JUDGMENT - B.G. DEO, J.:---This revision application preferred by the applicant-plaintiff Bajaranglal has been directed against the order passed on 5th March, 1987 by the Third Joint Civil Judge, (Junior Division) Yeotmal, dismissing the application of the plaintiff, purported to be under Order 18, Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) praying :- (i) that the defendant should be asked to commit himself as to whether he wants to step into the witness-box in support of his case, and (ii) if he does not commit as above, he should be directed to enter in the witness-box first and make himself available for cross-examination. 2. Regular Civil Suit No. 157 of 1977 was filed by the plaintiff Bajaranglal against the defendant Jawaharlal Amolakchand Darda for arrears of rent of Rs. 1485/- in respect of two rooms i.e. subject matter of the suit, of which the defendant is alleged to be the tenant. The defendant denied the ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises as also the privity of contract of tenancy as between him and the plaintiff and disputed the suit claim for arrears of rent. A number of issues were framed in the suit on 29th February, 1980. In the trial, the plaintiff examined himself and three other witness and closed his case. It appears that on 23rd March, 1984, the plaintiff had filed a similar application (Exhibit 123) and the defendant, at that time, was directed to furnish the list of his witnesses. The defendant submitted a list of nine witneses (Exhibit 124) mentioning therein that defendant would examine himself, if found necessary. Thereupon another application (Exhibit 125) under Order 18, Rule 3-A of the Code, requesting the Court to call for the defendant to state whether he was examining himself first or not, was filed on 19th June, 1984. This application was rejected on 3rd August, 1984 by the learned trial Court. The trial Court was of the view that the defendant cannot be compelled at that stage to enter into witness-box first nor can he be asked to commit himself in that respect. The trial Court further observed that in case the defendant desires to examine himself at a later stage, he will have to seek permission of the Court. 3. The trial Court was of the view that the defendant cannot be compelled at that stage to enter into witness-box first nor can he be asked to commit himself in that respect. The trial Court further observed that in case the defendant desires to examine himself at a later stage, he will have to seek permission of the Court. 3. On 29th July, 1985, the plaintiff again gave an application (Exhibit 139) under Order 18, Rule 3-A of the Code, contending inter alia that it was obligatory on the part of the defendant to examine himself first. The plaintiff cited the case reported in 1985 Maharashtra Law Journal page 197 (Hari Shrawan Sutar v. Ramdas Tukaram Patil)1, in support of his contention. This application was also rejected by the learned trial Court after perusing the aforesaid judgment (supra) and holding inter alia that a party cannot be compelled to examine himself as a witness and if at all he wants to examine himself at a later stage, he has to seek permission of the Court. The trial Court also observed that it could not be presumed that the defendant would make such an application for permission at a later stage. Yet another application (Exhibit 53) has also been dismissed by the learned trial Court by the impugned order dated 5th March, 1987. 4. The learned Counsel Shri Parchure for the applicant plaintiff contended that Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code, which was inserted by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 and which was intended to curb the malpractice of keeping back the party before the other witnesses are examined so that the party may get an advantage of removing the lacunae in the evidence, now makes it mandatory for a party to enter into witness-box first and that, therefore the impugned order is contrary to such mandate and therefore, deserves to be quashed. 5. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned Counsel Shri Darda for the non-applicant defendant that Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code, being a procedural law, is not mandatory in its entirety and a party cannot be either compelled to commit himself or be directed to examine himself first by an order of the Court. According to Mr. According to Mr. Darda, all that the rule enjoins is that when a party wants to examine himself at a later stage of proceeding, after examining his witnesses first, he should seek permission of the Court, which permission, may or may not be granted by the Court in the give circumstances of the case. Shri Darda, therefore, contended that the learned trial Court was perfectly justified in rejecting the application and refusing to call upon the defendant to commit himself or to enter into the witness-box first. 6. The case of Hari Shrawan Sutar v. Ramdas Tukaram Patil, decided by Masodkar, J., and reported in 1985 Maharashtra Law Journal page 197, on which stress was laid by the learned Counsel for the applicant, merely states that but for such a leave, the party would not be free to examine himself as a witness at a later stage. The rule has been construed as mandatory to that extent only. In this case, the earlier elaborate discussion on the ambit and scope of Order 18 Rule 3-A of the Code, made by Ginwala, J., in (Nagorao Nilkanthrao Deshmukh and another v. Keshav Govind Patil)2, reported in 1979 Maharashtra Law Journal page 809, has not been referred to, Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code reads thus :- "3-A. Where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf as has been examined, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a last stage." The question of stopping the pernicious practice of a party keeping himself back, before all other witneses are examined, with a view to fill in the gaps later on by examining himself at a later stage, came before the Fourteenth Law Commission which depreciated this practice and recommended that this should be stopped by making suitable amendment in Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order 18 of the Code, by calling upon the party to make up his mind at the commencement of the proceeding as to whether he wishes to give evidence or not. However, no action was taken, by the Government on this recommendation of the report which was made in 1958. 7. It appears that the matter again came up before the Law Commission in 1964. However, no action was taken, by the Government on this recommendation of the report which was made in 1958. 7. It appears that the matter again came up before the Law Commission in 1964. At that time, the Law Commission thought that a rigid provision, as was recommended earlier, was not desirable. No action on the part of the Government, therefore, followed. 8. The matter came up again for consideration of the Law Commission in 1973. According to the Law Commission, the time had come to insert a statutory provision to stop the consistent malpractice indulged into by litigants in this respect. Accordingly, it gave a draft of the rule which has now been inserted as the present Rule 3-A Ginwala, J., as he then was, referred to the aforesaid history leading to the amendment of Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code and came to the conclusion that lest the power of the Court to allow a party to examine himself at any stage of the suit, which has not been taken away by enacting the provision by the Legislature, should be retained by the Court, a party who wishes to examine himself after some of his witnesses are examined, can apply for the permission and obtain it not necessarily at the stage when it commences his evidence, but even at a subsequent stage. 