however, stated that the upper portion of the house was not fit for residence and that was the reason why it was left vacant. It would, therefore, appear that the respondent understood the plea in para 4 of the plaint to include the averment that the accommodation was suitable for his residence and, therefore, joined issues with the appellant. Since the suitability of the accommodation for residence was in dispute, additional issues were framed on 28.2.1980 and decided by the Court. Under the circumstances, it is really too late to hold that the appellant has not pleaded that the new accommodation was suitable for respondent's residence and non-suit him on this ground. In the opinion of this Court, the view taken by the learned lower appellante Court is not in accordance with law and cannot, therefore, be accepted. 9. Inspite of it, it remains to be seen whether the suit accommodation is suitable for resilience of the respondent. As noted earlier, the case of the respondent is that it was unsuitable because it has a tin-roof, which is slanting on both sides and is low. The appellant as P.W.1. has deposed on oath that the respondent has his own house behind the suit-house, which is used for running the flourmill and residence (para 6). He has also produced photographs of this house, which are marked as Ex.P-6 & Ex.P-7. In cross-examination, he asserted that this house had 6 or 7 rooms. He. however, admitted that it has a tin roof (para 22). Manakchand (P.W.2) proves photographs (Ex. P-6 & Ex.P-7), and admits that the house has tin roof, which is slanting on two sides. Murlidhar (D.W. 1) admits that he has a house of his own. which is known as 'Chakkiwala Makan'. According to him, its tin roof is slanting and, therefore, a person cannot stand. Manakchand (P.W.2) proves photographs (Ex. P-6 & Ex.P-7), and admits that the house has tin roof, which is slanting on two sides. Murlidhar (D.W. 1) admits that he has a house of his own. which is known as 'Chakkiwala Makan'. According to him, its tin roof is slanting and, therefore, a person cannot stand. In cross-examination (para 21), he admitted that this house is 45 x18' and has a bath room and latrine. He also admitted that he has not examined any Mistry or Overseer to prove the height of the first-floor. Abdul Latif (DW-2) claims to have seen the house and was of the opinion that the top floor was fit for use as a Store house had not for residence. He, however, admitted that on the ground-floor, there is a room, an open chawk. a bathroom and latrine. This is also the evidence of Rahim Bux (D.W.3). Under the circumstances, the only objection of the respondent appears to be that the firstfloor of his house has a tin roof, which is slanting and, therefore, a person cannot stand. This, however, does not appear to be supported by photographs (Ex. P-6 & (P-7). Ex.P-6 is admittedly the photograph showing both the storeys of the house. First floor clearly indicates that corrugated tin-sheets have been issued to cover the roof. The photograph also shows that slant is towards the front side. It is, therefore, reasonable to hold that the side visible in Ex.P-6 is the lowest in height. But, even this height is more than the height of the room is more than the height of the door, which is of full size, it will require explanation from the respondent as to how, he states that one cannot stand in that room. If the height at the visible end is more than the height of the door, the middle portion must be at least 2 feet higher than this part. This is usually the normal height of roof at the present. Under the circumstances, the statement of the respondent that a person cannot stand in the room does not deserve to be believed. Even otherwise, it is unthinkable that the respondent while building his house, which can be used for residence only, would have built its roof at so a level as not to permit free movement of persons. Then, nothing has been said about the accommodation in the ground-floor. Even otherwise, it is unthinkable that the respondent while building his house, which can be used for residence only, would have built its roof at so a level as not to permit free movement of persons. Then, nothing has been said about the accommodation in the ground-floor. Accommodation in the ground floor is without dispute, suitable for residence. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to accept that the accommodation built by the respondent was not suitable for this residence. This appears to be the reason why the learned lower appellate Court did not rely on the finding of the trial Court and chose to dismiss the appeal on technical ground of defect in pleading. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that the respondent has sold the house, during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, it is no longer available. He has filed an application praying for an amendment, which application was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. In Ahmed Khan Rajju Khan vs. Michel Nath Bhopal Nath 1977 M.P.L.J. 574, this Court has taken the view that this ground become available to the landlord when the tenant has built an accommodation suitable for his reedence. There is nothing in section 12(1)(i) of the Act to require that the tenant should continue to have possession of this accomodation till the date of landlord's suit or till the decree. The right of eviction acquired by the landlord cannot be defeated by otherwise disposing of the accommodation. Not only the logic and rationale of this decision, but also the object of the provision justify taking such a view. Under the circumstances, the fact that the respondent chose to dispose of his accommodation during the pendancy of the suit cannot be accepted as sufficient to defeat the suit. This, if at all, would be a circumstance against him indicating his effort to some how get the claim of the landlord frustrated. 11. The upshot of the discussion is that the appellant/landlord has proved each and every ingredient of section 12(1)(i) of the Act and is, therefore, entitled to get a decree for eviction of the respondent from the suit-premises. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to cosider other grounds on bona-fide requirement. 12. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned-judgment and decree are set-aside. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to cosider other grounds on bona-fide requirement. 12. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned-judgment and decree are set-aside. The appellant is held entitled to a decree for eviction of the respondent from the suit-premises. Considering that fact that the suit-premises are also used for non-residential purpose, it is directed that in case, the respondent gives a written undertaking in the trial Court to the effect that he will hand-over vacant possession of the suit-premises on or before 31 st December. 1987, he will not be evicted therefrom, inspite of the decree being put in execution. The appellant shall also be entitled to costs of this appeal. Counsel fee, as per rules.