K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) ON the report of an Amin, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Talcher initiated a proceeding under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code for short) on 4- 6-1983 against the petitioners and directed them to show cause why they should not execute bonds for Rs. 1,000/- with one surety for the like amount to keep peace for a period of one year. On 4-7-1983 the petitioners appeared before the Magistrate through an Advocate and applied for adjournment to show cause on the ground of illness. Adjournment was refused and on the same day without commencement of an enquiry as contemplated in section 116 (3) of the Code, the Magistrate passed the following order: Post to 13-7-83, directing the delinquents to personally be present and to execute an interim bond for Rs. 1,000/- each with one surety each. The petitioners are aggrieved with this order and have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court not only to set aside the said order, but also to quash the proceeding. ( 2 ) MR. Mohapatra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised the following contentions: (1) At the time of passing of the order on 4-6-1983 for initiating a proceeding under section 107, the Magistrate did not make an enquiry, did not apply his judicial mind and passed the order mechanically; (2) Before commencement of the enquiry, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to direct the petitioners to execute interim bonds; and (3) After lapse of four years there cannot be any apprehension of breach of peace. All the contentions are well founded and supported any decisions of this court. ( 3 ) AN Amin submitted a report to the Sub-divisional Officer who also functions as the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Talcher that he was making measurements of lands of mouja Danara, when petitioners along with about two hundred residents of the village surrounded and prevented him from making measurement of lands in the locality. They also threatened to destroy the records kept by the Amin and assault him. The record of the Magistrates court discloses that soon after the Amints report was received and without making the slightest enquiry either from the Amin himself or from other sources, the Magistrate initiated the proceeding under section 107. They also threatened to destroy the records kept by the Amin and assault him. The record of the Magistrates court discloses that soon after the Amints report was received and without making the slightest enquiry either from the Amin himself or from other sources, the Magistrate initiated the proceeding under section 107. Such a procedure has no sanction of law and has been disapproved by several decisions of this Court such as, Bairagi Charan Jena and others v. State of Orissa1 Harekrushna Singh and others v. Kailash Chand Beura and others2 and Rama Chandra Jena and others v. Muralidhar Ojha and others3. These decisions have reiterated the principle that in a case under section 107, the Executive Magistrate must have apply his judicial- mind and should not pass a mechanical order merely because he has received a report from the police. In the case of Harekrushna Singh (supra) this Court has gone to the extent of observing that the Magistrate should be satisfied on enquiry from other sources or on some other information in order to form an opinion that there are sufficient grounds to initiate a proceeding under section 107 so as to bind down a party and curtail his freedom. In the case of Bairagi Charan Jena (supra) it was observed that the intendment of legislature is that before any action is taken against a person to bind him down under the provisions of S. 107, the Executive magistrate must apply his judicial mind and should not pass a mechanical order on the basis of a report. It has already been observed that in this case the magistrate initiated the proceeding solely on the basis of a report of an Amin and made no enquiry whatsoever from other sources. Therefore, there is nothing on the record of the proceeding to suggest that he had applied his mind to the facts of the case And having formed an opinion that there were grounds to proceed against the petitioners, he found that initiation of a proceeding under section 107 was imperative. This being the position, I have least hesitation to hold that the order passed by the magistrate on 4-6- 1983 was mechanical in character and cannot be supported. ( 4 ) THE operative part of the order dated 4-7-1983 directing the petitioners to execute interim bonds had been quoted. This being the position, I have least hesitation to hold that the order passed by the magistrate on 4-6- 1983 was mechanical in character and cannot be supported. ( 4 ) THE operative part of the order dated 4-7-1983 directing the petitioners to execute interim bonds had been quoted. An interim bond is envisaged in section 116 (3) and can only be passed after commencement of the enquiry. Section 116 (3) has been interpreted by a Full bench of this Court in a decision Sona Khan and others v. State4 and it was held in clear terms that an order under sub-section? (3) of section 116 for an interim bond can be made only after the commencement of the enquiry and before its completion. This decision has consistently been followed by this Court in cases such as, Raghunath Subudhi v. Jagannath Panda and four others5 and M. Bhimarao Dora v. Bhajaram Swain and others6. The record of the proceeding shows that on 4-7-1983 no enquiry was held. There-fore the interim order directing the petitioners to execute bonds was in excess of the jurisdiction vested in the magistrate in law and hence must be held to be illegal. ( 5 ) AS already referred to above, a period of four year as has already elapsed. After long lapse of time apprehension of breach of peace may no more exist. It would cause hardship to the petitioners to face the pain of a proceeding initiated and intended to curtail their freedom after lapse of a long period. I am, therefore, of the opinion that in the interest of justice, the proceeding should not be allowed to continue. It is, however, made clear that if the magistrate would be satisfied according to law that there is still apprehension of breach of peace on the subject of the proceeding under Section 107 of the Code is quashed. The criminal revision is accordingly allowed. Revision allowed. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION OF P. O. ACT By VS. Kambli Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the, P. O. Act empowers all the courts empowered to try and sentence the offenders to pass orders under section 3 or 4 of the P. O. Act, including the High Courts of any other court even when the case comes before it in appeal or in revision. Kambli Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the, P. O. Act empowers all the courts empowered to try and sentence the offenders to pass orders under section 3 or 4 of the P. O. Act, including the High Courts of any other court even when the case comes before it in appeal or in revision. