JUDGMENT J. N. Dubey, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order dated 23-3-1984 of the Board of Revenue, U. P. allowing the second appeal of the respondents Nos. 2 to 4. 2. The writ petition was presented before Hon'ble V. N. Khare, J. on 19-12-1986. Since it was reported to be 909 days beyond 90 days by the Stamp Reporter and the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 had put in appearance they were permitted to file their counter-affidavit before admission. They have filed a short counter- affidavit on the point of laches in filing the writ petition to which a rejoinder affidavit has also been filed. In the meantime respondent No. 5 M/s. Shriram Honda Power Equipment Limited who has purchased the land in dispute from respondents Nos. 2 to 4 have filed an application for dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. 3. 1 have heard Mr. S. P. Srivastava, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. S. N. Mishra Senior Advocate for respondents Nos. 2 to 4 and Mr. Shanti Bhushan Senior Advocate for respondent No. 5 and have perused the record. 4. It is now well settled that although no specific period of limitation has been provided for filing a writ petition yet this Court may refuse to exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution where the petitioner is guilty of lathes or undue delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation. In State of M. P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, AIR 1987 SC 251 the Supreme Court said : "Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionay and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent rement and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premremised uponumber of factors. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premremised uponumber of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramanna Dayaram Shelly v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCR 1014 in Ashok Kumar v. Collector, Raipur, (1980) 1 SCR 491 . We may point out that in R. D. Shelly's case (supra) even though the Slate action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to about Rs. 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait-jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it." 5. It appears that on 24-8-1968 one Nishan Singh filed a suit in the Court of Assistant Collector First Class for declaration of his rights in the land in dispute which was dismissed on 29-11-1973. He filed appeal to the Commissioner, Kumaon Division which was also dismissed on 31-3-1975. Thereafter his heirs respondents Nos. 2 to 4 filed a second appeal to the Board of Revenue, U. P. which was allowed on 23-3-1984.On 12-10-1985 they moved an application before the Tahsildar, Kichha for mutation of their names on the basis of the aforesaid order of the Board of Revenue which was rejected on 29-4-1986. Feeling aggrieved they moved an application before the Commissioner, Kumaon Division which was allowed on 22-7-1986 and the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were directed to he mutated in the revenue records. The petitioner filed a review application which was rejected by the Commissioner, Kumaon Division on 12-8-1986. On 13-8-1986 respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were mutated in the revenue record. On 9-9-1986 respondents Nos. 2 to 4 executed a sale deed in favour of respondent No. 5 in pursuance of agreement to sell dated 26-7-1986. On 18-9-1986 the respondent No. 5 moved an application for mutation before the Tahsildar, Kichha on the basis of the said sale deed but before it could be finally disposed of the petitioner filed the present writ petition. 6. 2 to 4 executed a sale deed in favour of respondent No. 5 in pursuance of agreement to sell dated 26-7-1986. On 18-9-1986 the respondent No. 5 moved an application for mutation before the Tahsildar, Kichha on the basis of the said sale deed but before it could be finally disposed of the petitioner filed the present writ petition. 6. The delay in filing the writ petition has been explained in paragraph 10 of the writ petition which runs as under : "That it seems that the Court's files remained consigned to the Record Room of the Board of Revenue for some time till 7-5-1986. Then, it was received in the office of the District Magistrate, Nainital on 13-5-1986. Thereafter it remained there. On 15-7-1986, a letter came from S.D.M., Rudrapur to District Magistrate, Nainital informing that the Board of Revenue has decided the case against the State in the matter of Nishan Singh and whether any writ petition has been filed or not. The District Magistrate in his turn after necessary instructions from the D. G. C. (Revenue) on 1-8-1986 sent a letter to the Government Revenue Department seeking necessary instruction for filing the writ petition. The District Magistrate further received a telex message on 17-11-1986 in connection with the filing of the writ petition. The deponent came to Allahabad to meet the Chief Standing Counsel, High Court, Allahabad. But as the strike of the U.P. State Employees was going on the High Court was not functioning, the Chief Standing Counsel said that he had not received any instruction during the strike. The District Magistrate sent a letter to the Govt. informing these facts. The Govt. again issued a telex message which was received by the District Magistrate on 4-12-1986. The Addl. District Magistrate came to Allahabad along with his subordinate (deponent). On 10-12-1986 he met the Chief Standing Counsel in connection with the filing of the writ petition. The Chief Standing Counsel, allotted the file to Addl. Chief Standing Counsel, who after going through the files advised the deponent to inspect the records of Board of Revenue to ascertain the heirs of Nishan Singh whether they have been brought on the record or not. The certified copy of the judgment which was sent by the State Government mentions the name of Nishan Singh and not his heirs. Chief Standing Counsel, who after going through the files advised the deponent to inspect the records of Board of Revenue to ascertain the heirs of Nishan Singh whether they have been brought on the record or not. The certified copy of the judgment which was sent by the State Government mentions the name of Nishan Singh and not his heirs. The certified copy of the memo of appeal and certified copy of the judgment and decree were obtained from the Board of Revenue on 12-12-1986. Thereafter the writ petition was drafted on 12th and 13th December, 1986. After the typing of the writ petition it is being filed without any further delay." 