ORDER Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - The petitioner, one Ram Prasad contends that along with his two brothers, arrayed as respondents Nos. 3 and. 4, he was a tenant of a portion of the premises No. 68/90, Lokman Mohal, Kanpur on the first floor. The petitioner alleges and would like this Court to believe that his two brothers colluded with the landlord by filing an application under S. 21 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and seek the release of an accommodation which he occupies. The petition does not mention whether he occupies the accommodation with his brothers, or without them. He says that he is not aware of this release order as it was obtained ex parte, behind his back and without making him a party to the proceedings. 2. The petitioner submits, in effect, that when he faced an apprehension of eviction in pursuance of the enforcement of an order of eviction, being an order of the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, exercising the powers of Prescribed Authority under S. 23 of the Act, he had no other option but to rush to this Court to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner contends that the proceedings initiated by the landlord under S. 21 were fraudulent and collusive and for this reason he had also filed a suit before the Munsif City, Kanpur, by which he had sought a declaration that the proceedings for eviction under S. 23 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 be declared, in effect, as illegal. The petitioner contends that the Munsif City, Kanpur, granted an ad interim injunction on 18th August, 1986 that the parties would maintain status quo ante. 3. At least today, the petitioner is totally aware that there were proceedings initiated by the landlord under S. 21 of the Act for seeking release of the premises occupied by him. In fact this knowledge he had when he sought to protect himself from eviction under an injunction from the Munsif City, Kanpur. If indeed the claim, that the proceedings initiated by the landlord were illegal and collusive is to be tested in its correct perspective then the petitioner ought to have n placed before this Court the relevant record. In fact this knowledge he had when he sought to protect himself from eviction under an injunction from the Munsif City, Kanpur. If indeed the claim, that the proceedings initiated by the landlord were illegal and collusive is to be tested in its correct perspective then the petitioner ought to have n placed before this Court the relevant record. The petitioner intimated the landlord with a certified copy of the Munsifs order dated 18th August, 1986 that parties are to maintain status quo ante. By an application of 3rd Nov. 1986, the petitioner pleaded before the Prescribed Authority/IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, that the order of eviction under S. 23 of the Act, be set aside. Even the order to enforce the eviction, of 12th February, 1987 passed by the Prescribed Authority/IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, was passed in the petitioners presence. It was passed on petitioners objections, filed in November, 1986. Thus, why did the petitioner not present before this Court a copy of the landlord's application under S. 21 of the Act for the release of the premises, the reply of the tenants that is, his brothers in the written statement, the orders of the Prescribed Authority granting the release of the accommodation and the judgment in appeal under S. 22 by the District Judge? After all the petitioner did file an application as his objection to resist eviction in the very case wherein the landlord had obtained, according to him a fraudulent release order for his eviction. For the last seven months, since the petitioner attempted to obtain an injunction from the Munsif City, be had ample opportunity and time to obtain copies of these, all relevant papers. The presumption that he is ignorant of their existence throughout this period is difficult to reconcile with. 4. If the plea of the petitioner, that his eviction from the premises was occasioned by fraud and collusion between the landlord and the co-tenant brothers is accepted, then the petitioner could have had recourse to proceedings under S. 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872. This he did not do, because fraud has to be proved and a mere allegation will not suffice. The petitioner did not even initiate appropriate proceedings. 5. The text of the writ petition contains material suppression of facts, but this aspect will be dealt with later. This he did not do, because fraud has to be proved and a mere allegation will not suffice. The petitioner did not even initiate appropriate proceedings. 5. The text of the writ petition contains material suppression of facts, but this aspect will be dealt with later. The test of the petition suppresses that between the three brothers, the other two had moved the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and there was an order of 16th May 1986, by which while that petition was dismissed, the two brothers were given three months lime to vacate this very accommodation, which is the subject matter of the present writ petition. 