D. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal is directed against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Sambalpur in Sessions Trial No. 27 of 1982 convicting the appellant under section 302 I. P. C. for having committed murder by intentionally causing the death of one Mulchand Tewari by means of an axe and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. According to the prosecution the incident took place on 2-12-79 at about 12 noon when the appellant suspecting the deceased Mulchand to be in illicit love with his sister, assaulted him all over the body by means of the axe (M. O. 1) when the deceased was returning to his house from Kuchinda on a bicycle. On receiving Information about the incident, P. W. 9 Dilip Tewari, the younger brother of the deceased, lodged information at Mabulpali P. S. The A. S. I. attached to the police station (P. W. 10), in the absence of the Officer-in-charge, registered a case under section 307 I. P. C. when he visited the spot at about 3. 15 P. M. he found that the injured Mulchand was dead. Then he treated the case as one under section 302 I. P. C. held inquest on the dead body of the deceased, despatched the dead body for post-mortem examination, seized certain articles, sample blood-stained earth, from the spot and examined some witnesses. Later, the investigation was taken over by the Officer incharge of Mahulpali P. S. (P. W. 11), who examined the eye witnesses and after completing the investigation submitted charge sheet against the appellant. Having been committed to the Court of Session, the appellant stood his trial for the offence indicated above. ( 2 ) THE defence was one of complete denial. ( 3 ) THE prosecution in order to establish its case examined 11 witnesses including P. W. 1, the Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem examination, P. Ws. 7 and 8 eyewitnesses to the occurrence, P. W. 9 the informant, and P. Ws. 10 and 11 the police officers who investigated the case. The prosecution relied on the motive, dying declaration of the deceased direct evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8, extra-judicial confession, information leading to discovery of the weapon of offence and reports of the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist in support of the case. 10 and 11 the police officers who investigated the case. The prosecution relied on the motive, dying declaration of the deceased direct evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8, extra-judicial confession, information leading to discovery of the weapon of offence and reports of the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist in support of the case. ( 4 ) THE learned Sessions Judge, on consideration of the materials placed before him, came to hold that the deceased died a homicidal death. He however, did not accept the prosecution evidence relating to other points indicated above except the direct evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8. Relying on their evidence, he convicted and sentenced the appellant, as noticed earlier. ( 5 ) THE doctor (P. W. 1), who conducted autopsy on the dead body of Muichand Tewari, found the following injuries: (i) lacerated injury 1 x 1/a x 1/2 over the right arm two inches above the elbow joint; (ii) lacerated injury 1 x 1/a x 1/2 -on right fore arm three inches above the wrist; (iii) lacerated injury 1 x 1/a x 1/2 -over the left arm half an inch above the elbow joint. (iv) incised injury was present over the anterior surface of the right wrist joint. (v) lacerated injury present over the right leg three inches above the ankle joint; (vi) lacerated injury of left leg foul inches above the ankle joint; (vii) small lacerated injury over the right side face; (viii) four small lacerated injuries-the left side face; and (ix) lacerated injury- 1 x 1 over the scalp one inch left to the occipital protuberance with fracture of the underlying skull bone membrance underlying the fracture was torn, brain substance underlying the fracture was lacerates with haemorrhage and clot besides fractured of the left numerous one inch above the lower end and fracture of the radius and ulna of the right side three inches above the lower end. According to him, all the injuries were ante-mortem, Lacerated injuries were possible by the blunt side and incised wounds by the sharp side of the axe (M. O. 1 ). Cause of death was cerebral injury or shock due to multiple bleeding injuries. According to him, all the injuries were ante-mortem, Lacerated injuries were possible by the blunt side and incised wounds by the sharp side of the axe (M. O. 1 ). Cause of death was cerebral injury or shock due to multiple bleeding injuries. The doctor opined that injury No. (ix) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and even after sustaining injury like No. (ix) the injured would be able to talk for five to ten minutes and not beyond that. After five to ten minutes, the injured would succumb to death. Relying on this evidence, the learned Sessions Judge held that the deceased Mulchand died a homicidal death. This finding was not challenged before us. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant contended that evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8 should not have been relied upon by the court below Taking into account the distance from which the two witnesses allegedly saw the assault by the accused on the deceased and also the fact that there were several palm trees near about the place of occurrence it could not have been possible for them to have seen the occurrence. The learned Public Prosecutor supported the decision of the trial court. ( 7 ) THE main question for consideration is whether the statements of the two witnesses, P. Ws 7 and 8 could be taken to be reliable and acceptable to form the basis for conviction of the appellant. Mouzi Nayak (P. W. 7) stated that while he and Bichha (P. W. 8) were ploughing the land of Dhaniram Gountia, they saw Mulchand (deceased) coming on the road from Kuchinda side on his bicycle. He got down from his bicycle near a Jamun tree. The appellant (accused) then stood near a mango tree with an axe. When Mulchand got down from his bicycle, the accused came and talked to him. Both of them walked together to some distance. Some time after the witnesses heard Mulchand shouting A BUAGOTT. When the witnesses looked towards Mulchand they found him lying on the ground and the accused was assaulting him by the axe. Then the witness and Bichha came to the father of the accused and informed him about the assault. In cross-examination the witness stated to have known the accused from his (witness) childhood. When the witnesses looked towards Mulchand they found him lying on the ground and the accused was assaulting him by the axe. Then the witness and Bichha came to the father of the accused and informed him about the assault. In cross-examination the witness stated to have known the accused from his (witness) childhood. He further stated that there was rain on the previous day, but no rain on the date of occurrence. The sky was not cloudy. According to the witness palm trees were near the road where the occurrence took place. The place of assault was about 200 yards from the place of ploughing. The witnesses were standing beyond the sal trees when the assault took place. The evidence of P. W. 8. Bichha Samarath, was to the same effect on the material aspect of the case. This witness too stated that though there was rain on the previous day, there was no rain on the date of occurrence and the sky was not cloudy. He stated that the occurrence took place at about 12 noon when the two witnesses left the field after unyoking the plough. He knew the accused from his (accuseds) boyhood. Nothing particular was elicited from the aforesaid two witnesses to discredit their statements. No serious discrepancy on material particulars could be found in their evidence. The main ground on which it is urged that their evidence is not acceptable, is that they could not have seen the incidents so minutely and could not have recognised the accused from a distance of 200 yards. This point was also urged, as appears from the judgment, before the learned Sessions Judge. He did not accept it stating that the distance stated by the witnesses may not be accurate. ( 8 ) A Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party in the case of Patel Dung Dung v. State, referring to Grosss Criminal Investigation 5th Edn. page 159, observed that the evidence of a witness to the occurrence which does not satisfy a scientific test must be rejected on that ground. ( 8 ) A Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party in the case of Patel Dung Dung v. State, referring to Grosss Criminal Investigation 5th Edn. page 159, observed that the evidence of a witness to the occurrence which does not satisfy a scientific test must be rejected on that ground. A similar view was also taken in an earlier case Brahmananda Nanda v. State2, where Bench of this Court referring to wills, observed that Illustrations are numerous to show that what are supposed to be the clearest intimations of the senses are sometimes fallacious and deceptive and that some extraordinary cases have occurred of mistakes of personal identity. Examining the evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8 in the light of the principles indicated above we find it difficult to accept their evidence that the accused had assaulted the deceased as wholly reliable and acceptable. Though these witnesses claimed to have known the accused since long they were neither members of his family nor his relations nor were the residents of the same village. Their evidence discloses that at the place where the occurrence took place there were trees of different types. Above all these are the elements of the distance as observed by this Court in the case of Patel Dung Dung v. State (supra ). The witnesses could have identified the deceased within a distance of 50 to 90 yards or say 100 yards. Even giving a reasonable margin for errors in judging the distance, it is difficult to believe that from the distance between the places of occurrence where the witnesses were standing they could have identified the appellant. Another argument was advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8 should be discarded due to delay on the part of the Investigating Officer to examine them. We do not accept this contention. The position is well settled that mere delay on the part of the Investigating Officer to examine a witness is not sufficient to discard his evidence. 