9. It was contended that the language of Rule 3-A of Order 18 and the use of the word 'shall' in the same make the entire rule mandatory and impeative in the sense that unless a party obtains permission to examine himself at a later stage, he should not be allowed to do so and the time for obtaining permission is the stage when his evidence commences and not later. Such a rigid interpretation of the Rule is neither conducive to justice nor is intended by the Legislature. The content of the rule in which it is enacted and the language used in the entire rule itself does not make the rule such a rigid and imperative one. Interest of justice would hardly be served, if a party is not permitted to examine himself at a later stage, despite his case being a genuine and bona fide one on the sole ground that he has failed to obtain permission of the Court, before he commences his evidence by examining his other witnesses. Interest of justice would hardly be served, if a party is not permitted to examine himself at a later stage, despite his case being a genuine and bona fide one on the sole ground that he has failed to obtain permission of the Court, before he commences his evidence by examining his other witnesses. The use of the word 'shall' in this content cannot make the rule amandatory rule. The Supreme Court in (State of Punjab and another v. Shamlal Murari and another)3, (1976)1 Supreme Court Cases 719 has given the following guideline for interpreting a procedural law in paragraph 8 at page 722 :- "8. x x x x x x We must always remember that procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. It has been wisely observed that procedure prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant not a resistant in the administration of justice. Where the non compliance, the procedural, will thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing of justice to parties, the rule is mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominant desideratum. After all, courts are to do justice, not to wreck this and product on technicalities." In this context, it must be observed that the rule is conspicuously silent as regards the stage at which the permission has to be obtained. It cannot be gathered its certainty by reading the rule as a whole that such a permission has to be obtained at the very commencement of the evidence led by a party. The normal rule is that a party should examine himself before leading evidence of other witnesses. This normal rule can be departed only with the permission of the Court. In other words, when a party wishes to examine himself at a later stage of evidence, after examining his other witnesses, the party must obtain permission of the Court and without such permission, be cannot enter into the witness-box. As has been held in the case reported in 1985 Mh.L.J. 197 (supra), Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code can be construed as mandatory only to that extent. As has been held in the case reported in 1985 Mh.L.J. 197 (supra), Rule 3-A of Order 18 of the Code can be construed as mandatory only to that extent. In order words but for such a leave, a party would not be free to examine himself as a witness at a later stage. Whether such permission should be granted or not at a later stage will depend upon the judicial discretion of the Court, in the light of the conduct of the party and the circumstances of the case. 10. Having, therefore, regard to the fact that the rule is a procedural one, that no penal consequences have been provided for its non-compliance, that the word 'shall' read in the entire context does not make the rule an imperative one as a whole, and in view of the fact that no specific stage is prescribed in the rule for securing permission by the party to examine himself at a later stage or at the commencement of his evidence himself, the view held by Ginwala, J., in Nagorao's case (supra) appeals to me. In a Division Bench ruling reported in A.I.R. 1978 Orissa 228 (Maguni Dei v. Gauranga Sahu and others)4, Rule 3-A of Order 18 has been held to be of a directory nature. It has been further held that in proper cases the Court has got power to examine a party at a later stage even though he has not obtained the Court's previous permission as provided in the rule. If a party has acted in good faith and it is just and fair to permit him to examine himself at a later stage, the Court is not absolutely helpless in the matter. In paragraph 7 of the said judgment, it has been observed that the use of the word 'shall' in a statutory provision, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not always conclusively convery an imperative mandate. This has been followed in the case reported in A.I.R. 1979 Orissa 132 (Parmananda Fatesingh and others v. Labanya Bewa and others)5, in which it has been held that a party may be examined even after examination of other witnesses in the interests of justice and for a just decision. This has been followed in the case reported in A.I.R. 1979 Orissa 132 (Parmananda Fatesingh and others v. Labanya Bewa and others)5, in which it has been held that a party may be examined even after examination of other witnesses in the interests of justice and for a just decision. Much to the same conclusion is the Division Bench ruling of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in A.I.R. 1979 Punjab and Haryana page 72 (M/s. Kwality Restaurant, Amritsar v. Satinder Khanna, Amritsar)6. In this case, in paragraph 7, it has been observed:- "7. Broadly construed, therefore, the intention of the legislature appears to be that the normal rule prescribed by the legislature now is that a party appearing as his own witness should do so before any one of his own witnesses. However, the rule is not inflexible and may be deviated from with the permission of the Court. No specific stage is prescribed or fixed by the statute for securing its permission. A party may perhaps as a matter of abundant caution apply at the stage of commencing his evidence and get the necessary permission and equally, if sufficient ground is made out, he may secure such permission at a later stage." It must, therefore, be held that under Order 18, Rule 3-A of the Code, it is not necessary that a party must obtain necessary permission before examining any other witneses and that it is open to him to apply even after examining his witnesses by seeking permission of the Court to give his own evidence and it would be open to the Court to grant or not to grant such permission depending on the reasons given by the party. 11. In view of this position, no party can be compelled to commit himself and to take a decision whether they wants to examine himself first or be asked to enter into the witness-box first, although only for cross-examination, if no such decision is taken. In no case therefore, can a party be debarred at any stage from seeking permission to examine him self as a witness, if he fails to make an application for permission before commencing the evidence of his other witnesses. 12. The impugned rejection of an application for such directions does not, therefore, call for any interference. The revision application is, therefore hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. 12. The impugned rejection of an application for such directions does not, therefore, call for any interference. The revision application is, therefore hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Needless to state that the interim stay of suit shall stand vacated. Application dismissed. -----