JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. - Petitioner Smt. Malti Sharma has directed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 31-10-1979 refusing to grant release of the house in question and the order dated 15-5-1981 passed by the VIth Additional District Judge, Lucknow dismissing the appeal. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that petitioner is the landlady of the House No. 499/196 Gokaran Nath Misra Park Road, P.S. Husainganj, Lucknow which was purchased on 19-1-1976 through a registered sale deed. The petitioner along with her husband, two daughters and two sons had been living in the house belonging to her brother-in-law Sri Ram Lakhan Sharma at 58 Chhitwapur Road, Lalkuan, Husainganj, Lucknow. She moved an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) after expiry of the statutory period for release of the accommodation claiming that her need was bona fide. The Prescribed Authority after considering the various factors recorded a finding that the need was not bona fide and hence he rejected the application. These findings have been affirmed in appeal and the same was dismissed. This is how this petition is before this court. 3. I would have not have ordinarily interfered in this petition but, it was emphasised that husband of the petitioner died on 28-6-1984 and the relations with brother-in-law became strained. I, therefore, proceeded to hear the learned Counsel for the parties to this litigation. It is now well settled that intervening facts can also be taken into account while determining the question of bona fide need. It has already been mentioned above that husband of petitioner is no more alive. The eldest daughter of the petitioner Madhu Sharma has been married. Thus the members now left are petitioner herself, Kumari Ranjana Sharma who is studying in M.A. Lucknow University and the two sons who are studying in Jail Narain Degree College. The petitioner as has been mentioned above is residing in the house belonging to her brother-in-law. The accommodation in possession of the petitioner's family consists of one room measuring 16' X 7' and a Kothri 8' X 8' and an open terrace 8' X 8'. This accommodation is in the first floor. The petitioner as has been mentioned above is residing in the house belonging to her brother-in-law. The accommodation in possession of the petitioner's family consists of one room measuring 16' X 7' and a Kothri 8' X 8' and an open terrace 8' X 8'. This accommodation is in the first floor. The latrine and bathroom in the ground floor is shared with the family of brother-in-law and other persons living in the said house. The other residents is Sri Vinod Kumar Sharma who lives in the ground floor and is a diploma engineer in P.W.D. He is the close relative of Mrs. Ram Lakhan Sharma. The other resident in the house is Gaddu a close relation of Sri Ram Lakhan Sharma who is studying in Jainarain Degree College. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has pressed this petition primarily on two grounds namely, in the first instance the accommodation left at the disposal of the petitioner is wholly insufficient and is causing great inconvenience and hardship to her and her children. The second point urged is that after the death of the husband of the petitioner, the petitioner has become the target of all curses of her husband's brother (brother-in-law) and his wife. On account of the strained relations and pin-pricking it has become difficult to stay there in peace. It has also been emphasised that it is difficult for the petitioner to continue to live indefinitely in the house of brother-in-law after the death of the husband who, was the link between the two families. The petitioner has supported her claim through affidavits filed as Annexures 3-A, 3-B and 3-C to the writ petition. A certified copy of the sale deed-dated 26-9-1968 with respect of house No. 56 Chhitwapur Road to rebut the findings of the Prescribed Authority that the house in question was an ancestoral property and as such the petitioner and her family were living in the said house in their own right has been filed. A true copy of the said sale deed is filed as Annexure-R1 to the rejoinder affidavit. There is also affidavit of Sri Ram Lakhan Sharma to that effect. 5. A true copy of the said sale deed is filed as Annexure-R1 to the rejoinder affidavit. There is also affidavit of Sri Ram Lakhan Sharma to that effect. 5. The other reasoning of the Prescribed Authority while rejecting the petitioner's claim is that the purchase of the house in question under the tenancy of opposite party No. 3 from her own mother was not bona fide. Learned Counsel urged that such a reasoning was incompetent and illegal. He, therefore, urged that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority suffered from jurisdictional error as they were not in conformity with the requirement of Section 21 of the Act. The learned District (;Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground that even assuming that the building in which she has been living does not belong to her, there is nothing to indicate that she was on the verge of being thrown out and the presumption is that she must be living conveniently. This finding, in my opinion, also is based on conjectures and surmisers and are perverse. 6. Learned Counsel for Sri Surendra Mohan opposite party No. 3 who is the tenant of House No. 499/196 Gokaran Nath Misra, Park Road stated that the two Courts have recorded a concurrent finding that the need of landlady is not genuine and bona fide. It was also stated that she was living conveniently in the house which was purchased by the joint family funds and she was in occupation thereof as a matter of right. The house was spacious consisting of several rooms. The brother-in-law of the petitioner has no issue and naturally husband and wife could not be occupying the specious house, therefore, need of the petitioner could not be regarded a genuine. The tenant had no other accommodation where he could shifts. The previous owner was the mother of the petitioner who wanted to enhance the rent and when she could not succeed she transferred it to the petitioner. It is also asserted that with the consent of the landlord the tenant has spent a huge amount by replacing the falling roof by a new R.B. Slab which has increased the value of the house. If the tenant is made to vacate the house he will be faced with great hardship. It is also asserted that with the consent of the landlord the tenant has spent a huge amount by replacing the falling roof by a new R.B. Slab which has increased the value of the house. If the tenant is made to vacate the house he will be faced with great hardship. Learned Counsel pointed out that tenant before the Prescribed Authority had stated that previous landlady was the mother of the petitioner who wanted to get the rent increased and since that was not done the house was transferred to her daughter so that she may be able to get the rent enhanced under the threat of eviction. This fact was accepted by the Prescribed Authority and, therefore, in order to