JUDGMENT 1. THE only question of taw involved in this second appeal has been framed by A. K. Chatterjee, 3. in his order of reference as hereunder : " Whether an under -raiyat, in order to get protection from eviction under proviso (i) (2) to Section" 48c of the Bengal Tenancy Act. must prove continuous possession for a period of twelve years in his character as an under -raiyat or whether he can claim the same benefit even if he is found to be in possession for a part of the continuous period of twelve years in some other character". 2. THE material portion of section 48c of the Bengal Tenancy act, 1885, inserted therein by the Amendment Act of 1928, may be reproduced hereunder : " An under -raiyat shall. . . . . . be liable to ejectment on one or more of the following grounds : -X X X X X (c) on the ground that the term of his lease has expired, when he holds the land under a written lease: (d) on the ground that the tenancy has been terminated by his landlord by one year's notice expiring at the end of the agricultural year when he holds the land otherwise, than under a written lease; x X X X X provided that an under -raiyat shall not be. liable to ejectment on the grounds specified in clause (c) or clause Id) (i) ii the under -raiyat has --X X X X X (2) been in possession of his land for a continuous period of twelve years, whether before or after or partly before and partly after, the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy. (Amendment) Act. 1928. " As already noted, the question that has arisen for our consideration in this appeal is whether, in order to acquire non ejectibility under the provisions of the proviso quoted above, an under raiyat possessing his land for a continuous period of twelve years was required to possess the same qua an under -raiyat only during the entire period of twelve years or whether an under -raiyat could have acquired such immunity from ejectment even if he possessed the land in some other capacity during any portion of that period of twelve years. An affirmative answer to the first question and, therefore, a negative answer to the second question would decree the appeal, while a negative answer to the first question and, therefore, an affirmantive answer to the second question would entitle its dismissal. 3. AS noted by A. K. Chatterjee, J. there are two contrary single judge decision of this Court laying; down two diametrically opposite prepositions, the one being the decision of Jack, J. in Biswamber v. Kalidas (40 CWN 1275) decided in 1936 and the other being the decision of Edgley, J. in Ali Ahammad v. Abdul Gani (44 CWN 330 : AIR 1940 calcutta 441) decided in 1939. It appears that even though in Ali ahammad (supra), the attention of Edgley, J. was duly drawn to the earlier decision of Jack, J. in Biswambar (supra), the learned Judge nevertheless thought it fit to brush aside the same as he was "not in agreement with the views adopted by the learned Judge in the above cited decision". While one can understand a single-Judge laying down a different view in ignorance of an earlier contrary single-Judge decision, it would, however, be difficult to appreciate if a single-Judge does so with full knowledge of the earlier contrary decision solely on the ground that he regards the same to be erroneous. He may distinguish the earlier decision, if he can; he may show the earlier decision not to be good law in view of contrary decision of higher authority or of subsequent legislative changes; but if he does not or can not do so, he will have to decide the matter before him in accordance with the earlier unless he takes steps to refer the matter to larger bench. Speaking for a unanimous three-Judge Bench of the Supreme court in Mahadeolal v. Administrator General ( AIR 1960 SC 936 at 941), it was observed by Das Gupta, J. that "judicial decoram no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure" and "if one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing it is the quality of certainty" and that "that quality would totally disappear if Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in the High Court start over-ruling one another's decisions". It was observed further that the result would be utter confusion if a "judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decisions of another single-Judge on a question of Jaw is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench" as "in such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all courts subordinate to the high Court would find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient judgment of their own High Court". We are therefore, of the opinion, and this we say with great respect, that it was not proper for Edgley, J. sitting singly, to lay down a contrary proposition in Ali Ahamnnad (supra) which was diametrically opposite to what was held by Jack, J. sitting singly, in Biswambar (supra), and we have no doubt that it was a case in which Edgley, thought to have taken steps to have the matter referred to a larger bench. 