Judgment :- 1. These revisions arise out of the common judgment passed by the District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, in C.M.A. Nos. 9 and 10 of 1987. 2. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of these revisions are briefly as follows:—The Respondents in both the revisions were appointed as Heads of Undergraduate Departments of Commerce and Chemistry respectively of the Scott Christian College, Nagercoil, by resolutions dated 20th August, 1981, and 14th August, 1983 and both the appointments were approved by the Executive Committee on 10th December, 1983. The first petitioner is the Correspondent of the said College, while the second petitioner is the Principal. According to the Respondents, who are the plaintiffs, as per the Constitution of the Kanyakumari Diocese, the goveruing body cannot alter any decision of the Executive Committee and that the Diocesan Council should have approved of the re-consideration of the already decided matters by 2/3rd majority. But contrary to the above provision of the constitution of the Kanyakumari Diocese, the governing body decided to cancel the appointment of the Respondents as Heads of the Undergraduate Departments and appointed other persons in their places on 30th January, 1986. Challenging the said action, the respondents filed the suits for a declaration that they have the status of the Heads of Undergraduates Departments of Commerce and Chemistry and for an injunction restraining the defendants, who are the revision petitioners herein from enforcing the new decision of the Governing body taken on 30th January, 1986. They also moved for grant of interim injunction in respect of the said reliefs. 3. The revision-petitioners opposed the applications I. A. No. 124 of 1986 in O. S. No. 72 of 1986 and I. A. No. 310 of 1986 in O.S. No. 305 of 1986 on the ground that since the post of post-graduate Professor is abolished and the seniormost professor has to be appointed as Head of the Department in view of the order passed by the Government, the resolution of the governing body is perfectly valid. The District Munsif dismissed the applications holding that the cancellation of the status of the respondents as Heads of Departments was in accordance with the policy of the Government, that it is only for the administrative reason the respondents were appointed as Heads of Undergraduates Departments and that they are not entitled to the injunction in view of the fact that the suit itself is not maintainable under S. 9, C.P.C. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents herein preferred appeals in C.M.A. Nos. 9 and 10 of 1987 before the District Judge and they were allowed. Hence, the aggrieved revision Petitioners have preferred these two revisions. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the revision-petitioners Mr. R. Gandhi, submitted that if the respondents are aggrieved by the action of the governing body under the constitution, an appeal is provided to the Executive Committee and the decision of the Executive Committee is final and instead of resorting to the same, they have come forward with the suits. Further, the Correspondent and the Principal of the College and the Governing body abolished the said posts and appointed the Senior Professors in that place, only in accordance with the Government policy and as per order passed by the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education under Ex. B5. It is further stated by the learned counsel that on the date when the suits were filed by the respondents, they were not functioning as Heads of Undergraduate Departments, of Commerce and Chemistry, since the abolition took place with immediate effect long prior to the filing of the suits. B5. It is further stated by the learned counsel that on the date when the suits were filed by the respondents, they were not functioning as Heads of Undergraduate Departments, of Commerce and Chemistry, since the abolition took place with immediate effect long prior to the filing of the suits. The learned counsel also vehemently argued that while allowing the Respondents to continue as Undergraduate Professors, the Management has not assigned any specific functions to the Respondents and without any financial commitments on their part and as such, the respondents have no existing civil rights which are enforcible in civil court under S.9, C.P.C. Since, even according to the plaints, only privilege is affected and no civil right and monetary loss or any function which was assigned earlier was taken away, the suits are not maintainable under S. 9, C.P.C In this connection, the learned counsel drew my attention to the decision in K. Periakali Poosari v. M Feriakali Poosari 1, wherein it was held : “Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9—Scope—Right to ritual not of a disputed civil nature unless perquisites are attached to the office or obligation and a compellable duty are attached thereto.” (Head Note). That was a case where the plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that he is entitled to do pooja in a temple on certain days and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his rights. In that connection, it was held: “The essential condition is that the person holding office should be under legal obligation to discharge the duties attached to the office and for which non-observance, he may be visited with penalty.” But, the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not coupled with a compellable duty or emoluments attached and hence there is no civil dispute which would attract S.9 Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel also submitted that a contract of personal service is not specifically enforcible in a court of law. In this connection, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dipak Kumar v. Director of Public Instruction 2. That was a case where the appellant was appointed as a Lecturer in English in Girls College subject to the approval of the Director of Public Instruction. In this connection, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dipak Kumar v. Director of Public Instruction 2. That was a case where the appellant was appointed as a Lecturer in English in Girls College subject to the approval of the Director of Public Instruction. Subsequently alter five months he received a communication from the Principal stating that his services were being terminated with immediate effect for want of prior approval of the Director of Public Instruction. In Para 10 of the judgment, Their Lordships observed: “The Court then proceeded to consider the next question regarding a contract of personal service being specifically enforceable. After referring to the decisions in S.R. Tewari v. District Board Agra 1, Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi 2, Bank of Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehotra 3. and SirsiMunicipalityv. Cecelia Kom Francis 4, the Court held as follows:— “On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach of violation of the mandatory provisions of the Statute.” Ultimately, it was held in that case that the appellant, viz., the lecturer is not entitled to the declaration prayed for even though the instruction issued by the Director of Public Instruction proceeded on the erroneous assumption and the Appellants appointment was in contravention of the rules and he should decline to approve his appointment. Learned counsel also invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vaish College v. Lakshmi Narain 5. That was also a case where the respondent was appointed by the appellant, namely, Executive Committee of an Educational Institution (A College) registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act and affiliated to a University, as a Principal of the College. That was also a case where the respondent was appointed by the appellant, namely, Executive Committee of an Educational Institution (A College) registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act and affiliated to a University, as a Principal of the College. No agreement as prescribed by the University Act and the Statutes, was executed between the parties. Two years after his appointment, the Executive Committee served a notice on the respondent not to discharge the duties of the principal and shortly thereafter terminated his services. Thereafter the respondent did not work as Principal. The Respondent Sled a suit contending that he must be deemed to be continuing in service as there was no sanction of the Vice-Chancellor for the termination of his services and prayed for an injunction restraining the Executive Committee from interfering with his duties as Principal. In the appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended by the Appellant: (1) the Appellant was not a statutory body: (2) in the absence of an agreement the requirement regarding the approval by the Vice-Chancellor would not apply and the termination of the respondents services would be governed by the usual master and servant relationship: (3) there are no special circumstances for enforcing the contract of personal service; and (4) the present case was not a fit one for granting the reliefs prayed for, they being equitable reliefs and in the discretion of the Court. The Supreme Court upheld the above contentions and allowed the appeal. Their Lordships elaborately discussed the scope of such employee in seeking the relief of declaration and injunction before Civil Court. Applying the ratio laid down in the above decisions to the facts of this case, as rightly observed by the District Munsif and submitted by the learned counsel for the revision-petitioners, Mr. R. Gandhi, no civil right or monetary loss or any function which was assigned earlier to each of the respondents, is taken away, i.e., even according to the plaint allegations only the privilege is being affected, and as such prima facie the suit itself is not maintainable under S.9 of the C.P.G Further, a contract of personal service cannot specifically be enforced in a court of law. The learned District Judge has not at all adverted to this aspect in the whole of his judgment but proceeded only on a wrong direction and reversed the finding of the District Munsif on the ground that once the Executive Committee of the Diocese takes a decision, the said decision can be re-considered only if the Diocesan Council with 2/3rd majority permit such reconsideration and admittedly the governing body had not obtained any permission for reconsideration from the Diocese Council and it is violative of the Constitution of the said diocese. It is to be noted that, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the revision-petitioners, if there is any violation of the constitution and the governing body of the College acts against the said constitution, they have got a remedy of appeal to the Diocese Council. In sub-R.(9) of R.2 of the Constitution and Rules 1960, of the Church of South India, Kanyakumari Diocese, (i.e., in Chapter XI, Page 33) it is provided. “to decide appeals from individuals in service under the Diocesan Council against decisions of the various boards in the matter of their appointment, transfer, discipline or retirement; the decision of the Executive on such an appeal shall be final.” Further, it is seen from the judgment of the learned District Judge that under Ex.B7 the Executive Committee approved the impugned resolution of the governing body and later by the Diocese Council. But the District Judge ignored the same as it was passed subsequent to the suit. Certainly, even though they are subsequent to the suit, in the circumstances of the case, the subsequent events can be taken note of in moulding the relief as repeatedly laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court in catena of decisions. It is also brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the revision-petitioners that as far as the constitutional provisions referred to by the plaintiff, R.40(2)(9) of the Church of South India, Kanyakumari Diocese, which contemplates such permission for re-consideration by the 2/3rd majority, it is only in respect of the amendment of the constitution, and not for implementation of the Government Order and University regulations for administration of the college by the Governing body of the college. In the instant case, the same has been done, namely, the abolition of Heads of Undergraduates Department from 30.1.1986 and has been approved by the next Executive Committee of the Diocese and the Diocesan Council on the next immediate respective meetings. As such, the plaintiffs cannot take umbrage under the provision. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners. It is also not in dispute that one R.S.A. Sundar Singh was appointed as Head of the Department in Chemistry and Selvin Thampi-raj was appointed as Head of Department in Commerce on 30.1.1986 and they acted as such from that day. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents only submitted that as seen from para 6 of the lower Appellate Courts judgment that Exs.A7 and A8 show that the Heads of Undergraduates Departments are being retained in some other Colleges run by the Kanyakumari Diocese and even in the same College in some other departments. Further, when the suit was filed, the District Munsif ordered as status quo and it was in force till the dismissal of the suits on 3.4.1987 and again the District Munsif was pleased to order allowing them to continue as Heads of Departments for one month from 1.4.1986 and subsequently till the District Judge passed final order on 24 6.1987. Hence they, had the benefit of interim orders from 1.2.1986, excepting a brake from 6.5.1986 to 23.7.1986 and at such an the question of balance of convenience the revision is to be dismissed directing the petitioners to agitate the matter in the suit. As regards the first question, merely because some of the Heads of the Undergraduates Departments were being retained in some other Colleges, it cannot be said that the respondents are also entitled to continue when admittedly the same is liable to be abolished in pursuance of the order passed by the Government and the directions issued by the authorities of the Education Department. When the Respondents are unable to make out a case as to how the suits filed by them are maintainable and how they have got a prima facie right to the relief prayed for, the mere fact that they obtained some interim orders directing them to maintain status quo is not a ground to grant injunction in their favour against the management of the college, namely, revision-petitioners 1 and 2. Further, the learned District Judge has not considered the reasons given by the District Munsif regarding the maintainability of the suits and about the unenforceability of the contract of service while reversing the well considered order of the District Munsif. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the impugned orders passed by the District Judge in both the revisions are not sustainable and liable to be set aside. 6. In the result, both the revisions are allowed, the orders passed by the District Judge, in G.M.A. Nos. 9 and 10 of 1987 are set aside while the orders passed by the District Munsif dismissing the injunction applications are restored. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.