6. These facts are not mentioned in the text of the petition, but are discernible from the order of the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, dated 12th February, 1987, exercising jurisdiction as the Prescribed Authority, under the Act aforesaid. A perusal of the order of the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur reveals that an opportunity was given to the three brothers in the proceedings under S. 23 of the Act, when the eviction order was being enforced. The very first paragraph of the aforesaid order, Annexure 6 to say further, despite the fact that the Court was waiting almost till it rose for the day. In a reference to the petitioners brothers, the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, aforesaid, records that it appears, for reasons that they would not present themselves before the Court, that they have nothing further to say. The petitioner's submissions for whatever they were worth were also considered and the Civil Judge, Kanpur aforesaid, was not prepared to accept the petitioner as a tenant. The Civil Judge was satisfied that the petitioner had no locus standi as he was not a tenant. 7. This Court directed the registry to trace out the earlier writ petition, a reference to which has been made in the order dated 12th Feb. 1987, aforesaid, of the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, appended as Annexure 6 to the petition. The record sought, was laid before this court. This was writ petition No. 3142 of 1983. The array of parties in this writ petition is : 1. Har Prasad sons of Shri Mathura 2. Ganga Narain Prasad both residents of House No. 68/90 Lokman Mohal, Kanpur. Petitioners v. 1. IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur. 2. The record sought, was laid before this court. This was writ petition No. 3142 of 1983. The array of parties in this writ petition is : 1. Har Prasad sons of Shri Mathura 2. Ganga Narain Prasad both residents of House No. 68/90 Lokman Mohal, Kanpur. Petitioners v. 1. IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur. 2. Smt. Shyam Devi alias Shyama Devi widow of late Suraj Prasad, resident of 68/90 Lokman Mohal, Kanpur. Respondents The judgment is of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.N. Verma, on 16th May, 1986 : (reported in 1986 All LJ 1043). The eviction of the petitioners, that is the two brothers of Ram Prasad, the petitioner before this Court, was stayed for three months. By the middle of Aug. 1986, the landlord ought to have received vacant possession, the release of which was sought. But, she has not received it till today. On the record of the writ petition decided by the Hon'ble A.N. Verma J., Ram Prasad, the petitioner before this court is mentioned in the objections in reply to the release application of the landlord under S. 21 of the Act, as a member of the family of his two brothers, Messrs Har Prasad and Ganga Narain. There was a commission which reported to the Prescribed Authority's court on the accommodation; the petitioner could not be unaware of this. The District Judge in appeal holds the three brothers, the petitioner included by name, as residing jointly in this accommodation as a family. This decision in appeal has been upheld by this Court, in the decision of the Hon'ble A. N. Verma, J. delivered on 16th May, 1986. It may be mentioned that this decision is also reported in two journals. The references are, 1986 U P RCC 400 and (1986) 2 All Rent 106 (2) : (1986 All 1043). The decision delivered by this Court earlier relates to the same accommodation, the same landlord and the same family as tenants. 8. It is reprehensible that the petitioner had not pleaded these facts in the writ petition. If the High Court interferes in the present writ petition it will virtually amount to a situation that what the two brothers in an earlier petition could not receive directly, the petitioner as the third brother in the present petition would deliver the relief to them indirectly. If the High Court interferes in the present writ petition it will virtually amount to a situation that what the two brothers in an earlier petition could not receive directly, the petitioner as the third brother in the present petition would deliver the relief to them indirectly. When the High Court had ordered that the premises must be vacated within three months from 16th May 1986, the order was meant to be complied with. The order was not meant to be evaded or side-tracked. 9. The petitioner Ram Prasad, in this writ petition and his two brothers in the earlier writ petition were ingeniously playing roulette with courts in judicial proceedings. The landlords release application was filed in 1974 which was finally decided in appeal before the District Judge in 1982. Despite a writ petition filed in 1983 having been decided against the tenants in May, 1986 with directions to vacate the accommodation within three months of the decision delivered by Hon'ble A. N. Verma, J. the erstwhile tenants continue to retain possession. Between such litigants and the lawyers who encouraged inequitable pleas in proceedings otherwise terminal, the course of justice and the sanctity of judicial proceedings has been embarrassed. 