JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - First party member In a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the "Code") is the Petitioner against the revisional order of the learned Sessions Judge, Kalahandi. 2. It appears from the records of the case that the first party member had filed a petition before the learned Magistrate to take action against the second party members u/s 144 of the Code. Second party member Fakir also had filed an application to take similar action against the first party. The Magistrate sent both,these applications to the Officer-in charge, Khariar Police Station, for enquiry and report. On receiving the reports from the Officer-in-charge, Khariar Police Station, as well as the report from the Tahasildar, the Magistrate on being satisfied that there is likelihood of breach of peace during the harvesting of the paddy from the disputed land, passed the preliminary order u/s 145 (1) and attached the standing crop u/s l45 (8) of the Code asking both parties to put their written statements, in respect of their respective claims of possession over the disputed and Pursuant to the said notice, parties filed their respective written statement and also led evidence regarding actual possession. It was the case of the first party that the land in question belongs to his father and it was so settled in his father's name in a proceeding under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. On the basis of alleged purported sale by his father in favour of the second party members the second party members created disturbance in the possession of the first party, though the first party member continued to be in possession of the land in question and in the aforesaid premises he had filed the application to restrain the second party members u/s 144 of the Code. The case of the second party members was that three of them had purchased specific parcels of land out of 5.58 acres from the father of the first party member, Fakir claiming 2.05 acres, Jadab claiming 1.59 acres and Chitrakut claiming 0.80 acre and were in possession of the respective purchased lands since the date of purchase. 3. Before the learned Magistrate, for witnesses were examined on behalf of the first party and five witnesses were examined on behalf of the second party members. 3. Before the learned Magistrate, for witnesses were examined on behalf of the first party and five witnesses were examined on behalf of the second party members. On an analysis of the entire evidence, the learned Magistrate discarded the evidence adduced on behalf of the second party members in view of their inconsistent statements one contradicting the other. Relying upon the evidence of the witnesses produced on behalf of the first party and also the admission of witness Jadu Harijan who was a witness on behalf of the second party came to the conclusion that it is the first party member who was in possession of the land in question on the date of the preliminary order and accordingly declared his possession. 4. On a revision being carried, the learned Sessions Judge has interfered with the said finding of possession which is being impugned in the present revision. 5. Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the learned Sessions Judge committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the members of the second party were grossly prejudiced since only one proceeding was initiated though independent claims of possession in respect of different parcels of land had been made by the members of the second party. The learned Counsel further contends that even with regard to the question of actual possession, the learned Sessions Judge also committed an error in not discussing the oral evidence of possession but only declaring possession of the respective parties on the basis of their sale deeds and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained. I find sufficient force in both the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 6. The question whether a Magistrate when exercises power u/s 145 of the Code is bound to split-up the proceeding into as many cases as there are claimants and the legal effect of not doing so, has been considered in several cases of this Court. See Ratan Majhi and Ors. v. Budu Rondhari and 22 others 55 (1959) C.L.T. 3401 :(1955) C.L.T. 174, Nathuri Mallik v. Satrughna Giri and four others2, Sudarsan Das and Ors. v. Jagannath Roul 1971 (2) C. W. R. 377, Brundaban Kuar v. Kanhoi Jagat and 7 others 41 (1975) C.L.T. 88 and B. Dasso Patro and Others Vs. B. Tariniga Patro and Another. v. Budu Rondhari and 22 others 55 (1959) C.L.T. 3401 :(1955) C.L.T. 174, Nathuri Mallik v. Satrughna Giri and four others2, Sudarsan Das and Ors. v. Jagannath Roul 1971 (2) C. W. R. 377, Brundaban Kuar v. Kanhoi Jagat and 7 others 41 (1975) C.L.T. 88 and B. Dasso Patro and Others Vs. B. Tariniga Patro and Another. A bare reading of Section 145 of the Code would indicate that there is no express provision prohibiting consideration and disposal of disputes of more than one person in one proceeding by one order. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would indicate that when the Magistrate finds that different members of the first party claim their respective possession over different parcels or pieces of land and similarly different members of the second party also lay claim to different parcels of the disputed land and the Magistrate finds that there would be gross prejudice if the claims are considered together, then in such a case it is desirable that the proceeding should be split-up which would enable the parties to 'present their respective cases properly and would also enable the Magistrate to consider each claim and dispute in a more convenient manner. Thus, the dictum for splitting-up of proceeding is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law and the question whether it should be split-up or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. That is why, it was held in B. Dasso Patro's case5, that where one party claims the entire land and the members of the other party lay claim over portions thereof, it is open to the Magistrate to draw up one proceeding. In the present case, the first party member claims possession in respect of the entire 5.28 acres of land whereas the second party members claim possession in respect of specified portions thereof on the basis of the alleged sale by the father of the first party. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Magistrate committed any error in drawing up one proceeding and deciding the disputes in one proceeding.. The conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge on this score cannot be sustained and must be set aside. 7. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Magistrate committed any error in drawing up one proceeding and deciding the disputes in one proceeding.. The conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge on this score cannot be sustained and must be set aside. 7. Coming to the question of possession, I also find that the Sessions Judge has not gone into the evidence of possession given by the first party as well as the second party. On the other hand, merely on the basis that second party members purchased specific portions of land from the father of the first party, he has declared possession of those second party members in respect of those specified portions of land. In my opinion, by this process he has committed gross error of law. A Magistrate u/s 145 is required to find out without reference to the claim .of the parties to right to possess the subject of dispute, whether any or which of the parties was on the date of the order made by him under Sub-section (1) of Section 145 in possession of the subject of dispute. A Magistrate u/s 145 is not deciding title. Therefore, when the Sessions Judge exercises his revisional jurisdiction against an order of the Magistrate, the jurisdiction cannot be enlarged in any manner. The possession contemplated u/s 145 is the actual possession of the subject of dispute. As has been held in several cases, actual possession means, actual physical possession; it means the possession ('If the person who has his feet on the land, who is ploughing it, sowing and growing crop in it actually irrespective of whether he has any right or title to possess it or not. Actual possession is not the same as right to possession nor does it mean lawful or legal possession. Usually, therefore, an order passed by a Magistrate is not to be lightly interfered with by the revisional Court unless there is some patent error in the order of the Magistrate. This being the revisional power, and applying my mind to the impugned under of the Sessions Judge passed in revision, I am satisfied that the Sessions Judge illegally interfered with the order of the Magistrate on the present case merely on the basis of the title claimed by the second party members. Consequently, the said order of the learned Sessions Judge cannot be sustained. Consequently, the said order of the learned Sessions Judge cannot be sustained. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 22-K/2/14 of 1281-82 and affirm the order of the learned Magistrate in Criminal Misc. Case No. 140 of 1977. This Criminal Revision is accordingly allowed. Final Result : Allowed