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 empowers the persons aggrieved by the order made by the court under section 3 or 4 to prefer appeal. The absence of words by the accused in Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act, has given rise to scope for debate and conflicting decisions by the several courts. This sub-section has also over-riding effect on the Criminal Procedure Code like sub-section (1) of the same section. Sub-section (3) of Section 11, confers right on the offenders aged less than 21 years of age, when convicted and sentenced to imprisonment with or without fine from which no appeal lie notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal P. C. Sub-section (4), confers revisional powers on the High Court, as well as on the appellate court to set aside the order passed under section 3 or 4 of the P. O. Act, by the lower Courts. Now, reading all the Sub-section together, it creates some doubt regarding the right of the prosecution as to whether a revision is to be preferred or an appeal is to be preferred by the prosecution, if it is aggrieved by the order passed under section 3 or 4 of the act. Accordingly limitation period will also be different for preferring the appeals and revision. Orissa High Court has held in a case reported in the AIR 1971 page 193 that right of the preferring appeal is conferred on both the prosecution and accused by Sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act. Karnataka High Court has held in a case reported in K. L. J. 1984 (1) page 466 that revision can by preferred by the prosecution against the order passed under section 3 or 4 of the Act. The conflicting opinions are matters of much debate and require a decision of the Highest Court of the land. Section 377 of the Criminal P. C. confers right on the state to prefer an appeal to the High Court when accused is convicted and sentenced and when it is felt that sentence is in adequate. The conflicting opinions are matters of much debate and require a decision of the Highest Court of the land. Section 377 of the Criminal P. C. confers right on the state to prefer an appeal to the High Court when accused is convicted and sentenced and when it is felt that sentence is in adequate. Subsection 11 of the P. O. Act states that appeal shall lie to the court to which ordinarily appeals lie from the sentences. Hence sub-section (2) of Section 11 is not in any way affecting the right conferred on the state by Section 377 of Criminal P. C. as ordinarily appeals against inadequate sentence lie to the High Court as pet Section 377 Cr. P. C. Hence it can be said that right of appeal conferred on the prosecution by Section 377 Cr. P. C. is not affected or already Section 11 (2) of the P. O. Act. The purpose of the legislature by enacting Section 11 (2) of the P. O. Act may be only to confer right of appeal on the accused, when he is convicted and released under section 3 or 4 of the P. O. Act but when he is disqualified by virtue of Section 376 of the criminal P. C. Section 376 of Cr. P. C. takes away the right of the appeal by the accused when he is sentenced for a term not exceeding six month or of the fine not exceeding one thousand rupees by the High Court, for a term not three months or of fine not exceeding two hundred rupees by the session court or by a Metropolitan Magistrates Court, fine not exceeding one hundred rupees by the Magistrate of the First Class and tried when summarily fine not exceeding two hundred rupees by the Magistrate. Hence when accused is disqualified by the reasons of the release under section 3 or 4 of P. O. Act, though convicted by the court, the legislature has conferred right of a appeal in such cases also only to the accused by enacting sub-section (2) of section 11 of the P. O. Act. Hence when accused is disqualified by the reasons of the release under section 3 or 4 of P. O. Act, though convicted by the court, the legislature has conferred right of a appeal in such cases also only to the accused by enacting sub-section (2) of section 11 of the P. O. Act. Taking from another view, and supposing for a moment that right of appeal is conferred on the prosecution also, if it was intended by the legislature, then there was no necessity for enacting Sub- section (4) of Section 11 of the P. O. Act conferring right to prefer revision to the appellate or High Court when order is passed under section 3 or 4 of the Act. Usually law does not permit two or remedies on one and the same order. Introduction of Section 11 (2) has conferred remedy of appeal to the accused and remedy open to the prosecution is to prefer revision under section 11 (4) of the P. O. Act. The over-riding effect of Section 11 (4) takes away the right of appeal conferred by Section 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the prosecution as two remedies i. e. appeal and also revision are not permitted by section 404 (4) Cr. P. C. Though legislature has not expressly used the words by the accused in Section 11 (2) of the P. O. Act, it can be Inferred by reading Section 376 Cr. P. C, and Section 11 (2), 11 (4) of the P. O. Act together. Hence prosecution has no right to prefer appeal, as Section 11 (4) is a overriding provision as P. O. Act is a Special Act take away the right of She stale to prefer appeal conferred by Section 377 Cr. P. C. as revisional powers are conferred by Special Act, which overrides the general provisions of law i. e. Cr. P. C. and also when power to pass sentence is provided in Section 11 (4) as provided In section 386 after hearing the accused. More over section 11 (4) clearly empowers the appellate or High Court in its revisional powers to set aside the order and in lieu to pass sentence, but does not confer power of converting an order of conviction into an order of acquittal. More over section 11 (4) clearly empowers the appellate or High Court in its revisional powers to set aside the order and in lieu to pass sentence, but does not confer power of converting an order of conviction into an order of acquittal. This dearly goes to show that accused cannot seek remedy under section 11 (4) of the P. O. Act and it is open only to the prosecution. For preferring revision under section 11 (4) of the P. O. Act limitation will be 90 days as per the provisions of the Limitation Act. Hence though the words by accused in Sub-section (2) of section 11 (4) of P. O. Act are not introduced, the intention of the legislature may be only to confer right on the accused who is disqualified by virtue of Section 376 Cr. P. C. to prefer appeal but not on the prosecution as section 11 (4) of the P. O. Act, confers right of revision to the prosecution. Hence when accused has got right of appeal, prosecution has got right of revision when released under section 3 or 4 of P. O. Act. .