JUDGMENT 1. THE suit for recovery of compensation, giving rise to this appeal, has been filed by the plaintiff against the Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. and others on the allegation that the plaintiff was knocked down and run over by a Tram Car whose wheel pierced through and separated his right leg thereby permanently disabling him for life. 2. THE learned trial Judge found that the plaintiff was involved in some sort of accident, was admitted to the hospital, lost his right leg which has disabled him and has incapacitated him from earning livelihood by puting in hard manual labour, had to spend about Rs. 563. 5/-for his trimmest and that his claim for compensation for Rs. 48,000/-is otherwise reasonable. The learned Judge has observed thus " I believe the evidence given by the plaintiff that the plaintiff was admitted in S. S. K. M. Hospital on 7. 5. 75 and has spent rs. 5635/- for his treatment. I also believe the plaintiff's case that the plaintiff has been disabled because of loss of leg and it is not possible for him to earn his livelihood by hard manual labour. The compensation of Rs. 48,000/- claimed by the plaintiff does not also seem to me to be unreasonable". The defendants have not filed any cross-objection against, any of these findings and Mr. Dhruba Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the defendants, who has argued the case with exemplary fairness, has not seriously assailed them in his submissions before us. These findings of the learned Judge, therefore, would stand confirmed. The learned judge has, however, dismissed that suit as, according to him, it has not been proved that any Tram Car of the defendants caused the injuries to the plaintiff and/or that there was any negligence on behalf of the defendants or their servants. The learned Judge has also been inclined to think that there was also contributory negligence on the side of the plaintiff. We are, however, of opinion that there can be no satisfactory reason to disbelieve the plaintiff's case that he was knocked down and run over by a Tram Car of Route No. 35 - Esplanade Behala Route -belonging to the defendants. We are, however, of opinion that there can be no satisfactory reason to disbelieve the plaintiff's case that he was knocked down and run over by a Tram Car of Route No. 35 - Esplanade Behala Route -belonging to the defendants. Apart from the clear evidence of the plaintiff, figuring as PW-6, to the effect that he was knocked down and run over by a Tram Car, the categorical evidence of Nanda Kishor Pathak, pw-1, a resident of the locality and a witness to the occurrence, is to the following effect : - " I saw a boy being knocked down by a tram car of route no. 35 which was going, towards Behala. . . . I saw the boy standing on the foot path. Thereafter he tried to cross the road. The tram car was standing at a distance of 100 feet from the tram stop. The car had also stopped at the stop. Thereafter it knocked the boy, 1 did not hear the car ringing bell before the accident usually people crossed the road at the spot where the accident occured. After knocking down the boy, the tram did not wait. I along with another man took the injured boy to the p. G. Hospital. . . . . . (xxm. . . . . The boy locked both sides before crossing the road. Shyamal Biswas accompanied me to the hospital". 3. THIS Shyamal Biswas, who has been examined as PX-4, has also deposed that he reached the spot immediately after the accident and took the injured boy, identified to be the plaintiff, to the hospital. And the material portion of the evidence of the plaintiff is to the following effect : - " The tram car was standing at a distance of 20 to 25 cubits from me. A bus was coming from the southern side. I was keeping a watch of the movement of the said Bus. As I was crossing the road, I was knocked down by the tram car from behind. The tram did not ring the bell before the accident. The place where f was crossing was the place', for crossing the road. On being knocked. I became unconscious. The tram driver was negligent, so 1 was involved in the accident". 4. As I was crossing the road, I was knocked down by the tram car from behind. The tram did not ring the bell before the accident. The place where f was crossing was the place', for crossing the road. On being knocked. I became unconscious. The tram driver was negligent, so 1 was involved in the accident". 4. THE evidence of the plaintiff has been corroborated by PW-1 in all material particulars and we have not been able to discover any reason as to why we should not accept and rely on the statement of pw-1, whom we have found to be an independent and disinterested witness. As to appreciation of evidence, the principle is well-settled that a statement "on oath should usually be accepted unless (1) the witness is shown to be interested or, (2) the facts deposed are improbable or (3) the evidence is shaken in cross-examination and if may be authority is needed in support of this principle,, reference may be made to the observations of Gajendragadkar," J., (as his Lordship then was) in the decision of the Supreme Court in Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad tea {air 1963. SC 1728 at 173and-1735. . Since we do not find PW-1 to be an interested witness, nor his evidence to be either improbable or to have been shaken in cross-examination, we. accept his evidence and, therefore, the evidence of the plaintiff: also, as the same has received sufficient corroboration from the evidence of PW-1. The plaintiff trial Judge has refused to rely on the evidence of PW-1, PW-4 and the plaintiff as they could not furnish the Number of the Tram Car. Now, it is in evidence, that the plaintiff on being knocked down immediately became unconscious and regained his consciousness on the next morning and that PW-4 reached the spot immediately after the occurence and it was, therefore, not possible for any of them to note the Number of the Tram Car. PW-1 also stated that after knocking the plaintiff, the Tram Car did not wait at all and he could obviously be expected to be more attentive to the injured than to note the Number of the fleeing Tram Car. PW-1 also stated that after knocking the plaintiff, the Tram Car did not wait at all and he could obviously be expected to be more attentive to the injured than to note the Number of the fleeing Tram Car. We have no doubt that the learned Judge was absolutely unjustified in rejecting the material evidence on such a groundless pretext, particularly when it was the clear evidence of both PW-1 and the plaintiff that it was a Behala bound Tram Car of the Esplanade-Behala Route 35. One Jamma, DW-1, a Driver and one Aurobinda, DW-2, a Conductor have been examined by the defendants to show that their tram Car in the Esplanade Behala Route was not involved in any accident. But when this Driver DW-1 has said that he was going towards esplanade and not towards Behala and that he does "not know if any behala-bound Tram Car of Route no. 35 caused an accident on 7. 