Order 1. The Union of India, represented by the Second Income Tax Officer, City Circle II, Madras 34, has preferred these revisions underSs.397 and 401, Crl. P.C., for setting aside the order passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences II), Egmore, Madras, in C.C.Nos. 232, 231 and 233 of 1984, discharging the respondents of offences under Ss. 120B read with Ss. 193 and 196 , I.P.C., on the ground that the above sections will not apply since the Income Tax Officer had not been declared to be a court under S. 195 (3), Crl.P.C. 2. Facts necessary for the disposal of the revisions are briefly as follows: The first respondent is a registered firm, carrying on business in manufacturing, purchasing and selling drums and kegs used in painting industry and other materials and had been assessed to income tax The other respondents are its partners. For the years 1976 - 77, 1977 - 78 and 1978 - 79, the first respondent was assessed to income tax on the basis of the returns filed and the account books produced before the Income Tax Officer. Later on 14th February, 1979 during a search of the premises of the first respondent, several incriminating accounts and documents were seized and a perusal of the same showed that the returns submitted earlier were false and the account books produced in support of the returns were also false. Purchase figures had been inflated and the alleged purchases were found to be bogus The original purchase bills produced at the time of assessment, were found to contain interpolations when compared with the documents seized during the search After the search statements were obtained and the second respondent admitted that the account books originally produced at the time of assessment, were all false and had been prepared for the purpose of income tax assessment to reduce the total income and thereby evade income tax. Complaints were filed before the trial Court for the three assessment years, which were numbered as follows: (1) C.C.No. 231 of 1984 which is the subject matter of Crl. R.C.No. 922 of 1984 was for offences under Ss. 120B , read with Ss. 193 and 196 , I.P.C., andS.276C of the Income Tax Act 1961, (43 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the assessment year 1976-77; (2) C.C.No. 232 of 1981, which is the subject matter of Crl. R.C.No. 922 of 1984 was for offences under Ss. 120B , read with Ss. 193 and 196 , I.P.C., andS.276C of the Income Tax Act 1961, (43 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the assessment year 1976-77; (2) C.C.No. 232 of 1981, which is the subject matter of Crl. R.C.No. 918 of 1984, was for offences under S. 120B read with Ss. 193 , and 196 , I.P.C., and Ss. 276C and 277 of the Act for the assessment year 1977 - 78; and (3) C.C.No.233 of 1984, which is the subject matter of Crl.R.C.No.923 of 1984 was for offences under Ss.120B and 193 , I.P.C., andSs.276C and 277 and 278 of the Act for the assessment year 1978 - 79. 3. In each of the cases, four witnesses on the side of the prosecution were examined. At that stage, the respondents raised an objection that a complaint for offences underSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C., was not maintainable in view of the fact that those offences could only be committed in judicial proceedings and the proceedings before the Income Tax Officer for assessment of income tax had not been declared to be a court under S. 195(3), Crl. P.C., and that, therefore, the charges under Ss. 193 and 196, I.P.C., should be dropped. 4. The trial Court upheld the contention of the respondents and quashed the charges relating toSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C., in all the cases and ordered continuance of the trial only for charges underSs.276C , 277 and 278 of the Act. Aggrieved with the above order, Union of India has preferred the present revisions. 5. Thiru Sam V. Chelliah, Standing Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the order of the Court below, could not be legally sustained for the following reasons: (i)S.136 of the Income Tax Act clearly lays down that any proceedings under the Income Tax Act before an Income Tax authority should be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Ss. 193 and 228 , I.P.C., and that was sufficient to attract the provisions ofSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C., and that a declaration underS.195(3), Crl. P.C. that the Income Tax Officer is a Court is not necessary for attracting Ss. 193 and 228 , I.P.C., and that was sufficient to attract the provisions ofSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C., and that a declaration underS.195(3), Crl. P.C. that the Income Tax Officer is a Court is not necessary for attracting Ss. 193 and 196, I.P.C. (ii) Even the above question is purely academic in view of the Amending Act 32 of 1985 , amendingS.136 of the Income Tax Act declaring the Income Tax authority as a Civil Court for the purpose ofS.195, Crl.P.C, with effect from 1st April, 1974. 