10. The petitioner moved an application before the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur for time to file a writ petition before the High Court. The Civil Judge, aforesaid, rightly rejected the request dated 18th February 1987, with an order to the effect that the petitioner has no locus standi. Undeterred, and notwithstanding the facts, the circumstances, and the history of the litigation resting on a decision of this Court on 16th May 1986 : (1986 All LJ 1043) (supra) the petitioner had the courage to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. 11. The petitioner has suppressed material facts and has evaded reference to the earlier writ petition. When the time granted by this Court in the earlier writ petition was drawing to a close requiring the petitioners two brothers to deliver vacant possession of the, accommodation, the petitioner put a handle in the spokes of the wheel to thwart the decision of this Court. His brothers, party respondents in the earlier writ petition would not appear before the Civil Judge on 124 1987, as indeed they had no face in justifying occupation of the accommodation which this K Court directed would be vacated three months post 16th May, 1986. His brothers, party respondents in the earlier writ petition would not appear before the Civil Judge on 124 1987, as indeed they had no face in justifying occupation of the accommodation which this K Court directed would be vacated three months post 16th May, 1986. If this Court has not summoned the record of the earlier petition, the judgment arising out of it could have frustrated should the petitioner Ram Prasad had received indulgence of grant of time to vacate the accommodation as mentioned in his affidavit of 4th March, 1987. There was a remote possibility that in this exercise of material suppression of facts, justice earlier received by the landlord from this very court would have been denied; at least temporarily. 12. This Court cannot help but recall what a Full Bench of this very Court observed in a similar situation, twenty-six years ago. The Full Bench ( AIR 1951 All 746 (FB), Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram) held : "51. In our opinion, the salutary principle laid down in the cases quoted above should appropriately be applied by Courts in our country when parties seek the aid of the extraordinary powers granted to the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. A person obtaining an ex parte order or a rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under Article 22b of the Constitution must come with clean hands, must not suppress any relevant facts from the Court, must refrain from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the Court. Courts, for their own protection, should insist that persons invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts." 13. Courts, for their own protection, should insist that persons invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts." 13. After having heard the observations of this Court and the order dismissing the writ petition along with the reasons, the petitioner who was present in Court filed an affidavit that he "undertakes to vacate the portion in his possession of (sic) house No. 68/90 Loakman Mohal by 30lh June, 1987 and shall hand over its peaceful vacant possession to the landlady respondent No. 2 Smt. Shyam Devi." This Court desired to bear the petitioner on what he had to say by omitting reference to the earlier writ petition decided by Hon'ble A. N. Verma, J. learned counsel for the petitioner stated that after the petitioner had delivered the affidavit it under reference to his office, the latter left for Kanpur. Learned counsel requested tins Court postpone the formal delivery of orders on this petition till 9th March, 1987 by which date he would ask the petitioner to be present. The request was acceded to by this Court. On 9th March 1987, learned counsel for the petitioner made a statement that he had formally advised the petitioner to be present in Court, for which purpose the adjournment was obtained, but the petitioner has not responded. Learned counsel candidly accepted the position that the orders on the petition be delivered. 14. Thus this writ petition must be dismissed. The record of this petition reveals That an earlier judgment of this Court was not given effect to, and the petitioner was instrumental in delaying its implementation. For this the petitioner will pay costs to the respondent No. 2 Shrimati Shyama Devi. The costs will be Rs. 250/-. 15. A certified copy of the judgment will be sent immediately by the Registrar, High Court to the court of the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, in Re : Rent Case Miscellaneous No. 40/74 of 1986 : Smt. Shyama Devi v. Ganga Narain. 16. The petition is dismissed.