JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. 1. This is a tenant's application in revision against the judgNo.1.ment and order passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Jhansi, exercising the powers of the Small Causes Court decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff-opposite party for the eviction of the applicant as well as for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation calculated at the rate of Rs.3,500/- per month. 2. In this case the landlord (plaintiff-opposite party) put in appearance at the stage of admission. Thereafter both the parties agreed through their counsel that the revision may be disposed of finally at the stage of admission itself. Shortly, the plaint case was that the disputed accommodation which is the first floor portion of premises no. 91 Khatriana, Jhansi, was constructed in the year 1976 and it was let out to the defendant-applicant bank on October 1, 1978 for a period of five years at the end of which the plaintiff served a notice on the defendant-applicant to vacate the premises and to pay arrears of rent for the period October 1, 1983 to November 7, 1983 and damages for use and occupation from November 8, 1983 at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month. It was asserted that as the period of ten years prescribed in U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 had not expired since the construction of the building, the provisions of the said Act were not applicable to the building under tenancy. 3. The suit was contested by the applicant. The defence was that there was an understanding between the parties that so long as the defendant desired to remain in occupation he could continue as a tenant of the premises. In any case the building was more than ten years old. Besides there were other tenants also prior to the letting out of the premises to the applicant. 4. The parties led oral and documentary evidence in respect of their respecNo.1.tive pleas on a consideration of which the trial court decreed the suit for ejectment as well as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The damages were granted at the rate of Rs. 3,500/- per month and not Rs. 5,000/- as claimed by the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decree, the defendant applicant has filed this revision. The damages were granted at the rate of Rs. 3,500/- per month and not Rs. 5,000/- as claimed by the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decree, the defendant applicant has filed this revision. During the pendency of the revision an application was filed by the applicant for acceptance of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure in an attempt to prove that according to the agreement between the parties the tenancy was initially for five years but was liable to be extended upto fifteen years at the option of the tenant. I have passed a separate order rejecting the application for additional evidence on the ground that there did not exist any valid ground for reception of additional evidence at this stage. 5. The first contention in support of the revision was that the court below has committed a palpable error in granting the relief for damages at the rate of Rs. 3,500/-. In my opinion, the contention is right, and must be accepted. The sole ground on which the court has fixed the rate of damages at Rs. 3,500/- is that on January 15, 1985 the defendant had filed an application before the court below in which it was mentioned that the General Manager of the defendant bank had given his consent for increasing the rent to Rs. 3,500/- per month and that the papers had been submitted for necessary approval to the appropriate authority. This, in my opinion, was not sufficient to justify the finding of the trial court. The court below has totally misunderstood the import of the above application. The proposal for increasing the rate of rent to Rs. 3,500/- was made on the premise that the applicant would be allowed to remain in occupation as tenant. The offer was made at a time when the defendant was facing an action for its eviction and it was not difficult to imagine that in order to be left undisturbed the bank offered a higher rent. The circumstances in which the offer was made were totally ignored by the trial court. The offer so made could not be regarded as a legitimate basis for determining the rate of damages for use and occupation. According to the agreement of tenancy the rate of rent fixed was Rs. 1,102/- per month. This rate was applicable till October 1, 1983. The offer so made could not be regarded as a legitimate basis for determining the rate of damages for use and occupation. According to the agreement of tenancy the rate of rent fixed was Rs. 1,102/- per month. This rate was applicable till October 1, 1983. There was no reliable material brought on the record to indicate that there was any unusual spurt in the rate of rents from 1983 so as to justify granting a higher damage or mesne profits. The decree of the trial court must, therefore, be modified insofar as the rate of mesne profits is concerned. It should be reduced from Rs. 3,500/- to Rs. 1,102/- per month. 6. This brings me to the main question which was debated at the Bar. For the petitioner it was urged that on the own showing of the plaintiff as admitted by him the building under tenancy was constructed in the year 1976. That being so, ten years have elapsed during the pendency of the revision and consequently the exemption which was available to the plaintiff in respect of the building in question when the suit was instituted on November 10, 1983 is no longer available to her even if it be assumed that the building was constructed in the year 1976. In this connection, learned counsel placed strong reliance on paragraph 3 of the plaint which states that the first floor of the building under tenancy was conNo.1.structed in the year 1976 but the same was let out for the first time on October 1, 1978. Counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party, on the other hand, vehemently contended that the issue as to the date on which the construction of the building under tenancy can be said to have been completed within the meaning of Section 2 (2) has to be decided with reference to Explanation I to section 2 (2). Elaborating the submission learned counsel contended that the date of completion of building has to be determined not on the basis of what party, whether the landlord or the tenant, may not or may assert. Elaborating the submission learned counsel contended that the date of completion of building has to be determined not on the basis of what party, whether the landlord or the tenant, may not or may assert. The date has to be determined only with reference to the specific factors laid down in clause (a) of Explanation I. In support, learned counsel cited two decisions one, in