B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant, who as the relevant time, had been functioning as the Officer-in-charge of the Gangpur Police Station assails the judgment and order of conviction passed against him by the learned Special Judge, Bhubaneswar, holding him to be guilty of the charges under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short, the Act) for having accepted an amount of Rs. 200/- from Bipra Charan Panda of Balipadar on February 16, 1978, at his residence at Gangpur as gratification other than legal remuneration with a motive to let him off in Gangpur Police Station Case No. 6 of 1978 registered under sections 302 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and for having obtained for himself pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs. 500/- by abusing his position as a public servant. The appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of four months on each court with a direction that the sentences of imprisonment would run concurrently. ( 2 ) APPEARING on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Ray has contended, on the principles laid down by this Court in B. K. Mutty v. State1 that sanction has not validly been accorded under section 6 of the Act and on facts, no case had been made out. The learned Additional Government Advocate has submitted that this case is directly covered by the aforesaid reported decision of this Court and it would not be reasonable to contend that valid sanction had been accorded and on this ground, the trial had been vitiated. ( 3 ) THE facts of the prosecution case and the plea of denial set up by the appellant have been narrated in details in the body of the impugned judgment and need not be re-stated. No findings need be recorded on facts as, for the reasons to follow, I am of the view that sanction had not legally and duly been accorded for which the prosecution of the appellant had been vitiated. ( 4 ) EXT. 9 is the sanction order. No findings need be recorded on facts as, for the reasons to follow, I am of the view that sanction had not legally and duly been accorded for which the prosecution of the appellant had been vitiated. ( 4 ) EXT. 9 is the sanction order. After stating the allegations against the petitioner, this order reads: And whereas the said acts of Sri Subhas Chandra Satapathy constitute offences under section 161 IPC/5 (2) P. C. Act read with section 5 (1) (d) of the P. C. Act (Act II of 1947 ). And whereas I Sri T: Ananthachari, D. I. G, of Police, Southern Range, Berhampur being the authority competent to remove Shri Subhas Chandra Satapathy from office, after fully and carefully examining the materials and the consolidated report of investigation placed before me in regard to the said allegations and circumstances of the case, consider that Sri Subhas Chandra Satapathy should be prosecuted for the said offences. Now therefore I do hereby accord sanction under section 6 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947) to prosecute Shri Subhas Chandra Satapathy for the said offence or any other offences punishable under other provisions of law In respect of the acts aforesaid and for taking cognizance of the said offences by a Court of competent jurisdiction. ( 5 ) IT does not make any specific reference to any particular materials which had been placed before the sanctioning authority. The consolidated report of the Investigating Officer said to have been placed before the sanctioning authority had not been produced and proved at the trial. There is no material to indicate that the case diary or any other documents had been sent to or placed by anyone before the sanctioning authority. The sanctioning authority had not been examined to say as to what materials had been examined by him. The only oral evidence with regard to the sanction had been led by the prosecution through the Investigating Officer (P. W 10) who had testified thus; I got the sanction order from the D. I. G. Southern Range, Berhampur through the S. P. Vigilance Berhampur and submitted charge sheet. The only oral evidence with regard to the sanction had been led by the prosecution through the Investigating Officer (P. W 10) who had testified thus; I got the sanction order from the D. I. G. Southern Range, Berhampur through the S. P. Vigilance Berhampur and submitted charge sheet. It is important to keep in mind that even this police officer had not stated a word that he had sent the case diary or other material documents or the statements of the witnesses recorded in the course of investigation to the sanctioning authority through the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance. He his merely stated that be obtained the sanction order from the sanctioning authority, The Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, had not been examined at the trial. In an almost identical case, for the same lacuna in the evidence as in the Instant case, this Court has held in 58 (1984) C. L. T. 52 (supra) that the prosecution had failed to establish that valid sanction had been accorded under section 6 of the Act. ( 6 ) IN Major Som Nath v. Union of India and another2, the Supreme Court has held: TI For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the accused is proposed to be charged. Though it is desirable that facts should be referred to in the sanction itself, none-the-less if they do not appear on the face of it, the prosecution must establish allude by evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authorities 11 As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Echal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh3, the grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise, but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servant against frivolous prosecution and must, therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned. ( 7 ) IN the instant case, the prosecution had not led evidence as to what were the contents of the consolidated report said to have been placed before the sanctioning authority as mentioned in Ext. 9. In the case reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 677 (supra), no evidence had been led to prove what were the contents of the note mentioned in Ext. 9. In the case reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 677 (supra), no evidence had been led to prove what were the contents of the note mentioned in Ext. P-16 which had been placed before the sanctioning authority. The Supreme Court observed and held: In the instant case no evidence has been led either primary or secondary to prove as to what were the contents of the note mentioned in Exhibit P-16 which was placed before the Sanctioning Authority. The evidence of P. W. 2 or P. W. 7 is wholly irrelevant because they were not in a position to say as to what were the contents of the note which formed the subject matter of the sanction by the Standing Committee of the Corporation. The note referred to above was the only primary evidence for this purpose. Mr. Rao vehemently argued that although the Resolution, Ext. P-16 does not mention the facts, the Court should presume the facts on the basis of the evidence given by P. W. 2 and the order implementing sanction which mentions these facts. This argument is wholly untenable because what the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same and any subsequent fact which may Come into existence after the resolution granting sanction has been passed, is wholly irrelevant: ( 8 ) KEEPING in mind the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court which had been followed by this Court In Md. Sabir Hussain v. State of Orissa4 and 58. (1984) Cuttack Law Times 53 (supra) and the highly unsatisfactory evidence led by the prosecution with regard to the grant of valid sanction. I would uphold the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that there had been no application of mind by the sanctioning authority before according sanction and that, therefore, the sanction order was illegal and invalid in law and consequently, the prosecution of the appellant for commission of the aforesaid offences was had in law as no cognizance could be taken by the learned Special Judge in respect of the offences for want of legal and valid sanction. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant in this regard must prevail and the concession made by the learned Additional Government Advocates is well-founded. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant in this regard must prevail and the concession made by the learned Additional Government Advocates is well-founded. ( 9 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the Order of conviction recorded against the appellant in respect of both the offences cannot be sustained. ( 10 ) THE appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of conviction passed against the appellant under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the sentences passed against him thereunder are set aside. Appeal Allowed .