6. Per contra, Thiru A.K. Lakshminarayanan, learned counsel for the respondents, contended: (i) Ss. 193 and 196 , I.P.C., would not apply unless there was a declaration under S. 195(3), Crl. P.C., that the Income Tax authority was a court and in the absence of any such declaration at the time when the offences are said to have been committedSs.195 and 196 , I.P.C., would not be attracted, (ii) Amending Act 32 of 1985 could not be given retrospective effect in respect of the specific wordings therein, since it relates to a criminal proceedings and the amendment would be an ex post facto legislation. 7. The question that arises for determination is whether the order of the Court below quashing the charges underSs.193 and 196, I.P.C. For the reasons given therein could be sustained? 8. On behalf of the respondents before the trial Court, it had been urged that as a condition precedent to the applicability of Ss. 193 and 196 , I.P.C, to proceedings before the Income Tax authority, a declaration underS.195(3), Crl.P.C, declaring the Income Tax authority as the Court was necessary. Without such a declaration the assessment proceedings before an Income Tax authority could not be construed as judicial proceedings, there by attractingSs.193 and 196, I.P.C. 9. 193 and 196 , I.P.C, to proceedings before the Income Tax authority, a declaration underS.195(3), Crl.P.C, declaring the Income Tax authority as the Court was necessary. Without such a declaration the assessment proceedings before an Income Tax authority could not be construed as judicial proceedings, there by attractingSs.193 and 196, I.P.C. 9. In support of the above contention, reliance had been placed before the trial Court upon a decision of this Court in Association Industries v. First Income Tax Officer 1981 L.W. (Crl.) 79: (1982) 1341.T.R. 565 wherein the learned Judge held that subsequent to the amendment ofS.195 , Crl.P.C, 1974, any Tribunal created by the statute under the Central Act could be construed as a Court, only if it was declared to be a court by that Act and since the Income Tax authority had not been so declared under the Income Tax Act , the Income Tax authority could not be construed as a Court underS.195(3) , Crl.P.C In that case, a complaint by the Income Tax Officer on facts more or less similar to the facts of the present case, was laid underS.195 , Crl.P.C, andS.136 of the Act, for offences underS.120B read withSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C, andSs.276 and 278 of the Act. The legality of the trial court taking cognizance of the complaint was challenged on the ground that sanction in writing by the Government, as required underS.196 , Crl.P.C, as it then stood, had not been obtainedS.196 , Crl.P.C, as it then stood required sanction inter alia for prosecution for conspiracy to commit offences, which were non-cognizable.S.196 , Crl.P.C, had an explanation that such a sanction was not necessary in respect of cases whereS.195 , Crl.P.C, would apply The offences in the complaint were non-cognizable there by requiring sanction; unless the case could be brought underS.195, Crl.P.C. The legality of cognizance taken therefore, turned on the question whether the Income-tax authority was a Court or not underS.195, Crl.P.C. It was under those circumstances, that this Court held that in the absence of the declaration underS.195(3) , Crl.P.C, the Income Tax authority was not a court and that, therefore, sanction underS.196, Crl. P.C., was necessary Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the above decision for the legal position that the Income Tax authority was not a Court underS.195(3) , Crl.P.C The trial Court accepted the above legal contention and held that offences underSs.193 and 196, I.P.C, would not apply to a case of fabricating false evidence intended to be produced and actually produced before the Income Tax Authority and quashed the charges relating to them. 10. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the decision of this Court in Associated Industries v. First I.T.O. Associated Industries v. First I.T.O. 1981 L.W. (Crl) 79: 1982 I.T.R. 565 has no direct bearing on the present case. The question whetherSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C, would apply to false accounts intended to be a produced and actually produced in assessment proceedings before the Income Tax Officer would not depend upon the question, as to whether or not, the Income Tax Officer has been declared to be a court underS.195(3) , Crl. P.C. This is so becauseS.136 of the Act, even as it stood prior to the amendment by Act 32 of 1985 , was as follows:S.136 of the Act- “Any proceeding under this Act, before an Income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning ofSs.193 and 228 and for the purposes ofS.196 of the I.P.C.” In the case referred to in preceding paragraph, the question as to whether sanction underS.196(2) , Crl.P.C. was necessary or not depended directly on the question as to whether the Income-tax Officer was declared to be a court, thereby coming within the purview ofS.195, Crl.P.C. Hence, even the finding of the learned Judge in the above case that under the law, as it then stood, the Income-tax Officer is not a court for the purpose ofS.195 , Crl.P.C, since the Income-tax Act has not declared him to be a court, will not have any direct bearing by virtue of the express provision ofS.136 of the Act, or to present question as to whetherSs.193 and 196, I.P.C., would be attracted, to fabricating and producing false evidence before the Income-tax authority. 