4. BUT now that the matter has come before us on a reference being made by A. K. Chatterjee, J. for resolving the constrict between these two contrary decisions of Jack, J. and Edgley, J. we have felt, after giving the matter our best consideration, that the decision of edgley, J. in Ali Ahammad (supra) is correct in law and that of Jack, J. in Biswambar (supra) must be taken to have been wrongly decided. This also appears to be the view of A. K. Chatterjee, J. in his referring order with which we are in respectful agreement. Therefore, even though we have not been able to appreciate Edgley, J's laying down a contrary proposition in Ali Ahammad (supra) in complete and unceremonious disregard of Jack, J's' earlier decision in Biswambar (supra), we would, for the reasons stated herein below, endorse the same as having enunciated the correct proposition of law. Therefore, even though we have not been able to appreciate Edgley, J's laying down a contrary proposition in Ali Ahammad (supra) in complete and unceremonious disregard of Jack, J's' earlier decision in Biswambar (supra), we would, for the reasons stated herein below, endorse the same as having enunciated the correct proposition of law. As already indicated, while Jack, J., in construing the relevant provisions of the Proviso, extracted above, held in Biswambar (supra)that there was nothing in those provisions to indicate that in order to bring those provisions into operation the under raiyat must have been in possession in his capacity as an under raiyat for not less than twelve years, Edgley, J., however, ruled in Ali Ahammad (supra) that in order to invoke the protective provisions of the Proviso, the under raiyat must show that he was in continuous possession of the demised land as an under raiyat for a period of not less than twelve years. The reasons which have led us to agree with and accept the view of edgley, J. are as hereunder. 5. SECTION 48c is contained in Chapter VII of the Bengal Tenancy act and Section 47 A, with which the Chapter begins, clearly provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to under raiyats only. Prima facie, therefore, Section 48c is to be invoked by a person owning, enjoying and possessing the land in his capacity as an under raiyat at the material time and for the (relevant period. 6. THE collocation of words in the material portion of section 48c and the Proviso thereto, as extracted above, namely, an Under raiyat shall not be liable to ejectment. if the under raiyat has been in possession of his land for a continuous period of twelve years", also, in our view, clearly goes to show that for the operation of the proviso, the person possessing must be an under raiyat, the land possessed must be the under raiyati land and the character of possession must also be that of an under raiyat. The user of the expression "his land" instead of "the land" is, in our view quite significant, thereby making it clear that what must be possessed is not just the land, but the under raiyati land as an under -raiyat. The user of the expression "his land" instead of "the land" is, in our view quite significant, thereby making it clear that what must be possessed is not just the land, but the under raiyati land as an under -raiyat. As is well-known, the object of Section 48 C, as inserted by the Amendment Act, 1928, was to confer non-eject ability on an under raiyat who has possessed his land for not less than twelve years, The avowed object thus being to immune the under raiyat against ejectment because of his long possession, it h obvious that the Legislature wanted to protect such a one who was possessing the land in his capacity as an under- raiyat for the relevant period of twelve years. For example, if a person, immediately before acquiring under- raiyat; of a land from a raiyat, possessed the same for twelve years or more as a complete usufructuary mortgage from the raiyat and then possessed the same for another two years as an under- raiyat under the raiyat, then obviously his possession of the land in his capacity as a money lender mortgagee could not enure to his benefit to attract the protection of the proviso where under an under raiyat must possess 'his land", that is, must possess under- raiyati land as an under- raiyat. We, therefore, hold, agreeing with the view of Edgley, in Ali Ahammad (supra)and of A. K. Chatterjee, J. in his order of reference, that in order to acquire non-delectability under the provisions of the Proviso (i) (2)to section 48c of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the under- raiyat must possess the land in his capacity as an under raiyat for a period not less than twelve years. 7. WE must therefore, allow this appeal, which we hereby do. The judgment and decree of the court of appeal below are hereby set aside and those of the trial court are restored. No order as to costs as the confusion was created by this court speaking in difference voices and actus curiae neminem gravavit appeal allowed.