7 and 8 should be discarded due to delay on the part of the Investigating Officer to examine them. We do not accept this contention. The position is well settled that mere delay on the part of the Investigating Officer to examine a witness is not sufficient to discard his evidence. The delay may he an infirmity If there are concomitant circumstances to suggest that the investigator was deliberately marking time with a view to decide about the shape to be given to the case and the eye witnesses to be introduced Ganesh Bhtivan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra3 and Ranbir and others v. State of Punjab4. There is absolutely no material in this case to indicate or suggest of some unfair practice by the investigating agency for the purpose of introducing a got-up witness to falsely support the prosecution case. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons set forth above, we hold that the prosecution has not been able to establish the charge under section 302 I. P. C. against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under section 302 I. P. C. He shall be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed. HAVE WE LOST ALL RESPECT TO THE HUMAN DIGNITY By Chinmay Chaudhuri Public Prosecutor, Howrah West Bengal Article 23 of the Constitution of India assures the right to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. Sale of any human beings, men or women, definitely by traffic in human beings, which is constitutionally prohibited. In 1950 the Government of India ratified an International convention for the Suppression of traffic in persona and of the exploitation of the prostitution of others. It may be mentioned here that even Art. 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, ensures dignity to all human beings and Article 4 additionally prohibits slavery, servitude and also slave trade. The International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, to which Article 8 that no one shall be held in slavery; and slave trade in any of their forms shall be prohibited. The International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, to which Article 8 that no one shall be held in slavery; and slave trade in any of their forms shall be prohibited. But it is unfortunate to state that still a trade in human beings which it tokes place in respect of woman, is not illegal in terms of the Immoral Traffic in women and Girls Act, 1956. Although it is an assurance of our Constitution that the State is under an obligation to see that there is no violation of the fundamental right of any person, particularly when he or she belongs to the weaker sections of the Community and is unable to wage a legal battle against a strong and powerful opponents who is exploiting him or her. Supreme Court in Ogla Tellis case observed that no individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the Constitution. The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land but it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions arc concerned in public interest and intended to serve a public purpose. Ignoring the Constitutional assurance, unfortunate helpless women in same communities are treated as a chattel. It should be remembered that the suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 was enacted in pursuance of an International convention signed at New York. Its main object was to prevent commercialisation of the vice and trafficking among women and girls. The purpose of the act was also to inhibit or abolish commercialised vice namely traffic in women and girls for the purpose of prostitution as an organised means of living. One should not forget that practically it is a male dominated society in action and equal, domination in book. It is an admitted fact that the offence of trading in flesh and trafficking in women is not merely an offence against public morality and society at a large, In the International Year of Women, the Hontble Supreme Court in a case under Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, commented that Legislature must in the International Year of Women, protect the virtue of weaker sex from the purchasing power of the tokens of virginity who sip every flower and change every hour. Further commented that No Nation with all its boasts and all its hopes, can ever morally be clean till an its women are really free-free to live without sale of their young flesh to Lascivious Wealth or commercialising their Luscious figures, India, to redeem this gender Justice and to prescribe whereby rich men buy poor women through homes of vice, has salved its social conscience by enacting the Act. But the law is so ill-drafted and lacunose that fee who follow the most ancient profession in the would have been frightened into virtue and the customers of wire-cum-women are catered to respectably in bars, hotels and night clubs in sophisticated and subtle ways, especially in our cities. It appears that The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 was enacted by Parliament in a mood of high morality but with such drafting inefficiency that it has pathetically failed to produce any decline in the malady. Humanitarian approach from Socio perspective is very much needed to the offence on weaker sex without depending on more technicalities to give the proper status to the unfortunate and down trodden women in the society, otherwise, advancement would became a dream if the womanhood is not paid proper honour prestige and dignity. There was an interesting case in Madhya Pradesh. The fact of the case in short-was