5. 75 in the morning", the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 loses all relevance as the definite case of the plaintiff is that the accident was caused by a Behala-bound Tram Car of Route no. 35. One Dhiresh, DW-3, a starter attached to Behala Tram Depot, has also been examined to show that no accident was reported on 7. 5. 75. If we hold on the evidence, as we do, that there was an accident caused by a Tram Car of Route no. 35, the mere face With the no accident was recorded, in Ext. A, the record maintained by the defendants, would not be of much significance. 5. WE, agree with the learned trial Judge, as we must, that even after holding the Tram Car belonging to the defendants was involved in this accident resulting in such serious injuries to the plaintiff, we can not sadle the defendants with the liability to pay compensation unless we further hold them the defendants or their servants were negligent in operating the Tram Car. The plaintiff has stated that the Driver was negligent, that the accident was caused due to his negligence, that the Tram Car did not ring the bell before the accident and that the place where the. accident took place was the place for crossing the road. The plaintiff has stated that the Driver was negligent, that the accident was caused due to his negligence, that the Tram Car did not ring the bell before the accident and that the place where the. accident took place was the place for crossing the road. PW-1 has also stated that usually people crossed the road at the spot where the accident occured and that he also did not hear the Tram car ringing the bell before the accident. Driving a Tram Car at a busy through fare at a place usually used by the people for crossing the road without ringing bell or sounding any warning must be taken to be evidence of negligence. 6. WHILE we do not dispute that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove negligence on the side of the defendants, we can not but note that, as pointed out by the Privy Council in Murugesam Pillai v. Gnana sambandha Pandama (AIR 1917 Privy Council 6. at 8), it is an inversion of sound practice for a party to proceeding, trusting to the abstract doctrine of onus of proof, not to furnish the best material in his possession which would throw light on the points in issue. This view was again endorsed by the Privy Council in Rameshwar Singh v. Bajit Lal pathak (AIR 1929 Privy Council 95 at 99) and has now been approved by the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Baduklal (AIR 195 3 SC 225 to 22 7. And, therefore, if a party does so, the court would be entitled to presume against him. Nay, there is more. In the case at hand, the Tram Car was plying, as most of the Tram Cars do in Calcutta, over a busy through fare and was negotiating over a spot usually used by the people for crossing the road, it was obviously within the special knowledge of the defendants as to what steps, what care, what precautionary measures they took to ensure the road-worthiness of the vehicle and to prevent accidents on the road and under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the onus to prove those facts was on the defendants and on their failure to do so, the court would have to hold against them. As already noted, all that. As already noted, all that. the defendants have done is to examine a Driver (DW-1) and a Conductor (DW-2) of a Tram Car plying in the opposite direction to say that their Car was not involved in any accident and to examine a Starter (DW-3) to prove a document to show that there was no report of any accident. We have already held that a Behala-bound Tram Car the accident and, therefore, if the defendants could have shown that even though their Car was so involved, yet there was no negligence on their part and that they took all reasonable stets to prevent such accident, we would have given our best considerations to such evidence. The defendants having adduced no such evidence live, in our view, failed to discharge the onus resting on them and must in their written statements stood in the way of discharging their on their main stand being that none of their Tram Cars was at all involved in any accident and not that the accident occured involving their "am Car in spite of no negligence on their part and/or because of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Having thus found that the Defendants' Tram Car caused the accident and that there was negligence on their part," we will now have to advert to the question of compensation payable to the plaintiff. We have already noted that on the evidence adduced and materials produced by the plaintiff, the trial court has come to a finding that his claim for compensation for Rs. 48,000/- is not unreasonable. The suit having been dismissed, the defendants Could not obviously appeal against this adverse finding. Under Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendants, however, could have preferred cross-objection against this finding which they have not. They could also, under the said provisions, assailed the adverse finding while supporting the decree of dismissal even without filing any cross-objection. But the learned Counsel for the defendants has not seriously challenged this finding, the main thrust of his argument being that on the materials on record it has not been proved that any Tram Car belonging to the defendants was involved in the accident and/or that there was any negligence on the part of the defendants or their servants. But the learned Counsel for the defendants has not seriously challenged this finding, the main thrust of his argument being that on the materials on record it has not been proved that any Tram Car belonging to the defendants was involved in the accident and/or that there was any negligence on the part of the defendants or their servants. There should be no doubt that if in an appeal by the plaintiff against the dismissal of this suit the defendant does not challenge any finding adverse to him, whether by cross-objection or even without cross-objection, then the defendant in effect invites the court to accept that finding as correct. We should accordingly hold that the claim of the plaintiff for Rs. 48,000/- as compensation for the injuries caused to him resulting in his loss of the right leg is quite reasonable. 