rebut the same an affidavit was filed at the appellate stage. It is further pointed out that he had neither given any details of the accommodation at her disposal in the portion occupied by her in the house of her brother-in-law. Nor she had given number of persons living there. In order to fill up the lacuna a supplementary affidavit has been filed in this Court. He, therefore, urged that she had been taking stands which could suit her from time to time. He argued that the new facts snack of falsehood and they had never been mentioned at an earlier stage, viz., now it is asserted that quarrels take place between her family and the family of her brother-in-law. He further pointed out that the accommodation was sufficient and the findings of the Court below did not call for any interference. There is no evidence to show that she has to vacate the present place of residence and the petitioner has not shown her requirements and the extent of accommodation which is with her. The accommodation could not be said to be insufficient or that her need was genuine. The landlady is not without a roof and, therefore, while at this belated stage if petition is allowed the tenant would be left with no roof. 7. On giving my anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances pointed out by the learned Counsel for the contenting parties I have no hesitation in observing that the findings recorded by the Courts, below are) based on conjectures and surmisers. 7. On giving my anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances pointed out by the learned Counsel for the contenting parties I have no hesitation in observing that the findings recorded by the Courts, below are) based on conjectures and surmisers. The findings with respect to the bona fide) need of the landlady have not been given due weight by the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority. It has been pointed out that the husband of the petitioner died during this intervening period. I, therefore, find substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that relation between the family of the brother-in-law and the petitioner would have ceased to be cordial. The) Court below have not mentioned the actual accommodation in possession of the tenant and a comparative assessment with respect to the accommodation at the disposal of the petitioner and the Respondent No. 3 has not been duly considered. The claim of the petitioner has been dismissed in a very perfunctory manner. It has not been disputed that the husband of the petitioner has expired. Therefore, if the petitioner wants to stay in her own house which assuming was transferred to her by her mother in peculiar circumstances cannot deprive the petitioner seeking vacation of the house in question. The application submitted by her was not barred by any of the provisions. Merely because the premises were in occupation of a tenant for last 32 years that would not be ground for outright rejecting the claim for release of the premises. It appears that the Court) below were swayed away by the fact that husband of the petitioner was drawing a handsome salary and living comfortably with the family of the brother-in-law, Ram Lakhan Sharma. The Appellate Court observed that there was nothing on the record to show that the brother-in-law of the applicant has been asking her to vacate her house. He observed that no affidavit was filed by the brother-in-law and he had asked the lady to vacate her house. Still he referred to certain circumstances for not accepting the genuine need of the lady by observing that Sri Ram Lakhan Sharma had a small family and had no issues. The house is spacious one and it belonged to none else but the real brother of the husband of the petitioner. The approach, in my opinion, is wholly irrelational. Still he referred to certain circumstances for not accepting the genuine need of the lady by observing that Sri Ram Lakhan Sharma had a small family and had no issues. The house is spacious one and it belonged to none else but the real brother of the husband of the petitioner. The approach, in my opinion, is wholly irrelational. In this Court through the affidavits it is really borne out that the petitioner is not living happily and is under constant mental strain, therefore, the finding that her need was not bona fide has been recorded in a very perfunctory manner. 8. While considering the question of comparative hardship he has only observed that since respondent-tenant has no alternative accommodation, he is an old tenant, therefore, more hardship would be caused to the respondent if the application is allowed. This reasoning if is applied then, in my opinion, in no case the landlord can seek release of the premises. I am, therefore, of the view that both the ingredients have not been assessed in the light of evidence on record. I have already observed above that lot of intervening circumstances have been put forth through affidavit and they require serious consideration. The point to be examined in the instant case is whether there is any likelihood) of the petitioner letting out the premises after obtaining release. The Court below has not devoted itself to this aspect of the matter. It has been swayed away by the fact that she was living with her husband in the house belonging to her brother-in-law and, therefore, they were not without a roof. It would not be out of place to mention that now the relationship of blood has been snatched away at the cruel hands of God and to presume that relations still would be cordial would be to presumptuous. The order, therefore, cannot be sustained and deserved to be set aside. 9. The various aspects that now have been brought on the record regarding which a mention has been made in the proceeding paragraph it is necessary that on the basis of evidence brought by the contesting parties the genuine need as well as the bona fide hardship requires to be considered afresh. This can only be done through evidence brought on record by exchange of affidavits and inspection of the two houses. This can only be done through evidence brought on record by exchange of affidavits and inspection of the two houses. I, therefore, direct that the learned Lower Appellate Court will re-sift the evidence in the light of new circumstances that have emerged out on account of lapse of time. The property was purchased in 1976 and the petitioner is running from pillar to post to seek release of the premises for her own benefit and enjoyment. The case is being sent back for reconsideration of the claims of the petitioner on the basis of fresh circumstances. 10. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed and the appellate order impugned in the petition is quashed. The VIth Additional District Judge, Lucknow is directed to restore the appeal and dispose it of in the light of new circumstances that have emerged out due to lapse of several years. He will dispose of the appeal within six weeks of receipt of the certified copy of this order after providing arK opportunity to the contesting parties. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.