7-8. The explanation of the petitioner for not filing the writ petition till 15-7-1986 is that the trial court's record remained consigned in the office of the Board of Revenue till 7th May, 1986 and thereafter in the office of the District Magistrate, Nainital. The fact that the record of judicial proceedings remained consigned to one record room or the other is of absolutely no relevance with the filing of the writ petition. The impugned order of the Board of Revenue was not ex parte but was passed after hearing both the parties in their presence and, therefore, the petitioner should have filed the writ petition within reasonable time irrespective of the fact whether trial court's record remained consigned in the office of the Board of Revenue or in the office of the District Magistrate. The petitioner has neither claimed that the impugned order was passed in absence of its counsel nor has it claimed that its counsel did not communicate to it the decision of the second appeal. As a matter of fact the petitioner has not denied the knowledge of the impugned order at all and therefore, the presumption will be that it came to know of the order immediately. The petitioner made no effort to file the writ petition for this long period of more than two years. Moreover, the use of words 'it seems' before stating that the court's files remained consigned to the record room of the Board of Revenue also indicates that the petitioner is not certain even about this fact. Thus, the petitioner has failed to explain the delay in filing the writ petition for this period of over two years. Moreover, the use of words 'it seems' before stating that the court's files remained consigned to the record room of the Board of Revenue also indicates that the petitioner is not certain even about this fact. Thus, the petitioner has failed to explain the delay in filing the writ petition for this period of over two years. & The petitioner has also failed to explain the delay in filing the writ petition after 15-7-1986. Although there is material on record to prove that the petitioner and its various authorities came to know of the impugned order of the Board of Revenue much before 15-7-1986 when admittedly the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rudrapur wrote a letter to the District Magistrate, Nainital in this regard yet there is no reasonable explanation for not filing the writ petition even thereafter. The impugned order of the Board of Revenue was passed in presence of both the parties and, therefore, the petitioner must have come to know of it immediately. Moreover, on 12-10-1985 the Tahsildar, Kichha was informed about it when the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 moved an application before him for mutation of their names in the revenue records on the basis thereof. On 13.5.1986, the trial court's record was received by the District Magistrate, Nainital and on 15.7.1986 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rudrapur also wrote a letter 14 him in this regard. On 22-7-1986, the Commissioner, Kumaon Division directed for mutation of the names of respondents Nos. 2 to4 in the revenue records on the basis of the impugned order. Thus, on the own case of the petitioner all its authorities, viz., Tahsildar, Kichha, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rudrapur, District Magistrate, Nainital and Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Kumaon had come to know of this order of the Board of Revenue by July, 1986 but even then no serious attempt was made on behalf of the petitioner to file writ petition immediately. Although the filing of the writ petition was already delayed by over two years by July, 1986 yet the authorities instead of taking any prompt action filed the present writ petition in a leisurely manner after another five months. The petitioner could have definitely avoided this delay by taking prompt action which was least expected from it considering the fact that the matter was already delayed by over two years. The petitioner could have definitely avoided this delay by taking prompt action which was least expected from it considering the fact that the matter was already delayed by over two years. Thus, there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition which has not been properly explained. 9. The failure of the petitioner to file writ petition against the impugned order of the Board of Revenue also induced the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to alter their position. It appears that when the writ petition was not filed by the petitioner for over two years respondents Nos. 2 to 4 negotiated with the respondent No. 5 for transferring the land in dispute and after the Commissioner, Kumaon Division directed for mutation of their names in the revenue records on the basis of the said order they entered into an agreement to sell with the respondent No. 5 on 26-7-1986. They executed formal sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 5 in pursuance of the said agreement to sell on 9-9-1986 after their names were duly mutated in the revenue records. Thus, the failure of the petitioner to file the writ petition within reasonable. time has not only induced the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to alter their position but has further. resulted in creation of the rights of the respondent No. 5 in the land in dispute. 10. After the Commissioner, Kumaon Division ordered for mutation of the names of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 on the basis of the impugned order of the Board of Revenue they executed an agreement to sell in favour of respondent No. 5 on 26-7-1986. They were formally mutated in the revenue records on 13-8-198h and only thereafter they executed a sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 5 on 9-9-1986 for a consideration of Rs. 32,00,000/-. The respondent No. 5 apart from paying the huge consideration of Rs. 32,00,000/- to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 has further spent a sum of Rs. 3.76 lacs in getting the sale deed registered. It also invested a sum of Rs. 50,00.000/- in the development of the land and erection of the factory on it. The respondent No. 5 has also placed orders for importing equipment worth Rs. 12 crores. 32,00,000/- to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 has further spent a sum of Rs. 3.76 lacs in getting the sale deed registered. It also invested a sum of Rs. 50,00.000/- in the development of the land and erection of the factory on it. The respondent No. 5 has also placed orders for importing equipment worth Rs. 12 crores. The equipments are due to be received from March, 1983 onwards and the letter of intent issued in its favour is to expire on 12-5-1987. Thus, the interest of the respondent No. 5 is very much involved in the writ petition and in fact if the writ petition is entertained it will be the greatest sufferer. This, in my opinion, is another circumstance which would disentitle the petitioner to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. I also find substance in this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 that the conduct of the petitioner in not challenging the impugned order for about three years and permitting the names of the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to be mutated in the revenue records in pursuance thereof led the respondent No. 5 to believe that the title of the vendors in the land in dispute was no more under challenge and as such the petitioner.is now estopped from challenging the right of the respondent No. 5 who purchased the land in dispute from respondents Nos. 2 to 4 for a huge consideration of Rs. 32 lacs after the rejection of the review application of the petitioner by the Commissioner, Kumaon Division on 12-8-1966 with the observation that there was nothing wrong in the order of the Board of Revenue and that the limitation for filing a writ petition had also expired. The aforesaid conduct of the petitioner may not strictly operate as estoppel against it yet it can very well he a ground for not exercising discretion by this Court in its favour under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. In view of the above discussion, I do not find it a fit case for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed summarily. The interim order dated 19-12-1986 is discharged.