this:- That a woman was sold mercifully. The buyer was a Dangi by Caste and she had a son who could not be married at an early age. According to custom prevalent among people of Dangi Caste, the marriage must be taken place at an early age. The son of Dangi woman (the buyer) who was aged twenty four years, had lost all hopes of marriage, she contracted with the seller (defendant) to arrange a Dangi woman for her son who could be kept by him as his mistress. The seller (defendant) was paid Rs. 4000/- for a woman whom he sent to the buyerts family representing that she was a Dangi girl. For hardly twenty days, the girl had lived with the buyerts son when she got a message from the seller (defendant) that a warrant had been issued against the girl from the court and she should therefore, be sent back to the village. Thus she went back, not to return ever thereafter. For hardly twenty days, the girl had lived with the buyerts son when she got a message from the seller (defendant) that a warrant had been issued against the girl from the court and she should therefore, be sent back to the village. Thus she went back, not to return ever thereafter. Later when it was discovered that the girl was a Bedhini (Dancing girl), the buyer asked the seller (Defendant) to return the money but the defendant/seller refused to return the same. The buyer as plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant for refunding the money paid for a Dangi girl. The seller violated the agreement in sending a Bedhini (Dancing girl) In place of Dangi girl as per agreement. The matter later reached to Madhya Pradesh High Court and it was held by the High Court that obligation of person running advantage under an agreement which was void-contract act in such case does not apply. Any agreement for purchase and sale of human beings is ab initio void. If sale of a woman if considered traffic in human beingst which is prohibited by Article 23 of the Constitution, any action based on a contract or agreement, evidencing such a transaction, cannot at all be entertained. In the recent time there are complaints of custodial violence on to the undertrial women prisoners. A writ petition was brought by Sheela Barse, a well-known Journalist before the Supreme Court in 1982 complaining of custodial violence to women prisoners whilst confined in the police Lock-up in the city of Bombay. The petitioner stated that she interviewed, fifteen women prisoners in the Bombay Central Jail with the permission of Inspector General of Prisons between 11th and 17th May, 1982 and five out of them told her that they had been assaulted by the police in the Police Lock-up. In connection with the said writ petition of Sheela Barse, the Honble Court directed Dr. (Miss) A. R. Desai, Director of College of Social Works, Nirmala Niketan, Bombay will visit the Bombay Central Jail and interview women prisoners and ascertain whether they had been subjected to any torture, or ill treatment and submit a report to the Court on or before 30th August, 1982. Dr. (Miss) Desai, visited Bombay Central Prison and after-interviewing women prisoners, submitted a detailed report. Dr. (Miss) Desai, visited Bombay Central Prison and after-interviewing women prisoners, submitted a detailed report. The Report was a highly Interesting and instructing sociolegal document which provided an insight into the problems and difficulties facing women prisoners. The Report showed that there was no adequate arrangement for providing legal assistance to the women prisoners. The Court held that the State should come forward to the resene of persons in distress. Another case with distressing facture cause to the Honble Supreme Court in 1982 and it was found that a prisoner who became sane almost sixteen years ago but he was still confined to jail and had not been able to breathe the fresh air of freedom during his long detention. The petitioner/prisoner was sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence of murder on 28th February 1949 by the Learned Sessions Judge, Gaya, Bihar. Thereafter on 20th November 1951 the petitioner/prisoner was transferred to another Jail for confinement as a Criminal lunatic. The medical history sheet and the medical report showed that the petitioner was fully recovered and was free from any symptoms since 23rd December 1966 and he was fit for discharge. The State Government instead of directing release of petitioner, directed the Jail authority to keep the petitioner in safe custody as a criminal lunatic. Considering the fact the Supreme Court observed that this was clearly symptomatic of the utter callousness and indifference on the part of the officers of the State Government dealing with the matter. It was also the observation of the Highest judiciary that It was shocking to our conscience that Ii perfectly same person should have been incarcerated within the walls of a prison for almost 16 years without any Justification in law whatsoever. It should be a matter of shame for the society as well as the administration to detain a person in Jail for over 16 years without any authority of law. However The Supreme Court directed that the petitioner/prisoners should be released from Jail and set at liberty forthwith. Now the question gives alarm that Have we lost all respect for the dignity of the Individual and the worth of the human persons so nobly enshrined in our Constitution. .