the case of Ram Swaroop Rai v. Smt. Lilavati, AIR 1982 SC 945 = 1980 AWC 333 and the other in the case of Smt. Samundri Devi v. Nand Kishore Marwah, 1986 (2) ARC 428. Having given the matter a careNo.1.ful consideration 1 am clearly of the opinion that the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff must be accepted. In order to appreciate the controversy it would be necessary to extract Sec. 2 (2) round which the submission of the learned counsel have mainly centred. Section 2 (2) insofar as the same is relevant for the present controversy reads as follows : "(2) Except as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or subNo.1.section 24 (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of 10 years from the date on which its construction is completed. Provided that where any building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a cooperative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, and the period of re-payment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years, then the reference in this subNo.1.section to the period of ten years, shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years of the period ending with the date of actual re-payment of each loan or advance (including interest), whichever is shorter. Explanation I For the purpose of this sub-section, (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in the case of a building subject to assessNo.1.ment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time ; Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants." 7. This provision has been the subject of an exhaustive analysis and comNo.1.ment by their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Swaroop Rai (supra). THIS is what their Lordship said in that connection : "An analysis of Explanation I to Section 2 (2) of the U. P. Act indicates : (1) Where a building has not been assessed, it is the date on which the completion was reported to, or otherwise recorded by, the local authority having jurisdiction. (2) Where a building has been assessed, it is the date on which the first assessment comes into effect ; Provided that if the date on which the completion was reported to, otherwise recorded by, the local authority is earlier than the date of the first assessment, the date of completion will be such earlier date. (3) Where there is no report, record or assessment, it is the date of actual occupation for the first time (not being an occupation for the purpose of superNo.1.vising the construction or guarding the building under construction)." 8. Having set out the relevant statutory provisions and noticed the decision of the Supreme Court which is directly in point, I proceed to examine the facts of the present case. The plaintiff has examined her husband Sri Jagdish Prasad Agarwal, an advocate practising at Jhansi. He has very categorically stated that till the date on which he was making the statement i. e., February 5. The plaintiff has examined her husband Sri Jagdish Prasad Agarwal, an advocate practising at Jhansi. He has very categorically stated that till the date on which he was making the statement i. e., February 5. 1985, the building under tenancy, namely, the first floor accommodation of premises no. 91, Khatriana had not been assessed by the Municipal Board. Later, in his statement in cross-examination he unequivocally asserted that after the building under tenancy was constructed the plaintiff had not reported the completion thereof to the Municipal Board. Further there is no material whatever existing on the record which might indicate the date on which the completion of the building was recorded by the Municipal Board. It is apparent that if the information about the completion of the construction was not reported to the Municipal Board there would be no occasion for the same to be recorded by the local authority. The said witness was cross-examined at great length but as observed by the trial court nothing worthwhile has been brought out which might reflect on his veracity The trial court has believed that testimony of this witness and I see no reason to take a different view. The position which emerges out of the above discussion, therefore, is that the case is not covered by the first category mentioned by their Lordship of the Supreme Court in their judgment extracted above. For the same reason the case does not fall even within the second category as it is obvious that where a building has not been assessed there would be no question of the date on which the first assessment comes into effect. If the building under tenancy was not assessed till the date of the filing of the suit or even the recording of the statement of PW 1 before the court below, the building under tenancy would not come within the clutches of the Act even if the assessment was made subsequently i. e., after 1983. This brings us to the third category of cases laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, namely, where there is no report, recorded or assessment, the relevant date for the application of section 2 (2) would be the date of actual occupation for the first time. This brings us to the third category of cases laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, namely, where there is no report, recorded or assessment, the relevant date for the application of section 2 (2) would be the date of actual occupation for the first time. On this point the contention of counsel for the applicant was that in the plaint all that was stated was that the building in quesNo.1.tion was let out for the first time only on October 1, 1978. The plaintiff did not assert in the plaint that the building was not in occupation of anyone prior to its being let out to the applicant-bank on October 1, 1978. Learned counsel vehemently contended that the statute, namely, Explanation I (a) to Section 2 (2) speaks of the date on which the building was actually occupied for the first time and not the date on which the building is let out for the first time. Counsel urged that it is possible that the landlady herself might have occupied the building prior to October 2, 1978. 9. The submission, though attractive on its face, does not bear a closer scrutiny. PW 1 has very categorically stated in his cross-examination that prior to the letting out of the accommodation in question to the applicant bank the same was not in occupation of any other tenant or anyone. On the contrary, there is no evidence whatever led on behalf of the defendant which might even remotely hinted that the accommodation was in occupation of the landlady prior to its being let out. The sole attempt made by the defendant-applicant was to prove that the building was constructed prior to 1976 and that before the Bank came to occupy it in 1978 the plaintiff-landlord had let it out to several other tenants, but the attempt has miserably failed. The court below has, for very good and proper reason, rejected the defendant-applicant's evidence attempted to prove the same as completely unreliable. I agree with the comments of the court below. 10. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that in terms of Explanation 1 (a) to Section 2 (2), the construction of the building under tenancy shall be deemed to have been completed on October 1, 1978, the date on which it was first occupied by the defendant-applicant after the building was constructed. 10. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that in terms of Explanation 1 (a) to Section 2 (2), the construction of the building under tenancy shall be deemed to have been completed on October 1, 1978, the date on which it was first occupied by the defendant-applicant after the building was constructed. An analysis of section 2 (2) read with Explanation I leaves no manner of doubt that the prior of ten years has to be computed from the date on which the construction is completed. Now the completion of the construction has not to be confused with or understood in the ordinary sense of the term. It has to be determined with reference wholly to the specific factors laid down in clause (a) to Explanation I. Learned counsel for the applicant rightly submitted that the concept of completion of a construction varies from individual to individual. The construction of a building may be regarded as complete by the many as soon as the masonry work is complete even though the walls may not have been fully plastered, floor polished and doors and shutters painted and so forth. While in the eye of others depending on the degree of sophistication the construction of the building could be deemed to have been completed only after the building has been fully done-up polished and painted with all the modern fittings, electric connections fixed up. An element of subjectivity is hence likely to enter in the ordinary concept of when the construction of a building may be deemed to be complete. 11. In order, therefore, to remove all possible ambiguities, the legislature has specified the precise circumstances on the happening of which the construction of the building shall be deemed to be complete for the purpose of computing the period of ten years. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court observed in the case of Ram Swaroop Rai (supra) in paragraph 10 thus : "The statute makes it clear that reliance upon the municipal records rather than on the lips of witnesses, is indicated to determine the date of completion and the nature of the construction." 12. Of course, in that case there was evidence on record indicating that the building had been subjected to assessment. Of course, in that case there was evidence on record indicating that the building had been subjected to assessment. However, the document on "the record merely stated 'increased assessment' their Lordships felt that a further enquiry was necessary to find out whether this was a case of fresh assessment or it was a case of revised assessment It was for that purpose that the case was remanded with a direction that the municipal records may be brought on the record for removing this ambiguity and resolving the controversy. In the present case as mentioned above the evidence is only one way, namely, that the building under tenancy had not been assessed until the date on which PW 1 was examined in 1985. The dictum of the Supreme Court in Ram Swaroop Rai's case (supra), however, clearly indicates that it is not what the parties might choose to state as the date on which the building was constructed but the enquiry will have to be made with reference to the guidelines laid down in clause (a) to Explanation I. Consequently the fact that the plaintiff averred in the plaint that the building was constructed in 1976 would not be conclusive of the controversy. 13. Applying the provisions of section 2 (2) read in the light of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Ram Swaroop Rai's case (supra) it is apparent that the date on which the construction of the building under tenancy shall be deemed to have been completed shall be October 1, 1978 when it was first occupied. 14. Learned counsel for the applicant invited my attention to the decision of a learned Single Judge reported in the case of Hirday Narain Singh v. Mulalal Srivastava, 1978 ALR 131 in support of his contention that the plaintiffs admission in the plaint was conclusive. It is not necessary for me to dilate on this submission beyond noticing the decision of another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Nand Kishore Marwaha (supra) in paragraph 9 of which the decision of Hirday Narain Singh has been fully explained and distinguished. I respectfully agree with the comments made by the learned Single Judge in the case of Nand Kishore Marwaha (supra). I respectfully agree with the comments made by the learned Single Judge in the case of Nand Kishore Marwaha (supra). Further, in my opinion, insofar as what ought to be the precise interpretation of section 2 (2) is concerned, the same stands concluded by a very direct and categorical authority of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Swaroop Rai (supra). In the end, I turn to the last submission of the learned counsel for the applicant namely that the court below has gone wrong in holding that the lease was only for a period of five years. In this connection, learned counsel placed reliance on Ex. A-1 which was filed on behalf of defendant before the court below. I find no merit in this contention. Both the parties had categorically pleaded before the court below that no written lease had been executed by the parties. There was only a proposal in writing from the defendant submitted to the defendants but the lease never came to be executed (vide paragraph 2 of the plaint and paragraph 13 of the written statement). Indeed neither Ex. A-1 nor any other document could be read in evidence as proof of lease for 15 years or even 5 years. It is elementary that a lease for a term exceeding one year can be made only by a registered instrument. In the absence of any registered lease the tenancy could be at best regarded as one from month to month. 15. No other point was urged on behalf of the applicant. 16. In the result, the revision succeeds in part. The decree passed by the Court below for ejectment as well as arrears of rent is affirmed. The decree for pendente lite and future mesne profits from the date of the filing of the suit to the date of delivery of possession is, however, modified to this extent that the same shall be calculated at the rate of Rs. 1,102/- per month and not Rs 3,500/-. The applicant will be at liberty to withdraw the amount which he has deposited in this court under Section 39/40 of the U. P. Act no. XIII of 1972. The parties are however, left to bear their own costs of this revision.