7. THE claim also appears to us to be reasonable even otherwise. The plaintiff has sworn that he was 18 years of age when the accident occured and used to earn about Rs. 250/- to Rs. 300/- per month by selling Ghugni on the way side and there is absolutely no evidence in rebuttal as has been fairly conceded by the learned Counsel for the defendants-respondents. As to the extent of loss of earning capacity suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the injuries sustained, the evidence of the plaintiff, PW-6, and that of PW-7, a neighbouring shop-keeper, is that after the accident the plaintiff, is no longer running the shop and has become unemployed. 8. HAD it been a case under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 192 3, we would have straightway referred to Part II of Schedule I, Entries no. 19 and No. 20 and would have held that since the plaintiff has lost his leg from below the knee a result of the injuries, he has suffered 40 to 50 per cent loss of his earning capacity. True, the plaintiff is not a workman under the defendants and the present lis is not a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act and, therefore, the provisions thereof can not apply here ex propriety vigore. True, the plaintiff is not a workman under the defendants and the present lis is not a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act and, therefore, the provisions thereof can not apply here ex propriety vigore. But nothing should prevent us from applying those principles where, as here, the aggrieved party suing as a pauper, has, because of indigence or otherwise, not been able to adduce satisfactory evidence before the Court as to the extent of loss of his earning capacity, when such a statutory standard is available at hand. The history of administration of justice in our country is full of instances where the Courts finding no law to be directly applicable to the case at hand, have freely applied the principles under analogous laws in order to do justice, for which alone they exist. The courts have very often applied the principles of the provisions of the transfer of Property Act, the Easement Act and a lost of them to proceedings before them even in areas beyond the territorial extents of those enactement. If this is branded as judicial activism, we would only say that, as pointed out by Beg, C. J., in the Supreme Court decision in Bangalore Water Supply (AIR 1978 SC page 548 at 552), with the passage of time, "judges can more frankly step into the shoes of the legislature" and that situation may very often arise calling for "some judicial heroics to cope with the difficulties raised". Indeed, our apex court has, of late, repeatedly demonstrated that judicial heroics, including judicial law-making, may be the only way left to secure and promote social and economic justice, if the legislative laws do not provide the needful. But what should be taken to be the expected span of life of the plaintiff so that we can quantify the loss of earning suffered by him as a result of the injuries. Reference to the reported cases arising out of accident-claims collected in any standard treatise would show that though there can obviously be no invariability, the normal and general expectancy of life in India these days has been taken to be 60 to 65 to 70 years. Reference may, for example, be made to the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Nand Kaur v. Sukh Raj (AIR 1981 Delhi 319) and Chameli Wati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation (AIR 1982 Delhi 5 75. Reference may, for example, be made to the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Nand Kaur v. Sukh Raj (AIR 1981 Delhi 319) and Chameli Wati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation (AIR 1982 Delhi 5 75. Reference may, also be made t:o Manjushri v. B. L. Gupta ( AIR 1977 SC 1158 at 1162) where the Supreme Court has held that normal span of human life in India may be taken to be at least 65 years, if not more. Now the evidence is that the plaintiff was aged about 18 years when he met the accident and his life expectancy would, therefore be more than 40 years even if we take the general normal span to be 60 years. And if we take, as we do his average monthly income to be Rs. 250/- and the percentage of his loss of earning to be even 40 according to the Schedule I of the Workmen's. Compensation Act, he should be entitled to Rs. 48,000. 00 and to this his expenses for medical treatement ' to the tune of Rs. 5635. 00 and the price of artificial limb and crutches are to be added. That being so, we would agree with the learned trial Judge that the claim of the plaintiff for compensation for Rs. 48,000. 00 is reasonable. 9. WE would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree under appeal and would decree the suit for Rs. 48,000/- with costs together with interest from the date of the decree till realisation. The defendant-respondents shall also pay to the plaintiff-appellant cost of this appeal. 10. WE would like to place on record our appreciation of the role of Mr. Dhruba Mukherjee, the learned Counsel for the defendant respondents, who has ail throughout conducted the appeal with the zeal to help us to do justice and never with the bellicose attitude of a combatant. Appeal allowed.