11. 11. It is equally true, that the above question is more or less academic, since the above judgment was pronounced prior to the Amending Act 32 of 1985 amendingS.136 of the Act.S.28 of the Amending Act 32 of 1985 amendingS.136 of the Act is as follows- “InS.136 of the Income-tax Act, the words and figure ‘and every Income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes ofS.195, but not for the purpose of Chapter 26 of Crl.P.C, 1973’ shall be inserted and shall be deemed to have been inserted at the end, with effect from the 1st day of April, 1974.” Hence, offences underSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C when committed before any Income-tax authority, would come within the purview ofS.195, Crl. P.C 12. As against the above amendment, learned counsel for the respondent contended, that the amendment giving retrospective effect to the above provision from 1.4.1974 onwards is illegal, since this is a penal provision, and giving retrospective effect to it, would make it an ex-post facto legislation. Learned counsel for the petitioner countered this contention in that the petitioner countered this contention in that the amendment declaring the Income-tax authority as a court for the purpose ofS.195, Crl.P.C, relates only to procedural matter and since the amendment neither creates an offence nor enhances any punishment the amendment is not an expost facto legislation. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention. In State of Mysore v. Fakkntddin 1977 L.W. (Crl.) 19 (S.N.): 1977 Crl. L.J. 1005, a charge-sheet filed by the Police on 1.10.1970 for an offence under the Mysore Excise Act 1965 , was returned by the Magistrate who refused to take cognizance of the offence on the ground that by Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970 which came into force on 7.8.1970S.60, Cl.(b) of the Mysore Excise Act 1965 had been amended taking away the power of the police to file a charge-sheet and that therefore, the court could take cognizance of the offence, only on a complaint by an Excise Official. The order of the Magistrate, was unsuccessfully challenged by the State, before the Sessions Court and then before the High Court By the time the matter came up for disposal before the Supreme Court there had been a further amendment toS.60(b) of the Mysore Excise Act, 1965 by Amendment Act 1 of 1971 by which Ordinance No.4 of 1970 was repealed with effect from 7.8.1970. Mysore Excise Act 1 of 1971 inter alia provided that the amendment toS.69 , made by Mysore Ordinance No.4 of 1970 shall be deemed never to have been made and the provisions ofS.60 as they stood prior to the said amendment shall be deemed to continue to be in force. The Supreme Court holding that by virtue of Mysore Act 1 of 1971, the Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence on the basis of a police report observed with reference to the retrospective effect of the second amendment: “It is now settled law that when a legal fiction is enacted by the Legislature, the Court should not allow its imagination to boggle but must carry the legal fiction to its logical extent and give full effect to it We must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the words ‘or police’ were always there in Cl.(b) ofS.60, even at the time when learned Judicial Magistrate made his order, dated 3.10.1970 refusing to take cognizance of the offence and returning the charge-sheet to the police.” 14. Again in O.P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi Admn.) O.P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi Admn.) l919 L.W. (Crl.)43 (S.N.): 1979 Crl.L.J. 589. The Supreme Court was dealing with amendments made to the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947 . On 26.12.1963, a charge-sheet was filed for offences under Ss.120B and 161 , I.P.C. read withS.5(2) and 5(1)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On 18.12.1964 by amendment to the above Act,S.5(3) has been deleted. The trial Court found that conspiracy and specific instances of receipt of illegal gratifications had not been proved However, the Court held that though there was evidence that the assets of the accused were disproportionate to the income, in view of the fact that the presumption raised underS.5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was no longer available since the same had been repealed, there was no evidence to convict the accused, who was, therefore, acquitted The State preferred an appeal to the High Court. While the appeal was pending, by Act 16 of 1967 , which came into force on 20th July, 1967. S.5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was re-introduced in the Act and was made retrospective in operation Before the High Court, the above amendment was challenged, as being void and in violation of Arts. 14 and 20(1) of the Constitution The High Court upheld the validity of the Act 16 of 1967 and remanded the case for fresh trial. The accused went to the Supreme Court. Repelling the argument, that making the amendment retrospective was ex post facto legislation in violation of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court observed: “All that Art, 20(1) prohibits is ex post facto laws and is designed to prevent a person being punished for an act or omission, which was considered innocent when done. It only prohibits the conviction of a person or his being subjected to penalty under ex post facto laws”. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the following passage from an earlier decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 394. “…. what is prohibited under Art.20(1) is only conviction or sentence under an expost facto law and not the trial thereof. Such trial, under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence, or by a court different from that which had competence at the time, cannot, ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the commission of an offence, has no fundamental right to trial by a particular court or by a particular procedure, except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved.” It follows, therefore, that procedural amendments could be made retrospective, without being in violation of the rights guaranteed under Art.20(1) of the Constitution. 15. In the instant case, what has been given retrospective effect, is the application ofS.195(1)(b) , Crl.P.C.S.195 , Crl.P.C, lays down a condition precedent to the Court taking cognizance of certain offences directed primarily against certain authorities, viz., a complaint by the court or authority concerned.S.195, Crl. P.C., is an Exception toS.190, Crl. P.C.S.195(1)(b) has been enacted in the interest of parties, witnesses and others appearing in court to protect them from frivolous and vexatious proceedings instituted by private parties. P.C., is an Exception toS.190, Crl. P.C.S.195(1)(b) has been enacted in the interest of parties, witnesses and others appearing in court to protect them from frivolous and vexatious proceedings instituted by private parties. The Court therefore is required to lay a complaint The Amending Act 32 of 1985 merely extends the protection underS.195(1)(b), Crl.P.C, to income tax assessees, who file returns, account books, ledgers and other documents, in support of their returns and extends the protection to others, who could be connected either in the preparation of those documents or in the preparation of returns. By declaring the Income Tax Officer as a court for the purpose ofS.195(3), Crl. P.C, and thereby requiring the Officer himself to lay a complaint for offences mentioned inS.195(1)(b), Crl. P.C, it prevents any private individual from setting the law in motion actuated by ulterior motives. The Supreme Court in O.P. Nayyar v. State, Delhi Admn. O.P. Nayyar v. State, Delhi Admn. 1979 L.W. (Crl.) 43 (S.N.): 1979 Crl.L.J. 589, held that the presumption raised underS.5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the accused and which enabled the Court to base a conviction solely on the presumption was held to be not in violation of Art.20(1) of the Constitution. It could never be contended, therefore, that the retrospective amendment of a benevolent provision, extending protection to certain persons connected with the income tax assessment would be in violation of either Art.20(1) of the Constitution or the principles of natural justice. Amending Act 32 of 1985 therefore has to be given retrospective effect, as the amendment itself makes it clear. 16. It, therefore, follows that by virtue ofS.136 of the Act, even as it originally stood, prior to the Amending Act 32 of 1985 , assessment proceedings before the Income Tax authority are judicial proceedings In the instant case, the respondents are said to have fabricated account books and had for the purpose of producing them before the Income Tax Officer produced the same before the Income Tax OfficerSs.193 and 196 , I.P.C. therefore, are attracted In view of the fact that the Income Tax Officer has now been declared to be a court underS.195(3) , Crl.P.C. with effect from 1st April, 1974, the first part ofS.193, Crl.P.C, would apply. The trial court had found that the complaint had been laid by a competent officer, as required underS.195, Crl.P.C. I fail to see any legal bar to the complaint launched for offences underSs.193 and 196, I.P.C. The order of the trial Court, quashing the charge underSs.193 and 196, I.P.C., cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. The complaint filed against the respondents by the Officer concerned, for offences underSs.193 and 196, I.P.C., as well as the other sections under the Act, is in order. 17. In the result, the revisions are allowed the orders of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, (Economic Offences-II) Egmore, Madras, in C.C.231,232 and 233 of 1984 are set aside and the cases will go back to the trial court for fresh disposal according to law. B.S. ----- Petition allowed.